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Abstract 
Worldwide corporate collapses in the past highlighted various weaknesses in 
the corporate governance regimes which included auditor independence. The 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) referred to as CLERP 9 was the Australian government’s 
response to address the lack of auditor independence in Australia.  
This thesis provides recommendations for practical legal reform where CLERP 
9 is found to serve private interests rather than the public interest. This study 
advocates the use of private interest theory as an alternative method by which legal 
proposals in relation to auditor independence can be evaluated. 
The proposal for this project is that the law relevant to audit independence was 
developed to serve private interests rather than the stated goal of the public interest, 
and as a result, the current regime is in need of reform. Through the use of private 
interest theory, this study critically evaluates the development of CLERP 9. The 
study explores (as far as auditor independence is concerned) whether the 
development of CLERP 9 has been motivated by the self-seeking interests of various 
interest groups rather than the public interest.  
The findings from this study support the proposal of this thesis that there is a 
case for reform of the existing requirements in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) as a 
result of CLERP 9 in respect of independence. This is because the law in some 
instances has been developed to serve private interests rather than the public interest 
and has, therefore, benefited the various interest groups at the expense of greater 
auditor independence (the public interest).  
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Chapter 1: BACKGROUND TO THE 
STUDY 
 
This thesis provides an analysis of the adequacy of selected provisions in 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) 
Act 2004 (Cth) (referred to as CLERP 9)1. Deficiencies in auditor independence 
contributed to the collapse of large Australian entities such as HIH and One.Tel in early 
20002 and as a consequence provided the impetus for auditor independence legal reform 
in Australia.3 Likewise, the lack of auditor independence has been attributed to the 
corporate collapses of United States entities namely Enron and WorldCom.4 The 
legislative response in Australia to these matters was the CLERP 9 proposals.5 
The CLERP 9 proposals for auditor independence law reform contained in the 
Australian government’s discussion paper, titled ‘Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening 
the Financial Reporting Framework’ were released to the public in September 2002. 
These are referred to throughout this thesis as the Relevant Proposals. They were 
introduced to enhance auditor independence in Australia.  
                                                 
1 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth). 
2 Michael De Martinis, ‘Do directors, regulators and auditors speak, hear and see no evil? Evidence from 
the Enron, HIH and One.Tel collapses’ (2002) 15(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 66, 79. 
3 Larelle Chapple and Boyce Koh, ‘Regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas – who takes 
the stronger line?’ (2007) 21(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1, 1-2, See generally, Ian Ramsay, 
Independence of Australian Company Auditors (Treasury, 2001) 21-22, Anona Armstrong, ‘Corporate 
governance standards: intangibles and their tangible value’ (2004) 17 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
97-110, Geoffrey George, ‘Auditor independence – Who guards the guardians? – A critique of the 
 Ramsay Report into the Independence of Auditors’ (2001) 13(3) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 
328, 332 and The HIH Royal Commission, Report of the HIH Royal Commission (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2003) Vol 1, [7.2.1]. 
4 Paul von Nessen, ‘Corporate governance in Australia: Converging with international developments’ 
(2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 189, 190-191. 
5 Jean Jacques du Plessis, James McConvill and Mirko Bagaric, Principles of Contemporary Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge University Press, 1st ed, 2005) 243 and Emma Ladakis, ‘The auditor as 
gatekeeper for the investing public: Auditor independence and the CLERP reforms – a comparative 
analysis’ (October, 2005) 23(7) Company & Securities Law Journal 416, 416. 
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As part of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program, proposals which 
included CLERP 9 formed a component of the themed set of legislative developments in 
corporate law focused on key economic and public policy principles. These broad 
objectives of CLERP can be found from the various themes identified as the ‘key 
principles’ that should also underpin auditor independence reform.6 The key principles’ 
emphasis on market integrity, reasonable access to information for all investors, the 
confidence of individual investors in the fairness and integrity of financial markets, the 
provision of necessary investor and consumer protection and the consistent and fair 
application of regulation to encourage high standards of business practice and ethics, 
were themes that consistently aim to safeguard the public interest. CLERP 9, being the 
ninth instalment of the CLERP program, was therefore developed with the public interest 
in mind.  
In this thesis it is argued that if the current legislation was designed to serve private 
interests at the expense of the public interest, there is scope for law reform in relation to 
audit independence. That is, if CLERP 9 has digressed from the public interest, then 
CLERP 9 has deviated from achieving its objectives. By using private interest theory to 
evaluate the development of CLERP 9 in the context of auditor independence, this thesis 
contends that in some circumstances, the public interest objective has not been achieved. 
This chapter provides an overview of the arguments developed in the thesis and is 
presented in five sections that generally set out the objectives, framework, methods 
adopted as well as the significance and scope of the study. The last section outlines the 
chapters for the remainder of the thesis. 
 
 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This section provides the purpose of the study. It outlines the major focus of the 
study and highlights its importance to the credibility and integrity of financial reporting. 
                                                 
6 Treasury, CLERP – Policy Framework   
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/267/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=index.asp>. 
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It defines the specific aims and objectives of the study. It also provides the role of the 
auditor, an introduction to private interest theory and an overview as to why this theory is 
used to explain the development of the current regime.  
Through the use of private interest theory, this thesis critically evaluates the 
development of the current audit independence regime. The study explains why private 
interest theory was selected to evaluate how the current law was developed. This thesis 
evaluates the current regime through the application of private interest theory and draws 
conclusions as to the appropriateness of the existing regulation from the study.   
The thesis proposes that the law relevant to audit independence was developed in 
some circumstances to serve private interests rather than the stated goal of the public 
interest, and as a result, the current regime is in need of reform. The thesis will evaluate 
the extent to which the current legislation was established as a result of lobbying efforts 
on the part of specific interest groups rather than by consideration of the public interest. 
This study then proposes practical solutions and alternatives to the existing corporate 
governance framework to improve the existing requirements for it to be consistent with 
greater independence (the public interest).7  
According to the Treasury, six ‘key principles’ were to be adhered to when 
developing future instalments of the broader CLERP program to ‘ensure that regulation 
facilitates economic activity and job creation and that contemplated reform will not 
impede these objectives’.8  These principles provide a useful tool for analysing and 
critiquing CLERP 9, being the ninth instalment of the CLERP program. This is because 
the themes entrenched in these principles can provide a measure of the public interest 
which assist in determining the rationale for the current regime.  
 
                                                 
7 The public interest is the rationale (or one of the main considerations) for new legislation to be introduced 
as can be inferred from each of the six key CLERP principles as discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 5 
identifies circumstances in which the public interest can be promoted and introduces various proposals that 
seek to support greater independence on the part of auditors. 
8 Treasury, above n 6. 
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1.2 FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
This section introduces the theoretical framework for this study and sets out the 
methodology used to evaluate the current legislation. The private interest theory of 
regulation is adopted. 
Horwitz has described a theory of regulation as a theory that seeks to explain the 
development of regulation and how key actors can influence the development of such 
regulation.9 Private interest theory proposes that the regulatory outcomes reflect the 
interests of the most powerful interest groups rather than the stated goal of the public 
interest. Regulation is, therefore, viewed as a commodity by which powerful interest 
groups can protect and advance their self-seeking interests.10  
According to Stigler, private interest theory proposes that self-seeking individuals 
will organise themselves into politically effective lobby groups in order to protect their 
respective interests. Applying Stigler’s view, the various interest groups that stand to 
gain/lose the most from the regulatory outcome(s) will seek to influence the regulatory 
process. This theory also proposes that the regulatory outcome(s) will reflect the self-
seeking interests of the most powerful group(s). As a consequence, legislation can be 
developed to serve private interests rather than the stated objective of the public 
interest.11 The major interest groups selected to be analyzed are collectively referred to in 
this study as the Selected Interest Groups.12 The Selected Interest Groups have been 
identified in this thesis as the stakeholders that stand the most to gain (or lose, as the case 
may be) from any change to the auditor independence requirements. The argument here is 
that there is auditor independence provided for in the current structure but it is inadequate 
and should be driven by public, rather than private, interest. This concept is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3. According to Baldwin and Cave, this ‘general approach thus 
                                                 
9 Robert Horwitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform – The Deregulation of American Telecommunications 
(Oxford University Press, 1st ed, 1989) 34. 
10 Ibid. 
11 George Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (Spring, 1971) 2, No. 1 The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 3, 21. 
12 See Section 3.5 for the various motivations that can drive the Selected Interest Groups to seek to 
influence the current audit independence legislation and Section 3.6 for an explanation as to why 
submissions from various other parties were excluded from detailed analysis. 
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encompasses theories going under a number of names, notably ‘economic’, ‘Chicago’, 
‘private interest’, ‘public choice’, ‘special interest’ and ‘capture’’.13  
Private interest theory has been used to explain corporate law reform in the United 
States.14 Brown and Tarca have applied private interest theory in a separate CLERP 9 
proposal that is not directly associated with improving auditor independence and noted 
that the professional accounting bodies have the ability to wield significant influence in 
order to promote their respective interests during the accounting standard setting 
process.15 The literature suggests16 that there is some support for reform or modification 
of the relevant Australian law in relation to auditor independence in general terms. 
However, a review of the literature indicates that private interest theory has not, as yet, 
been applied to analyse auditor independence law reform in Australia.  
Given that the stated objective of CLERP 9 is the promotion of the public interest, 
on this basis CLERP 9 auditor independence legal reforms can be measured. Whether 
these legal reforms are in the public interest is the question which needs to be answered.  
As stated previously, this study analyses the significant auditor independence 
provisions in CLERP 9 (referred to as the Relevant Proposals) and discusses how private 
interest theory can be applied to explain the development of such regulation. The 
stakeholders that influence the auditor independence reforms from the perspective of 
private interest theory (referred to as the Selected Interest Groups) were identified in this 
study. These stakeholders had made submissions to the Treasury and the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (referred to as the 
“JPCCFS”) at specific points in time during the development of the Relevant Proposals. 
These submissions provide a basis for evaluating the development of CLERP 9. The 
                                                 
13 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation – Theory, Strategy and Practice (Oxford 
University Press, 1st ed, 1999) 22. 
14 David Haddock and Jonathan Macey, ‘Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an 
Application to Insider Trading Regulation’ (October, 1987) 30(2) Journal of Law and Economics 311, 339 
and Randall Kroszner, ‘The Motivations Behind Banking Reform’ (Summer, 2001) 24(2) Regulation 36, 
41. 
15 Philip Brown and Ann Tarca, ‘Politics, Processes and the Future of Australian Accounting Standards’ 
(October, 2001) 37(3) ABACUS 267, 281. 
16 Armstrong, above n 3. This article argues that voluntary standards adopted by various entities can 
promote good corporate governance, See also George, above n 3. This article argues that the rotation of 
audit partners does not guarantee auditor independence as there may still exist a conflict of interest due to 
the auditor and client relationship. 
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regulatory outcomes as a consequence of the successful lobbying efforts of these 
stakeholders were noted in this thesis and were compared against the public interest 
measure. This measure, explained in Chapter 2, was consistent with ideal auditor 
independence. Chapter 5 provided recommendations for practical future legal reform in 
circumstances where these regulatory outcomes were found to be inconsistent with ideal 
auditor independence. 
Various interest groups are examined for the purposes of this thesis on the basis 
that these groups can potentially benefit from or suffer loss as a result of corporate 
actions from the introduction of new auditor independence legislation. This thesis 
analyses the lobbying efforts of powerful interest groups being the members of 
accounting professional bodies17 (comprising the Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms, 
Middle Tier Firms and Small Firms), managers of companies and government officials 
(comprising of the Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited, ASIC, 
ASX, Auditing & Assurance Standards Board, Companies Auditors & Liquidators 
Disciplinary Board, Financial Reporting Council) collectively referred to as the Selected 
Interest Groups.  
This analytical study seeks to identify (by reference to the documentation at the 
time of the legal reform) that in relation to CLERP 9, the successful lobbying of the 
Selected Interest Groups has resulted in a regime that is not wholly in the public interest. 
This analysis is undertaken with reference to the collated submissions from the Treasury 
in relation to the Relevant Proposals, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit 
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) referred to as CLERP 9 Bill and the 
Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2012 (Cth) referred to as 
Audit Enhancement Bill public consultation process and the collated submissions from 
the JPCCFS in relation to the CLERP 9 Bill public consultation process. These 
submissions obtained from the Treasury and the JPCCFS as a result of the Relevant 
Proposals, CLERP 9 Bill and Audit Enhancement Bill public consultation process were 
                                                 
17 See section 4.2 for an explanation as to why the accounting professional bodies have been further 
subdivided into smaller groups (for the purposes of this thesis) being the Accounting Associations, Big 4 
Firms, Middle Tier Firms and Small Firms. 
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used to ascertain whether any (or all) of the Selected Interest Groups have been 
successful in obtaining what they have lobbied for.  
Private interest theory is used to highlight that in some circumstances, the ideal 
auditor independence measure has not been met. To the extent that this measure has not 
been met (where the current regime is found to serve the private interests rather than the 
public interest), this study provides practical proposals for legal reform to the existing 
requirements.  
 
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Auditor independence is an important factor that can enhance the reliability of a 
corporation’s financial statements. Legal reform designed to promote ideal auditor 
independence, if implemented correctly, can potentially enhance the reliability of a 
corporation’s financial statements. As such, the public interest can be advanced by 
measures that seek to promote ideal auditor independence. On the other hand, measures 
that do not seek to promote ideal auditor independence can be considered inconsistent 
with the public interest. Legal reform that is focused on promoting this ideal auditor 
independence measure can be considered as advancing the public interest and as such, is 
consistent with the public interest.18 Chapter 2 develops this idea further by providing a 
framework by which the public interest is determined for the purposes of this thesis. 
Mautz and Sharaf have suggested that auditor independence is an essential 
ingredient in the reporting of financial information as it provides much needed credibility 
to representations made by management in an entity’s financial statements.19 On this 
view, commentators have regarded the independence of the external auditor as ‘the 
                                                 
18 This is consistent with the accountants’ ethical code of conduct to serve the public interest which appears 
in Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited, Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants APES 110 (2013) Section 100.1.   
19 Robert Mautz and Hussein Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing, Monograph No 6 (American Accounting 
Association, 1st ed, 1961) 204. 
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cornerstone of the accounting profession’20 as it is perceived by the public to enhance the 
reliability and usefulness of an entity’s financial statements.21 
The significance of auditor independence has been described by Lynn E. Turner, 
the former United States Securities & Exchange Commission Chief Accountant: 
The enduring confidence of the investing public in the integrity of our capital 
markets is vital. In America today, approximately one out of every two adults has 
invested their savings in the securities markets … These investments have 
provided trillions of dollars in capital for companies in the United States and 
around the globe. That capital is providing the fuel for our economic engine, 
funding for the growth of new businesses, and providing the necessary 
investment in new plant and job opportunities for tens of millions of workers … 
… the willingness of investors to continue to invest … cannot be taken for 
granted … Public trust begins, and ends, with the integrity of the numbers the 
public uses to form the basis for making their investment decisions … it is the 
report of the independent auditor that provides investors with the critical 
assurance that the numbers in the financial statements have been subjected to an 
impartial, unbiased, and rigorous examination by a skilled professional. But in 
order for that report to have credibility with investors, to add value to the process 
and investors, it must be issued by a person or firm that the investor perceives is 
free of all conflicts – conflicts that may or will in part, weight on or impair the 
auditor’s judgments about the accuracy of the numbers.22 
 
In summary, despite of the many definitions of what auditor independence is and 
should be, commentators have generally acknowledged that ideal independence means 
                                                 
20 For example, Robert Mednick, ‘Chair’s corner’ (June 1, 1997) The CPA Letter 1, 10 and Brenda Porter, 
Jon Simon and David Hatherly, Principles of External Auditing (2nd ed, 2003) 45. 
21 Abraham Briloff, ‘Accountancy and Society: A Covenant Desecrated’ (1990) 1 Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting 5, 29. 
22 Lynn Turner, ‘Independence: A Covenant for the Ages’ (Speech delivered at the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, Stockholm, Sweden, June 28, 2001). 
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that the external auditor must be free from all conflicts of interest (actual and/or 
perceived) in order to provide an impartial opinion on the client’s financial statements.23  
HIH and One.Tel (as discussed above) are examples24 of how the lack of auditor 
independence can erode the credibility of financial reporting. The resultant loss of market 
confidence in the integrity of the financial statements of these entities has inflicted 
widespread financial losses amongst the shareholders, financiers and employees of these 
entities. Commentators have suggested that CLERP 9 was introduced in response to the 
public outcry following these corporate collapses in order to enhance auditor 
independence in Australia with the objective of protecting the public interest.25 
The study advocates that the fine tuning and detailed implementation of some of the 
proposals in the CLERP 9 Policy Paper26 were found to be influenced by the lobbying of 
particular interest groups. As such, there are some provisions in the current regime which 
can be attributed to (amongst other things) the lobbying efforts of these interest groups. 
Had it not been for the lobbying efforts of these interest groups, the development of these 
provisions is likely to have resulted in a different outcome.  
How the successful lobbying efforts of the various interest groups compromised 
ideal auditor independence is explained in Chapter 5. Whether the reduction of auditor 
independence in these circumstances is in the public interest is discussed. Potential 
weaknesses in the current regime are highlighted for possible legal reform. Various 
structures for ensuring auditor independence are considered. It is envisaged that these 
practical incentives will promote and enhance the public interest in circumstances where 
the current regime is found to serve private interests rather than the public interest.  
Legal reform that is continuously evolving to safeguard the corporate stakeholders 
in line with ideal standards (where applicable) is consistent with the spirit of CLERP27 as 
discussed above ‘where a flexible and transparent framework will be more conducive to 
                                                 
23 Gary Kleinman, Dan Palmon and Asokan Anandarajan, ‘Auditor independence: A synthesis of theory 
and empirical research’ (1998) 12 Research in Accounting Regulation 3, 4 and John Carey, ‘The 
independence concept revisited’ (Spring, 1985) 44 Ohio CPA Journal 5, 8. 
24 von Nessen, above n 4. 
25 du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 5 and Ladakis, above n 5. 
26 Treasury, Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) 1-9. 
27 Treasury, above n 6. 
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innovation and risk taking, which are fundamental elements of a thriving market 
economy, while providing necessary investor and consumer protection’.28 This thesis 
provides practical improvements and alternatives to the current regime in order for it to 
be consistent with the public interest, so that the public interest can be served better. The 
issues surrounding auditor independence are not new and the corporate collapses noted in 
this chapter are examples of how auditor independence may have been compromised 
prior to the collapse of these corporate entities. The debate can be further informed by the 
research findings as to whether the current regime serves the interests of the primary 
users of accounting information. The primary users of accounting information for the 
purposes of this study comprise of investors and members of the financial community. 
The focus of any legal reform will be concerned with the economic needs of the primary 
users of accounting information, namely individual investors and those in the financial 
community who rely on the objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on 
behalf of these individual investors. The proposals for legal reform (in Chapter 5) would 
enhance auditor independence and further strengthen the confidence of the primary users 
of accounting information (the investing public and the financial community) in the 
current regime. The primary users of accounting information stand to benefit from the 
proposals for legal reform (in Chapter 5) as any increase in shareholder value as a result 
of these proposals have the potential to increase the financial wealth of the primary users 
of accounting information.   
 
1.4 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study focuses on whether effectively organized groups have lobbied 
successfully for their respective interests and whether the government has been 
influenced by such lobbying efforts at the expense of the public interest. Effectively 
organized groups have an advantage over the unorganized individual as these groups 
have access to valuable resources such as information, time and money which can be 
utilized to protect their own more significant financial interests. This study analyzes 
whether the auditor independence requirements in the current regime have developed in a 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
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manner consistent with serving private interests. Where the current regime is consistent 
with serving private interests rather than the public interest, this study provides practical 
proposals for law reform.  
The Selected Interest Groups were identified because these groups will value the 
outcome of any company law reform in relation to auditor independence. As discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3, the members of accounting professional bodies have their livelihoods 
at stake, managers of companies (producer group) have to constantly ensure that audit 
expenses are kept under control and government officials have the incentive to maintain 
their respective position of power or privilege within the community. 
This study discusses how the Selected Interest Groups may have had an impact in 
controlling and overseeing the regulation of financial reporting through the lobbying 
efforts of these groups. The public interest, as can be inferred from the key principles of 
CLERP, may not have been the overriding consideration for the current regime but rather 
secondary to the respective interests of the Selected Interest Groups. This study 
essentially argues that the current regime is the outcome of intense competition among 
various interest groups. No single group however, can claim that it has been successful in 
achieving all of its lobbied objectives. This is because the lobbying efforts of these 
groups have not achieved complete success in the implementation of their respective 
proposals. In some of these circumstances, the government has enacted into law a 
moderated final outcome in order for the appearance of social gain to be distributed. This 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
It is important to note however, that three limitations have been identified in this 
research methodology. The first relates to the data analysed. The data analysed consists 
of information obtained from Treasury and JPCCFS submissions during specific points in 
time of the Relevant Proposals, CLERP 9 Bill and the Audit Enhancement Bill public 
consultation process. This information was used to ascertain whether any (or all) of the 
Selected Interest Groups have been successful in obtaining what they have lobbied for. 
Various other sources of information may exist which have not been collated for the 
purpose of analysis. As such, the Treasury and JPCCFS submissions do not comprise of 
(and neither do they represent) all of the views from all interest groups at any point in 
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time. These submissions however represent the official responses received by the 
government from the various interest groups as a result of the public consultation process. 
The candidate is confident that the submissions collated (comprising of more than 180 
submissions), provide a reliable and adequate source of information that can be analysed 
from the perspective of private interest theory.  
The second limitation relates to the submissions examined. The scope of this thesis 
and the application of private interest theory in this thesis do not consider every 
submission made in response to the Relevant Proposals. This is because the traditional 
literature on private interest theory29 in the context of corporate and accounting 
legislation have broadly focused on the lobbying efforts of groups such as the Selected 
Interest Groups. As a consequence, some submissions have been ignored.  A review of 
these excluded submissions (as explained in Section 3.6 of this thesis) have found that 
these other parties have had their proposals ignored by the government when the Selected 
Interest Groups had lobbied for different outcomes. These findings were consistent with 
private interest theory as they indicated that these other parties did not have any influence 
on the regulatory outcome as opposed to the Selected Interest Groups.  
The third limitation relates to the existence of other theories and perspectives. It is 
acknowledged that other theories and perspectives exist, apart from private interest 
theory. The application of other theories and perspectives to this study in place of private 
of interest theory, may lead to a different conclusion.  The Selected Interest Groups were 
identified because these groups will value the outcome of any company law reform in 
relation to auditor independence. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, private interest 
theory is well placed to contribute to this knowledge base as it can be used to critically 
analyse the development of the current regime in view of the respective preferences of 
the Selected Interest Groups. This theory can provide an explanation as to how and why 
the current regime has developed the way it has. Through the use of this theory, potential 
                                                 
29 Stigler, above n 11, 12, Sam Peltzman, ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of 
Deregulation’ (1989) Special Issue Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 7, Richard Posner, ‘Theories 
of Economic Regulation’ (Autumn, 1974) 5, No. 2 The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science 335, 343 and Gary Becker, ‘A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence’ (August, 1983) 98, No. 3 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 371, 373-374. 
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shortcomings in the legislation (where the ideal auditor independence measure has not 
been met) can be identified and highlighted for future legal reform.  
Finally, it is important to note that this study is focused on auditor independence 
and not on the practice of audit on a broader or wider perspective. As such, the proposals 
recommended in Chapter 5 are envisaged to specifically improve auditor independence. 
   
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 provides a historical insight into the development of CLERP 9. This 
analysis into the background of CLERP 9 provides supporting evidence for the rationale 
of CLERP 9 and for the ‘public interest’. This chapter also explains and expands on how 
ideal auditor independence has been defined by the literature. It describes what ideal 
auditor independence is (the public interest) by considering the significance of auditor 
independence and the concept of independence. It also reviews the significant auditor 
independence requirements in the current regime.  
Chapter 3 provides the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis to analyse the 
effectiveness of the CLERP 9 reforms. The chapter provides an overview of private 
interest theory, including discussion of the stakeholders involved in private interest 
theory and the concept of ideal auditor independence from the perspective of those 
stakeholders. Chapter 3 provides support for the use of private interest theory to evaluate 
how the current audit independence regime emerged. Chapter 3 concludes that this theory 
is well placed to explain the reasons for the various interest groups to control and oversee 
the regulation of financial reporting. The Selected Interest Groups which stand to benefit 
the most from controlling and overseeing the development of the current regime were 
analysed.  
Chapter 4 discusses how the Selected Interest Groups have had an impact in 
controlling and overseeing the regulation of financial reporting. The preferences of the 
various stakeholders as far as independence is concerned and the extent to which these 
preferences are evident in legal reform are examined. Submissions obtained from the 
  24 
Treasury and the JPCCFS as a result of the Relevant Proposals, CLERP 9 Bill and Audit 
Enhancement Bill public consultation process are used to ascertain this. 
Chapter 5 analyses whether the existing auditor independence requirements in the 
CLERP 9 regime are consistent with private interest theory. It provides recommendations 
for practical legal reform where the current regime is found to serve private interests 
rather than the public interest. 
The concluding chapter explains how the research findings can be applied to new 
proposals for legal reform. It advocates the use of private interest theory as an alternative 
method by which legal proposals in relation to auditor independence can be evaluated. 
 
1.6 SUMMARY 
An understanding of what auditor independence means is important for the 
purposes of this thesis. In addition, an understanding of the various facets of 
independence is important in this thesis as the development of any proposed legal reform 
should take these into consideration.   
The study explores (as far as auditor independence is concerned) whether the 
development of the current regime has been motivated by the self-seeking interests of the 
Selected Interest Groups rather than the public interest. The findings from this study 
support the proposal of this thesis that there is a case for reform of the existing 
requirements in the current regime in respect of independence. This is because in some 
instances, these have been structured to serve private interests rather than the public 
interest. These have benefited the various interest groups at the expense of greater auditor 
independence (the public interest). When analysed from the perspective of private interest 
theory, there is scope for further law reform to the current regime in relation to auditor 
independence.  
The next chapter provides a review of the historical background to CLERP 9 in 
order to establish that a key motivation for CLERP 9 was the public interest. Chapter 2 
explains what the public interest means in the context of ideal auditor independence and 
provides a definition of the public interest which will be used in this thesis to determine 
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whether the development of the current regime has been motivated by the self-seeking 
interests of the Selected Interest Groups rather than the public interest.  
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Chapter 2: AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Various commentators have proposed legal reform to auditor independence both 
before and after the implementation of CLERP 9.30 Whilst the CLERP 9 reforms were 
designed to improve auditor independence, what appears to be lacking in these CLERP 9 
reforms is a measure by which the effectiveness of these legal reforms can be assessed. 
The extent of auditor independence reforms required will vary, depending on whose 
interests are to be protected. Section 2.2 of this chapter proposes that the key CLERP 
principles provide guidance as to whose interests are to be protected.  
In order to determine the extent to which auditor independence legal reforms in 
CLERP 9 are adequate, a benchmark needs to be established by which these legal 
reforms can be compared against. Legal reforms that are not consistent with this measure 
can then be identified. These inconsistencies can then be addressed by the development 
of new proposals for legal reform that can be designed to meet this objective.  
This thesis proposes that the key CLERP principles provided guidance as to whose 
interests are to be protected. The key CLERP principles contained various themes that 
consistently aim to safeguard the public interest. Legal reform should be specifically 
designed to support this purpose. This chapter looks into the historical background of 
CLERP and establishes that an overriding objective of CLERP was the public interest.  
 Various commentators31 have stated that the public interest has often been used as 
a significant reason for the introduction of new legal reforms. These commentators have 
                                                 
30 Chapple and Koh, above n 3, Ramsay, above n 3, Armstrong, above n 3, George, above n 3 and The HIH 
Royal Commission, above n 3. 
31 Clarke Cochran, ‘Political science and “the public interest”’ (1974) 36(2) The Journal of Politics 327, 
327 and Steven Dellaportas & Laura Davenport, ‘Reflections on the public interest in accounting’ (2008) 
19 Critical Perspectives on Accounting 1080, 1080. 
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also suggested that despite the public interest being a significant motivation for new 
legislation, there appears to be no consensus as to what this term really means.32  
This chapter provides a definition of the public interest for the purposes of this 
thesis. It is argued in this chapter that the public interest can be defined by reference to 
the key CLERP principles and the code of ethics for accountants. The auditor 
independence legal reforms in CLERP 9 can be measured against this definition of the 
public interest in order to assess the adequacy of the current regime. The normative 
perspective of the public interest is adopted in this thesis as a framework for analysis.33 
This perspective subscribes to ideal normative principles designed to enhance the 
common good of the community.34 The term ‘community’ however, can potentially 
include all stakeholders.  
Cohen has described a stakeholder as being an entity or a person who holds an 
interest in something and as a consequence will be susceptible to any change 
circumstance that can potentially affect that which the entity or person is concerned 
with.35 Freeman and Reed have referred to corporate stakeholders as entities or persons 
that have an interest in a corporate entity and as a result are affected by corporate actions 
that impact the corporate entity’s future.36 On this view, the definition of corporate 
stakeholders is broad and can include the entity’s employees, financiers, advisors and 
shareholders.37  
This chapter explains how this term ‘community’ can be applied to a clearly 
identified group of people. Proposals for legal reform can then be tailored to specifically 
benefit this clearly identified group of people, rather than an ambiguous group of people 
at large. Legal reform that seeks to enhance the common good of this clearly identified 
group of people can therefore be considered for the purposes of this thesis, to be in the 
public interest.  
                                                 
32 Cochran, above n 31 and Dellaportas & Davenport, above n 31. 
33 Cochran, above n 31, 330. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Stephen Cohen, ‘Stakeholders and Consent’ (Spring, 1995) 14(1) Business and Professional Ethics 
Journal 1, 1-3. 
36 Edward Freeman and David Reed, ‘Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate 
Governance’ (Spring, 1983) 25(3) California Management Review 88, 91. 
37 Ibid. 
  28 
Measures aimed at supporting ideal auditor independence can be consistent with the 
public interest. This chapter explains what ideal auditor independence is and discusses 
how legal reform designed to enhance ideal auditor independence can promote the public 
interest. It acknowledges however that total ideal auditor independence cannot be 
achievable under current institutional arrangements. 
 As increased auditor independence regulation can often increase compliance costs, 
one can assume that groups who are profit driven would be more likely to object to 
incurring additional costs if they have to bear those costs. The success or failure of the 
continued profitability of many accounting firms (where the majority of the fee earners 
comprise members of the Accounting Associations) and listed entities (these entities are 
also included in the category of Managers of Companies (Producer Group)) depend on 
the amount of profit these entities can generate in any given financial year.   
For example, the effect of increasing the frequency of compulsory audit partner 
rotation on audit firms may result in increased fee earner time spent auditing the same 
entity. Familiarity with the entity’s business and audit practices can lead to significant 
reduction in cost for the audited entity. If the audited entity is not willing to bear this 
additional cost, the audit firm will have to bear this additional cost. The profitability of 
the audit firm will be reduced. On the other hand if the audited entity is willing to take on 
this additional cost, the profitability of the audited entity will be reduced.  This increased 
cost could also be shared between the audit firm and the audited entity. Regardless of the 
scenario, the end result can be summarised as decreased profit for the audit firm or the 
audited entity or both.  
Not everyone, however, will be particularly concerned about such potentially 
adverse financial consequences of increased auditor independence regulation. This 
category of people would most likely be those who are least affected financially by the 
outcome of such regulation. The average person who neither works for the audit firm or 
the audited entity, (that has no direct financial interest in either the audit firm or the 
audited entity), will be less likely to object to the introduction of new legislation that will 
increase the compliance cost of either the audit firm or the audited entity or both. Other 
examples of people who may not object can include those whose financial portfolios are 
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not heavily dependent on the potentially adverse performance of listed shares as a result 
of increased regulation or perhaps even those who perceive that the benefits of increased 
auditor independence regulation outweigh the costs. 
In order to analyse whether these reforms are consistent with the concept of ideal 
auditor independence, it is necessary to determine the rationale for CLERP 9. This 
involves obtaining an understanding of the historical background and context of the 
broader CLERP program from which CLERP 9 was enacted. The next section is 
dedicated to this. 
2.2 OBJECTIVE OF CLERP 9  
The CLERP program was announced in March 1997 and involved a fundamental 
review of key areas of regulation which affected business and investment activity in order 
to facilitate strong economic growth.38  The objective of CLERP can be identified from 
the various themes in the ‘key principles’ discussed in an important discussion paper, 
titled ‘CLERP – Policy Framework’.39 These themes consistently aim to safeguard the 
public interest. CLERP 9, being the ninth instalment of the CLERP program was to be 
developed within this broader framework and with the public interest in mind.  
These principles provided a useful tool for developing or critiquing corporate law 
and governance reforms. This is because the spirit of these principles or the themes 
entrenched in these principles can assist in determining the rationale for the current 
regime.  
The explanation of the six ‘key principles’, contained in the ‘CLERP – Policy 
Framework’ document under the heading ‘Economic Approach to Business Regulation’ 
is reproduced in Appendix 1.40 
It would appear that the public interest rationale is the overriding motivation (or at 
the very least, one of the main considerations) for the current regime as can be inferred 
from the selected excerpts (with emphasis in bold) from each of the six key CLERP 
principles as set out below:  
                                                 
38 Treasury, above n 6. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
  30 
 
3.1 Market Freedom 
‘…Business regulation can and should help markets work by enhancing market 
integrity and capital market efficiency. …’ 
 
3.2 Investor Protection 
‘…business regulation should ensure that all investors have reasonable access to 
information regarding the risks of particular investment opportunities. …’ 
 
3.3 Information Transparency 
‘... Disclosure requirements increase the confidence of individual investors in 
the fairness and integrity of financial markets and, by fostering confidence, 
encourage investment. …’ 
 
3.4 Cost Effectiveness 
‘… A flexible and transparent framework will be more conducive to innovation 
and risk taking, which are fundamental elements of a thriving market economy, 
while providing necessary investor and consumer protection.’ 
 
3.5 Regulatory Neutrality and Flexibility 
‘Regulation should be applied consistently and fairly across the marketplace. …’ 
 
3.6 Business Ethics and Compliance 
‘… Fostering an environment which encourages high standards of business 
practice and ethics will remain a central objective of regulation, as will effective 
enforcement.’ 
Various public interest themes can be gleaned from these excerpts. The emphasis 
on market integrity, reasonable access to information for all investors, the confidence of 
individual investors in the fairness and integrity of financial markets, the provision of 
necessary investor and consumer protection and the consistent and fair application of 
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regulation to encourage high standards of business practice and ethics, are all themes that 
consistently aim to safeguard the public interest.41 
These themes seek to protect the financial interests of the general community. The 
confidence of individual investors in the capital markets is strengthened when there is 
integrity in the financial markets. A business environment that promotes values such as 
fairness and integrity reduces the risk of investors suffering financial loss as a result of 
dishonest conduct by certain individuals. The provision of reasonable access and timely 
information to all investors strengthens the confidence of individual investors in the 
capital markets. Investors need to have access to such information in order to make 
informed decisions in relation to their respective investments.42  
The consistent and fair application of legislative provisions that support values such 
as fairness and integrity can have the effect of deterring dishonest individuals from 
pursuing ill-gotten gains through deceitful means. A fair and honest business 
environment is conducive for encouraging further investment as investors would be more 
willing to invest in financial markets that are considered by them to be safe from 
fraudulent schemes. Likewise legislative mechanisms that support the provision of timely 
and accessible information to all investors have the potential to attract more investment 
as investors have the ability to make timely and informed decisions concerning their 
investments.43    
In view of the themes above in support of the public interest rationale as the 
overriding motivation (or at the very least, one of the main considerations) for the current 
regime, it is now worthwhile considering what the public interest means.   
It is argued that if CLERP 9 has digressed from the public interest, then CLERP 9 
has deviated from achieving its objectives. Therefore, it is important to define what is 
meant by the public interest. This way, a measure (being the public interest) can be 
established to evaluate CLERP 9. The next section identifies what the public interest 
means in this context and sets out the parameters for the measure to be applied in this 
study.  
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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2.3 WHAT IS THE PUBLIC INTEREST?  
This chapter has demonstrated that CLERP was to be developed with the “public 
interest” in mind. Auditor independence reforms therefore have to be designed in such a 
manner so as to protect the interests of the public. What the public interest means for the 
purposes of this thesis needs to be determined as this is the benchmark by which auditor 
independence reforms are to be compared against. This section provides an overview of 
the various interpretations of what the public interest might be and provides support for 
the adoption of the normative perspective of the public interest for the purposes of this 
thesis. This section adopts the argument developed by Dellaportas & Davenport to 
provide a definition of the public interest based on the normative perspective of the 
public interest. When the existing auditor independence reforms are assessed against this 
definition of the public interest, proposals for legal reform can be developed in 
circumstances where the current regime is found to be inadequate. These proposals can 
be designed with the view of protecting the interests of the public, with this definition of 
the public interest in mind, consistent with the spirit of CLERP as set out in the key 
CLERP principles. 
2.3.1 Public Interest Theories 
Cochran has identified four categories of what the public interest means. Cochran 
draws on the prominent works of political scientists such as Cassinelli, Bentley, Smith 
and Flathman and segregates the public interest theories advocated by these 
commentators into four broad categories.44 These four categories comprise of the 
normative, abolitionist, process and consensualist theories.45  
Cochran’s normative theory of the public interest utilises Cassinelli’s view that the 
public interest is ‘the highest ethical standard applicable to political affairs.’46 According 
to Cochran, the public interest involves ‘an ethical standard for evaluating specific public 
policies and a goal which the political order should pursue.’47  The public interest in 
Cassinelli’s view is an ethical concept and the process of group accommodation and 
                                                 
44 See generally, Cochran, above n 31, 327-355. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Carlos Cassinelli, ‘Comments on Frank J. Sorauf’s “The Public Interest Reconsidered”’ (August, 1958) 
20(3) The Journal of Politics 553, 553. 
47 Cochran, above n 31, 330. 
  33 
compromise being the process of democracy is a suitable method to achieve this as it 
promotes liberty and equality for all.48 On this view, ‘the public interest (or common 
good) is a normative concept and the relevant norm is the general good of a whole 
community.’49 The aim is the common good of the community as this ‘enhances their 
common life and is shared by all.’50 The measure by which to determine whether a 
proposed public policy is in the public interest will solely depend on ‘whether it will 
contribute more to the common good than will alternative policies.’51  
Bentley’s theory of the public interest is categorised by Cochran as abolitionist 
theory.52 The public interest as explained by Bentley, is the result of pressure, the ‘push 
and resistance’ between various groups promoting their respective self-interests.53 
According to Bentley, there is no such thing as group interest. The only outcome is 
known as ‘group phenomena’ and that ‘society itself is nothing other than the complex of 
the groups that compose it.’54 In addition, there is no notion of the common good as there 
is no suitable method capable of measuring feelings and/or ideas.55 
Cochran’s process theory adopts Smith’s perspective of the public interest.56 
According to Smith, the public interest is the result of the ‘consensus-responsive 
decision-making process’.57 As such, the process by which competing policies are 
decided where ‘consensus may be used to the fullest possible extent in resolving conflict 
harmoniously’ is the public interest.58 The process referred to by Cochran comprises of 
the mechanisms in place, characteristic of a democratic system which allow for 
accommodation and compromise.59 
                                                 
48 Cassinelli, above n 46, 555-556. 
49 Cochran, above n 31, 330. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Cochran, above n 31, 332. 
53 Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (The Belknap Press of  Harvard University Press, 1st ed, 
1967) 258-259. 
54 Ibid 222. 
55 Ibid 172. 
56 Cochran, above n 31, 339. 
57 Howard Smith, Democracy and the Public Interest (University of Georgia Press, 1st ed, 1960) 111.  
58 Ibid 159. 
59 Cochran, above n 31, 341. 
  34 
The consensualist theory as explained by Cochran adopts Flathman’s concept of the 
public interest.60 According to Flathman the public interest is not only a result of the 
process of accommodation and compromise, but that the effects of such a policy needs to 
be tested against community values and moral principles.61 Flathman defines community 
values as interests that are valued by the majority of the community.62 This theory 
expands on the concept of process theory to include as Cochran puts it ‘to employ 
community values as well as individual interests, and to give reasons in terms of these 
values for their decisions.’63 Flathman is of the view that the purpose of moral principles 
is to guide conduct and the moral reasoning that follows is used to validate the legislative 
proposal.64 This view of the public interest has its roots in Cochran’s normative concept 
of the public interest as discussed above. This is because it subscribes to the ideal 
normative concept of enhancing the common good of the community. Legal reform as a 
consequence must be aligned with community values and moral principles for the 
common good. 
2.3.2 Why this thesis adopts the normative perspective of the public interest 
This thesis utilises the normative concept of the public interest developed by 
Cochran. It does not adopt the other three categories of the public interest also developed 
by Cochran, namely, the abolitionist theory, process theory and the consensualist theory. 
The normative theory is applied in this thesis, as this theory subscribes to ideal normative 
principles and values that are consistent with the objective of CLERP. The key CLERP 
principles65 provide support for the utilisation of this normative theory for the purposes 
of defining the public interest.  
The objective of CLERP is the enhancement, protection and preservation of the 
common good shared by the financial community. This is a normative concept. This is 
because the aim of CLERP is to protect the financial interests of individual investors. 
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This can be achieved by the development of legislative provisions that seek to support 
fairness and integrity in the financial markets as well as the provision of reasonable 
access and timely information to all investors. In seeking to protect the financial interests 
of individual investors, CLERP enhances the common good and the life shared by the 
community.  This objective can be derived from the key CLERP principles’ emphasis on 
market integrity, reasonable access to information for all investors, the confidence of 
individual investors in the fairness and integrity of financial markets, the provision of 
necessary investor and consumer protection and the consistent and fair application of 
regulation to encourage high standards of business practice and ethics.66  
The requirement that a policy adhere to prescribed objectives that enhance the 
financial well-being of the community as identified in the key CLERP principles67 is 
consistent with the normative concept of the public interest. As a result, policies that seek 
to contribute more to the common good of the financial community being the public 
interest will be given preference over alternative policies. 
Interest group politics play a significant part of the public interest in the abolitionist 
theory.68  This theory relies heavily on the assumption that competing interest groups 
seek to promote their own respective interests. The common good is not a consideration 
in the abolitionist theory. The public interest is the outcome of such competing 
interests.69 This theory assumes that the outcome of such interest group politics, is in the 
public interest. Powerful interest groups will seek to lobby for control of the outcome so 
as to protect their respective interests. These compact and highly organised interest 
groups have the ability to use their resources such as time and money to successfully 
lobby for legal reforms at the expense of the unorganised individual.  This is not 
consistent with the spirit of CLERP. There is in the abolitionist theory no common 
objective that seeks to enhance, protect and preserve the common good shared by the 
financial community.  Rather, the opposite can occur. On this view, the well-being of the 
financial community can be jeopardised in circumstances where these interest groups are 
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successful in lobbying for a legislative outcome that enhances their respective interests at 
the expense of the rest of the financial community. 
The process of accommodation, compromise and majority consensus, the hallmarks 
of a fully functional democratic system is attributed to process theory.70 This theory 
refers to the procedural mechanisms in place that facilitate this process.71 The 
consequence of legal reform as a result of this process, need not necessarily be in the 
common good. Rather, the public interest is attained when this process has taken its full 
course.72 This theory assumes that as long as the democratic process has taken its full 
course, the outcome whatever it may be is in the public interest. This is because in a fully 
functioning democratic system, policies that have majority voter support will prevail. 
This democratic process however, does not guarantee that the result of such a process 
will produce a legislative outcome that adheres to the normative principles and values 
entrenched in the key CLERP principles.73 As in the abolitionist theory described above, 
process theory also fails to take into account the existence of powerful interest groups 
that seek to influence the outcome of such a process in order to serve their own respective 
interests rather than for the common good of the financial community as subscribed to by 
CLERP.  
The consensualist theory emphasises that the process of accommodation, 
compromise and majority consensus, must adhere to community values and moral 
principles.74 In addition to the democratic legislative process of creating new law, this 
theory focuses on the consequences of such policy proposals.75 According to this theory, 
the reasons as to how community values and moral principles are reflected in these 
proposals have to be provided.76 The consensualist theory endorses the normative 
concept as it requires that community values and moral principles be aligned to the 
interests of the majority consensus.77 These normative community values and moral 
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principles essentially comprise of ideals and principles envisaged to enhance the common 
good of the community. This theory is again flawed for the same reasons given for the 
abolitionist theory and process theory as described above. As long as the process (of 
accommodation, compromise and the need for a majority vote prior to the introduction of 
a legislative proposal into law) is observed and reasons are provided (as to how 
normative community values and moral principles are reflected in these proposals) to 
justify these proposals, the legislative outcome can still be influenced by powerful 
interest groups that stand to benefit more by the introduction of these proposals when 
compared to the unorganised individual. This result can potentially provide preferential 
treatment to these powerful groups and is not consistent with the objective of CLERP that 
seeks to enhance, protect and preserve the common good shared by the financial 
community.  In contrast, the normative theory of the public interest would automatically 
reject proposals that can provide preferential treatment to these powerful groups on the 
basis that these are not in the best interests of all the financial community. 
2.3.3 The accountant’s perspective of the public interest  
The four concepts of the public interest developed by Cochran as discussed above, 
are abstract theories that provide a broad framework for the various interpretations of the 
term the public interest. The application of the normative perspective of the public 
interest in this thesis relies on the specific framework developed by Dellaportas & 
Davenport which incorporates the accountant’s perspective of the public interest.  
Dellaportas & Davenport have applied Cochran’s normative concept of the public 
interest to give meaning to the term the ‘public interest’.78 According to them, this 
normative perspective is consistent with the accountants’ ethos which can be observed in 
the code of ethics.79  They are of the view that ‘accounting associations use codes of 
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ethics to create expectations of professional behaviour that are ostensibly aimed at 
benefiting third parties’.80   
In their opinion, accountants are required to comply with ‘fundamental principles 
of professional conduct such as expertise, knowledge, competence and integrity’.81 In 
doing so, they are obligated to ‘protect the economic interests of third parties by 
facilitating an efficient and effective economic decision making process through the 
provision of relevant and reliable economic data’.82 This means that members of the 
profession are obligated to protect the economic interests of the collective well-being of 
the public.83 
2.3.4   The public interest defined  
This section adopts the method developed by Dellaportas & Davenport, to answer 
two questions (1) who exactly is the public and (2) what are the interests of the public.84 
This way, the public interest can be defined for the purposes of this thesis in order to 
establish a measure to assess the adequacy of the current regime. Where the public 
interest is found to be compromised, legal reform that will enhance the public interest is 
proposed in Chapter 5. 
This approach is adopted as the normative ideals upheld in the normative theory 
can similarly be applied here. The normative principles as set out in the key CLERP 
principles85 can be utilised to give meaning to the term the public interest. 
2.3.5 Who exactly is the public? 
Dellaportas & Davenport have stated that the term ‘public’ is defined in the 
accountants’ code of ethics as ‘the collective well-being of the community of people and 
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institutions that the members serve.’86  They are of the view that this definition of the 
public which can potentially include all stakeholders is not practical in application.87 This 
is because accountants prepare financial information for particular user groups and not 
the public at large.88 As such, the expansion of this definition to include non-users of 
accounting information may not be tenable.89 A practical solution to this can be found in 
the key CLERP principles.90 The key CLERP principles can be seen to limit the term 
‘public’ to a certain category of people and not the whole community. Utilising the same 
reasoning behind Dellaportas & Davenport’s method, the ‘practical limitations of serving 
the wider community of stakeholders that is associated with the normative definition of 
the public’ appears to have been addressed by the key CLERP principles which limits the 
scope of the public to primary users of accounting information.91 The emphasis on 
market integrity, reasonable access to information for all investors, the confidence of 
individual investors in the fairness and integrity of financial markets, the provision of 
necessary investor and consumer protection and the consistent and fair application of 
regulation to encourage high standards of business practice and ethics, from the key 
CLERP principles are themes that consistently aim to safeguard the primary users of 
accounting information.92 
According to Dellaportas & Davenport, in identifying the primary users of 
accounting information, emphasis is given to specific user groups and their information 
needs.93 As such, the primary users of accounting information will typically comprise of 
investors and members of the financial community.94   The code of ethics specifically 
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includes these user groups as part of the wider definition of the ‘public’.95 These user 
groups are described as ‘investors, the business and financial community, and others who 
rely on the objectivity and integrity of members to maintain the orderly functioning of 
commerce’.96  
The key CLERP principles provide further clarity as to the identity of the primary 
users of accounting information. The themes in the key CLERP principles seek to protect 
the individual investor. The confidence of individual investors in the capital markets is 
strengthened when market fairness and integrity are both encouraged.97 The provision of 
reasonable access and timely information also increases investor confidence as investors 
need to have access to such information in order to make informed decisions. 98 
Investor protection is a recurring theme throughout the key CLERP principles. 
What this means is that the definition of the term public can for the purposes of this thesis 
be narrowed to individual investors and those in the financial community who rely on the 
objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on behalf of these individual 
investors.  
2.3.6 What are the interests of the public? 
Dellaportas & Davenport have stated that ‘interests are asserted if the benefit in 
question can plausibly be connected to the individuals to whom the definition relates.’99 
Where it concerns accounting, they are of the view that this is likely to occur when 
financial reporting serves the economic interests of direct user groups.100 As the code of 
ethics is silent on the term ‘interest’, they are of the opinion that the key to understanding 
the term ‘interest’ lies in the phrase ‘the collective well-being’.101 In order to better 
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understand this phrase, this thesis refers to the key CLERP principles102 to explain the 
meaning of the ‘collective well-being’.  
The key CLERP principles that aim to safeguard the primary users of accounting 
information as discussed above, (the emphasis on market integrity, reasonable access to 
information for all investors, the confidence of individual investors in the fairness and 
integrity of financial markets, the provision of necessary investor and consumer 
protection and the consistent and fair application of regulation to encourage high 
standards of business practice and ethics)103 are also consistent with safeguarding the 
economic interests of the primary users of accounting information. The Second Reading 
Speech of the CLERP 9 Bill states as follows: 
The draft Bill continues the work of the Government’s Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program, to modernise business regulation and foster a strong and vibrant economy, 
progressing the principles of market freedom, investor protection and quality disclosure of 
relevant information to the market.104  
This read in conjunction with the key CLERP principles emphasise that CLERP 9 
is concerned with promoting a solid, stable and dynamic economy. As such, CLERP 9 
legal reform was aimed at the primary users’ broader economic interests. The interests in 
question are concerned with the economic needs of the primary users of accounting 
information.  
Mechanisms that promote ideal auditor independence can promote the public 
interest. In order to gain a better appreciation of what ideal auditor independence is, the 
next section discusses the significance of independence, introduces commentary on 
auditor independence and explains the various facets of independence. It also 
acknowledges that ideal auditor independence is only an ideal and that whilst it may be in 
the public interest for the current regime to be designed to support this objective, this 
ideal cannot be completely achieved within current institutional arrangements.  
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2.4 AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE, COMMENTARY, ITS 
VARIOUS FACETS AND THE IDEAL  
An overview of the significance of auditor independence is provided to highlight 
the importance of auditor independence in the development of corporate legal reform. 
Auditor independence has been a recurring issue105 and will continue to be a contentious 
issue. Its significance to the development of corporate legal reform makes it important for 
policy makers to fully consider what is at stake and to understand that the implementation 
of auditor independence legal reform can potentially have far reaching consequences for 
the good or to the detriment of the public interest.  
2.4.1 The significance of auditor independence 
The significance of auditor independence has been a much written about topic long 
before the corporate collapses such as HIH and One.Tel which provided the impetus for 
significant auditor independence legal reforms to the current regime.106 Auditor 
independence has been described as the cornerstone of auditing.107 This is because 
without the independence of the external auditor, the financial reports of an entity cannot 
be relied upon to give a true and fair view of the entity’s financial position and therefore 
would be perceived by the investing public to have no value.108   
In discussing CLERP 9, Justice Owen highlighted the importance of auditor 
independence in the HIH Final Report, as follows: 
Auditor independence is a critical element going to the credibility and reliability 
of an auditor’s reports. Audited financial statements play a key role promoting 
the efficiency of capital markets and the independent auditor constitutes the 
principal external check on the integrity of financial statements.  
… In the absence of a competently and independently performed audit, there is 
increased risk to the efficiency of capital markets. There is a danger that the audit 
report will lure users into a false sense of security that there has been an 
independent scrutiny of the financial report when there has not.109 
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The Ramsay Report noted that auditor independence plays a significant part in 
contributing to the efficiency of the capital markets as follows: 
(a) adding value to financial statements 
(b) adding value to the capital markets by enhancing the credibility of financial 
statements 
(c) enhancing the effectiveness of the capital markets in allocating valuable 
resources by improving the decisions of users of financial statements 
(d) assisting to lower the cost of capital to those using audited financial 
statements by reducing information risk.110 
In addition, the HIH Final Report stated that auditor independence further promotes 
the efficiency of the capital markets by ‘enhancing the consistency and comparability of 
reported financial information in Australia.’111  
The US Supreme Court highlighted the special function that auditors owe to the 
investing public when it stated: 
The independent public accountant performing this special function owes allegiance to the 
corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as the investing public. This public 
watchdog function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the 
client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.112 
It is important to consider the significance of auditor independence as set out above 
in order to gain an appreciation of its potential impact on corporate legal reform. By 
considering the significance of auditor independence, a better understanding of the way 
in which corporate legal reform has evolved in relation to auditor independence can be 
obtained.  
To establish a measure by which auditor independence can be assessed, it is useful 
to look at what judges and academics have commented on this topic. It is a worthwhile 
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exercise to note their views about what constitutes ideal auditor independence in order to 
obtain a more complete and thorough understanding of this concept.  
2.4.2 Commentary on auditor independence 
Esanda Finance in 1997 was a landmark High Court decision in relation to an 
auditor’s duty to third parties.113 The facts were that Esanda Finance had financed various 
companies associated with Excel Finance and had suffered a loss as a result.114 Esanda 
Finance claimed that the external auditor Peat Marwick Hungerfords had been negligent 
and that it had relied on the audited accounts of Excel Finance audited by Peat Marwick 
Hungerfords in its decision to proceed with the financing.115 This case considered the 
issue of auditor negligence and the various elements that constituted this including the 
auditor’s duty of care.116 Although this case did not discuss the issue of auditor 
independence, in considering whether to extend the liability of the auditor, Justice 
McHugh considered various factors that could potentially encourage the auditor ‘to be 
more diligent in the execution of their statutory obligations’.117 Justice Gummow 
acknowledged that ‘the auditing process involves more than the statement of verifiable 
fact.’ Rather, ‘it is a complex process involving the formulation of a professional 
opinion’.118 This thesis submits that judicial commentary such as these have paved the 
way for legal reform to be explored by policy makers in the area of auditor independence. 
In the Deo case in 2005 Chief Justice Martin of the Northern Territory Supreme 
Court although not called upon to decide on the issue of auditor independence, indirectly 
supported the use of auditing standards which required the auditor to be independent in 
both mind and in appearance.119 Deo’s application to be admitted as a legal practitioner 
in the Northern Territory was refused on the grounds that Deo had not provided the 
Supreme Court with full disclosure of ASIC’s reprimand concerning Deo’s conflict of 
interest in his capacity as auditor of Balangarri Aboriginal Corporation.120 Prior to Deo’s 
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application, Deo had been an auditor and had audited the financial statements of this 
corporation whilst conducting an import business with the CEO of the corporation.121 
ASIC referred to auditing standards which required auditors to be both independent in 
mind and in appearance.122  ASIC concluded that Deo had failed to appear to be 
independent as a result of his business dealings with the CEO whilst auditing the 
financial statements of the corporation.123 Chief Justice Martin held that Deo ‘displayed a 
lack of judgment and a lack of appreciation of the requirement that an auditor be entirely 
independent of an organisation in respect of which he was conducting an audit.’124 
In a more recent case in 2011 Senior Member Walsh in Re Confidential affirmed 
that the code of ethics of the respective Accounting Association to which the auditor is a 
member will be used to determine whether or not the auditor is independent.125 These 
codes specifically require that for the auditor to be independent, the auditor must be both 
independent in mind and in appearance.126 In Re Confidential, the applicant was the 
auditor of three self-managed superannuation funds in which the applicant was also either 
a director of the corporate trustee of the funds, a member of the funds and/or the tax agent 
for the funds.127 The applicant sought review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 
the Commissioner of Taxation’s decision disqualifying him from being an auditor for 
(amongst other things) failing to maintain professional independence.128 Senior Member 
Walsh concluded that these circumstances gave rise ‘to a lack of independence of 
appearance, if not a lack of independence of mind’ and as a result the auditor had failed 
to comply with his independence obligations in the code of ethics.129 
According to Justice Owen, the courts have not had much opportunity to decide on 
the issue of audit independence.130 This is because the cause of action for breach of the 
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auditor’s duty is normally associated with the incompetence of the external auditor rather 
than the lack of auditor independence.131 
The HIH Report acknowledged the difficulty of proving whether an auditor is truly 
independent.132 The HIH Report did not conclude that the independence of the external 
auditor (Andersen) was impaired.133 All it found was that there were circumstances 
which gave rise to the perception that Andersen was not independent of HIH.134 These 
circumstances included three former Andersen partners who were on the board of HIH at 
the relevant time, former Andersen partners who had close working relationships with 
HIH management and in the case of Cohen (a former Andersen partner), who continued 
to receive benefits from Andersen, (amongst other things) consultancy fees, whilst in his 
capacity as chairperson of the board of HIH.135  
Justice Owen was of the view that the difficulties associated with proving whether 
an auditor is truly independent stem from the nature of auditing.136 As the audit process is 
generally conducted outside of the sight of the users of financial statements, ‘the users of 
the financial statements are not privy to the information that is received by the auditor or 
the process by which the auditor exercises skill and judgment to reach conclusions on that 
information.’137 As a result, significant reliance is placed upon the integrity of auditors.138 
This reliance creates the need for auditors to not only be independent in mind but that 
auditors need to be perceived (by the users of the financial statements) to be 
independent.139 The HIH Report acknowledged that in addition to actual independence, 
the perception that the external auditor is independent ‘adds value to capital market 
efficiency because it enhances the credibility of financial statements.’140 
In considering what the appropriate standard of audit independence should be, 
Justice Owen referred to the (then existing) law in relation to (amongst other things) 
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‘fiduciary obligations’ and ‘the disqualification of members of the judiciary on the 
grounds of bias or apprehended bias’.141 
Justice Owen put forward a measure of independence which draws on fiduciary 
obligations.142 He highlighted the explanation given by Chief Justice Gibbs in Hospital 
Products that a fiduciary duty is created when a person undertakes to act ‘in the interests 
of another’ and ‘is entrusted with the power to affect those interests’.143 In these 
circumstances the person whose interests have been entrusted, is vulnerable to the abuse 
of power of the other.144 Justice Owen also referred to Justice Deane’s judgment in Chan 
v Zacharia which held that a person who owes a fiduciary duty can receive a benefit or 
gain despite there being a conflict of interest between that person’s fiduciary duty and 
his/her personal interest as long as this benefit or gain is disclosed to the person to whom 
the fiduciary duty is owed.145  
Similarities can be drawn from Justice Owen’s measure of independence that 
referred to the disclosure of the benefit or gain received in Justice Deane’s judgement in 
Chan v Zacharia and the existing CLERP 9 requirement for listed companies to disclose 
non-audit services.146 The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) referred to as Corporations Act 
stipulates that the respective company’s annual report must disclose details of the 
amounts paid or payable to the auditor for non-audit services provided and that the listed 
entity’s board of directors must state in the company’s annual report that the provision of 
the non-audit services does not compromise the auditor independence requirements of the 
Corporations Act.147 As in Chan v Zacharia, the Corporations Act requires the entity to 
disclose the benefit or gain received by the auditor for non-audit services provided to the 
entity including the amounts paid or payable to the auditor.148 The Corporations Act 
however takes this one step further in that the entity is not only required to disclose the 
benefit or gain received by the auditor but that the entity’s board of directors have to state 
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that the provision of the non-audit services does not compromise auditor 
independence.149 
Austin and Ramsay have sought to distinguish the current statutory requirement for 
auditors of a ‘conflict of interest situation’ from the law of fiduciary obligations.150 In 
their view the law of fiduciary obligations considers whether ‘the circumstances of actual 
or possible conflict between personal interest and fiduciary duty are present and will 
intervene accordingly to prevent the possibility that interest will be preferred to duty, in 
the absence of fully informed consent by the principal.’151 On the other hand, the current 
statutory requirement for auditors outright prohibits the auditor from acting for the 
auditee where a ‘conflict of interest situation’ exists.152 This can occur if the auditor is 
not independent in mind or in appearance.153 They are however of the view that the 
auditor’s fiduciary obligations still exist in addition to the current statutory requirement 
as explained above.154 
This thesis supports the view of Austin and Ramsay in that the current statutory 
requirement of a ‘conflict of interest situation’ is different from the law of fiduciary 
obligations in its interpretation as well as its application as discussed above. As a 
consequence, the law of fiduciary obligations does not assist much in the determination 
of what constitutes ideal auditor independence.  
Justice Owen was of the view that the measure of independence for auditors should 
‘be adapted from the test laid down to determine whether a judge is disqualified by 
reason of the appearance of bias.’155 This is because according to Justice Owen, although 
‘judges and auditors perform different functions, there is a common element’ in that ‘both 
functions involve an exercise of judgment which results in the public expression of an 
important opinion which is capable of affecting society widely.’156 Justice Owen referred 
to Johnson v Johnson which specified that the test to determine whether a judge is bias 
                                                 
149 Corporations Act s300(11B). 
150 Robert Austin and Ian Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (Lexis Nexis Online) [11.455.5]. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
155 The HIH Royal Commission, above n 3. 
156 Ibid. 
  49 
is ‘whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might 
not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is 
required to decide.’157 
This thesis does not accept Justice Owen’s view that the test for auditor 
independence should be adapted from the test to determine whether a judge is biased on 
the basis of the common element shared by the two professions as discussed above. 
Despite there being a ‘common element’ in that ‘both functions involve an exercise of 
judgment which results in the public expression of an important opinion which is capable 
of affecting society widely’,158 their respective responsibilities are nevertheless very 
different and so are the consequences of their respective decisions.  
Judges may have the ability to sentence guilty individuals with severe penalties that 
in some circumstances can result in life imprisonment for the individual. As these 
consequences can severely restrict the freedom of the individual, judges must be seen to 
be impartial whilst deciding on these matters. The auditor on the other hand is generally 
appointed by the auditee to ensure that the audited financial statements of the auditee 
provide a true and fair view of the financial position of the auditee. The failure of the 
auditor to accomplish this can cause the users of financial statements to suffer financial 
loss. Financial loss is not the same as the loss of freedom and/or life. On this view, the 
same test for judges should not be applied to auditors.   
The appointments of judges and auditors are significantly different. The 
constitution provides that judges once appointed generally cannot be removed from their 
office until they reach the age of 70.159 They can only be removed on the grounds of 
proven misbehaviour or incapacity.160 Their salaries whilst in office cannot be reduced.161  
Auditors on the other hand are appointed by shareholders during the company’s annual 
general meeting and their appointment is subject to annual renewal by the shareholders at 
the next company’s annual general meeting.162 Their remuneration for the next year is not 
                                                 
157 Ibid and Johnson v Johnson (2000) 174 ALR 655, 658. 
158 The HIH Royal Commission, above n 3. 
159 Australian Constitution s 27. 
160 Ibid s 27 (ii). 
161 Ibid s 27 (iii). 
162 Corporations Act 328B. 
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assured. As the auditor is dependent on the company for his/her remuneration,163 this 
uncertainty is a threat to the independence of the external auditor as a consequence of the 
self-serving bias discussed in Section 2.4.4 of this thesis.  On this view as well, the same 
test for judges should not be applied to auditors.   
This thesis rejects Justice Owen’s view that the common element shared by the two 
professions provides justification that the test for auditor independence should be adapted 
from the test to determine whether a judge is biased. This thesis however accepts that the 
test for auditor independence can be adapted from the test to determine whether a judge is 
biased on the basis that this test for judges seeks to enhance the appearance of 
independence. This is because ideal auditor independence can be enhanced when auditors 
are independent in both mind and appearance. The reason for this is attributed to the 
multifaceted nature of auditor independence as explained in Section 2.4.3 and not on the 
basis of the common element shared by judges and auditors as discussed above. On this 
view, it seems appropriate that a similar standard has been adopted in the codes of 
conduct of the Accounting Associations.164 These codes stipulate that auditors not only 
be independent in mind but also independent in appearance.165 The requirement that 
auditors be independent in appearance is similar to the standard required for judges in 
that a fair-minded lay observer must be able to conclude that the action or conduct in 
question of the auditor is independent.166   
As the above commentaries do not provide much guidance as to what constitutes 
ideal auditor independence, literature on the multifaceted nature of auditor independence 
is examined in the following section to assist in providing clarity to the meaning of ideal 
auditor independence.    
                                                 
163 It may well be that due to financial pressures to retain existing clients, an audit partner can be faced with 
conflicting interests that can compromise independence. This self-serving biased is explained in Section 
2.4.4.  In these circumstances, the number of clients that an audit firm has (for example in larger audit 
practices) may not necessarily alleviate the financial pressures faced by the audit partner. These financial 
pressures can still be considered as threats to the independence of the external audit. 
164 Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board, Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants APES 
110 (2013) Section 290.6. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid and Johnson v Johnson (2000) 174 ALR 655, 658. 
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2.4.3 The various facets of independence 
This section will discuss the compartmentalization of the various facets of 
independence. In order to analyse the implications for auditor independence, an 
understanding of the various facets of independence is needed. It is necessary to 
understand what these key concepts mean. It is only when this is accomplished, can 
focused efforts be made to address any inadequacies found in the current regime in 
relation to ideal auditor independence.  
According to Michael Power, independence can be divided into ‘organizational 
independence’ and ‘operational independence’.167 He has stated that ‘organizational 
independence’ concerns ‘the independence of the individual auditor and the profession’ 
and ‘operational independence’ refers to ‘the immanent ability of auditing to be 
independent.’168  
Power has further segregated ‘organizational independence’ into ‘independence in 
fact’ and ‘independence in appearance’ and ‘operational independence’, into 
‘informational independence’ and ‘epistemic independence’.169 In his view, 
‘informational independence’ relates to ‘the problem with auditing’s fundamental 
dependence on information supplied by the auditee.’170 According to Power, ‘epistemic 
independence’ means the ‘knowledge upon which the conclusions of the audit is built 
must be independent.’171  
Independence in fact means that the external auditor has to be independent in 
mind.172 This involves ‘the state of mind that permits the provision of an opinion without 
being affected by influences that compromise professional judgment, allowing an 
individual to act with integrity, and exercise objectivity and professional scepticism.’173 
                                                 
167 See generally, Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford University Press, 1st 
ed, 1997) 131-134.  
168 Ibid.  
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 The definitions of independence in mind and appearance respectively can be found in CPA Australia 
and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Professional Statement F1 Professional Independence 
(2006) paragraph 14, Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board, Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants APES 110 (2013) Section 290.6 and Corporations Act s324CD(1)(b). 
173 The definitions of independence in mind and appearance respectively can be found in CPA Australia 
and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Professional Statement F1 Professional Independence 
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Independence in appearance means that the auditor must be seen to be independent.174 
Put simply, a reasonable person must be able to conclude that the action or conduct in 
question of the auditor is independent.175 As such, in order for an auditor to be 
independent from the ‘organizational independence’ perspective, the auditor must not 
only be independent in mind but must also be perceived by the general public to be 
independent.176 
A decision in itself to deliberately channel efforts to address ideal auditor 
independence inadequacies in the current regime is not going to be workable unless ideal 
auditor independence is first defined. The next section is dedicated to this, in order for 
practical legal reform to be consistent with the public interest.  
 
2.4.4  Ideal auditor independence 
This section will discuss what ideal independence is and why it may be impossible 
to achieve ideal independence. Critical to the development of auditor independence legal 
reform is an understanding of what ideal auditor independence is. This section considers 
what this term means and concludes that ideal auditor independence is impossible to 
attain in the area of ‘operational independence’. However, the concept of ideal auditor 
independence can still be promoted within existing arrangements in the area of 
‘organizational independence’.  
Ideal auditor independence means that the external auditor must be totally 
independent from the client in the preparation and the subsequent issue of the audit 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2006) paragraph 14, Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board, Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants APES 110 (2013) Section 290.6 and Corporations Act s324CD(1)(b). 
174 The definitions of independence in mind and appearance respectively can be found in CPA Australia 
and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Professional Statement F1 Professional Independence 
(2006) paragraph 14, Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board, Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants APES 110 (2013) Section 290.6 and Corporations Act s324CD(1)(b). 
175 The definitions of independence in mind and appearance respectively can be found in CPA Australia 
and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Professional Statement F1 Professional Independence 
(2006) paragraph 14, Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board, Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants APES 110 (2013) Section 290.6 and Corporations Act s324CD(1)(b). 
176 The definitions of independence in mind and appearance respectively can be found in CPA Australia 
and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, Professional Statement F1 Professional Independence 
(2006) paragraph 14, Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board, Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants APES 110 (2013) Section 290.6 and Corporations Act s324CD(1)(b). 
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report. It is submitted that ideal auditor independence can only be achieved when the 
auditor has ‘organizational independence’ and ‘operational independence’.  
For the reasons given below, this thesis acknowledges that ‘operational 
independence’ cannot be attained. Notwithstanding this, this thesis seeks to improve 
auditor independence in the area of ‘organizational independence’ with the objective of 
promoting the public interest. Despite the impossibility of achieving ideal auditor 
independence nevertheless the public interest can still be enhanced when mechanisms are 
developed to support this public interest objective in the area of ‘organizational 
independence’. 
This thesis does not seek to propose changes to the way in which the process of 
auditing is carried out. As a result, proposals that can promote ‘operational independence’ 
are not considered. 
Changes that support ‘informational independence’ would require the auditor to 
obtain the requisite financial information concerning the auditee directly from its source, 
without having to rely on the auditee’s management for the information. This cannot be 
practically achieved as a significant amount of time would need to be spent by the auditor 
to independently collate the requisite information. This exercise would change the very 
nature of auditing and would cause additional audit fees to be incurred that would be 
difficult to justify. For example, instead of requesting the management of a listed retail 
entity to provide the auditor with a listing of its inventory and the respective values of 
such inventory, the auditor would then have to consult an independent valuer to provide 
an independent valuation of the inventory. It is anticipated that such an exercise will 
cause audit fees to increase significantly to such an extent that it will not be financially 
viable for either the auditor or the auditee, depending on who will bear this additional 
cost, to conduct the audit. 
Likewise, the current institutional arrangements which exist between the auditor 
and the auditee, prevent ‘epistemic independence’ from becoming a reality. ‘Epistemic 
independence’ can only be held as an ideal for as long as the external auditor is 
dependent on the client for audit fees. This independence can be impaired when the 
auditor’s knowledge base is influenced by the auditor’s self-serving bias.  
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Various commentators177 have claimed that it is psychologically impossible for an 
auditor to be free from bias. This is because auditors are paid by the very same clients for 
whom they audit and prepare an audit report.  
 According to Bazerman, Morgan and Loewenstein, the need for self-preservation 
inherent in auditors as a result of the auditor and client relationship has the potential to 
influence the way in which auditors process information.178 This may cause honest 
auditors to unknowingly and gradually make marginal decisions in their client’s 
favour.179 Widely defined financial reporting standards provide this opportunity.180 At 
some stage, this can result in a material misrepresentation of facts which can lead to an 
inappropriate audit report being issued.181 As this is unintentional, the threat of sanctions 
is unlikely to prevent this from occurring.182  
One way to overcome this is for the listed entity auditor to be appointed and 
remunerated by an independent entity such as a government agency. This however would 
be unacceptable for the taxpayer who may have to remunerate the auditor.  Alternatively 
a levy could be imposed on listed entities. The amount of levy to be contributed by each 
company could be based on the market capitalisation of the company. The contributions 
collected from this levy can form a common pool to be utilised by the independent entity 
to remunerate the external auditors for their respective audit services. This would be 
unacceptable for the larger listed entities as these entities will lose their right to negotiate 
directly with the external auditor for reduced audit fees. 
This section identifies that ‘organizational independence’ being independence in 
fact and in appearance can enhance auditor independence. Mechanisms can be designed 
with the purpose of supporting these two facets of independence. This thesis 
acknowledges that ideal auditor independence cannot be achieved as the way in which 
auditing is conducted and the current institutional arrangements for auditing prevent 
‘informational independence’ and ‘epistemic independence’ from being fully realised. 
                                                 
177 See generally Max Bazerman, Kimberly Morgan and George Loewenstein, ‘The Impossibility of 
Auditor Independence’ (Summer,1997) Sloan Management Review 89, 90. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid 93. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid 94. 
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This thesis however seeks to enhance ideal auditor independence by proposing legal 
reform that has the potential to promote ‘organizational independence’ being 
independence in fact and in appearance. 
Now that a definition of the public interest has been established to evaluate the 
current regime, the significant auditor independence requirements in CLERP 9 can be 
critically analysed in order to identify potential areas for legal reform specifically in 
relation to organizational independence where this ideal is found to be inadequate. This 
way, the public interest can be advocated.  
The subsequent paragraphs introduce the significant CLERP 9 reforms that were 
implemented by the government in response to high profile corporate collapses such as 
HIH and One.Tel.183 The next section provides a summary of these legal reforms which 
were introduced with the sole purpose of addressing auditor independence concerns. 
These legal reforms can be found in the Corporations Act. The ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles are introduced in Section 2.7 because they have the potential to 
complement CLERP 9 in supporting ideal auditor independence. The public interest can 
be promoted when these two mechanisms work seamlessly together in their respective 
efforts to enhance ideal auditor independence. The existing framework for auditor 
independence in place within these principles can be developed to complement proposals 
for legal reform pursuant to CLERP 9. 
Chapter 5 analyses whether these CLERP 9 reforms were developed with the public 
interest CLERP objective in mind. As ideal auditor independence is consistent with the 
public interest, Chapter 5 analyses whether these CLERP 9 reforms are consistent with 
ideal auditor independence. Proposals for legal reform in the area of organizational 
independence are introduced in Chapter 5 in circumstances where ideal organizational 
independence is found to be inadequate.  
                                                 
183 Chapple and Koh, above n 3, See generally, Ramsay, above n 3, Armstrong, above n 3, George, above n 
3 and The HIH Royal Commission, above n 3. 
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2.5 SIGNIFICANT CLERP 9 REFORMS 
CLERP 9 was the government’s response to the corporate collapses of HIH and 
One.Tel in early 2000.184 The corporate collapses of HIH and One.Tel initiated public 
outcry in relation to (amongst other things) the independence of external auditors.185 The 
external auditors of HIH and One.Tel provided both audit and non-audit services to their 
respective clients.186 The recurring fees received for these services were considered to be 
significant enough to pose a threat to the independence of the external auditors.187 It was 
alleged that these fees had impaired the judgement of the auditors in the issuing of the 
respective auditor’s report.188 Questionable accounting practices condoned by the 
external auditors for both HIH and One.Tel allowed these entities to show a profit whilst 
millions of dollars of losses were hidden from public scrutiny.189 At the time of HIH’s 
collapse, two board members of HIH were also ex-partners of HIH’s external auditors.190 
The existence of this relationship posed another threat to independence.191 
As a consequence of these corporate collapses, Professor Ian Ramsay was 
requested by the government, in 2001, to review the then existing auditor independence 
requirements in Australia. Professor Ramsay provided the Ramsay Report to the 
government in the same year.192 The Ramsay Report contained (amongst other things) 
recommendations that could enhance the then existing auditor independence 
requirements.193 
Subsequent to the issue of the Ramsay Report, a report was also compiled by the 
government’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit.194 This report titled 
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‘Review of Independent Auditing by Registered Company Auditors’ was released in 
September 2002 and contained 13 recommendations.195 The report was based on a review 
of the independent audit function conducted by company auditors. 196 
In addition, a Royal Commission was established by the government to investigate 
the HIH collapse.197 Justice Owen headed the Royal Commission and he delivered his 
report to the government in 2003.198 Included in this report were law reform proposals in 
relation to auditor independence.199 
The proposals for auditor independence law reform contained in the Australian 
government’s discussion paper, titled ‘Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial 
Reporting Framework’ (referred to in this thesis as “Relevant Proposals”) were released 
by the Treasury in 2002 for public consultation.200 This discussion paper contained 
legislative proposals for (amongst other things) auditor independence law reform.201 
More than 60 submissions were received in response to the Treasury public consultation 
process in relation to the Relevant Proposals.  These submissions were analysed for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
The CLERP 9 Bill was circulated by the Treasury in 2003 for public 
consultation.202 A total of 60 submissions were received in response to the Treasury 
public consultation process.  The JPCCFS also invited public submissions on the CLERP 
9 Bill and they received over 60 submissions.203  CLERP 9 was introduced into law on 1 
July 2004.204 For the purposes of this thesis, these submissions were examined. 
The significant CLERP 9 reforms in relation to auditor independence can be 
categorized and divided into two broad areas. The first is a general requirement for 
auditor independence and the second being specific requirements for auditor 
independence. These are discussed under their respective headings below. 
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2.5.1 General requirement for auditor independence 
Part 2M.4 Div 3 Subdiv A section 324CA of the Corporations Act stipulates a 
general requirement for auditor independence. This took effect from 2004 and was part of 
the government’s auditor independence law reform in response to the corporate collapses 
of HIH and One.Tel in early 2000.205 It prohibits the auditor from auditing the auditee 
where a ‘conflict of interest situation’ exists at the time the audit activity occurs.206 There 
is a contravention of section 324CA(1A) where the auditor after being aware that the 
‘conflict of interest situation’ exists does not, within seven days, ensure that the ‘conflict 
of interest situation’ ceases to exist or notify ASIC in writing that it exists.207 
Section 324CD(1) states that a ‘conflict of interest situation’ exists in circumstances 
where the ability of the auditor to exercise ‘objective and impartial judgment’ may be 
compromised or where ‘a reasonable person, with full knowledge of all relevant facts and 
circumstances, would conclude that the auditor’ ‘is not capable of exercising objective 
and impartial judgment in relation to the conduct of the audit’.208 This means that as long 
as a reasonable person is of the view that the auditor ‘is not capable of exercising 
objective and impartial judgment’ a ‘conflict of interest situation’ exists for the purposes 
of the Corporations Act. A conflict of interest need not have to actually occur in order for 
there to be a contravention. 
An ‘individual auditor’ contravenes section 324CA(2) if the auditor ‘engages in 
audit activity in relation to an audited body at a particular time’ and ‘a conflict of interest 
situation exists in relation to the audited body’, even though the auditor ‘is not aware that 
the conflict of interest situation exists’.209 In those circumstances, a contravention occurs 
if the auditor ‘would have been aware of the existence of the conflict’ had there been ‘in 
place a quality control system reasonably capable of making the individual auditor’ 
‘aware of the existence of such a conflict’.210 The auditor however does not contravene 
this section if the auditor had ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that there was ‘in place at 
                                                 
205 De Martinis, above n 2. 
206 Corporations Act s324CA(1). 
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208 Ibid s324CD(1). 
209 Ibid s324CA(2). 
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that time a quality control system that provided reasonable assurance (taking into account 
the size and nature of the audit practice)’ that the auditor had complied with the 
requirements of the corporations law.211 
 
2.5.2 Specific requirements for auditor independence 
In addition to the general standard of auditor independence, various provisions in 
the Corporations Act such as Part 2M.4 Div 3 Subdiv B sections 324CE-324CK provide 
for specific independence requirements designed to enhance auditor independence. Some 
of these are relevant to the discussion in Chapter 5 as these mechanisms either encourage 
the auditor to be independent in mind and/or promote the appearance of independence. 
For these reasons they are briefly introduced under the sub-headings Declarations, 
Relationships, Disclosure, Rotation and Notifications in the following paragraphs.   
Declarations 
The Corporations Act requires an auditor to give the directors of a company, a 
written declaration that, to the best of the auditor’s knowledge, the auditor has not 
contravened any of the auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act and 
any applicable code of professional conduct.212 This applies to an auditor who conducts 
an audit of the financial report for a full financial year or a half financial year.213 The 
annual directors’ report and the directors’ half-year report must include a copy of the 
auditor’s independence declaration made under s307C.214  
Relationships 
The significance of relationships as a threat to auditor independence is reflected in 
the Corporations Act. It prohibits the auditor from engaging in prescribed employment 
and financial relationships. 
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214 Ibid s298(1AA) and s306(1A). 
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Employment Relationships 
Section 324CI prohibits a person from becoming an officer of the audited body for 
two years where the person ceases to be a member of an audit firm or director of an audit 
company and was a professional member of the audit team for the audit.215 The same 
prohibition of two years also extends to a professional employee of the audit firm where 
the person was a ‘lead auditor’ or ‘review auditor’ for the audit of the audited body.216 A 
‘lead auditor’ is the registered company auditor who is primarily responsible to the audit 
firm or the audit company for the conduct of the audit.217 A ‘review auditor’ is the 
registered company auditor (if any) who is primarily responsible to the individual auditor, 
the audit firm or the audit company for reviewing the conduct of the audit.218 
Financial Relationships 
An individual auditor is prohibited from engaging in audit activity with the audited 
body in circumstances where the auditor has entered into a financial relationship as set 
out in the table in s324CH(1) with the audited body at a particular time. For example, an 
individual auditor must not engage in audit activity with the audited body where the 
auditor has an investment in the audited body, owes an amount of money to the audited 
body or is owed an amount of money by the audited body unless exempted by the 
Corporations Act in certain circumstances.219 
Disclosure 
Listed companies are required to disclose non-audit services that have been 
provided, in the respective company’s annual report pursuant to section 300(11B). The 
information to be disclosed includes details of the amounts paid or payable to the auditor 
for non-audit services provided and a statement from the listed entity’s board of directors 
stating that the provision of the non-audit services does not compromise the auditor 
independence requirements of the Corporations Act.220 This information must be 
included in the directors’ report to be identified under the heading “Non-audit 
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services”.221 If the listed entity has an audit committee, the directors’ statement that the 
provision of the non-audit services does not compromise the auditor independence 
requirements of the Corporations Act must be made in accordance with advice provided 
by the listed entity’s audit committee.222 
Rotation 
The Corporations Act prohibits an individual auditor who has acted as an external 
auditor for the listed company for five successive financial years from continuing to act 
as an external auditor for that company for at least another two successive financial 
years.223 
These rotation requirements are limited to the lead engagement and review 
partners.224 As explained in the Explanatory Memorandum, this is because the lead 
engagement and review partners, ‘are responsible for the audit opinion and have the 
ability to control the work of other members of the engagement team.’ ‘It is at this level 
that independence concerns are greatest.’225 The reliability of the audit opinion can be 
questioned in circumstances where the independence of these key people is (and/or 
perceived to be) compromised. This is because the lead engagement and review partners 
have the ability to influence the work flow of the audit team and ultimately the outcome 
of the audit which culminates in the audit opinion. 
Notifications 
CLERP 9 has expanded auditors’ duties to include notifications to ASIC in 
circumstances where the independence of the external auditor may be compromised.  
Section 311 requires an individual auditor conducting an audit to notify ASIC in 
writing within 28 days after the auditor becomes aware of any circumstances (amongst 
                                                 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid s300(11D). 
223 Ibid s324DA . 
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225 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) para 4.53. 
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other things) that amount to an attempt, in relation to the audit, by any person to unduly 
influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead a person involved in the conduct of the audit.226  
Section 311 is comprised of two limbs. The first consists of the auditor’s duty to 
notify ASIC in circumstances where the conduct of the officer(s) of the auditee can be 
construed as being a threat to the independence of the auditor. The second involves the 
time period (being 28 days) within which such notification to ASIC is required to be 
made. 
As this thesis is concerned with auditor independence, only the first limb of section 
311 in relation to the relevant submissions will be analysed and discussed. This is 
because any attempt by the officer of the auditee that is perceived to be a threat to the 
independence of the auditor can potentially invoke this section. The first limb was 
expressly stated in the Relevant Proposals and its relevance to auditor independence was 
the rationale for the decision to subject it to detailed analysis in this thesis. 
The second limb on the other hand refers to the time period in which the auditor is 
required to notify ASIC after the auditor becomes aware of such an incident. This time 
period regardless of its duration poses no threat to the independence of the auditor and as 
a consequence has no bearing on the independence of the auditor. For this reason, the 
second limb was excluded from analysis. It is also noted that the second limb was not 
expressly stated in the Relevant Proposals and that it was introduced by the government 
at a later stage when the Relevant Proposals were being fine-tuned for practical 
application.  
 
2.6 POST-CLERP 9 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS 
It was not until 2010 that a review of the auditor independence requirements in 
CLERP 9 was undertaken by the government. The reason for this may well have been a 
lack of high profile corporate collapses during this period which could have prompted the 
government to take urgent action to re-evaluate the existing auditor independence 
requirements. However, as a result of the global financial crisis, the Treasury (in March 
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2010) completed a strategic review of audit quality in Australia.  Treasury completed its 
consultations with key stakeholders by holding roundtable discussions with stakeholders 
in November 2010. It is important to note that only key stakeholders attended these 
consultations. These stakeholders were not identified. These consultations seem to be to a 
closed group. It is arguable that the proposals raised during these roundtable discussions 
were not representative of all stakeholders as only some stakeholders were present during 
these discussions. A number of important legislative proposals were identified during this 
‘consultative process’. These included proposals to amend the existing oversight powers 
of the FRC in relation to auditor independence227 and the auditor rotation requirements228 
in the current regime. The government proposed to progress these reforms through the 
Audit Enhancement Bill.229   
On 30 September 2011, the Treasury released an exposure draft of the Audit 
Enhancement Bill together with the relevant commentary for public consultation. This 
thesis analyses the submissions which were received in response to the Treasury public 
consultation process. These submissions were made in response to proposals to amend 
the existing oversight powers of the FRC in relation to auditor independence and the 
auditor rotation requirements in the current regime. These proposed reforms comprised a 
range of measures to enhance audit quality in Australia and were introduced into law in 
June 2012.230 
CLERP 9 provided the FRC with the power to directly monitor auditor 
independence.231 The Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Act 
2012 (Cth) referred to as Audit Enhancement Act delegated this power to ASIC.232 This 
move removed the duplication233 between the ‘operational’ nature of the FRC’s previous 
function and ASIC’s audit inspection program.  
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CLERP 9 prohibited the lead audit engagement and review partners from 
continuing to act as an external auditor for a listed company for at least another two 
successive financial years in circumstances where the lead audit engagement and review 
partners have acted as external auditor for the listed company for five successive 
financial years.234 The Audit Enhancement Act enables the lead audit engagement and 
review partners to continue to audit the listed company for up to a further two years 
provided requirements are satisfied in relation to the safeguarding of audit quality and 
auditor independence.235 
This thesis analyses the collated submissions from the Treasury in relation to the 
Relevant Proposals, CLERP 9 Bill and the Audit Enhancement Bill public consultation 
process and the collated submissions from the JPCCFS in relation to the CLERP 9 Bill 
public consultation process.  
 
2.7 ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 
As stated previously, the ASX Corporate Governance Principles were not part of 
CLERP. The ASX Corporate Governance Principles however can be developed to 
enhance auditor independence in addition to CLERP 9. This way, the existing framework 
within the ASX Corporate Governance Principles can potentially complement CLERP 9 
in supporting ideal auditor independence.   
The Council was formed in August 2002 ‘as a central reference point for companies 
to understand stakeholder expectations and to promote and maintain investor 
confidence.’236 It has stated that its purpose is ‘to develop principles and 
recommendations which reflect international good practice.’237 The Council has the 
potential to develop principles and recommendations that can potentially enhance the 
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independence of the company’s external auditors. This can be achieved by, for example, 
extending the existing responsibility of audit committees of ASX listed companies in 
order to support such an outcome. The Council has claimed that it represents ‘21 
business, investment and shareholder groups.’238 It has stated that its objective is ‘to 
ensure that the principles-based framework it developed for corporate governance 
continues to be a practical guide for listed companies, their investors and the wider 
Australian community.’239 
As the ASX Corporate Governance Principles were designed with the objective to 
broadly improve the corporate governance of listed companies, the Council has the 
ability to influence the development of principles and recommendations in relation to 
auditor independence specifically. The role of these guidelines will be revisited in 
Chapter 5 where recommendations which can further enhance auditor independence are 
proposed. 
In March 2003, the Council issued 10 corporate governance principles and 28 
specific recommendations for implementing those principles (collectively referred to as 
the ASX Corporate Governance Principles).240 An extensive review of these principles 
and recommendations was subsequently undertaken between November 2006 and 
February 2007.241 On 2 August 2007, the Council issued revised ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles (known as the second edition of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles) with the effective date being the listed entity’s first financial year 
commencing on or after 1 January 2008.242 
By 2011, the Council completed another review of the ASX Corporate Governance 
Principles. The purpose of the review was to ascertain whether the existing ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles was adequate or whether there was a need to amend the 
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second edition and to issue a third edition.243 The review involved consultations with 
various stakeholders which included ‘representatives of directors, management, 
institutional and retail shareholders, proxy advisers and others with an interest in the 
development of corporate governance practices.’244 These consultations did not reveal 
any inadequacies that would provide justification for amending the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles.245 Instead, the Council obtained consistent feedback that the 
existing ASX Corporate Governance Principles were practical in application to both large 
and small companies and ‘were structured in a way that enabled businesses of very 
different sizes to adopt approaches that were simultaneously consistent with the ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles and yet tailored to the level of complexity of a 
particular business.’246 
The Council initiated another review of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles 
during the second half of 2012 with particular focus on Principle 6 Respect the rights of 
shareholders, Principle 7 Recognise and manage risk and Principle 8 Remunerate fairly 
and responsibly.247 As the focus of the review does not appear to concern auditor 
independence, it is envisaged that the forthcoming issue of the third edition (scheduled to 
be issued by the end of 2013 but as at the submission date of this thesis has yet to be 
issued) will not have an impact on the outcome of this thesis.248 This thesis examines and 
proposes legal reform to Principle 4 Safeguard integrity in financial reporting. 
The ASX Corporate Governance Principles entrust the responsibility of ensuring 
the independence of the company’s external auditors, on (amongst others) members of 
the audit committee. Principle 4 details the purpose of the audit committee, which 
includes focusing the company on particular issues relevant to verifying and safeguarding 
the integrity of the company’s financial reporting.249  
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Commentators have suggested that both CLERP 9 and the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles complement each other in supporting the good corporate 
governance practices (including the promotion of auditor independence) of listed 
companies.250 Civil and criminal penalties are associated with CLERP 9 
contraventions.251 On the other hand, significant non-compliance with the ASX 
Corporate Governance Principles can result in the expulsion of the listed entity from 
being a member of the ASX.252 
The significant auditor independence reforms in CLERP 9 as well as Principle 4 of 
the ASX Corporate Governance Principles have been introduced here to provide a legal 
framework that can be analysed later in this thesis. In circumstances where this legal 
framework is found to be inadequate, legal reform can be proposed. 
2.8 SUMMARY 
This thesis evaluates the existing requirements with a view to provide proposals 
which support ideal auditor independence in the area of organizational independence in 
circumstances where ideal auditor independence is found to be lacking.  
A decision in itself to deliberately channel efforts to address ideal auditor 
independence inadequacies in the current regime, specifically in relation to organizational 
independence, is not going to be workable unless ideal auditor independence is first 
defined. This is the public interest requirement – the ideal measure, that auditors be 
completely independent against the existing requirements in the current regime. This 
needs to be established before this thesis can identify ways of practically improving the 
auditor independence requirements where the current regime is found to be inconsistent 
with the public interest.  
It is acknowledged that in view of the way in which auditing is conducted and the 
self-serving bias, ideal independence is not achievable under existing arrangements. This 
study however seeks to enhance ideal independence by proposing legal reform aimed at 
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improving organizational independence with the objective of promoting the public 
interest.  
The circumstances which led to the enactment of CLERP 9 are discussed in this 
chapter. These events highlight the need for greater auditor independence. In view of this, 
auditor independence is an important ongoing consideration which has been and will 
continue to arise from time to time. As such, this issue needs to be regularly reviewed in 
order for auditor independence legal reform to be consistent with the public interest. 
For the purposes of this study, ideal independence can be promoted where auditor 
independence legal reform is aimed at benefiting the public interest. Such legal reforms 
should support the primary users’ broader economic interests. These interests consist of 
the economic needs of the primary users of accounting information. The primary users of 
accounting information comprise individual investors and those in the financial 
community who rely on the objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on 
behalf of these individual investors. 
In the next chapter, the thesis will analyze why private interest theory was selected 
to evaluate how the current regime emerged. Stakeholders involved in private interest 
theory will be discussed and their respective motivations to influence the development of 
the current regime will be explored. 
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Chapter 3: WHY PRIVATE INTEREST 
THEORY WAS SELECTED TO 
EVALUATE HOW THE 
CURRENT REGIME EMERGED 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the adequacy of the auditor 
independence requirements in the Corporations Act against the ideal auditor 
independence measure. The public interest can be promoted when these requirements are 
consistent with ideal auditor independence. Private interest theory is applied to determine 
whether the auditor independence requirements in CLERP 9 were developed to serve 
private interests rather than the stated goal of the public interest. In that context, this 
chapter provides an introduction to private interest theory in order to explain how the 
current regime was established.  
In order to determine the most suitable theory to evaluate the current regime, 
reference is made to the key CLERP principles as discussed in Chapter 2. According to 
du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, these key principles can provide a useful framework 
for analysing corporate law reforms from the perspective of whether the reforms are 
consistent with the key principles. This way any inconsistencies between the new 
legislation and the key principles can be identified for potential future legal reform.253 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that an objective of CLERP was to promote the public 
interest.254 That chapter discussed the concept of the public interest from the perspective 
of the key CLERP principles. In doing so, it maintained that measures aimed at 
promoting ideal auditor independence in CLERP 9 can be consistent with the public 
interest. Chapter 2 stipulates that these measures should comprise mechanisms in CLERP 
9 that support independence in mind and independence in appearance. 
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This chapter outlines the theory and process that will be used in Chapter 4 to 
explain how the CLERP 9 regulatory process has been influenced by the lobbying 
activities of powerful interest groups through the use of private interest theory. This 
chapter explains what this theory is and develops the framework through which it can be 
applied in the next chapter. 
This chapter is presented in five sections. Section 3.2 looks at the background to the 
development of the current regime to provide support for the use of private interest 
theory. Section 3.3 introduces private interest theory as a basis for evaluating the process 
by which the current regime was arrived at. Section 3.4 explains how private interest 
theory can be used to examine the development of the current regime and provides an 
overview as to how this theory has been used by various commentators to explain the 
regulatory process. In applying this theory Section 3.5 identifies the various interest 
groups to be examined in Chapter 4. It is argued that to the extent that the development of 
the regulation of audit independence has been dominated by private interests, the stated 
goal of the public interest may not be achieved. Section 3.6 sets out the reasons for 
excluding other submissions from analysis in this thesis and provides support for this. 
 
3.2 WHY PRIVATE INTEREST THEORY WAS SELECTED TO EVALUATE 
THE CURRENT REGIME? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a recurring theme identified in the key CLERP 
principles is the public interest. The public interest is the motivation which underpins the 
development of corporate law in relation to audit independence.   
The public interest in the context of the auditor independence requirement 
explained in Chapter 2 was concerned with the economic needs of the primary users of 
accounting information, namely individual investors and those in the financial 
community who rely on the objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on 
behalf of these individual investors.255  However, this thesis argues that the current 
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legislation in some circumstances does not serve the economic interests of these primary 
users of accounting information because it was developed to serve private interests. 
Through the use of this theory, it is envisaged that the development of the current 
CLERP 9 legislation can be found to have (at least in some circumstances) served the 
private interests of certain interest groups whilst at the same time compromising ideal 
auditor independence. This way, potential gaps in the current legislation can be identified 
and legal reform can be specifically designed with the objective of promoting ideal 
auditor independence and therefore advancing the public interest as defined in this thesis. 
The submission documents available for public inspection during the CLERP 9 and 
Audit Enhancement Bill public consultation processes can provide the relevant 
information to ascertain what the various lobby groups had lobbied for and whether any 
(or all) of the various groups have been successful in obtaining what they have lobbied 
for. For the purposes of this thesis, ‘success’ by a lobby group could mean either it has 
obtained what it has lobbied for or an outcome that is in substance256 what it has lobbied 
for.  
These submission documents show how lobby groups obtained legislation 
consistent with their own interests. We can then analyse how it falls short of the ideal 
independence requirement identified earlier. 
According to private interest theory, certain interest groups will seek to influence 
the regulatory process in order to achieve an outcome that is consistent with their 
respective goals, which may not necessarily be in the public interest.257 On this view, 
legislation (the outcome of the regulatory process) is perceived as a means (resource) by 
which various interest groups can enhance their respective self-interests. 
Under the ‘private interest’ perspective of regulation, effectively organized groups 
can lobby successfully for their respective interests and the government can be influenced 
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by such lobbying efforts at the expense of the public interest.258 These effectively 
organized groups have an advantage over the unorganized individual as these groups 
have access to valuable resources such as information, time and money which can be 
utilized to protect their own more significant financial interests.259  
On this view, private interest theory can explain the manner in which the current 
regime was formulated. It is suggested that various interest groups may have an interest 
in protecting themselves through lobbying efforts from the consequences of Australian 
corporate failures like HIH and One.Tel.  
The aim of this thesis is to explore whether the development of the current regime 
has been motivated by the self-seeking interests of the major interest groups selected to 
be analyzed in this thesis being the members of accounting professional bodies, managers 
of companies and government officials (referred to in this thesis as “Selected Interest 
Groups”) rather than the public interest. This theory is best suited to be applied in this 
thesis as preliminary observations suggest that certain interest groups have lobbied to 
protect their respective interests. It is argued that the lobbying activities of these interest 
groups have at least in some instances influenced the CLERP 9 outcome and can 
therefore explain the development of the current regime. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to analyse all possible theories and to pursue the complex philosophical debates 
around this issue.  
The interest groups analysed in this thesis were selected on the basis that these were 
the most obvious groups that would seek to influence the CLERP 9 auditor independence 
requirements. The reasons (explained in Section 3.5) can be generally summarised as 
members of accounting professional bodies have their livelihoods at stake, managers of 
companies (producer group) have to constantly ensure that audit expenses are kept under 
control as these costs can affect their profitability and government officials have the 
incentive to maintain their respective position of power or privilege within the 
community.  
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This thesis utilises private interest theory to identify the most direct and obvious 
beneficiaries of the current legislation as it is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyse all 
possible interest groups.  
The following table summarises the Selected Interest Groups that will be examined 
and the respective sub-groups (where applicable) as discussed in Section 3.5.  
Selected Interest Groups Sub-groups (where applicable) 
Members of accounting professional bodies Accounting Associations 
 Big 4 Firms 
 Middle Tier Firms 
 Small Firms 
Managers of companies (producer group) These comprise of producers of financial 
information 
Government officials Accounting Professional & Ethical 
Standards Board Limited 
 ASIC 
 ASX 
 Auditing & Assurance Standards Board 
 Companies Auditors & Liquidators 
Disciplinary Board 
 Financial Reporting Council 
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3.3 PRIVATE INTEREST THEORY 
3.3.1 An introduction to private interest theory  
According to Horwitz, a theory of regulation seeks to explain the development of 
regulation and how key actors can influence the development of such regulation.260 The 
private interest theory of regulation is applied in this thesis as certain interest groups have 
lobbied to protect their respective interests and have in some instances influenced the 
development of CLERP 9.   
Originally developed by Stigler, private interest theory proposes that individuals 
seek to promote their respective self interests and will do so by organising themselves 
into lobby groups.261 This theory proposes that the process of accommodation and 
compromise prior to the enactment of new legislation can be influenced by private 
interests.262 As a consequence the legislative enactment may reflect the interests of the 
most powerful group(s).263  
Stigler and Peltzman proposed that lobby groups that were organized effectively 
have an advantage over the unorganized person.264 According to Peltzman ‘these groups 
have access to valuable resources such as information, time and money which can be 
utilized to protect their own more significant financial interests’.265 This means that 
effectively organized group(s) (say accountants) that have more at stake (for example 
their livelihoods) from the introduction of the new legislation have the potential to use 
these resources at their disposal to influence the outcome of the legislation for their own 
benefit at the expense of the unorganized person (say shareholders).    
In Peltzman’s view, ‘the most important element of [private interest] theory is its 
integration of the analysis of political behaviour with the larger body of economic 
analysis.’266 On this view, it is assumed that groups will form to protect their respective 
economic interests. In doing so, these groups will seek to lobby the government to 
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introduce legislation that benefits their respective groups to the exclusion of others. As a 
consequence, the legislative outcomes reflect the interests of the most powerful 
group(s).267  
According to Stigler, Peltzman, Posner and Becker, private interest theory explains 
how regulation can be used to serve the economic interests of politically effective 
groups.268 Posner claimed that this theory is based on the assumption ‘that people seek to 
advance their self-interest and do so rationally.’269 As a consequence of this Stigler, 
Peltzman, Posner and Becker argued that groups will compete for political influence in 
order to have access to regulation that can enhance the welfare of these groups.270 
Horwitz was of the opinion that ‘interest group bargaining takes place at the expense of 
the unorganized. There is no concept of the state as a positive actor. The state is little 
more than the vehicle for private group compromise and the source of coercion to enforce 
that agreement.’271 
Stigler, Peltzman, Posner and Becker view regulation as a valuable commodity that 
is actively sought by powerful interest groups.272 Once the legislative process has been 
captured by these interest groups, the outcome of this legislative process will be the 
enactment of legislation that is designed to promote the economic interests of the most 
powerful groups.273 Stigler has stated that:  
The state-the machinery and power of the state-is a potential resource or threat to 
every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel, to take or give 
money, the state can and does selectively help or hurt a vast number of 
industries.274 The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not 
shared with even the mightiest of its citizens: the power to coerce. The state can 
seize money by the only method which is permitted by the laws of a civilized 
society, by taxation. The state can ordain the physical movements of resources 
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and the economic decisions of households and firms without their consent. These 
powers provide the possibilities for the utilization of the state by an industry to 
increase its profitability.275  
According to Stigler, Peltzman, Posner and Becker, legislation is enacted to serve 
the interests of various groups including politicians who seek re-election.276 They were of 
the view that votes and money are critical resources that can determine the success or 
failure of a political campaign. That is self-interested politicians would be willing to lend 
their support to vote in favour of enacting legislation that would benefit the economic 
interests of powerful groups potentially at the expense of the public interest in exchange 
for these resources. 277 As a result, groups that are able to organise effectively to deliver 
these resources to self-interested politicians stand to benefit from the political process as 
compared to the unorganised person who does not have the means on his or her own to 
provide such resources on a large scale.278 
 
Stigler stated:  
The industry which seeks political power must go to the appropriate seller, the 
political party. The political party has costs of operation, costs of maintaining an 
organization and competing in elections. These costs of the political process are 
viewed excessively narrowly in the literature on the financing of elections: 
elections are to the political process what merchandizing is to the process of 
producing a commodity, only an essential final step. The party maintains its 
organization and electoral appeal by the performance of costly services to the 
voter at all times, not just before elections.279  
Peltzman agreed with Stigler as follows: 
As the politician’s ultimate goal is securing and enhancing his / her power, the 
politician prefers decisions that directly elicit favourable votes. Regulatory 
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decisions can also elicit campaign contributions, contributions of time to get-out-
the vote, occasional bribes, or well-paid jobs in the political afterlife. As the more 
well-financed and well-staffed campaigns tend to be the more successful and 
because a self-interested politician also values wealth, he / she will pay attention 
to these resource (money) consequences of regulatory decision as well as to the 
direct electoral consequences.280  
The existence of politically effective interest groups has caused regulation to be described 
as a commodity subject to the laws of economics of supply and demand. According to 
Posner:  
Since the coercive power of government can be used to give valuable benefits to 
particular individuals or groups, economic regulation-the expression of that 
power in the economic sphere-can be viewed as a product whose allocation is 
governed by laws of supply and demand281 … There are a fair number of case 
studies-of trucking, airlines, railroads, and many other industries-that support the 
view that economic regulation is better explained as a product supplied to interest 
groups than as an expression of the social interest in efficiency or justice.282  
Becker further developed Stigler’s theory and claimed that ‘individuals belong to 
particular groups-defined by occupation, industry, income, geography, age, and other 
characteristics-that are assumed to use political influence to enhance the well-being of 
their members.’283 Becker declared that groups with such characteristics can be 
considered ‘active groups [that] produce pressure to raise their political influence and the 
sum of all influences are jointly determined by the pressures produced by all groups.’284 
Becker’s view that ‘governments can correct market failures by favouring the politically 
powerful’ is consistent with that of Stigler, Peltzman and Posner.285  
According to Becker while a politically active group with similar characteristics 
may be willing to incur costs to become well informed about political issues in order to 
protect their common economic interests, the unorganised individual will be less 
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motivated to do so.286 Becker maintained that there is greater motivation for an individual 
to become well informed about most private decisions (for example, a decision to 
purchase a car). This is because such private decisions have a direct impact on their 
general well-being be it financial or otherwise and as a result the individual will have to 
live with the consequences of his/her mistake. On the other hand there is less incentive to 
become well informed about political issues as each individual knows that he/she by 
him/herself will not be able to have significant influence on the political outcome to be 
decided by the majority.287 
As explained above, private interest theory is applicable when powerful interest 
groups are able to successfully lobby for their respective self-interests. This theory 
however assumes that the government can be influenced by the lobbying efforts of these 
powerful interest groups. Li and Xu have suggested that this can only happen when a 
government is willing to listen to its constituents.288 They have stated that the ability of 
various groups to effectively lobby for their respective interests is dependent on the 
extent of democracy that exists in the respective jurisdiction. In their view, ‘a more 
democratic society provides more effective channels for its constituents to voice concerns 
and erects lower barriers for its constituents to organize interest groups.’289 As a result 
the greater the extent of democracy practiced in the respective jurisdiction, the higher the 
likelihood of private interest theory being applicable. Applying Li and Xu’s view, private 
interest theory may not be applicable in an environment where democracy is non-
existent, for example, in a dictatorial regime as compared to a fully matured democracy 
such as that which is practiced in Australia. 
In sum, private interest theory is applied in this thesis to examine the development 
of the auditor independence requirements in CLERP 9 due to the existence of certain 
interest groups that would be keen to influence the development of the regulatory process 
for their own benefit. These interest groups will comprise of likeminded individuals with 
similar characteristics and as a consequence have common goals. The ability of these 
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groups to lobby effectively for their self-motivated interests can be constrained by the 
extent to which the government is willing to seek the views of its constituents on such 
regulatory proposals and the available resources (time and money) at their disposal to 
lobby for their respective interests.  
As suggested above, the more resources (time and money) an interest group has at 
its disposal, the higher the likelihood of it being able to influence the regulatory process. 
This is because political lobbying involves costs that may be prohibitive to interest 
groups that do not have sufficient resources. The next section explains what these 
prohibitive costs are. 
3.3.2 The prohibitive costs that can influence the regulatory outcome  
Peltzman has provided some insight as to what these prohibitive costs entail. 
Peltzman has identified two types of costs that play a part in an interest group’s ability to 
influence the regulatory process. These are information and organization costs.290  
Information costs are the costs that will be borne by the individual in order for the 
individual to be adequately informed about a regulatory proposal. Such information 
would include details as to how the regulatory proposal will affect the individual’s 
economic interests. This way, the individual would be in a position to make a well-
informed and timely decision in relation to the regulatory proposal.291  
Organization costs pertain to the costs involved for the individual to seek out other 
likeminded individuals and to set up an effective lobby group that can lobby for, against 
or abstain from lobbying on the regulatory proposal so as to promote their financial 
interests.292 
It is unlikely that an individual would want to incur such costs as there is no direct 
benefit to be gained from such an exercise. As suggested by Becker, there is less 
incentive for the individual to incur such costs as each individual knows that he/she by 
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him/herself will not be able to have significant influence on the outcome of the regulatory 
proposal to be decided by the majority.293 
On the other hand, Becker declared that individuals that belong to particular groups 
(such as by occupation and industry) have more money at their disposal as a result of 
their combined resources. These groups are in a better position (as compared to the 
unorganised individual) to obtain timely and relevant information in relation to the 
regulatory proposals as to what is at stake and how these proposals can affect their 
respective financial interests. These groups have the ability to rapidly organize 
themselves to lobby effectively for, against or abstain from lobbying on the various 
regulatory proposals in order to protect their respective financial interests.294  
3.3.3 The moderated final outcome 
According to private interest theory, the motivations behind the lobbying activities 
of these interest groups were driven by self-seeking interests. As a consequence, it is 
unlikely that the current auditor independence legislation (in its entirety) can be said to be 
consistent with ideal independence. Likewise, it would be incorrect to assume that the 
development of the current auditor independence legislation was driven purely by 
rational economic principles. 
The idea that is being mooted by the advocates of private interest theory (such as 
Stigler, Peltzman, Posner and Becker) is that groups that do not have significant financial 
wealth at their disposal to organise themselves into lobby groups with likeminded 
interests, will not be able to lobby effectively for regulation that may protect their 
respective interests. On this view legislation can in some circumstances be enacted to 
promote the economic interests of those who are in a position of power and influence at 
the expense of others who do not have significant financial wealth. 
Hirshleifer argued that it is generally in the political interest of the regulators to 
moderate the final outcome so as to ensure that the economic benefit/loss arising from the 
regulatory process is distributed widely across all groups including the large, diffused 
group comprised of unorganized individuals. In doing so, the regulators would ‘lean 
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against the wind’ so that the regulatory outcome will only reflect the majority (and not 
all) of the proposals put forward by the powerful interest groups.295 This way the 
economic interests of the other groups can also be promoted (albeit to a lesser extent).296  
This thesis adopts the private interest theory perspective suggested by 
commentators such as Stigler, Peltzman, Posner and Becker that groups will lobby to 
protect their respective interests as well as the views of Hirshleifer that further builds 
upon this theory by stating that the end product of this regulatory process is not only the 
outcome of intense lobbying among various interest groups but also a moderated final 
outcome in order for the appearance of social gain to be distributed.  
On this view it is argued that the development of the current auditor independence 
legislation has been influenced by the lobbying activities of various powerful interest 
groups and the Australian government’s efforts to accommodate and appease these 
interest groups. In doing so, the Australian government may unintentionally compromise 
ideal independence in some instances in order to accommodate the interests of various 
interest groups. The Australian government however will not select one single group for 
preferential treatment. This way it will not be seen to be favouring one particular group at 
the expense of others. Rather it can be perceived by the general public to be considering a 
wide range of interests from its constituency. 
In order to ensure that some portion of the benefit resulting from new legislation is 
distributed to all interest groups, the government may have in some instances, provided 
alternative solutions that appear to enhance ideal auditor independence. Such measures 
may result in a less than ideal version of auditor independence. In these circumstances, 
ideal auditor independence could be compromised. These solutions cannot and should not 
be considered as ideal solutions. As such, it can be argued that the moderated final 
outcome achieved by the government, as a result of the introduction of some of the 
various proposals successfully lobbied by these respective interest groups, may not 
necessarily be in the best interests of the public and may even be at the expense of the 
public. 
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This moderated final outcome if found to exist in the current auditor independence 
legislation suggests that some interest groups stand to benefit more by the introduction of 
the various auditor independence proposals successfully lobbied by them. If this can be 
established in this thesis, this would mean that the Australian government’s efforts to 
accommodate and appease the wide range of interests from its constituency (including 
certain interest groups) may have unintentionally resulted in ideal independence being 
compromised.   
 
3.3.4 How private interest theory will be applied in this thesis  
This theory which has been applied in countries such as the United States,297 is 
similarly applied to the auditor independence requirements in Australia for the purposes 
of this thesis. Various aspects of this theory have been adopted for the purposes of 
analysing the development of CLERP 9 whilst other elements have been intentionally 
excluded as explained in the following paragraphs. 
A political party needs to obtain as many votes as possible in order to form 
government and therefore they seek to win support by being perceived as being proactive 
following a corporate collapse such as HIH. Evidence (or lack) of such support of the 
government’s handling of the matter can be observed through voting power. Improving 
auditor independence is one way the government can be seen to be proactive in the wake 
of the HIH collapse. The current regime which endeavours to improve auditor 
independence is the outcome of such a process to win voter support. 
As shown previously, self-interested politicians can be ‘bought’ with money and 
votes.298 Lobby groups that are able to deliver these resources to these politicians can 
therefore influence the outcome of the regulatory process in order to benefit their 
respective economic interests at the expense of the public interest.299 In the context of the 
audit independence requirements in Australia, the regulatory process is not ‘bought’ with 
money and votes.  This thesis argues that private interest theory is still applicable because 
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the Australian government will seek to accommodate a wide range of interests from its 
constituents that will inevitably include powerful interest groups.  This form of 
accommodation by the Australian government with certain influential interest groups can 
potentially lead to the enactment of audit independence legislation that falls short of the 
ideal independence standard. 
Whether various interest groups have ‘bought’ the government by providing 
financial or other support as suggested by (amongst others) Stigler, Posner and Peltzman 
is not within the scope of this thesis. As such, this thesis will not seek to investigate 
whether regulatory decisions can directly elicit votes, money, favours and/or other 
questionable contributions. Instead, this thesis will focus on whether effectively 
organized groups have lobbied successfully for their respective interests and whether the 
government has been influenced by such lobbying efforts at the expense of greater 
auditor independence (the public interest). Effectively organized groups have an 
advantage over the unorganized individual as these groups have access to valuable 
resources such as information, time and money which can be utilized to protect their own 
more significant financial interests.  
3.4 PRIVATE INTEREST THEORY IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCOUNTING 
REGULATION 
The previous part of this chapter introduced private interest theory and discussed 
how the application of this theory can explain the development of regulation generally. 
This section provides various examples of how this theory has been adopted to explain 
the development of the accounting standard setting process.  
Private interest theory has been adopted in the various examples discussed below to 
explain how the regulatory process has developed as it takes into consideration the 
special interest that various interest groups have in influencing the regulatory outcome. 
This is consistent with the views of Stigler, Posner and Becker, that political systems 
have been subject to pressures from special interest groups that try to use influence to 
enhance their welfare. 
Different interest groups have various reasons for promoting their respective self-
interests. Depending on what is at stake, the interest groups that will be affected by the 
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outcome of the regulatory process may vary and so will the respective motivation(s) for 
these interest groups to influence the regulatory process. The findings from this analysis 
will be used to explain why the Selected Interest Groups were determined for the 
purposes of analysing the development of CLERP 9. 
 Deegan, Morris and Stokes maintained that ‘audit firms are relatively more likely 
to lobby in favour of particular accounting methods if those methods are already in use 
by a number of their clients.’300 The application of private interest theory in these 
circumstances would mean that these audit firms were lobbying to protect their interests.  
The reason for this could be that audit firms favour rules that reduce the amount of time 
taken required to conduct an audit. As these ‘methods are already in use by a number of 
their clients’ familiarity with the ‘particular accounting methods’ would enable the audit 
firm to complete the audit in a shorter amount of time as compared to the application of  
new and unfamiliar methods. In addition the risk that the auditor could be found to be 
negligent during the conduct of the audit is reduced as the audit firm would be well 
versed with the application of the existing methods.  
Puro however claims that the opposite could also happen in that audit firms can 
favour the application of new methods if the audit firms are adequately renumerated for 
their additional work.301  Puro conducted a study on the lobbying activities of audit firms 
in the United States302 in relation to the accounting standard setting process. Puro 
suggests that audit firms will favour the application of new disclosure rules because audit 
firms can expect to generate additional audit fees as a result.303 Puro further adds that if 
small audit firms lack the specialization to generate the additional business, large audit 
firms would be more likely to support the new disclosure rules.304 
According to Walker and Robinson, the threat by the Australian Stock Exchange 
(now known as the Australian Securities Exchange) to intervene in the accounting 
standard setting process was sufficient incentive for the accounting profession to abandon 
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their lobbying efforts to impede the development of a particular accounting standard.305 
These commentators stated that the Australian Accounting Research Foundation 
(“AARF”) (sponsored by the accounting profession) had lobbied for the disclosure of 
funds statements instead of the statement of cash flows. They claimed that the AARF 
attempted to delay the Accounting Standards Review Board (now known as the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board) from developing an accounting standard in 
relation to the statements of cash flows.306 Walker and Robinson noted that the Australian 
Stock Exchange subsequently gave notice in 1990 of its intention to require listed 
companies pursuant to the listing requirements to provide a statement of cash flows by 
1992. They stated that the Australian Stock Exchange threatened to introduce its own 
requirements if the Accounting Standards Review Board failed to issue an accounting 
standard for that purpose. According to Walker and Robinson, this threat was sufficient 
to cause the accounting profession to work with the Accounting Standards Review Board 
to develop and issue an accounting standard in relation to the statements of cash flows in 
December 1991.307 
Brown and Tarca have noted that the professional accounting bodies have the 
ability to wield significant influence in order to promote their respective interests during 
the accounting standard setting process.308 They examined a separate CLERP 9 proposal 
that is not directly associated with improving auditor independence and as a consequence 
has been intentionally excluded from analysis in this thesis. They analysed how lobbying 
by various interest groups (including the professional accounting bodies) had successfully 
lobbied against a CLERP 9 proposal to replace the existing Australian accounting 
standards (“ASA”) with International Accounting Standards (“IAS”).309  In their view, by 
delaying the ‘wholesale adoption’ of the IAS, the professional accounting bodies were 
able to maintain their influence over the Australian accounting standards process as 
compared to the delegation of this authority to an international body being the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”) where their influence will be 
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greatly reduced.310 They concluded that the threat to this influence can take the form of 
for example, the reduced likelihood of the professional accounting bodies’  representation 
on the governance of the IASC and as a consequence their ability to influence the 
international standards as compared to their existing leadership role in lobbying for 
Australian standards.311 In addition to Brown and Tarca, Godfrey has also proposed that 
private interest theory can be used to explain why the Australian professional accounting 
bodies (Institute, CPA and the IPA) may want to influence the accounting standard 
setting process.312  Brown and Tarca also alluded to the existence of other interest groups 
(other than the professional accounting bodies) that also sought to influence the standard 
setting process. These interest groups included the producers of financial information 
(companies) as well as the regulators (for example, ASIC and the ASX).313 In doing so, 
they suggested that the lobbying by producers of financial information and the regulators 
would be motivated by cost savings and outcomes that would make economic sense.314 
They noted however that ASIC (then known as the Australian Securities Commission) 
did not take an active role in the process. They concluded that this was probably 
attributed to ASIC’s emphasis on monitoring and compliance rather than standard 
setting.315 
The findings by commentators such as Deegan, Morris and Stokes, Puro, Walker 
and Robinson and Brown and Tarca in the selection of the various interest groups as set 
out in the above examples are similarly applied in the identification of the relevant 
interest groups to be examined in this thesis. The next section explains this.  
3.5 UTILISING PRIVATE INTEREST THEORY TO IDENTIFY THE 
SELECTED INTEREST GROUPS FOR THE PURPOSES OF 
EVALUATING CLERP 9 
Private interest theory proposes that in the background, there are powerful user 
groups that will seek to influence the regulatory process for their own benefit which may 
not necessarily be in the public interest. Section 3.4 explained how the various interest 
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groups were identified by reference to what they stand to gain (or lose as the case may 
be) by the outcome of the regulatory process and their respective motivations to influence 
the regulatory process. This section similarly explains how the Selected Interest 
Groups316 were determined by applying private interest theory. This method is based on 
identifying what the interest groups have at stake as a consequence of the regulatory 
process and their self-interested incentives to influence the regulatory process.317  
The Selected Interest Groups have an incentive to influence the legislature so as to 
benefit from the introduction of the new legislation. The Selected Interest Groups were 
determined after careful evaluation as the groups that will most likely value the outcome 
of any company law reform in relation to auditor independence. The members of 
accounting professional bodies have their livelihoods at stake, managers of companies 
(producer group) have to constantly ensure that audit expenses are kept under control as 
these costs can affect their profitability and government officials have the incentive to 
maintain their respective position of power or privilege within the community.  
This means that the legislature can be influenced by the Selected Interest Groups 
since the Selected Interest Groups stand to lose or gain from the introduction of such 
legislation. Put simply, compact, organized groups would stand a better chance of 
lobbying successfully for their respective interests at the expense of a diffused group of 
unorganised individuals.   
This section discusses why the Selected Interest Groups were used to evaluate the 
current regime under the sub-headings - Members of accounting professional bodies, 
Managers of companies (producer group) and Government officials.  
3.5.1 Members of accounting professional bodies 
This thesis concurs with Brown, Tarca318 and Godfrey’s319 comments that the 
professional accounting bodies have the capability to influence the accounting standard 
setting process. This thesis argues that the professional accounting bodies (Institute, CPA 
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and the IPA) will seek to promote their respective interests in relation to auditor 
independence legal reform.  
In analysing the lobbying decisions of audit firms to lobby in favour of existing and 
familiar accounting methods as described above, Deegan, Morris and Stokes have 
stressed the importance of the anticipated cost savings to audit firms and the perceived 
reduction of auditor liability as a result.320 Likewise, in investigating the lobbying efforts 
of audit firms in relation to the application of new disclosure rules, Puro emphasised the 
importance of increased audit revenue that audit firms can expect to receive as a 
consequence of the new disclosure requirements.321 
The motivations that influence the decisions of members of accounting professional 
bodies to lobby during the accounting standard setting process such as cost savings as 
suggested by Deegan, Morris and Stokes322 and increasing audit revenue as proposed by 
Puro323 can be similarly applied in the context of auditor independence legal reform. 
Their views are adopted in this thesis as it is suggested below that auditors will seek to 
lobby against proposals that may increase audit costs and proposals which may lead to a 
decrease in profits for audit firms. 
This thesis proposes that the members of the Australian accounting professional 
bodies have had an influence in the development of the current regime. Factors that may 
influence their decision to lobby for or against legal reform in relation to auditor 
independence includes (amongst other things) potential loss of recurring fees from audit 
and/or non-audit clients, increase in audit costs as a result of more stringent legislation 
for auditors (for example, compulsory auditor rotations for listed entities) which may lead 
to a decrease in profits for audit firms and legal reform aimed at curbing or reducing their 
influence in the audit standard setting process.  
These members of the Australian accounting professional bodies have been further 
subdivided into smaller groups.  These groups consist of the Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms and Small Firms. The Accounting Associations are 
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grouped together because these associations have provided (amongst other submissions) 
joint submissions, collectively representing all 3 associations. These associations also 
have common interests. One such common interest is to increase or at the very least, to 
maintain their respective influence in the audit standard setting process. Failure to 
maintain this influence can lead to their eventual lack of relevance and subsequent 
demise. In relation to the Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms and Small Firms categories, 
these accounting firms have been grouped together accordingly based on the way they 
have described themselves in their respective submissions. The Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier 
Firms and Small Firms are also grouped on the basis of common interests shared by the 
respective groups. For example, the size of the audit firm has a direct bearing on the type 
of audit client the firm can provide audit services to. Larger firms generally have more 
audit staff and audit expertise in terms of specialisations available. As a consequence the 
audit clients of larger firms would include listed entities which require such resources and 
expertise. On the other hand, the client base of smaller audit firms generally comprise of 
non-listed entities which by virtue of their size and nature of business, do not require as 
many audit staff and specialised audit experience to complete the audit. Medium sized 
firms may have a mix of listed and non-listed entities as audit clients. In most instances 
however the majority (if not all of their clients) would comprise of non-listed entities. 
The various audit firms discussed in this thesis can therefore be categorized into three 
broad categories being Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms and Small Firms on the basis of 
their common interests (for example by type of audit clients). They are grouped together 
as such, as each category of audit firm will seek to protect their respective economic 
interests which can vary significantly from one group to another. 
3.5.2 Managers of companies (producer group) 
Feroz and Hagerman have commented on Puro’s findings and have stated that audit 
firms are not the direct beneficiaries of new disclosure rules.324 They state that audit 
firms are not the issuers of financial statements. The issuers of financial statements are 
the companies which the audit firms audit. As a consequence the interests of the direct 
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beneficiaries (audited companies) need to be examined.325 This is also the case in 
Australia. This thesis agrees with Feroz and Hagerman’s assertions that as the issuers of 
financial statements stand to directly benefit from any auditor independence legal reform, 
the managers of companies (producer group), as an interest group needs to be evaluated. 
Shea and Chari have commented on the influential role that the managers of 
companies (producer group) have played in the development of merger control regulation 
(“MCR”) in the European Union. They analysed how the Nestle/Perrier merger in 1992 
influenced the development of the MCR. Shea and Chari’s findings from the 
Nestle/Perrier merger indicate that the managers of companies (producer group) such as 
Nestle and BSN would seek to lobby for regulation that could increase their respective 
profits.326  Nestle and BSN, both being business entities, had profitability in mind and as 
a consequence were motivated to use this opportunity to increase their respective market 
share by taking advantage of the new markets offered by the newly formed European 
Union.327 
Although this example analysed the development of competition regulation in the 
European Union, this thesis argues that the managers of companies (producer group) may 
also seek to influence the development of auditor independence legal reform Australia in 
order to protect and/or increase their respective profits. This is consistent with Brown and 
Tarca’s comments in that the managers of companies (producer group) have an incentive 
to lobby for economic outcomes that can potentially provide financial benefits to each of 
them respectively.328 
This thesis proposes that there exists a special interest group consisting of various 
Australian entities that may have lobbied for the current regime. Managers of Companies 
(Producer Group) are defined as producers of financial information. As such this category 
comprises of Australian entities that produce financial information. Factors that may 
influence their decision to lobby for or against legal reform in relation to auditor 
independence includes (amongst other things) increase in audit costs as a result of more 
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stringent legislation for auditors (for example, compulsory auditor rotations for listed 
entities), legal reform aimed at curbing or reducing their influence in the audit standard 
setting process and the creation of additional obligations on entities to disclose more 
information. 
3.5.3 Government officials 
The Nestle/Perrier merger not only provides an example of the lobbying behaviour 
of managers of companies (in this instance, multi-national conglomerates) but it also 
provides supporting evidence of how the regulator (the MTF) can also be an interest 
group – a group that is motivated to use this Nestle/Perrier test case to cement its role and 
extend its influence in the European Union.329  
The commentary by Shea and Chari suggested that the newly created European 
Union offered the opportunity for various actors to compete for political influence in 
previously unchartered political territory. The MTF was put forward as one such actor as 
it was motivated to establish its role as the regulatory body that could decide on matters 
concerning merger control regulation in the European Union.330 It can therefore be said 
that the self-seeking interest of the MTF was to establish its influence in the development 
of merger control regulation thereby ensuring its position of power and privilege in this 
aspect within the European Union community.  
In addition to Shea and Chari, Brown and Tarca have also acknowledged the 
existence of the regulator(s) as another interest group(s) that may seek to influence the 
development of the regulatory process.331 Brown and Tarca have suggested that the 
regulators (such as the APESB, AASB, CALDB, FRC, ASIC and the ASX) can be 
considered as separate and distinct interest groups as these entities may have an incentive 
to lobby for their respective interests.332  
This thesis concurs with Brown and Tarca in that the APESB, AASB, CALDB, 
FRC, ASIC and the ASX can be categorized as distinct and separate special interest 
groups to be evaluated. This is because these entities function independently from the 
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other and have separate and distinct roles to perform in relation to the audit independence 
regulatory function. Despite these differences, these entities can have the same and/or 
similar motivations for pursuing their respective self-interests as discussed below.   
The Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited is funded by the 
Accounting Associations but represents to be ‘an independent, national body that sets the 
code of ethics and professional standards’ for the members of the Accounting 
Associations to comply.333 The Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board 
Limited is considered a regulator for the purposes of this thesis, as it can potentially 
influence the development of auditor independence standards that can affect the manner 
in which members of the Accounting Associations conduct the external audit for their 
clients. As the Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited has been 
entrusted with the responsibility of standard setting as it relates to professional conduct 
and ethics for the Accounting Associations, it has a special interest in ensuring that this 
measure of influence is sustained and/or increased well into the future in order to 
maintain its position of power and privilege in this standard setting process. The APESB 
has shown its intent to lobby for its interests as it has furnished a submission to the 
Treasury in relation to the Audit Enhancement Bill.334 
The Auditing & Assurance Standards Board ‘is an independent, statutory agency of 
the Australian government, responsible for developing, issuing and maintaining auditing 
and assurance standards’.335 Its mission ‘is to develop, in the public interest, high-quality 
auditing and assurance standards’ that are legally enforceable under the Corporations Act 
in order to enhance the credibility of audited financial information.336 As in the case of 
the Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited, the Auditing & 
Assurance Standards Board is considered a regulator due to its ability to influence the 
auditor independence regime through its capacity to develop related standards that can 
regulate the conduct of the external audit by members of the Accounting Associations. 
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Likewise, the Auditing & Assurance Standards Board has been similarly entrusted with 
the responsibility of standard setting as it relates to auditing and in particular audit 
independence for the Accounting Associations, it also has a special interest in ensuring 
that this measure of influence is sustained and/or increased well into the future in order to 
maintain its position of power and privilege in this standard setting process. A submission 
was noted to have been prepared by the AASB and presented to the PJCCFS concerning 
the Relevant Proposals.337 This provides support that it is keen to lobby for its interests. 
The CALDB is a disciplinary body that conducts hearings in response to 
applications made by ASIC338 to determine whether a registered auditor has contravened 
the Corporations Act by (amongst other things) failing to adhere to their respective codes 
of professional conduct in relation to auditor independence.339 In addition, the CALDB 
also conducts hearings to determine the administrative and conduct matters of registered 
liquidators.340 The CALDB has a public protective role by virtue of its powers to cancel 
or suspend an auditor’s registration.341 The CALDB is therefore considered a regulator 
for the purposes of this thesis due to its public protective role and its ability to reprimand 
registered auditors for non-compliance of the auditor independence requirements in 
relation to their respective codes. The CALDB will have a keen interest in preserving and 
enhancing its public protective role in order to maintain its position of power or privilege 
within the community and as a consequence will be motivated to influence the 
development of the current regime to achieve that outcome. The CALDB has indicated 
that it is interested to lobby for its interests as it has procured a submission to the 
Treasury in relation to the Relevant Proposals.342 
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The FRC is entrusted with the responsibility for providing broad oversight of the 
process for setting accounting and auditing standards as well as the delivery of strategic 
policy advice and reports to the Treasurer and professional accounting bodies in relation 
to the quality of the external audit.343 The strategic policy advice offered by the FRC can 
include matters in relation to the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations 
Act, the auditing standards and the codes of professional conduct adhered to by members 
of the Accounting Associations.344 The FRC can be considered a regulator as it has the 
potential to influence the development of auditing standards through its broad oversight 
function and the provision of strategic policy advice in relation to auditing and in 
particular audit independence. The FRC will be motivated to seek to influence the 
development of the current regime. By cementing its role as a key actor in the regulatory 
process, it can maintain its position of power or privilege within the community. The 
FRC was noted to have submitted submissions on two separate occasions, once in 
relation to the Relevant Proposals and the other in relation to the Audit Enhancement 
Bill.345 This indicates that the FRC is motivated to lobby for its respective interests. 
ASIC is the regulator primarily responsible for monitoring and enforcing the 
auditor independence requirements in Australia pursuant to the Corporations Act.346 
ASIC’s audit oversight activities can promote ideal auditor independence as the threat of 
enforcement action by ASIC can act as a deterrent to potentially non-complying auditors 
to conform with the current requirements. ASIC must be seen to be proactive or else it 
risks facing public outcry and scrutiny which can eventually lead to its lack of relevance 
and subsequent demise.  
Brown and Tarca noted that the ASIC did not actively take part in the lobbying 
process (in relation to the CLERP 9 proposal to replace the existing Australian 
accounting standards with the ‘wholesale adoption’ of the International Accounting 
                                                 
343 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 8 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Financial Reporting Council, Submission to the Treasury, Exposure Draft Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), 10 November 2003, 1 and 
Financial Reporting Council Audit Quality Task Force, Submission to the Treasury, Corporations 
Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth), (undated), 1. 
346 See generally, ASIC Act Part 3 Division 3 and Corporations Act Part 2M Division 3.  
  95 
Standards) and suggested that the reason for this could be due to ASIC’s emphasis on 
monitoring and compliance rather than standard setting.347 This thesis disagrees with 
their view and argues that ASIC has an incentive to take an active role in the regulatory 
process in relation to the audit independence requirements in CLERP 9 because ASIC’s 
role pursuant to the Corporations Act stipulates that it takes a proactive role in monitoring 
and enforcing contraventions of the audit independence requirements.348 In order to fulfil 
this proactive role, ASIC would be keen to influence the development of audit 
independence regulation as the outcome of such a process will inevitably have an impact 
on its monitoring and enforcement function. Lax regulation (for audit independence 
compliance) can result in many potential breaches being undetected by ASIC, whereas 
overly-stringent regulation can stretch ASIC’s resources beyond its effective enforcement 
capability. Failure to fulfil this role can lead to public outcry and scrutiny which can 
result in its subsequent demise and loss of influence in the regulatory process. The 
contention that ASIC is keen to lobby for its interests, is supported by the fact that ASIC 
has provided a submission to the Treasury in relation to the Relevant Proposals.349 
The ASX has assumed a leadership role in enhancing Australian corporate 
governance practices.350  The entities trading on the ASX represent some of the largest 
companies by market capitalisation in Australia.351 The regulatory influence that the ASX 
wields on these listed entities is by no means insignificant. The threat of government 
intervention in circumstances where the ASX has been found to show a lack of leadership 
in its role in enhancing Australian corporate governance practices (for example, in the 
area of auditor independence) can lead to the erosion of such regulatory influence. As in 
the case of the APESB, AASB, CALDB, FRC and ASIC, the ASX has shown that it is 
also eager to lobby for its interests as it has also presented submissions on two separate 
occasions in relation to the Relevant Proposals.352 
                                                 
347 Brown and Tarca, above n 15, 279. 
348 See generally, ASIC Act Part 3 Division 3 and Corporations Act Part 2M Division 3. 
349 ASIC, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework, November 2002, 5. 
350 ASX, Corporate Governance Council <http://www.asx.com.au/regulation/corporate-governance-
council.htm>.    
351 ASX, Listing on ASX <http://www.asx.com.au/listings/listing-on-ASX.htm>.    
352 ASX, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework, 22 November 2002, 1 and ASX, Submission to the PJCCFS, Corporate 
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Brown and Tarca also noted that the ASX being a listed entity itself, can also be 
considered a producer of financial information and therefore can also be included in the 
interest group - the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) in addition to being a 
regulator.353 This thesis acknowledges that while the ASX can also be motivated by the 
same economic outcomes as other listed entities, the ASX’s leadership role in enhancing 
corporate governance practices and the public perception that it continues to do so 
suggests that its regulatory role takes precedence over any prospect of profiting by 
dishonest means when there is a conflict of interest. On this view it is analysed in this 
thesis from the perspective of a regulator. 
The APESB, AASB, CALDB, FRC, ASIC and the ASX will be motivated to 
influence the development of the current regime in order to ensure the maintenance of its 
respective position of power or privilege within the community. Other factors that may 
influence their decision to lobby for or against legal reform in relation to auditor 
independence includes (amongst other things) legal reform aimed at curbing or reducing 
their influence in the audit standard setting process, the creation of additional obligations 
on the regulator that may increase the risk of legal proceedings being commenced against 
the regulator by aggrieved persons and any other action which may cause the regulator to 
have a reduced position of power or privilege within the community. 
3.6 CRITERIA FOR EXCLUDING OTHER SUBMISSIONS 
 
Within the scope of this thesis it has not been possible to examine the influence of 
every submission made in response to the Relevant Proposals. Hence, some submissions 
have been ignored. The reasoning behind these exclusions is outlined below. Traditional 
literature using private interest theory354 in the context of corporate and accounting 
legislation have broadly focused on the lobbying efforts of groups such as the Selected 
Interest Groups for the purposes of analysing how a particular regulatory process may 
have been influenced by self-seeking interests. Private interest theory has generally based 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), 10 November 
2003, 3. 
353 Brown and Tarca, above n 15, 277. 
354 Stigler, above n 11, 12, Peltzman, above n 29, Posner, above n 29 and Becker, above n 29. 
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this approach on the assumption that these groups stand to gain/lose the most from any 
change to the particular regulatory outcome being examined and as a consequence have 
the most incentive to lobby for their respective interests.355 In adopting this approach, the 
literature ignored some parties who may also have made submissions in the legislative 
process. This thesis similarly applies the same approach in not considering in detail the 
submissions from these types of groups. 
This perspective of private interest theory does not take into account the possibility 
that in the specific area covered in this thesis that there could be an interest group(s) that 
may be keen to lobby for the public interest (for example, ideal auditor independence) for 
less direct economic and/or reputational reasons. Private interest theory assumes that 
powerful interest groups will seek to influence the legislative outcome for reasons that 
can be generally perceived to be directly attributed and/or closely associated with a 
gain/loss to that particular lobby group.356 In making the analysis in this thesis, the 
lobbying effort has been considered in respect of the submissions made to the Treasury 
and the PJCCFS. Submissions made by the Legal Practitioners and the External 
Commentators may be considered to be in this category. This is because these groups do 
not appear to directly benefit/lose from the introduction of the Relevant Proposals. The 
Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators are far more removed from the audit 
process as compared to those respective groups comprising the Selected Interest Groups. 
If the Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators were to achieve what they had 
requested for in their respective proposals as compared to the Accounting Associations, 
they are unlikely to get a direct benefit. It could be said that in submitting proposals that 
seek to benefit the public interest, the Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators 
could be perceived to be advocating for the public interest. This in itself could be 
considered a public relations exercise that can potentially enhance the reputations of the 
Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators at least from the public’s perspective 
but there is no direct financial benefit to be gained from the changes that they may 
advocate. There appears to be no direct link as to what their respective motivations might 
be other than to conclude that in these circumstances it could be that these groups were 
                                                 
355 Stigler, above n 11, 12, Peltzman, above n 29, Posner, above n 29 and Becker, above n 29. 
356 Stigler, above n 11, 12, Peltzman, above n 29, Posner, above n 29 and Becker, above n 29. 
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lobbying for less direct reputational reasons. On this basis, the Legal Practitioners and the 
External Commentators have been excluded from the Selected Interest Groups. 
Whilst there are reasons why these submissions are ignored from the perspective of 
private interest theory, a review of the actual submissions indicates that the Legal 
Practitioners and the External Commentators have in many instances the same regulatory 
outcome in mind as the Selected Interest Groups.357 In these instances, the Selected 
Interest Groups were successful in their lobbying efforts.358  
There was only one occasion noted where the Legal Practitioners and the External 
Commentators advanced proposals against the lobbying efforts of the Selected Interest 
Groups.359 This concerned the auditor rotation requirements. In this instance however, the 
Selected Interest Groups succeeded in their lobbying efforts and the proposals of the 
Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators were disregarded.360 
                                                 
357 For example, proposals from the Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators in relation to the 
the Annual Declaration were consistent with the successful lobbying efforts of the Accounting 
Associations. See Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on Corporate 
Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework, 21 November 2002, 3, Law Council of 
Australia, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework, 22 November 2002, 1 and Australian Auditors-General, Submission to 
the Treasury, Exposure Draft Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), 10 November 2003, 14. Likewise recommendations to limit the cooling off 
period to 2 years for Employment Relationships were consistent with the successful lobbying efforts of the 
Accounting Associations. See Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper 
on Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework, 21 November 2002, 3 and 
The Institute of Internal Auditors, Submission to the Treasury, Exposure Draft Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), 14 November 2003, 2. 
358 The Accounting Associations were successful in their lobbying efforts in relation to the Annual 
Declaration, see National Institute of Accountants, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on 
Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework, 25 November 2002, 15 and 
National Institute of Accountants, Submission to the PJCCFS, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), 14 December 2003, 13 (hereinafter “National 
Institute of Accountants PJ”) and to limit the cooling off period to 2 years for Employment Relationships, 
see CPA Australia, Submission to the PJCCFS, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform 
and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), 17 November 2003, 5 and Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia, Submission to the PJCCFS, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and 
Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), 17 November 2003, 8. 
359 Proposals from the Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators for a 5 year rotation were 
eventually disregarded, namely Corrs Chambers Westgarth, above n 357, 5, Law Council of Australia, 
above n 357, 2 and the Australian Auditors-General, above n 357, 15. 
360 In contrast to the suggestions by the Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators, proposals from 
(for example) the Accounting Associations to extend the rotation period to exceed 5 years were accepted. 
See CPA Australia, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening 
the Financial Reporting Framework, 25 November 2002, 10-11 and Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
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These findings provide additional support for excluding the Legal Practitioners and 
the External Commentators from detailed analysis. These results indicate that the 
regulatory outcomes in these instances are consistent with the successful lobbying efforts 
of the Selected Interest Groups rather than as a consequence of the proposals put forward 
by the Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators.   
This is because there was only one occasion where both the Legal Practitioners and 
the External Commentators advanced proposals against the lobbying efforts of the 
Selected Interest Groups.361 On this occasion, their efforts were ignored. These findings 
support the view that the Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators do not have 
any influence on the regulatory outcome of this topic.  
Private interest research, such as that carried out by Stigler, Peltzman, Posner and 
Becker, have deliberately focused on the lobbying efforts of powerful interest groups 
(such as the Accounting Associations, Managers of Companies and Government 
Officials) that stand to gain or lose as a consequence of the regulatory process. 362 These 
commentators do not consider the public investor as an influential interest group. On the 
contrary, the public investor is considered as an ineffective lobby group that lacks the 
requisite resources to organise itself efficiently to lobby successfully for the public 
interest. The lack of these resources can cause the interests of the public investor (being 
the public interest) to be compromised.363 On this basis, the Public Investors have been 
excluded.  
A review of the actual submissions further support this exclusion. It was noted that 
the Public Investors had submitted proposals on two occasions.364 These concerned the 
disclosure of non-audit services and the establishment of the Shareholders and Investors 
                                                                                                                                                 
Australia, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the 
Financial Reporting Framework, 25 November 2002, 6. 
361 Proposals from the Legal Practitioners and the External Commentators for a 5 year rotation were 
eventually disregarded, namely Corrs Chambers Westgarth, above n 357, 5, Law Council of Australia, 
above n 357, 2 and the Australian Auditors-General, above n 357, 15. 
362 Stigler, above n 11, 12, Peltzman, above n 29, Posner, above n 29 and Becker, above n 29. 
363 Stigler, above n 11, 12, Peltzman, above n 29, Posner, above n 29 and Becker, above n 29. 
364 Australian Shareholders’ Association Ltd, Submission to the PJCCFS, Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), 17 November 2003, 2 and 10 and The 
Australian Workers’ Union, Submission to the PJCCFS, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit 
Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth), November 2003, 2. 
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Advisor Council. The findings indicate that in relation to the disclosure of non-audit 
services, both the Public Investors and the Selected Interest Groups had different 
regulatory proposals in mind and that both their regulatory proposals were dismissed by 
the government.365 The findings also indicate that in relation to the establishment of the 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council, the Selected Interest Groups succeeded in 
their lobbying efforts and that the proposals of the Public Investors were disregarded.366  
These findings provide additional support for excluding the Public Investors from 
detailed analysis. These results indicate that regulatory outcomes favour the Selected 
Interest Groups as opposed to the Public Investors. This is because based on the two 
occasions examined where the Public Investors had put forward their views, on both 
these occasions their efforts were ignored by the government. These findings support the 
view that the Public Investors do not have any influence on the regulatory outcome.   
 
3.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter provided support for the use of private interest theory as a measure to 
evaluate the current regime. Preliminary observations suggest that various interest groups 
may have lobbied to protect their respective interests. As such, private interest theory 
would potentially explain what has happened.  
The public interest as discussed in Chapter 1, is the overriding theme for the six key 
CLERP principles. The key CLERP principles’ strong emphasis on ‘enhancing market 
integrity’, ‘ensuring that all investors have reasonable access to information’, ‘increasing 
the confidence of individual investors in the fairness and integrity of financial markets’, 
‘providing necessary investor and consumer protection’, ‘applying regulation consistently 
                                                 
365 For example, the Australian Shareholders’ Association Ltd, above n 364, 2 and The Australian Workers’ 
Union, above n 364 requested for outright prohibition of non-audit services, whereas the Accounting 
Associations advocated for adherence to the code of ethics, rather than mandatory disclosure, both of which 
were dismissed by the government. See CPA Australia, above n 360, 10, Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Australia, above n 360, 14 and National Institute of Accountants, above n 358, 9. 
366 For example, the Australian Shareholders’ Association Ltd, above n 364, 10 had provided support for 
the creation of the Council, but their suggestion was eventually disregarded whereas the Accounting 
Associations lobbied against the existence of such a Council and their proposal was ultimately accepted. 
See Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, above n 360, 22. 
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and fairly’ and ‘encouraging high standards of business practice and ethics’, is directly 
associated with safeguarding the public interest.  
As the key CLERP principles were intended to serve as a guide for future CLERP 
installments, the current legislation should be reviewed in circumstances where it is 
found to have digressed from its primary objective of safeguarding the public interest. 
This can occur in circumstances where the current legislation is found to have been 
developed to serve private interests rather than the stated goal of the public interest. The 
public interest may not have been the overriding consideration for the current regime but 
rather secondary to the respective interests of the Selected Interest Groups.   
Private interest theory can explain whether CLERP 9 has been developed to serve 
private interests. The current regime can then be tested against the stated goal of the 
public interest. Private interest theory was selected to evaluate how the current regime 
came about because it is well placed to explain the reasons for the various interest groups 
(members of accounting professional bodies, managers of companies and government 
officials) to control and oversee the regulation of financial reporting. Private interest 
theory is suitable for evaluating the current regime as the Selected Interest Groups stand 
to benefit the most from controlling and overseeing the development of the current 
regime. 
Commentators such as Stigler367 and Peltzman,368 have suggested that the 
development of the law can be associated with private interest theory. These 
commentators have introduced a promising approach that suggests what some of the key 
variables ought to be that can explain the regulatory process.  
To put this simply, regulation can be viewed as a commodity. In order for this to 
occur, firstly, there must be in existence interest groups that would benefit from the 
introduction of the new regulation. These interest groups would therefore have an 
incentive to influence the regulatory process so as to benefit from the introduction of such 
regulation. Secondly, these interest groups would need to be compact, highly organized 
and have the available resources (time and money) to effectively lobby for their 
                                                 
367 Stigler, above n 11. 
368 See generally, Peltzman, above n 29, 6-7. 
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respective interests. Finally, this means that the legislature must be able to be influenced 
by the lobbying efforts of the various interest groups. The greater the degree of 
democracy that exists, the higher the likelihood of private interest theory being 
applicable. This is because democracy provides a conducive environment for these key 
variables to thrive. 
When these key variables exist, private interest theory comes into play. The 
commodity of regulation would, in some circumstances, be developed for those who 
value it most. This would mean that the resultant regulation could in some circumstances, 
be developed to serve the private interests of the various groups that are compact, highly 
organized and that have the available resources to lobby effectively for their respective 
interests. This outcome may not necessarily be in the public interest. 
It is envisaged, through the use of private interest theory, this thesis can provide 
support  for the argument that the auditor independence requirements in CLERP 9 were 
developed to serve private interests rather than the stated goal of the public interest. This 
way, legal reform can be proposed in the area of auditor independence, where the current 
legislation is found to serve private interests, rather than the public interest. On this view, 
proposals for legal reform can be specifically designed with the objective of advancing 
the public interest and need not necessarily be consistent with the original intentions of 
the various stakeholders (members of accounting professional bodies, managers of 
companies and government officials).  
Now that the Selected Interest Groups have been identified, Chapter 4 will seek to 
determine the respective preferences of the Selected Interest Groups and examine how 
these preferences as far as independence is concerned are evident in legal reform. The 
Relevant Proposals, CLERP 9 Bill and Audit Enhancement Bill submissions from the 
Treasury and the JPCCFS as a result of the public consultation process will be used to 
ascertain this. 
This will be achieved by analysing the respective preferences of the Selected 
Interest Groups under the following sub-headings: Members of accounting professional 
bodies (further divided into the following sub-groups: Accounting Associations, Big 4 
Firms, Middle Tier Firms and Small Firms), Managers of companies (producer group) 
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and Government officials (being the APESB, AASB, CALDB, FRC, ASIC and the 
ASX).  
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Chapter 4: DOES PRIVATE INTEREST 
THEORY EXPLAIN HOW THE 
CURRENT REGIME WAS 
ESTABLISHED? 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will seek to determine whether any (or all) of the Selected Interest 
Groups have been successful in obtaining what they have lobbied for. For the purposes of 
this thesis, ‘success’ by a Selected Interest Group could mean either it has obtained what 
it has lobbied for or an outcome that is in substance what it has lobbied for.  
This chapter will discuss how the Selected Interest Groups may have had an impact 
in controlling and overseeing the regulation of financial reporting under the sub-headings 
- Members of accounting professional bodies, Managers of companies (producer group) 
and Government officials. Submissions obtained from the Treasury and the JPCCFS as a 
result of the Relevant Proposals, CLERP 9 Bill and Audit Enhancement Bill public 
consultation process will be used to ascertain this. Each of these sub-headings will 
identify the relevant stakeholders influencing the current regime from the perspective of 
private interest theory, assess the preferences of these stakeholders as far as independence 
is concerned and the extent to which these preferences are evident in legal reform. The 
preferences of these stakeholders as far as independence is concerned will be assessed by 
reference to the Relevant Proposals raised by the various stakeholder(s). 
The successful lobbying efforts by the Selected Interest Group(s) in relation to the 
Relevant Proposals in CLERP 9 were identified. Where the Relevant Proposals were 
subsequently amended by the Audit Enhancement Act, the successful lobbying efforts by 
the Selected Interest Group(s) were also identified. The Relevant Proposals subsequently 
amended by the Audit Enhancement Act specifically relate to the expanded FRC and 
auditor rotation proposals. As such, the impact of the initial lobbying by the Selected 
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Interest Groups in relation to the Relevant Proposals in CLERP 9 and the subsequent 
lobbying which resulted in the Audit Enhancement Act were both analysed. 
The Relevant Proposals369 are set out below:- 
Expanded FRC 
The Government will expand the responsibilities of the FRC, which currently 
oversees the accounting standard setting process, to oversee auditor independence 
requirements in Australia.370 
 
General Statement of Principle requiring Independence 
The Government will amend the Corporations Act to include a General Statement 
of Principle requiring the independence of auditors.371  
 
Annual Declaration by Auditor 
The Government will amend the law to require the auditor to make an annual 
declaration that they have maintained their independence.372 
 
Employment Relationships  
The Government will amend the law to strengthen restrictions on employment 
relationships between an auditor and the audit client. This will include a 
mandatory period of 2 years following resignation from an audit firm before a 
former partner who was directly involved in the audit of a client can become a 
director of the client or take a position with the client involving responsibility for 
fundamental management decisions.373  
 
 
                                                 
369 The CLERP 9 Policy Paper contained (amongst other things) 41 proposals in relation to CLERP 9. The 
Relevant Proposals comprised of legal reform for an expanded FRC, a general statement of principle 
requiring independence, an annual auditor declaration, employment relationships, financial relationships, 
non-audit services, auditor rotation, the expansion of auditors’ duties, streamlining auditor discipline 
arrangements and the establishment of a shareholders and investors advisory council.  These proposals 
were intended to be general in nature for all stakeholders to grasp essentially where corporate legal reform 
was heading whilst the fine tuning was intentionally left for future deliberation being the CLERP 9 Bill. 
Treasury, above n 26. 
370 Ibid 1. 
371 Ibid 2. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid. 
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Financial Relationships 
The Government will amend the law to impose new restrictions on financial 
relationships. This will cover investments in audit clients and loans between an 
audit client, and the auditor or the auditor’s immediate family.374  
 
Non-Audit Services 
The Government will implement a series of measures to deal with non-audit 
services. It will:- 
• Amend the law to require mandatory disclosure in the annual report of 
fees paid for the categories of non-audit services provided.375 
• Amend the law to require a statement in the annual report of whether the 
audit committee is satisfied the provision of non-audit services is 
compatible with auditor independence. This disclosure would include an 
explanation as to why the non-audit services referred to in F1, if 
contracted, do not compromise auditor independence.376 
 
Auditor Rotation 
The Government will make audit partner rotation compulsory after 5 years. The 
new requirement will apply to the lead engagement partner and the review 
partner. To maintain continuity of knowledge, the appointment of these partners 
could be staggered.377  
 
Auditors’ Duties Expanded  
The Government will amend the law to expand matters which auditors must 
report to ASIC to include any attempt to influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead 
the auditor.378 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
374 Ibid 3. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid 4. 
378 Ibid 8. 
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Streamline Auditor Discipline Arrangements 
The institutional arrangements for taking disciplinary action against registered 
company auditors will be strengthened to (amongst other things) provide a 
majority of members of the CALDB, with appropriate skills, who are non-
accountants.379 
 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
The Government will establish a Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council, to 
be chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, which it will consult 
on all disclosure-related reforms to ensure they meet the needs of retail 
investors.380 
 
4.2 MEMBERS OF ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONAL BODIES 
This section determines whether the members of the Australian accounting 
professional bodies have had an influence in the development of the current regime. 
Factors that may influence their decision to lobby for or against legal reform in relation to 
auditor independence includes (amongst other things) potential loss of recurring fees 
from audit and/or non-audit clients, increase in audit costs as a result of more stringent 
legislation for auditors (for example, compulsory auditor rotations for listed entities) 
which may lead to a decrease in profits for audit firms and legal reform aimed at curbing 
or reducing their influence in the audit standard setting process. 
These stakeholders have been further subdivided into smaller groups.  These groups 
consist of the Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms and Small Firms. 
The Accounting Associations are grouped together because these associations have 
provided (amongst other submissions) joint submissions, collectively representing all 3 
associations. These associations also have common interests. One such common interest 
is to increase or at the very least, to maintain their respective influence in the audit 
standard setting process. Failure to maintain this influence can lead to their eventual lack 
of relevance and subsequent demise. In relation to the Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms 
                                                 
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid. 
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and Small Firms categories, these accounting firms have been grouped together 
accordingly based on the way they have described themselves in their respective 
submissions. 
There is only one instance where the Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms and 
several representatives from the Middle Tier Firms aligned themselves to form a group 
(known as the Australian Public Policy Committee (“APPC”)) that lobbied in relation to 
the Expanded FRC and the Auditor Rotation requirements.381 Their combined lobbying 
efforts are noted under the heading Australian Public Policy Committee below.  
 
4.2.1 Accounting Associations 
This group consists of the CPA, the Institute and the IPA (formerly known as the 
‘National Institute of Accountants’). 
 
Expanded FRC 
The CPA did not support the FRC undertaking monitoring of the Accounting 
Associations. According to the CPA, it would be more effective for the FRC to focus on 
oversight and to have the monitoring function instead carried out by a newly created 
body. The CPA proposed that this separate entity could be funded by the users of 
financial information and in fulfilling this monitoring role could promote independence, 
transparency and public accountability.382 
The IPA was seeking to replace the words ‘monitor and review’ to ‘working with’ 
the Accounting Associations. The IPA was concerned that the words ‘monitor and 
review’ the Accounting Associations would empower the FRC to regulate the internal 
policy decisions of the Accounting Associations and to decide upon such matters which 
would ordinarily be the responsibility of the respective Accounting Associations. 
According to the IPA, the FRC should ‘facilitate discussion of issues surrounding auditor 
                                                 
381 Australian Public Policy Committee, Submission to the Treasury, Corporations Legislation Amendment 
(Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth), 31 October 2011, 1-2. 
382 CPA Australia, above n 360, 7. 
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independence issues and that it should work in conjunction with, not over the top of’ the 
Accounting Associations.383 
CLERP 9 provided the FRC with the jurisdiction to oversee and monitor the  
auditor independence requirements in Australia.384 Despite this however, ASIC and the 
Accounting Associations are the entities responsible for the enforcement of auditor 
independence requirements and not the FRC. ASIC is responsible for enforcement of the 
auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act whilst the Accounting 
Associations have assumed the responsibility for enforcement of these requirements in 
their respective codes of professional conduct.385 The explanatory memorandum however 
was silent as to the reasons for allowing ASIC and the professional accounting bodies to 
be responsible for the enforcement of auditor independence requirements. 
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act, the FRC became responsible 
for overseeing the auditor independence requirements as well as taking on a new role of 
providing strategic policy advice in relation to such requirements to the Treasurer.386 The 
new law replaced the FRC’s existing monitoring role in relation to the auditor 
independence requirements in Australia. This new responsibility gives the FRC the 
ability to advise the government on high level strategic policy matters in relation to all 
issues regarding auditor independence (including compliance with the Corporations Act 
and the respective codes of professional conduct used by the Accounting 
Associations).387  With the abolishment of the FRC’s existing auditor independence 
monitoring role, the FRC can only seek information regarding auditor independence 
matters from the Accounting Associations.388 Despite FRC’s role in providing advice on 
auditor independence, enforcement of auditor independence requirements is the 
                                                 
383 National Institute of Accountants PJ, above n 358, Executive Summary 2. 
384 ASIC Act s 225(1)(a),(b) and (c). 
385 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) 88. It is important to note that the subsequent enactment of the Audit 
Enhancement Act has not altered this responsibility.  The jurisdiction to enforce the auditor independent 
requirements still stays with ASIC or the Accounting Associations (depending on whether the 
independence requirement is contained in the Corporations Act or in the ethical codes of conduct of the 
Accounting Associations).  
386 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 8 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5. 
387 Ibid. 
388 Ibid. 
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responsibility of either ASIC (where there is an alleged breach of the Corporations Act) 
or the Accounting Associations (where there is an alleged contravention of the 
professional code of conduct), rather than of the FRC.389   
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act, the Accounting Associations 
were generally successful in their lobbying efforts for the FRC to focus on oversight and 
not to ‘monitor and review’ the operations of the Accounting Associations.390 By 
providing strategic policy advice in relation to (amongst other things) the auditor 
independence requirements in the Corporations Act, the FRC would not be seen to 
regulate the internal policy decisions of the Accounting Associations and to decide upon 
such matters which would ordinarily be the responsibility of the respective Accounting 
Associations. The role of the FRC instead could be perceived to ‘facilitate the discussion 
of the issues surrounding auditor independence’ and can also be perceived to ‘work in 
conjunction with, not over the top of’ the Accounting Associations to promote auditor 
independence.391 
It would appear that the Accounting Associations were also generally successful in 
their lobbying efforts to maintain their influence in the enforcement of auditor 
independence requirements. The Accounting Associations still retain responsibility for 
the enforcement of auditor independence requirements via their respective codes of 
professional conduct. 
The Institute and the IPA were of the view that the FRC should include 
representatives that had suitable audit skills and expertise.392 In addition, the IPA was of 
the view that the FRC should comprise key stakeholders including a representative from 
the IPA.393 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) referred to 
as the ASIC Act stipulates that the FRC comprise of members to be determined by the 
                                                 
389 du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 5, 257. 
390 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 8 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5. 
391 National Institute of Accountants PJ, above n 358, Executive Summary 2. 
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Treasurer.394 The ASIC Act provides indirect support for the appointment of FRC 
members from key stakeholder groups in addition to those that are appointed 
independently and are not associated with such groups as the ASIC Act states (amongst 
other things) that ‘the Minister may appoint a person by specifying an organisation or 
body that is to choose the person who is appointed.’395  
It would also appear that the Accounting Associations were generally successful in 
their lobbying efforts to maintain their influence on the FRC by securing membership on 
the FRC as can be seen in the current composition of the FRC.396 The Treasurer has 
determined that the current membership of the FRC comprise of 16 members and that the 
CPA, the Institute and the IPA nominate 1 member each. 
 
General Statement of Principle requiring Independence 
The CPA and the Institute supported this proposal but were of the view that 
compliance with the code of ethics for professional accountants397 should be in the 
definition adopted in CLERP 9. This is because the code of ethics for professional 
accountants is more comprehensive in that it broadly sets out the general independence 
requirements applicable to all members of the CPA and the Institute.398 The IPA also 
supported the general definition of auditor independence but was of the view that the 
auditor independence requirements prescribed by the International Federation of 
Accountants and adhered to by the Accounting Associations should be adopted instead of 
the general definition in CLERP 9.399 
                                                 
394 ASIC Act s 235A(1). 
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The CPA explained their reservations to this proposal by providing 2 reasons. 
Firstly, on their view a potential for conflict exists between these specific auditor 
independence restrictions in CLERP 9 and those prescribed by the code of ethics for 
professional accountants, the latter requirements being more general in nature and 
therefore more suitable for a wider range of circumstances. Secondly, the CPA was 
concerned that the identification of specific auditor independence restrictions in CLERP 
9 increased the likelihood that these specific restrictions would be given priority at the 
expense of ‘a general recognition of the need to assess and manage all risks to 
independence’.400 The code of ethics for professional accountants adopts the latter 
approach which is consistent with the professional obligation by CPA members to 
comply with ‘substance over form’.401 
The Corporations Act sets out a general requirement for auditor independence402 
and prohibits the auditor from auditing the auditee in specific circumstances.403 The 
Accounting Associations were not successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard as the 
code of ethics for professional accountants was not adopted in CLERP 9 and neither were 
the International Federation of Accountants rules on auditor independence.404 
Annual Declaration by Auditor 
The IPA supported this proposal subject to the inclusion of the IPA Code of Ethics 
in the declaration of the auditor. In addition, the proposal should be broad enough to be 
able to accommodate for qualified declarations to be issued in circumstances where a 
contravention of the code of ethics has occurred. This way the auditor can still ‘provide a 
declaration that states the circumstance of any breach rather than the auditor simply not 
making a statement, which may require the auditor to step down and cause problems for 
the audit process’.405 
 
                                                 
400 CPA Australia, above n 360, 9. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Corporations Act s 324CA. 
403 Ibid s 324CA(1). 
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The Corporations Act requires an auditor to give the company a written declaration 
that the auditor has not contravened any of the auditor independence requirements of the 
Corporations Act and any applicable code of professional conduct.406 The Accounting 
Associations were successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard as the Corporations 
Act requires that the written auditor independence declaration contain (amongst other 
things) a statement that the auditor complies with his/her respective code of professional 
conduct. In addition, the Corporations Act allows for a qualified declaration to be made. 
The original proposal407 for a written declaration by the individual auditor may not have 
envisaged the need for a qualified declaration. 
 
Employment Relationships 
The CPA and the Institute recommended ‘cooling off periods’ of ‘2 years for 
partners and key senior members of the audit team’.408 The IPA recommended a ‘cooling 
off period’ of ‘2 years for audit partners only’.409 
The Corporations Act prohibits a person from becoming an officer of the audited 
body for 2 years where the person ceases to be a member of an audit firm or director of 
an audit company and was a ‘professional member of the audit team’ for the audit.410 The 
Corporations Act defines a ‘professional member of the audit team’ as the individual 
auditor who conducts the audit, any person who ‘exercises professional judgment’ 
concerning accounts, audit or legal requirements and/or any person who is capable of 
directly influencing the audit.411 
The Accounting Associations were generally successful in their lobbying efforts in 
this regard as the restrictions applying to employment relationships between auditors and 
audited bodies have been limited to partners and key senior members of the audit team as 
these are the members of the audit team that conduct the audit, exercise professional 
judgment concerning accounts, audit or legal requirements and are capable of directly 
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influencing the audit.412 The original proposal may not have envisaged the need for 
limiting the restrictions to partners and key senior members of the audit team. 
 
Financial Relationships 
The CPA and the Institute recommended that the definition of ‘immediate family 
member’ that applied to financial relationships between the auditor and the auditee 
should be replaced with that used overseas that is ‘spouse and dependents’.413 The 
Corporations Act prohibits an individual auditor from auditing an auditee where the 
auditor or the auditor’s immediate family has entered into a financial relationship with 
the auditee at a particular time.414 
The Accounting Associations were not successful in their lobbying efforts in this 
regard as the definition of ‘immediate family member’ has not been replaced with that 
used overseas that is ‘spouse and dependents’.415 The government remained silent as to 
why such specific wording was to be used. It was however of the view that financial 
relationships should be prescribed in the Corporations Act as these could potentially 
enhance both actual and perceived auditor independence.416 
 
Non-Audit Services 
The CPA and the Institute believed that the code of ethics for professional 
accountants (to be adhered to by members of the CPA and the Institute) adequately 
provides for all threats to independence and as such this proposal should refer to 
compliance with this code and the CPA had objected to the proposal for a listed entity to 
disclose all non-audit services provided by the external auditor of the entity.417 The IPA 
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also supported this view and further suggested that reference should also be made to the 
IPA’s Code of Ethics in addition to the code of ethics for professional accountants.418 
The Corporations Act requires listed companies to disclose non-audit services that 
have been provided in the company’s annual report. The information to be disclosed 
includes details of the amounts paid or payable to the auditor for non-audit services 
provided and a statement from the directors stating that the provision of the non-audit 
services does not compromise the auditor independence requirements of the Corporations 
Act.419 Where the listed entity has an audit committee, this statement must be made in 
accordance with advice provided by the listed entity’s audit committee.420 
The Accounting Associations were unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts in this 
regard as the threats to independence (the inclusion of a list of non-audit services) still 
need to be specified in the company’s annual report.421  
 
Auditor Rotation 
The CPA questioned the 5 year requirement when the norm overseas (other than the 
US) was 7 years. The CPA recommended that the auditor rotation requirement should be 
reviewed at the end of every 7 years. Where a decision is made during such a review to 
reappoint the existing audit firm, audit partner rotation should be allowed to take place.422 
The Institute likewise did not support this proposal. The Institute commented that 
no explanation was provided in the CLERP 9 Policy Paper for the 5 year audit partner 
rotation instead of the 7 year requirement as proposed by the code of ethics for 
professional accountants and the Ramsay Report.423 
The CPA and the Institute further stated that the adoption of this proposal to every 
listed company does not take into account the size of each company and in particular the 
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SMEs.424 The IPA on the other hand, did not object to the reduction from 7 years to 5 
years for lead engagement and review partner rotation and supported the adoption of this 
proposal to all listed companies.425 
The Corporations Act sets out the requirements for auditor rotation by prohibiting  
the lead engagement or review partner who has acted as an external auditor for the listed 
company for 5 successive financial years from continuing to act as an external auditor for 
that company for at least another 2 successive financial years.426 
The Accounting Associations were initially generally unsuccessful (with the 
exception of the IPA) in their lobbying efforts for an increase from 5 years to 7 years for 
lead engagement and review partner rotation as the earlier amendment to the 
Corporations Act required that the lead engagement and review partner acting in the 
capacity of the external auditor for the listed company rotate after 5 years.427 
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act however, the Accounting 
Associations were generally successful (including the IPA which has since changed its 
position and has supported the extension) in their lobbying efforts for an increase from 5 
years to 7 years for lead engagement and review partner rotation as the amended 
Corporations Act enables the directors to allow the lead engagement or review partner  
who has acted as an external auditor for the listed company for 5 successive financial 
years to continue to act in such a capacity for up to a further 2 years provided that the 
auditor independence requirements are complied with.428 
 
Auditors’ Duties Expanded 
The CPA did not agree with the proposal to expand the duties of auditors to report 
to ASIC any attempt to ‘influence’ the auditor. The CPA was of the view that this ‘may 
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diminish the willingness of auditors and their clients to engage in robust and frank 
discussion of key issues such as the selection of accounting policies’.429 
In addition, the CPA believed that this proposal should require the external auditor 
to notify the audit committee or the board at first instance of such an attempt. ASIC 
should only be notified when the audit committee or the board has not taken any remedial 
action.430  
Both the CPA and the Institute were of the view that this provision was too broad 
as it applied to all audits and it did not differentiate the SMEs.431 The Corporations Act 
requires that the financial statements of large proprietary companies be audited.432 The 
Institute noted that ‘most large proprietary companies (in the regional areas at least) are 
still closely controlled by a family or dominant related group of persons’.433 The Institute 
was concerned that this proposal was not applicable to such companies and costly to 
implement with no actual benefit to be gained.434 
The Corporations Act requires an individual auditor conducting an audit to notify 
ASIC in writing within 28 days after the auditor becomes aware of any circumstances 
(amongst other things) that amount to an attempt, in relation to the audit, by any person to 
unduly influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead a person involved in the conduct of the 
audit.435 The Corporations Act also requires audited financial statements to be prepared 
for each financial year by all public companies as well as large proprietary companies.436 
The Accounting Associations were unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts in this 
regard. The auditors’ duties have been expanded to include the reporting to ASIC of any 
attempt to ‘influence’ the auditor437 and that large proprietary companies are not exempt 
from this requirement.438 
                                                 
429 CPA Australia, above n 360, 17. 
430 Ibid. 
431 CPA Australia, above n 358, 3 and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, above n 358, 5. 
432 See Corporations Act ss 285, 292 and 301 and ASIC’s power to exempt in Corporations Act ss 340-342. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid. 
435 Corporations Act s 311. 
436 Ibid s 292(1). 
437 Ibid s 311. 
438 Ibid s 292(1). 
  118 
 
Streamline Auditor Discipline Arrangements 
The Institute believed that members of the CALDB should possess the requisite 
audit expertise in order to apply the relevant audit standards to be considered.439 The 
Institute and the IPA had reservations about the suitability of a CALDB comprised of a 
majority of non-accountants.440 
Members of the CALDB are appointed by the Treasurer pursuant to the ASIC Act. 
The CALDB consists of a Chairperson (a lawyer), a Deputy Chairperson (also a lawyer), 
6 ‘accounting members’ (accountants) and 6 ‘business members’ as representatives of the 
business industry (who possess the requisite skills and experience in the specified 
category(ies)).441 
It would appear that the Accounting Associations were generally successful in their 
lobbying efforts to maintain their influence on the CALDB by securing membership on 
the CALDB as can be seen in the current composition of the CALDB. The ASIC Act has 
stipulated that the current membership of the CALDB comprise of 14 members and that 
the 6 ‘accounting members’ comprise of representatives from a ‘professional accounting 
body’ which could mean either the CPA, the Institute and/or the IPA.442 The ASIC Act 
has also stipulated that the 6 ‘business members comprise of representatives from the 
business community that have qualifications in, knowledge of or experience in one or 
more of the specified fields being business or commerce, the administration of 
companies, financial markets, financial products & financial services, economics or 
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law’.443 This means that additional members from the Accounting Associations (from the 
CPA, the Institute and/or the IPA) can be appointed as a business member as long as that 
person fulfils the requisite criteria as a business member. Members from the Accounting 
Associations are not excluded from being appointed as a business member. The 
composition of the CALDB is therefore not restricted to a majority of non-accountants. 
 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
The Institute did not consider it necessary for the creation of a new entity to 
evaluate reforms in relation to disclosure.444 The Institute was not successful in its 
lobbying efforts in this regard as to the establishment of a Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council. The establishment of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
was announced on 21 June 2004.445 According to the Treasury, the Shareholders and 
Investors Advisory Council was created to ‘inform the Government on developments and 
issues affecting retail investors and provide advice and feedback to the Government on 
development of policies and strategies, on issues of corporate disclosure and governance 
as they relate to retail investors’.446 The successful lobbying efforts of the Accounting 
Associations provide support for the subsequent cessation of the Shareholders and 
Investors Advisory Council.447  
4.2.2 Big 4 Firms 
This group consists of Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PWC. 
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Expanded FRC  
Deloitte stressed that the FRC should focus on overseeing the auditor independence 
requirements and that the FRC should not be involved in the direct monitoring of such 
requirements.448 KPMG was of the view that the Accounting Associations should 
continue to assume key responsibility for the direct monitoring of auditor independence 
through its existing self-regulatory mechanisms.449 
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act, the Big 4 Firms were generally 
successful in their lobbying efforts for the FRC to focus on oversight and not direct 
monitoring.450 By providing strategic policy advice in relation to (amongst other things) 
the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act, the FRC would not be 
seen to regulate the internal policy decisions of the Accounting Associations and to 
decide for those bodies. The role of the FRC instead can be perceived to ‘facilitate the 
discussion of the issues surrounding auditor independence’ and can also be perceived to 
‘work in conjunction with, not over the top of’ the Accounting Associations to promote 
auditor independence.451 
It would appear that the Big 4 Firms were also generally successful in their 
lobbying efforts to maintain the Accounting Associations’ influence in the enforcement 
of auditor independence requirements. The Accounting Associations still retain 
responsibility for the enforcement of auditor independence requirements via their 
respective codes of professional conduct. 
 
General Statement of Principle requiring Independence 
Deloitte and KPMG were of the view that compliance with the code of ethics for 
professional accountants was a more appropriate alternative than to prescribe a set of 
restrictions as set out in CLERP 9. This is because the code of ethics for professional 
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accountants contained a more suitable mechanism to address auditor independence 
issues.452 Deloitte, EY and KPMG supported the general definition of auditor 
independence however, compliance with the code of ethics for professional accountants 
should have been in the definition adopted in CLERP 9.453 
The Big 4 Firms were not successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard as the 
Corporations Act stipulates a general requirement for auditor independence instead of 
adopting the code of ethics for professional accountants.454 
 
Annual Declaration by Auditor 
Deloitte and KPMG were of the view that this proposal could have been catered for 
via the ethical and professional codes of conduct for accountants rather than in 
legislation.455 The Big 4 Firms were not successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard 
as the Corporations Act requires a written declaration by the individual auditor, that there 
have been no contraventions of the auditor independence requirements of the 
Corporations Act and any applicable code of professional conduct in relation to the audit 
or review and that any contravention is to be set out in the declaration.456 
 
Employment Relationships 
Deloitte recommended decreasing the ‘cooling off’ periods to ‘less than the 
proposed 4 years for partners and key senior members of the audit team’.457 EY 
recommended ‘cooling off’ periods of ‘2 years for partners and key senior members of 
the audit team’.458 PWC recommended ‘cooling off’ periods of ‘2 years for partners’.459 
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The Big 4 Firms were successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard as the 
restrictions applying to employment relationships between auditors and audited bodies 
have been limited to partners and key senior members of the audit team as these are the 
members of the audit team that conduct the audit, exercise professional judgment 
concerning accounts, audit or legal requirements and are capable of directly influencing 
the audit.460 
 
Financial Relationships 
Deloitte and EY were of the view that imposing additional obligations in relation to 
financial relationships were unnecessary as the code of ethics for professional 
accountants already provided for these relationships. As a consequence, they 
recommended that the Corporations Act should instead refer to the relevant rules 
regulating financial relationships prescribed by the code of ethics for professional 
accountants.461 This view was also endorsed by KPMG and PWC.462 In addition, 
Deloitte, EY and KPMG recommended replacing the definition of ‘immediate family 
member’ to that used overseas that was ‘spouse and dependents’.463 
The Big 4 Firms were not successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard as the 
Corporations Act currently introduces additional obligations on financial relationships 
and does not replace the definition of ‘immediate family member’ with that used overseas 
that was ‘spouse and dependents’.464 
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Non-Audit Services 
Deloitte proposed that any amendments to the disclosure requirements should be 
introduced through existing standards such as Accounting Standard AASB 1034 
‘Financial Report Presentation and Disclosures’ that required the disclosure of non-audit  
fees paid to the external auditor.465 KPMG and PWC were both of the view that this 
proposal should be considered by the Accounting Associations and should not be 
incorporated into legislation.466 
The Big 4 Firms were unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts for the regulation of 
non-audit services to be considered by the Accounting Associations and not to be 
incorporated into legislation.467 The Corporations Act currently regulates the provision of 
non-audit services as it requires listed companies to disclose non-audit services that have 
been provided in the company’s annual report including details of the amounts paid or 
payable to the auditor for non-audit services provided and a statement from the directors 
stating that the provision of the non-audit services does not compromise the auditor 
independence requirements of the Corporations Act.468  
 
Auditor Rotation  
Deloitte, KPMG and PWC supported the adoption of the code of ethics for 
professional accountants which stipulated lead engagement partner rotation after 7 
years.469 KPMG commented that auditor rotation should not apply to the review partner 
in addition to the lead engagement partner. According to KPMG, this may encourage 
external auditors for SMEs to avoid having a review partner altogether so that this 
rotation requirement need not be fulfilled. The removal of a review partner in such 
circumstances can potentially lead to a decrease in the quality of the audit.470  
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The Big 4 Firms were initially unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts for an increase 
from 5 years to 7 years for lead engagement partner and review partner rotation as the 
earlier amendment to the Corporations Act required that the lead engagement and review 
partner acting in the capacity of the external auditor for the listed company rotate after 5 
years.471 
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act however, the Big 4 Firms were 
generally successful in their lobbying efforts for an increase from 5 years to 7 years for 
lead engagement partner and review partner rotation as the amended Corporations Act 
enables the directors to allow the lead engagement or review partner  who has acted as an 
external auditor for the listed company for 5 successive financial years to continue to act 
in such a capacity for up to a further 2 years provided that the auditor independence 
requirements are complied with.472 
 
Auditors’ Duties Expanded 
Deloitte proposed that it should only be a contravention of the Corporations Act to 
‘fraudulently induce, coerce, manipulate or mislead the auditor’ in relation to this 
proposal.473 KPMG recommended that it should be a contravention of the Corporations 
Act to ‘fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead the auditor’.474 EY was of 
the view that expanding the auditors’ duties to report to ASIC matters that include 
‘attempts to influence, coerce or manipulate’ would be problematic as the practical 
application of this broad provision would be difficult.475 PWC shared these concerns in 
that ‘what constituted attempts to influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead’ may be open 
to various interpretations and therefore difficult to determine.476 
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The Big 4 Firms were unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts in this regard. The 
auditors’ duties have been expanded to include the reporting to ASIC of any attempt ‘to 
unduly influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead’ the auditor.477 
 
Streamline Auditor Discipline Arrangements 
Deloitte, EY, KPMG and PWC had concerns that non-accountants may not have 
the requisite expertise to determine audit matters raised at the hearings convened by the 
CALDB.478 It would appear that the Big 4 Firms were generally successful in their 
lobbying efforts to prevent a majority of non-accountants being represented on the board 
of the CALDB as can be seen in the current composition of the CALDB.  
The ASIC Act has stipulated that the current membership of the CALDB comprise 
of 14 members and that the 6 ‘accounting members’ comprise of representatives from a 
‘professional accounting body’ which could mean either the CPA, the Institute and/or the 
IPA.479 This will result in at least 6 members of the CALDB comprising at all times of 
accountants that have the appropriate skills to evaluate matters which are presented to the 
CALDB. Members from the Accounting Associations are not excluded from being 
separately appointed as a business member as long as that person fulfils the requisite 
criteria as a business member.480 The composition of the CALDB is therefore not 
restricted to a majority of non-accountants. 
 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
Deloitte and EY supported this proposal.481 The Big 4 Firms were successful in 
their lobbying efforts in this regard as to the establishment of a Shareholders and 
Investors Advisory Council which was announced on 21 June 2004.482 
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4.2.3 Middle Tier Firms 
This group consists of BDO, GT, PP, the Joint Submission, PKF and Stockford. 
 
Expanded FRC 
Stockford advocated for the FRC to assume a ‘non-intrusive’ oversight role that 
utilised the existing mechanisms that have been adopted by the Accounting 
Associations.483 According to Stockford, the Accounting Associations can use their 
respective self-regulatory mechanisms already in place to monitor the auditor 
independence requirements and report to the FRC on the status of compliance (or non-
compliance, as the case may be) of their respective members.484 With the enactment of 
the Audit Enhancement Act, the FRC’s role (amongst other things) is to focus on 
oversight and not direct monitoring of the effectiveness of auditor independence 
requirements in Australia.485 The Middle Tier Firms were successful in their lobbying 
efforts in this regard as the FRC’s focus on oversight is consistent with the ‘non-
intrusive’ approach advocated by them.486 This is because the FRC is no longer required 
to monitor the effectiveness of auditor independence requirements in Australia. By 
providing strategic policy advice in relation to (amongst other things) the auditor 
independence requirements in the Corporations Act, the role of the FRC instead can be 
perceived to utilise the existing activities of the Accounting Associations. This can be 
attained not only by the Accounting Associations reporting to the FRC on the status of 
compliance of the auditor independence requirements but also as a result of such strategic 
policy advice which can ‘facilitate the discussion of the issues surrounding auditor 
independence’.487 As a consequence of such advice, the FRC can be perceived to ‘work 
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in conjunction with, not over the top of’ the Accounting Associations to promote auditor 
independence.488 
It is important to note that although PP agreed with the proposed changes to the 
FRC’s monitoring functions in the Audit Enhancement Bill, PP had reservations in 
relation to the composition of the FRC.489 PP commented that the composition of the 
FRC is largely comprised of representatives from the Big 4 firms.490 PP was of the view 
that there is the potential for any strategic policy advice from the FRC to be influenced by 
the private interests of the larger accounting firms.491 PP was concerned that such 
strategic policy advice could result in regulation that would reduce the number of listed 
company external auditors from non-Big 4 firms.492 PP was of the view that as a 
consequence non-Big 4 firms could lose further market share to the Big 4 firms in an 
audit market already dominated by the Big 4 firms.493 
 
General Statement of Principle requiring Independence 
GT supported the general definition of auditor independence however, the code of 
ethics for professional accountants should have been in the definition adopted in CLERP 
9.494 The Middle Tier Firms were not successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard as 
the Corporations Act prescribes a general requirement for auditor independence instead 
of adopting the code of ethics for professional accountants.495 
 
Annual Declaration by Auditor 
Stockford supported this proposal but suggested that such a declaration should be a 
professional requirement and not a requirement in the Corporations Act as the 
                                                 
488 Ibid. 
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Accounting Associations have historically been associated with the regulation of auditor 
independence.496 The Middle Tier Firms were not successful in their lobbying efforts in 
this regard as the Corporations Act requires a written declaration by the individual 
auditor, that there have been no contraventions of the auditor independence requirements 
of the Corporations Act. This is because rather than allowing the declaration to be 
prescribed solely as a professional requirement (and as consequence having it regulated 
solely by the respective Accounting Associations), as it is set out in the Corporations Act, 
it now comes under the jurisdiction of ASIC (in addition to the Accounting 
Associations).497 
 
Employment Relationships 
Stockford supported the proposal to review these requirements but was of the view 
that these requirements should be determined by the AASB498 and included as part of the 
professional requirements to be adhered to by members of the Accounting Associations 
instead of being incorporated into CLERP 9.499 The Middle Tier Firms were not 
successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard as the restrictions applying to 
employment relationships between auditors and audited bodies have been set as legal 
requirements in CLERP 9.500  
 
Financial Relationships 
Stockford supported additional obligations on financial relationships but were of 
the view that the AASB should determine these rules.501 BDO recommended replacing 
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the definition of ‘immediate family member’ to that used overseas that was ‘spouse and 
dependents’.502 
The Middle Tier Firms were not successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard 
as the Corporations Act currently introduces additional obligations on financial 
relationships (not determined by the AASB) and does not replace the definition of 
‘immediate family member’ with that used overseas that was ‘spouse and dependents’.503 
 
Non-Audit Services 
The Joint Submission was of the view that the code of ethics for professional 
accountants adequately considers all threats to independence and as such this proposal 
should refer to compliance with this code.504 Stockford supported this proposal but 
considered that any amendments to the disclosure requirements should be introduced 
through existing standards rather than incorporating changes to the legislation.505 
The Middle Tier Firms were unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts for the 
regulation of non-audit services to be considered by the Accounting Associations and not 
to incorporate such changes into legislation.506 The Corporations Act currently regulates 
the provision of non-audit services as it requires listed companies to disclose non-audit 
services that have been provided in the company’s annual report including details of the 
amounts paid or payable to the auditor for non-audit services provided and a statement 
from the directors stating that the provision of the non-audit services does not 
compromise the auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act.507  
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Auditor Rotation 
The Joint Submission, PKF and Stockford expressed their preference for the 
adoption of the 7 year rotation period as prescribed by the code of ethics for professional 
accountants. They lobbied against the proposed 5 year rotation period.508 GT, PKF and 
PP were of the view that the lead engagement partner was the main person responsible 
for the conduct of the audit. As a consequence, the lead engagement partner should be the 
only person to be rotated and that the review partner should be excluded from this 
requirement.509 
According to GT, in relation to the conduct of audits concerning SMEs, the review 
partner’s role focused on quality control and in such circumstances the threat to 
independence (over-familiarity) would be unlikely as the review partner would have no 
direct communication with the auditee. As a consequence, there is less of a need for the 
review partner to be rotated.510 PP concurred with GT’s view. PP stated that the rotation 
of the review partner cannot be justified as a review partner’s role was concerned with 
regulatory compliance in the financial statements and not a review of the actual audit. On 
this view, contact with the auditee is kept to a minimum and there is no justification for 
rotating the review partner.511 
PP did not agree that both the lead engagement and review partner should be 
rotated after 5 years. According to PP, the lead engagement partner often took up the role 
of review partner. The review partner’s prior audit experience as lead engagement partner 
with the auditee can be useful in providing ‘an appropriate assessment of matters arising 
from an audit’ and can potentially enhance the quality of the audit.512 
The Joint Submission, BDO and GT were of the view that this proposal was too 
broad as it applied to every company without having regard to its size. In particular, this 
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proposal failed to differentiate SMEs.513 PKF was adamant that this proposal ‘would not 
prevent corporate collapses or prevent individual auditors from acting in an 
unprofessional manner’.514 Instead it would reduce the number of audit firms that can 
service the listed audit market and therefore may inhibit competition in this audit 
space.515 
The Middle Tier Firms were initially unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts for an 
increase from 5 years to 7 years for lead engagement partner and review partner rotation 
as the earlier amendment to the Corporations Act required that the lead engagement and 
review partner acting in the capacity of the external auditor for the listed company rotate 
after 5 years.516 
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act however, the Middle Tier Firms 
were generally successful in their lobbying efforts for an increase from 5 years to 7 years 
for lead engagement partner and review partner rotation as the amended Corporations Act 
enables the directors to allow the lead engagement or review partner  who has acted as an 
external auditor for the listed company for 5 successive financial years to continue to act 
in such a capacity for up to a further 2 years provided that the auditor independence 
requirements are complied with.517 
 
Streamline Auditor Discipline Arrangements 
PKF and Stockford objected to the proposal for the CALDB members to consist of 
a majority of non-accountants.518 It would appear that the Middle Tier Firms were 
generally successful in their lobbying efforts to prevent a majority of non-accountants 
being represented on the board of the CALDB as can be seen in the current composition 
of the CALDB. The ASIC Act has stipulated that the current membership of the CALDB 
                                                 
513 PP, BDO, William Buck, Grant Thornton, Horwarth Australia, above n 504, 14, BDO Chartered 
Accountants and Advisers, above n 502, 2 and Grant Thornton, above n 494, 2. 
514 PKF Chartered Accountants & Business Advisers, Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on 
Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework, 19 November 2002, 3. 
515 Ibid. 
516 Corporations Act s324DA . 
517 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 4 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 1 Part 1 item 7. 
518 PKF Australia Limited, above n 508 and Stockford Accounting Services Pty Ltd, above n 483, 20. 
  132 
comprise of 14 members and that the 6 ‘accounting members’ comprise of 
representatives from a ‘professional accounting body’ which could mean either the CPA, 
the Institute and/or the IPA.519 This will result in at least 6 members of the CALDB 
comprising at all times of accountants that have the appropriate skills to evaluate matters 
which are presented to the CALDB. Members from the Accounting Associations are not 
excluded from being separately appointed as a business member as long as that person 
fulfils the requisite criteria as a business member.520 The composition of the CALDB is 
therefore not restricted to a majority of non-accountants. 
 
4.2.4 Small Firms 
This group consists of Cameron, Wappett & Partners and Harding. 
 
Auditor Rotation 
Cameron and Harding lobbied against the specified rotation period as it was 
perceived to be detrimental to the business of Small Firms.521 Harding noted that smaller 
audit firms were given special consideration concerning the rotation of the lead 
engagement and review partners at the end of 5 years. Harding commented that special 
consideration would be given for the lead engagement and review partners from smaller 
audit firms to rotate at the end of 7 years. In Harding’s opinion, this concession ‘did not 
address the issues in any way’.522 
The Small Firms were unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts to prevent the periodic 
rotation of partners. According to Harding, this special consideration which could 
potentially extend the partner rotation period of smaller audit firms to 7 years did not 
resolve the existing issues.523 Although not specifically stated, it is assumed that these 
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issues include the lack of partners to rotate. This would mean that small firms may not 
have the ability to rotate their respective lead engagement and review partners at the end 
of 7 years. This would result in small firms losing their clients at the end of 7 years. 
4.2.5 Australian Public Policy Committee 
This group consists of the Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms and several 
representatives from the Middle Tier Firms that together formed the APPC that lobbied in 
relation to the Expanded FRC and the Auditor Rotation requirements.524   
Expanded FRC 
The APPC supported the proposal to delegate the auditor independence monitoring 
role of the FRC to ASIC so as to avoid the duplication of this role by both the FRC and 
ASIC.525 The APPC was successful in this regard as the FRC is no longer required to 
monitor the auditor independence requirements. ASIC has now been entrusted with this 
responsibility pursuant to the Audit Enhancement Act.526 
Auditor Rotation 
The APPC agreed with the proposal to extend the lead engagement and review 
partner rotation from 5 years to 7 years.527 The lobbying efforts of the APPC were 
successful as the Audit Enhancement Act provides for the lead engagement or review 
partner who has acted as an external auditor for the listed company for 5 successive 
financial years to continue to act in such a capacity for up to a further 2 years provided 
that the auditor independence requirements are complied with.528 
 
4.3 MANAGERS OF COMPANIES (PRODUCER GROUP) 
This section will analyse whether there exists a special interest group consisting of 
various Australian entities that may have lobbied for the current regime. Managers of 
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Companies (Producer Group) are defined as producers of financial information. As such 
this category comprises of Australian entities that produce financial information. Factors 
that may influence their decision to lobby for or against legal reform in relation to auditor 
independence includes (amongst other things) increase in audit costs as a result of more 
stringent legislation for auditors (for example, compulsory auditor rotations for listed 
entities), auditor independence legal reform aimed at curbing or reducing their influence 
in the audit standard setting process and the creation of additional obligations on entities 
to disclose more information. 
From the analysis of the relevant submissions, it is submitted that there exists 
various special interest groups consisting of various Australian entities that have lobbied 
for the current regime. These special interest groups consist of the Australian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (“ACCI”), Australian Council of Super Investors Inc (“ACSI”), 
Australian Institute of Company Directors (“AICD”), Association of Superannuation 
Funds of Australia Ltd (“ASFA”), Business Council of Australia (“BCA”), CSR Ltd 
(“CSR”), Compostela Pty Limited (“Compostela”), Group of 100 Inc (“G100”), 
Financial Services Institute of Australasia (“Finsia”), Financial Services Council 
(“FSC”), Finance Sector Union of Australia (“FSU”), Governance Institute of Australia 
(“GI”), Insurance Australia Group Limited (“IAG”), International Banks and Securities 
Association of Australia (“IBSA”), Public Sector & Commonwealth Superannuation 
Boards (“PSCSB”), Public Sector & Commonwealth Superannuation Schemes, the 
Catholic Super Fund and the Northern Territory Public Authorities Superannuation 
Scheme (“PSCSS”), Trustee Corporations Associations of Australia (“TCA”) and Telstra 
Ltd (“Telstra”). 
For the purposes of discussion, the AICD, BCA, Finsia, FSU, G100, GI and the 
IBSA have been included under this section although these interest groups cannot be 
strictly defined as producers of financial information. The membership of the AICD 
consists of individual directors529 and the BCA comprises of an association of the CEO’s 
of Australia’s leading corporations.530 Finsia is the result of a merger between the 
Australasian Institute of Banking & Finance and the Securities Institute of Australia and 
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represents financial services professionals throughout Australia and New Zealand.531 The 
FSU is a union that comprises of members from the finance industry532 and the G100 
represents ‘Australia’s senior finance executives from Australia’s major private and 
public business enterprises’.533 The GI (formerly known as the Chartered Secretaries 
Australia Limited) is the professional body that represents practising company 
secretaries534 and the IBSA represents the interests of investment banks.535 As such, these 
interest groups may not necessarily fully represent the interests of Australian entities. 
Entities that are involved in the business of superannuation such as the ACSI, 
ASFA, FSC (formerly known as the Investment & Financial Services Association Ltd), 
PSCSB, PSCSS, have also been included under this section. This is because these 
superannuation entities are themselves producers of financial information and have 
similar profit seeking objectives as the companies in which they invest in. Both the 
superannuation entities as well as the companies in which they invest will most likely 
choose a course of action that can generate the best financial return for their respective 
shareholders. Likewise, overly prescriptive audit independence regulation that is 
perceived to be unnecessary and not cost effective will most probably be frowned upon 
and rejected by both the investor (the superannuation entities) as well as the investee 
companies. A review of the actual submissions indicates that these superannuation 
entities have lobbied for the same outcomes as the managers of companies.536 These 
findings provide further support that they have similar motivations as the managers of 
companies and therefore are included in the same category as the managers of companies 
for the purposes of this thesis. 
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Entities that are involved in the business of trusts namely, the TCA have also been 
included under this section. This is because these trust entities are assumed to have the 
best interests of their beneficiaries in mind and therefore seek to profit in the companies 
in which they may invest in from time to time. Both the trust entities as well as the 
companies in which they invest will most likely choose a course of action that can 
generate the best financial return for their respective beneficiaries. Likewise, overly 
prescriptive audit independence regulation that is perceived to be unnecessary and not 
cost effective will most probably be frowned upon and rejected by both the investor (the 
trust entities) as well as the investee companies. A review of the actual submissions 
indicates that these trust entities have lobbied for the same outcomes as the managers of 
companies.537 These findings provide further support that they have similar motivations 
as the managers of companies and therefore are included in the same category as the 
managers of companies for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
Expanded FRC 
The ACSI and the ASFA advocated for increased representation on the FRC by 
superannuation funds.538 The ASFA stated that in view of the combined holdings of 
superannuation funds amounting to ‘one-third of all shares’, the ASFA recommended that 
these funds have direct representation on the FRC in order ‘to ensure the integrity of the 
oversight of auditors’ (such as by supporting measures that promote auditor 
independence) so as to protect the interests of their respective investors.539 
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It would appear that the ASFA was successful in its lobbying efforts to maintain its 
influence on the FRC by securing membership on the FRC as can be seen in the current 
composition of the FRC. The Treasurer has determined that the current membership of 
the FRC comprise of 16 members and that the ASFA nominate 1 member. 
According to the ACCI, the success of this proposal is dependent upon the FRC 
being appropriately comprised of members with a broad range of business skills in 
addition to expertise in accounting and finance.540 The G100 and Telstra believed that the 
composition of the FRC should continue to consist of independent and highly regarded 
individuals that are not perceived to be associated with private interest lobby groups. On 
this view, individuals concerned with the public interest should also be included in 
addition to those with the relevant business and professional skills.541 
It would also appear that the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) were 
successful in their lobbying efforts to ensure that the membership of the FRC consist of  
individuals that possess the relevant business and professional skills, as well as 
individuals that are independent, highly regarded, concerned with the public interest and 
not perceived to be associated with private interest lobby groups. This is because the 
ASIC Act supports the appointment of FRC members from nominations put forward by 
key stakeholder groups, as well as members appointed independently of stakeholder 
interests.542 
The TCA,  FSC and GI543 were unsuccessful in the long-term (albeit successful 
initially) in lobbying for the FRC to have an expanded role which would include the 
monitoring of the auditor independence requirements as this has been delegated to ASIC 
pursuant to the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act.544 According to the 
Explanatory Material to the Audit Enhancement Act, this move would ‘remove the 
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duplication between the operational nature of the FRC’s previous function and ASIC’s 
audit inspection program’.545 
 
General Statement of Principle requiring Independence 
The findings are inconclusive as half of the Managers of Companies (Producer 
Group) (being the AICD and FSC) made recommendations to amend this proposal546 
whilst the other half (namely the Finsia and GI) generally supported this proposal.547  
The AICD suggested that it would be more suitable for the general statement to 
require adherence to the professional codes of conduct of the Accounting Associations 
(for example, the code of ethics for professional accountants) as these codes reflect the 
latest international standards in relation to audit independence.548 The FSC recommended 
adherence to its own guidelines on the definition of independence.549  
 
Annual Declaration by Auditor 
The TCA, FSC, GI and IAG broadly supported this proposal.550 The TCA, FSC, GI 
and IAG were successful in their lobbying efforts in this regard as the Corporations Act 
requires an auditor to give the company a written declaration that the auditor has not 
contravened any of the auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act and 
any applicable code of professional conduct.551  
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Employment Relationships 
The findings are inconclusive as half of the Managers of Companies (Producer 
Group) (comprising the AICD, CSR and IAG) lobbied against this proposal552 whereas 
the other half of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) (namely the TCA, FSC 
and GI) provided wide support for this proposal.553 According to the AICD and CSR, the 
proposed 4 years exceeded any other developed market overseas and that the definition 
for professional audit member needed to be revisited in order to ‘avoid shrinking the pool 
of directors and audit firm staff available to companies’.554 The IAG also objected to the 
proposed 4 year requirement and indicated a preference for a shorter term.555  
 
Financial Relationships 
The findings are inconclusive as half of the Managers of Companies (Producer 
Group) (being the AICD and BCA) lobbied against this proposal556 whilst the other half 
(namely the FSC and GI) generally supported this proposal.557  
The AICD recommended that a better alternative would be for the Corporations Act 
to refer to the relevant rules regulating financial relationships prescribed by the 
professional and ethical codes of conduct for accountants.558 This was also supported by 
the BCA.559 In addition, the AICD was of the view that the definition of ‘immediate 
family’ should be replaced with ‘spouse and dependents’ as the proposed words 
‘immediate family’ was too broad in application.560 
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Non-Audit Services 
The majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) (comprising the 
BCA, AICD, ANZ, Compostela, ACSI, Foster’s and the FSU) lobbied against this 
proposal.561 Less than half of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) namely the 
Finsia, FSC, GI, TCA, PSCSB and PSCSS provided general support for this proposal.562 
The BCA was of the view that the existing accounting standards could be used to 
accommodate this proposal.563 The AICD, ANZ and Compostela supported the adoption 
of the code of ethics for professional accountants.564 According to Compostela, this 
would be consistent with ‘international best practice’.565 The ACSI, Foster’s and the FSU 
recommended a more prescriptive approach.566 According to Foster’s, the non-audit 
services to be prohibited should be identified in the legislation and that disclosure will 
only be required in circumstances where a specific contravention has occurred.567 
The majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) were unsuccessful 
in their lobbying efforts for the regulation of non-audit services to be best dealt with by 
accounting or auditing standards and/or to prohibit specific areas of non-audit services. 
                                                 
561 Business Council of Australia, above n 556, Australian Institute of Company Directors, above n 552, 12, 
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Discussion Paper on Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial Reporting Framework, 22 
November 2002, 9, Australian Council of Super Investors Inc, above n 538, 5-6, Foster’s Group Limited, 
Submission to the Treasury, Discussion Paper on Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial 
Reporting Framework, 15 November 2002, 2-3 and Finance Sector Union of Australia, Submission to the 
PJCCFS, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 
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The Corporations Act currently sipulates that the directors of a listed company furnish 
details of non-audit services that have been provided and requires a statement from the 
directors stating that the provision of the non-audit services does not compromise the 
auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act.568  
 
Auditor Rotation 
The majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) namely the FSC, 
TCA, PSCSB and PSCSS provided general support for the implementation of the 5 year 
rotation period.569 The AICD, Finsia and the GI on the other hand represented the 
minority view and expressed preference for the 7 year rotation period.570 The AICD 
believed that a 7 year rotation was consistent with international norms and that it is 
preferred ‘given the size of Australia’s marketplace, costs to companies arising from 
more frequent compulsory rotation and the lesser ability of smaller auditing firms to 
satisfy the requirement’.571 
The majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) were initially 
successful in their lobbying efforts for a 5 year rotation period for lead engagement 
partner and review partner as the earlier amendment to the Corporations Act required that 
the lead engagement and review partner acting in the capacity of the external auditor for 
the listed company rotate after 5 years.572  
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act however, the Managers of 
Companies (Producer Group) were generally unsuccessful in their lobbying efforts for a 5 
year rotation period for lead engagement partner and review partner as the amended 
Corporations Act enables the directors to allow the lead engagement or review partner 
who has acted as an external auditor for the listed company for 5 successive financial 
                                                 
568 Corporations Act s 300(11B). 
569 Investment & Financial Services Association Ltd, above n 537, 7, Trustee Corporations Association of 
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571 Australian Institute of Company Directors, above n 546, 9. 
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years to continue to act in such a capacity for up to a further 2 years provided that the 
auditor independence requirements are complied with.573 
 
Auditors’ Duties Expanded 
The majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) constituting the 
AICD, IAG, IBSA and G100 lobbied against this proposal574 whereas less than half of 
the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) namely the Finsia, FSC and GI provided 
broad support for this proposal.575 
The AICD disagreed with this proposal and suggested that the provision should be 
reworded to state ‘fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate to mislead’ an auditor.576 
According to the AICD, the inclusion of the word ‘fraudulently’ introduces a new 
element of fraud that would need to be proven by the alleged officer in question and 
requires ‘a higher standard of proof’.577  
The AICD was of the view that the proposal would result in the conduct of audits 
being ‘unnecessarily adversarial’ and would portray the auditor as the ‘enemy’.578 The 
AICD stated that this proposal would ‘encourage officers and other employees of a 
company to ensure that anything that could amount to a contravention of the 
Corporations Act was kept well and truly away from the attention of the auditors, thereby 
rendering the section less, rather than more, effective for its purpose’.579 This approach 
could potentially ‘alter the relationship between a company and its officers and the 
                                                 
573 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 4 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 1 Part 1 item 7. 
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auditor, who would correctly be seen as a conscripted informer to ASIC, whatever the 
circumstances’.580 
The IAG, IBSA and G100 did not agree with this proposal and commented that the 
inclusion of the word ‘influence’ was not acceptable.581 The G100 was concerned that 
normal discussions during the conduct of the audit between the auditor and the officer of 
the company (where a company’s view point has been advanced by the officer in 
response to a query by the auditor) can be potentially viewed as influencing the auditor 
and therefore would unnecessarily require ASIC notification.582  
The majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) were unsuccessful 
in their lobbying efforts in this regard. The auditors’ duties have been expanded to 
include the reporting to ASIC of any attempt ‘to unduly influence, coerce, manipulate or 
mislead’ the auditor.583 
 
Streamline Auditor Discipline Arrangements 
The findings are inconclusive as half of the Managers of Companies (Producer 
Group) (being the AICD, Compostela and G100) lobbied against this proposal584 whilst 
the other half (namely the AFSA, FSC and GI) broadly supported this proposal.585  
The AICD and Compostela were of the view that a degree of audit expertise was 
required by members of the CALDB to be able to understand the audit issues brought 
before the hearings convened by the CALDB.586 The G100 and Compostela had concerns 
about the suitability of a CALDB comprised by a majority of non-accountants.587 
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On the other hand, the AFSA, FSC and GI supported a majority of non-accountants 
on the CALDB.588 The AFSA dismissed concerns that ‘non-accountants were somehow 
incapable of assessing whether accountants had failed in their duty as auditors’.589 
 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
The majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) constituting the 
AICD, Compostela and GI lobbied against this proposal590 whilst less than half of the 
Managers of Companies (Producer Group) namely the FSC and TCA provided general 
support for this proposal.591 
The AICD, Compostela and GI were not convinced that it was necessary to create 
another entity to consider reforms in relation to disclosure.592 It would appear that the 
majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) were not successful in their 
lobbying efforts in this regard as to the establishment of a Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council which was announced on 21 June 2004.593 The successful lobbying 
efforts of the majority of the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) provide support 
for the subsequent cessation of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council.594  
 
4.4 GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
This section will investigate whether the regulators being the Accounting 
Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited, ASIC, ASX, Auditing & Assurance 
Standards Board, Companies Auditors & Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Financial 
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Reporting Council can be categorized as distinct and separate special interest groups that 
may have been motivated to influence the development of the current regime in order to 
ensure the maintenance of their respective position of power or privilege within the 
community. Factors that may influence their decision to lobby for or against legal reform 
in relation to auditor independence includes (amongst other things) legal reform aimed at 
curbing or reducing their influence in the audit standard setting process, the creation of 
additional obligations on the regulator that may increase the risk of legal proceedings 
being commenced against the regulator by aggrieved persons and any other action which 
may cause the regulator to have a reduced position of power or privilege within the 
community. 
 
Expanded FRC 
The ASIC was of the view that it should be responsible for enforcement of the 
auditor independence requirements pursuant to the Corporations Act.595 Despite the  
FRC’s previous extensive role in ensuring auditor independence prior to the enactment of 
the Audit Enhancement Act, enforcement of auditor independence requirements was (and 
still is)  the responsibility of either ASIC (where there is an alleged breach of the 
Corporations Act) or the Accounting Associations (where there is an alleged 
contravention of the professional code of conduct), rather than of the FRC.596 It would 
appear that the ASIC was successful in its lobbying efforts to maintain its influence in the 
enforcement of auditor independence requirements as ASIC still retains this 
responsibility.  
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act, the FRC’s existing monitoring 
role in relation to the auditor independence requirements has been delegated to ASIC.597 
According to the Explanatory Material to the Audit Enhancement Act, this move would 
‘remove the duplication between the operational nature of the FRC’s previous function 
                                                 
595 ASIC, above n 349. 
596 du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 5, 257. 
597 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 39 
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and ASIC’s audit inspection program’.598 As such, it can be argued that ASIC’s influence 
on the direct monitoring of the effectiveness of auditor independence requirements in 
Australia through ASIC’s audit inspection program is further entrenched. 
The ASX suggested that it would be desirable for the composition of the FRC to 
include people with the relevant experience and skill rather than for the FRC to be 
comprised entirely of nominees put forward to act as representatives for the various 
entities.599 
It would also appear that the ASX was successful in its lobbying efforts to ensure  
that the membership of the FRC consist of  individuals that possess the relevant business 
and professional skills, as well as individuals that are independent, highly regarded, 
concerned with the public interest and not perceived to be associated with private interest 
lobby groups. This is because the ASIC Act supports the appointment of FRC members 
from nominations put forward by key stakeholder groups, as well as members appointed 
independently of stakeholder interests.600 
The FRC had lobbied for an expanded role which included the monitoring of the 
auditor independence requirements.601 The FRC’s lobbying efforts however proved to be 
unsuccessful as the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act effectively removed the 
FRC from this monitoring role and handed it over to ASIC.602 
 
General Statement of Principle requiring Independence 
The ASX was of the view that the professional and ethical codes of conduct of the 
Accounting Associations (for example, the code of ethics for professional accountants) 
provided ‘a more flexible and responsive tool for expounding relevant principles and 
defining the appropriate criteria than could be achieved through legislation’.603 The ASX 
was not successful in its lobbying efforts in this regard as the Corporations Act sets out a 
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general requirement for auditor independence instead of adopting the measures for 
independence within the professional code(s) of conduct of the Accounting 
Associations.604 
 
Employment Relationships 
The ASX objected to the 4 year ‘cooling off’ period stipulated for professional 
audit staff prior to being appointed ‘on the boards of ex-clients’ as this exceeded the 
average 2 year requirement in other international markets.605 The ASX was successful in 
its lobbying efforts to limit the ‘cooling off’ period to 2 years606 instead of the proposed 4 
years. 
 
Non-Audit Services 
ASIC suggested that the non-audit services to be prohibited should be specific and 
clearly identified in the legislation. ASIC however has acknowledged that despite this 
approach, the threats to independence (for example, independence in appearance) cannot 
be completely eliminated by such measures.607 
ASIC was unsuccessful in its lobbying efforts for the regulation of non-audit 
services in this regard as there is no specific and clearly identifiable list of prohibited 
non-audit services.608 
 
Auditor Rotation 
Both the Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited and the FRC 
supported the 7 year rotation.609 The option to extend the rotation period for an additional 
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2 years from 5 years was encouraged610 and was seen to be consistent with international 
standards.611 
The Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited and the FRC were 
successful in their lobbying efforts in this respect as the Audit Enhancement Act allows 
for the lead engagement and review partners to continue to act as external auditor for the 
listed company for a further 2 years at the end of 5 years, provided certain auditor 
independence safeguards are met.612 
 
Auditors’ Duties Expanded 
Both the ASX and the Auditing & Assurance Standards Board objected to this 
proposal as it would simply require the auditor to report all potential contraventions to 
ASIC no matter how trivial.613 According to the ASX, the Corporations Act ‘previously 
required the auditor to obtain rectification of minor breaches and to make further 
enquiries’.614 
The ASX and the Auditing & Assurance Standards Board were unsuccessful in 
their lobbying efforts in this regard. The auditors’ duties have been expanded to include 
the reporting to ASIC of any attempt ‘to unduly influence, coerce, manipulate or mislead’ 
the auditor.615 
 
Streamline Auditor Discipline Arrangements 
The CALDB objected to the board of the CALDB being constituted by a majority 
of non-accountants as the concern was that non-accountants may not have the requisite 
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technical skills and experience to evaluate the matters deliberated by the CALDB and to 
produce good decisions.616 
It would appear that the CALDB was generally successful in their lobbying efforts 
to prevent a majority of non-accountants being represented on the board of the CALDB 
as the composition of the CALDB is not restricted to a majority of non-accountants as 
prescribed by the ASIC Act.617  
 
4.5 SUMMARY 
From the analysis of the relevant submissions, it is submitted that the Accounting 
Associations and Big 4 Firms successfully lobbied to maintain the Accounting 
Associations’ influence in the enforcement of auditor independence requirements despite 
being unsuccessful in their efforts for the Accounting Associations to monitor auditor 
independence requirements. ASIC was successful in its lobbying efforts to maintain its 
influence in the enforcement of auditor independence requirements as ASIC still retains 
this responsibility. The Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms and the 
APPC have had an influence for the FRC to focus on oversight and not direct monitoring 
of the auditor independence requirements in Australia. The Accounting Associations, 
Managers of Companies (Producer Group) and ASX influenced the development of the 
composition of the memberships of the FRC. The Accounting Associations and the 
Managers of Companies (Producer Group) were successful in their lobbying efforts in the 
development of the content for the auditor’s independence declaration. The Accounting 
Associations, Big 4 Firms and ASX have had an influence in narrowing the restrictions 
applying to employment relationships. The Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms, 
Middle Tier Firms, APPC, APESB and the FRC have had an influence in the increase 
from 5 years to 7 years for audit engagement partner and audit review partner rotation. 
The Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms, Managers of Companies 
(Producer Group) and the CALDB have had an influence in the development of the 
composition of the memberships of the CALDB. The Accounting Associations and the 
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Managers of Companies (Producer Group) were successful in their lobbying efforts as to 
the cessation of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council. 
The next stage of this study will discuss the conclusions reached regarding whether 
the existing requirements in the current regime have developed in a manner consistent 
with private interest theory. This discussion will include a comparison of the public 
interest requirement – the ideal measure, as discussed in Chapter 2, against the existing 
requirements in the current regime.  
The next chapter will look at ways of practically improving the auditor 
independence requirements in circumstances where the law has developed to protect 
private rather than public interests. Practical solutions consistent with greater 
independence (the public interest) will be provided.  
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Chapter 5: FINDINGS FROM ANALYSIS 
OF INTEREST GROUP 
LOBBYING EFFORTS AND 
PROPOSALS FOR LAW 
REFORM  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis set out earlier on that ideal auditor independence is consistent with 
practical legal reform aimed at benefiting the public interest. The public interest for the 
purposes of this thesis is established in Chapter 2 as the economic needs of the primary 
users of accounting information, both those individual investors and those in the financial 
community who rely on the objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on 
behalf of these individual investors. This means that practical legal reform consistent 
with ideal auditor independence should support the economic needs of these primary 
users of accounting information. 
This chapter evaluates whether the successful lobbying efforts of the various 
interest groups is consistent with ideal auditor independence by analysing whether these 
benefit the public interest. These are addressed under the subheadings enforcement of 
auditor independence requirements, expanded FRC, composition of the memberships of 
the FRC, auditor’s independence declaration, employment relationships, auditor rotation, 
composition of the memberships of the CALDB and establishment of a Shareholders and 
Investors Advisory Council.  
This stage of the study seeks to achieve this by focusing on the 2 facets of 
independence identified in Chapter 2, being independence in fact and independence in 
appearance. Measures aimed at promoting independence in fact and/or independence in 
appearance are consistent with ideal auditor independence as these can support the 
economic needs of the primary users of accounting information.  
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This chapter analyses whether the successful lobbying efforts of the various interest 
groups promote independence in fact and independence in appearance. This chapter 
discusses how the successful lobbying efforts of the various interest groups have in some 
circumstances, compromised ideal auditor independence. This chapter discusses why the 
reduction of auditor independence in these circumstances is not in the public interest.  
This stage of the study highlights potential weaknesses in the current regime for 
possible legal reform. This chapter looks at ways of practically improving the auditor 
independence requirements by supporting measures that enhance independence in fact 
and independence in appearance, with the sole objective of promoting the public interest.   
This chapter concludes that the current regime provides in some circumstances, 
solutions that produce a less than ideal version of auditor independence. These solutions 
are inconsistent with the concept of ideal auditor independence and cannot be considered 
to be in the public interest. 
 
5.2 ENFORCEMENT OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS  
Chapter 4 has established that the Accounting Associations and Big 4 Firms 
successfully lobbied to maintain the Accounting Associations’ influence in the 
enforcement of auditor independence requirements, despite being unsuccessful in their 
efforts for the Accounting Associations to monitor auditor independence requirements. 
ASIC was successful in its lobbying efforts to maintain its influence in the enforcement 
of auditor independence requirements as ASIC still retains this responsibility. 
5.2.1 Ideal auditor independence analysed 
Ideal auditor independence means that the Accounting Associations must be 
independent from the enforcement process. It is difficult for the Accounting Associations 
to be seen to be impartial in the enforcement process when there is a conflict of interest. 
This conflict exists when the Accounting Associations have to make a decision that is not 
in the public interest in order to protect its own interest. In this situation, the appearance 
of independence is compromised. In order to address this conflict of interest, it is prudent 
for another entity to be involved in the enforcement process rather than placing this 
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responsibility on the Accounting Associations. This however would be inconsistent with 
the emphasis on self-regulation supported by the Accounting Associations.618 According 
to a report prepared for the Treasury, an ethical approach to accounting and in particular 
audit independence that is self-regulated by the Accounting Associations can assist in 
promoting a client’s trust in accountants.619 The client’s trust in accountants can 
potentially be enhanced when accountants are perceived by the client to have a strict and 
enforceable self-regulatory framework in place that is aimed at maintaining the highest 
ethical standards.620 The findings in the report provide support for the emphasis on self-
regulation advocated by the Accounting Associations. 
The IFAC Code (the Accounting Associations are IFAC members and therefore are 
required to comply with the IFAC Code) defines auditor independence in appearance as  
The avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a reasonable and 
informed third party would be likely to conclude, weighing all the specific facts and 
circumstances, that a firm’s, or a member of the audit team’s, integrity, objectivity or professional 
skepticism has been compromised.621 
In the context of ideal auditor independence, the Accounting Associations must be 
independent from the enforcement process. The Accounting Associations must be 
considered independent in appearance by the public, if the audit as an institution is going 
to be of value. This means avoiding any conduct that may lead a reasonable person to 
conclude that the Accounting Associations are not impartial. A conflict of interest exists 
when the Accounting Associations have to make a decision that is not in the public 
interest in order to protect its own interest. In this situation, the appearance of 
independence is compromised.  
 
                                                 
618 See generally, CPA Australia, above n 360, 7, Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, above n 
360, 4 and National Institute of Accountants, above n 358, 6. 
619 Tasman Asia Pacific, Report to the Treasury, Analysis of market circumstances where industry self-
regulation is likely to be most and least effective (May 2000) 157. 
620 Ibid 159. 
621 International Federation of Accountants, 2013 Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants (2013) Section 290.6(b). 
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5.2.2 Self-regulation and the need for an independent entity to be involved in the 
enforcement process 
This section provides an overview of the self-regulatory approach adopted by the 
Accounting Associations. This mechanism enables the Accounting Associations to keep 
its respective members in check by administering disciplinary action in circumstances 
where its respective members have been found to breach the respective codes of the 
Accounting Associations in relation to (amongst other things) auditor independence. This 
section however argues that the appearance of independence is compromised as a 
reasonable person will conclude that the objectivity of the Accounting Associations is 
impaired in the enforcement process when there is a conflict of interest. This section 
proposes that it is important for another independent entity (in addition to the self-
regulatory approach adopted by the Accounting Associations) to administer disciplinary 
action for breaches of the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act as 
this can enhance the appearance of independence and promote the public interest.  
The FRC report on Auditor Independence noted that the Accounting Associations 
conducted regular reviews of their members in order to ensure that their members 
adhered to (amongst other things) the auditor independence requirements in the current 
regime. According to the report, external auditors of listed companies were reviewed 
every three years.622 The FRC report also noted that in addition to the above, the Institute 
had separately reviewed the Big Four firms. The report mentioned that the IPA only had a 
few members that audited listed companies.623 This is because the CPA and the Institute 
are the two largest accounting associations in Australia and as a consequence, members 
from these two professional accounting bodies comprise most of the accountants in 
public practice.624 
The self-regulatory approach advocated and supported by the Accounting 
Associations creates a lack of independence in appearance. The self-regulatory approach 
                                                 
622 FRC, FRC Report on Auditor Independence 2007-2008 <http://www.frc.gov.au/reports/2007 2008 
AAIR/2007 2008 AIR-10.asp> and FRC, FRC Annual Report 2011-2012 - Chapter 4 
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623 FRC, above n 622 and FRC 2012, above n 622. 
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is inconsistent with the definition of independence in appearance in the IFAC Code.625 
Despite the efforts of professional accounting bodies to appear objective by providing for 
the appointment of at least one lay person on their disciplinary bodies,626  it is still 
reasonable to conclude that the Accounting Associations cannot be objective in the 
enforcement process when a conflict of interest exists. It can be argued that the majority 
of persons presiding over these disciplinary bodies can still comprise of Accounting 
Association members and therefore these disciplinary bodies cannot be perceived to be 
completely free of all conflicts of interest in their decision making.627 
In order to address this conflict of interest, it is prudent for another entity to be 
involved in the enforcement process rather than placing this responsibility solely on the 
Accounting Associations. ASIC carries out surveillance, investigation and enforcement 
of the financial reporting requirements of the Corporations Act, including the 
enforcement of auditor independence requirements.628 Having ASIC responsible for the 
enforcement of the auditor independence requirements in addition to a self-regulatory 
enforcement process by the Accounting Associations significantly minimises the risk of 
the Accounting Associations acting in their own interest at the expense of the public. 
ASIC by ensuring that the public interest is upheld can only seek to gain more influence 
in the standard setting process. 
The enforcement of the auditor independence requirements in the current regime 
are consistent with ideal auditor independence as there are checks and balances in place 
to ensure that these are consistent with the public interest. Both the Accounting 
Associations (through respective codes) and ASIC have the ability to enforce any 
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peer-review program was conducted by an interest group that was focused more on preserving its image 
rather than on audit quality. See generally, Timothy Fogarty, ‘The Imagery and Reality of Peer Review in 
the U.S.: Insights from Institutional Theory’ (1996) 21 Accounting, Organizations and Society 243, 267. 
Anantharaman’s findings suggest that not all peer reviews can be considered objective.  How objective is 
peer review? Evidence from self-regulation of the accounting profession, Divya Anantharaman,  
<http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1015810>.  
626 See Tasman Asia Pacific, above n 619, 156,  CPA Australia, By-Laws (March 2013)  Section 5.4(b)(i), 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, By-Laws (current) Section 41(b) and Institute of Public 
Accountants, By-Laws (April 2014) Section 7.1.24(5)A.  
627 See Tasman Asia Pacific, above n 619, 156,  CPA Australia, By-Laws (March 2013)  Section 5.4(b)(i), 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, By-Laws (current) Section 41(b) and Institute of Public 
Accountants, By-Laws (April 2014) Section 7.1.24(5)A. 
628 See generally, ASIC Act Part 3 Division 3 and Corporations Act Part 2M Division 3. 
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breaches of auditor independence in the Corporations Act. The mechanisms employed 
concurrently by both the Accounting Associations and ASIC work together to promote 
the appearance of independence. The Accounting Associations have been concentrating 
their efforts to enforce breaches of auditor independence in relation to self managed 
superannuation funds,629 whilst ASIC has been carrying out auditor inspection and 
surveillance programs to ensure that all audit firms comply with the auditor independence 
requirements in the Corporations Act.630 When combined with the efforts of ASIC to 
carry out auditor inspection and surveillance programs, the public interest is advanced, as 
the appearance of independence is promoted by the concurrent comprehensive approach 
adopted by both the Accounting Associations and ASIC to enforce the auditor 
independence requirements in the Corporations Act.  
The Tasman Asia Pacific report prepared for the Treasury has noted that non-
compliance with the professional and ethical codes of conduct of the respective 
Accounting Associations can lead to disciplinary proceedings by the professional body to 
which the member belongs. The outcome of these disciplinary proceedings can result in 
the temporary suspension or permanent removal of the non-compliant auditor from public 
practice.631 The Accounting Associations have disciplined members for breaches of their 
respective codes that have occurred as a result of auditor independence being 
compromised.632 These have included disciplinary tribunal decisions where members 
were reprimanded for failing to comply with the provisions of their respective codes as 
                                                 
629 For examples of various tribunal decisions, see decisions from CPA Australia, 10 August 2011, 22 June 
2011, 26 October 2010, 13 October 2010, 15 July 2010, 10 March 2010 and 3 March 2010 
<http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/about-us/member-conduct-and-discipline/outcome-of-disciplinary-
hearings>, from The Institute of Chartered Accountants, 5 April 2011, 9 December 2010 and 23 June 2010 
http://www.charteredaccountants.com.au/The-Institute/Member-complaints-and-discipline/Tribunal-
decisions and from the National Institute of Accountants, 30 April 2010 
<https://www.publicaccountants.org.au/about-us/complaint-investigation-and-member-disciplinary-
processes/disciplinary-tribunal-decisions>.  
630 See generally, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 242: Audit inspection 
program public report for 2009 - 10 (June 2011).  
631 Tasman Asia Pacific, above n 619, 155. 
632 For examples of various tribunal decisions, see decisions from CPA Australia above n 629, The Institute 
of Chartered Accountants above n 629 and National Institute of Accountants above n 629. 
  157 
regards audit independence in relation to the audit of self managed superannuation 
funds.633 
 
5.2.3 ASIC’s role as an independent entity which administers auditor surveillance 
and enforcement  
ASIC can promote the public interest by enhancing the appearance of 
independence. This is because ASIC can fulfil the role as an independent entity that can 
enforce any breaches of the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act. 
ASIC however, must be seen to be taking proactive steps to fulfil this role.634 This 
section analyses ASIC’s role in administering these obligations and proposes that ASIC 
may need to increase the frequency of its enforcement actions in order to fully measure 
up to its role as an independent entity that can and will protect the public interest. 
The ASIC Act and the Corporations Act entrusts ASIC with overseeing the 
activities of the external auditor which includes auditor independence.635 It provides 
ASIC with statutory powers to monitor auditor independence as well as to initiate action 
against the non-compliant auditor.636  
A person who intends to be a registered company auditor must apply to ASIC to 
become registered as an auditor.637 ASIC’s role in the registration of company auditors is 
to grant the application and register the applicant as an auditor if 3 conditions are 
satisfied.638 These conditions relate to education, competency and being a ‘fit and proper 
person’.639 ASIC has the discretion to refuse the application if any of these 3 conditions 
                                                 
633 For examples of various tribunal decisions, see decisions from CPA Australia above n 629, The Institute 
of Chartered Accountants above n 629 and National Institute of Accountants above n 629. 
634 It is acknowledged however that the government’s 2014 budget cuts to ASIC’s funding amounting to 
$120 million over the next five years can potentially impair ASIC’s proactive ability to monitor and 
enforce the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act. See Lexi Metherell, ‘Budget 2014: 
ASIC’s funding cut in move away from financial sector oversight’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
News (Sydney), 15 May 2014 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-15/budget-2014-funding-cut-to-asic-
business-regulation/5453816>. 
635 See generally, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 630, ASIC Act Part 3 
Division 3 and Corporations Act Part 2M Division 3.  
636 See generally, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 630, ASIC Act Part 3 
Division 3 and Corporations Act Part 2M Division 3.  
637 Corporations Act s 1279. 
638 Ibid s 1280(2). 
639 Ibid. 
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are not satisfied.640 Once the applicant is registered as an auditor however, the CALDB 
has the jurisdiction to cancel or suspend the registration of an auditor on the application 
of ASIC.641  
The requirement of competency is fulfilled by (amongst other things) the applicant 
being a member of one of the Accounting Associations.642 Non-compliance with the 
respective rules of the Accounting Associations can lead to disciplinary proceedings by 
the professional body to which the member belongs. These disciplinary proceedings can 
include exclusion from membership. New applicants applying to be a registered company 
auditor are obligated to disclose details of all disciplinary proceedings by the Accounting 
Associations to ASIC.643 Such disclosure may have an adverse impact on the competency 
and ‘fit and proper person’ requirements of the new applicant.644 This may cause ASIC to 
prohibit the applicant from being a registered company auditor.  
Existing registered company auditors (through submission of their compulsory 
annual statements to ASIC) are also obliged to disclose details of all disciplinary 
proceedings by the Accounting Associations to ASIC.645 The requirement for such 
disclosure can be seen to act as a deterrent for existing registered company auditors who 
may be thinking about not complying with the rules of their respective professional 
associations. Such disclosure may have an adverse impact on the competency and ‘fit and 
proper person’ requirements of the existing registered company auditor. This information 
can alert ASIC to conduct an investigation which may eventually lead ASIC to apply to 
the CALDB to cancel or suspend the registration of the auditor by alleging that the 
auditor has failed to carry out or perform adequately and properly the duties of an 
auditor.646 
                                                 
640 Ibid. 
641 Ibid s 1292. 
642 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 180, Auditor Registration 
(September 2012), 34 <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg180-published-28-
September-2012.pdf/$file/rg180-published-28-September-2012.pdf >. 
643 Ibid and RG 180.28. 
644 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 642 and RG 180.28. 
645 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Form 912A Annual Statement by an Auditor 
(January 2011) 4. 
646 Corporations Act s 1292. 
  159 
5.2.4 Perceived lack of enforcement by ASIC in recent years 
A review of ASIC’s surveillance programs conducted during the last 5 years 
(compiled in Appendixes 2, 3 and 4) noted a combined total of 8 contraventions for 
breaches of the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act.647 No 
enforcement action by ASIC was noted in relation to any of these contraventions.648 This 
provides support for the view that there appears to be a lack of enforcement by ASIC in 
recent years. ASIC must be perceived by auditors to be actively pursuing enforcement 
actions for such contraventions. Active enforcement actions by ASIC can act as a 
reminder to auditors to be more vigilant in complying with their respective auditor 
independence obligations pursuant to the Corporations Act. The appearance of 
independence can be strengthened when the public perceives that ASIC is actively 
pursuing auditors who breach these requirements. 
ASIC has provided the FRC with information in relation to actions taken by ASIC 
against auditors for potential breaches of the auditor independence requirements in the 
Corporations Act. ASIC’s public record of its surveillance program on audit firms within 
the last 3 years has indicated 2 instances where ASIC has taken action against auditors 
for potential contraventions of the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations 
Act. The FRC report noted one matter where a substantial amount of shares were held in 
the audited body by immediate family members of a small firm audit partner.649 In 
another matter, the FRC report noted that a small firm auditor held financial interests in 
the audited body.650 According to the FRC report, both these alleged breaches of auditor 
independence were referred by ASIC to the Commonwealth Director of Public 
                                                 
647 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 317: Audit inspection program public report 
for 2011-12 (December 2012) 17, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 630, 36 and 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 192: Audit inspection program public report for 
2008-09 (March 2010), 29. 
648 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 647, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, above n 630, 36 and Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 647. 
649 FRC, above n 622 and FRC 2012, above n 622. 
650 FRC, above n 622 and FRC 2012, above n 622. 
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Prosecutions.651 The findings appear to indicate a lack of willingness on the part of ASIC 
to publicly reprimand the alleged offenders.652  
The CALDB has the power to take such steps as it considers reasonable and 
appropriate to publicise its decisions and the reasons for its decisions.653 A review of the 
decisions and media releases issued by the CALDB since 1 January 2008 indicate only 1 
instance where ASIC has taken action against an auditor for a contravention of (amongst 
others) auditor independence.654 In this instance, ASIC had referred an auditor to the 
CALDB for alleged contraventions of auditor independence. The auditor was found by 
the CALDB to have audited his own work when conducting the external audits of a 
company. The CALDB consequently ordered that the auditor’s registration be 
cancelled.655 
The alternative argument that the reason for the lack of enforcement by ASIC in 
recent years is because there are no contraventions (that all registered company auditors 
are complying with the current regime) is inconsistent with the fact that contraventions 
were noted by ASIC during 2008 to 2012.656  The CALDB’s public record of its 
decisions since 1 January 2008 indicate only 1 instance where ASIC has taken action 
against an auditor for a contravention of (amongst others) auditor independence.657 This 
affirms a lack of willingness on the part of ASIC to reprimand the alleged offender(s). 
ASIC was successful in its lobbying efforts to maintain its influence in the 
enforcement of auditor independence requirements. The effectiveness of the nature and 
frequency of ASIC’s existing enforcement actions should be investigated by the 
                                                 
651 FRC, above n 622 and FRC 2012, above n 622. 
652 Another rare example where ASIC has provided public information on action it has taken against an 
auditor for contravention of the auditor independence requirements occurred more than 5 years ago. This is 
where charges were brought by ASIC, relating to an auditor of a listed company, Avastra. The offender had 
acted in the capacity as the auditor of Avastra and also the company secretary for Avastra at the same time. 
The auditor was fined $1,000 in May, 2005 for contravention of the audit independence provisions. (ASIC, 
ASIC Media Release 05-124 ) <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/05-124 Sydney auditor 
pleads guilty and is fined for breaching auditor independence provisions?openDocument>. 
653 Corporations Act s 1296(1B). 
654 CALDB, CALDB Decisions 
<http://www.caldb.gov.au/CALDB/CALDBWeb.nsf/byheadline/Decisions?opendocument>. 
655 Ibid. 
656 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 647, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, above n 630, 36 and Australian Securities and Investments Commission , above n 647. 
657 CALDB, above n 654. 
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Treasury. If found to be deficient, the Treasury may need to provide additional funding to 
ASIC, in order for ASIC to have the resources necessary to increase the frequency of its 
enforcement actions for breaches of the auditor independence requirements in the 
Corporations Act.658  
 
5.3 EXPANDED FRC 
Chapter 4 has established that the Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms, Middle 
Tier Firms and the APPC influenced the development of the FRC to focus on oversight 
and not direct monitoring of the auditor independence requirements in Australia by 
limiting the FRC’s responsibilities to providing strategic policy advice to the 
Treasurer.659 It can be argued that were it not for the subsequent delegation of this power 
to ASIC, this latest amendment to the current requirements would have increased the 
Accounting Associations’ influence in the monitoring of the auditor independence 
requirements. However, by delegating this power from the FRC to ASIC, this move 
enables ASIC to further strengthen its influence in the monitoring of auditor 
independence requirements as ASIC still retains this responsibility. 
 
5.3.1 Ideal auditor independence analysed 
Ideal auditor independence means that there must be an independent entity (other 
than the Accounting Associations) that directly monitors the auditor independence 
requirements in Australia. It is difficult for the Accounting Associations to be seen to be 
                                                 
658 The funding cuts to ASIC amounting to $120 million over five years commencing from 2014 have 
raised concerns over the ability of ASIC to adequately monitor and enforce contraventions of the 
Corporations Act. See Metherell, above n 634. In particular, these cost reduction measures can potentially 
impede ASIC’s surveillance and enforcement activities in relation to auditor independence. It may be that 
as in the case of insolvency matters, ASIC has adequate funding to fulfil its statutory responsibilities. See 
Australian Senate Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the role of liquidators and 
administrators in Australia (2010) 
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/economics_ctte/liquidators_09/report/report.pdf. This view 
however would be in sharp contrast to the IMF’s comments that ASIC requires more funding in order to 
properly carry out its role as a corporate regulator. See Lucy Battersby, ‘ASIC needs more funding, says 
IMF’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 23 November 2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/business/asic-
needs-more-funding-says-imf-20121122-29suo.html#ixzz36kkph72A>.   
659 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 8 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5. 
  162 
impartial as a conflict of interest can exist when the Accounting Associations have to 
make a decision that is not in the public interest in order to protect its own interest. In this 
situation, the appearance of independence is compromised. In order to address this 
conflict of interest, it is prudent for another entity to be involved in the monitoring 
process rather than placing this responsibility on the Accounting Associations.    
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act, the FRC’s direct monitoring 
powers in relation to auditor independence is delegated to ASIC.660 This move which is 
envisaged to remove the duplication661 between the ‘operational’ nature of the FRC’s 
previous function and ASIC’s audit inspection program is consistent with ideal auditor 
independence.  
As discussed above, ASIC is required by the Corporations Act to carry out 
surveillance, investigation and enforcement of the financial reporting requirements of the 
Corporations Act, including the monitoring of auditor independence requirements. It is 
submitted however that having ASIC responsible for the monitoring of the auditor 
independence requirements in addition to a self monitoring process by the Accounting 
Associations significantly minimises the risk of the Accounting Associations acting in 
their own interest at the expense of the public. ASIC by ensuring that the public interest 
is upheld can only seek to gain more influence in the standard setting process whilst 
protecting its own interest. 
The monitoring of the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act 
by ASIC in the current regime are consistent with ideal auditor independence as there are 
checks and balances in place to ensure that these are consistent with the public interest. 
 
5.4 COMPOSITION OF THE MEMBERSHIPS OF THE FRC  
The Accounting Associations, Managers of Companies (Producer Group) and the 
regulator (ASX) have had an influence in the development of the composition of the 
memberships of the FRC. The Treasurer has determined that the current membership of 
                                                 
660 Ibid. 
661 Ibid. 
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the FRC comprise of 16 members and that the Accounting Associations (CPA, Institute 
and IPA), Managers of Companies (Producer Group) (ASFA) and the regulator (ASX) 
nominate 1 member each.  
It would also appear that the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) and the 
ASX were successful in their lobbying efforts to ensure that the membership of the FRC 
comprise a combination of people that have the relevant industry experience, that are 
independent and not only associated with interest groups. This is because the ASIC Act 
provides (amongst other things) that ‘the Minister may appoint a person by specifying an 
organisation or body that is to choose the person who is appointed.’662 As such, the ASIC 
Act supports the appointment of FRC members from key stakeholder groups in addition 
to those that are appointed independently and are not associated with such groups. 
 
5.4.1 Ideal auditor independence analysed 
Ideal auditor independence means that implementation of this proposal must ensure 
the FRC is appropriately comprised of members with a broad range of business skills in 
addition to expertise in accounting and finance.663 In addition, the membership of the 
FRC should continue to comprise of independent and highly regarded individuals that are 
not perceived to be associated with private interest lobby groups. Individuals concerned 
with the public interest should also be included in addition to those with the relevant 
business and professional skills.664  
Prior to the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act, the FRC was responsible for 
(amongst other things) monitoring the effectiveness of the auditor independence 
requirements in Australia. The FRC provided the Treasurer with reports and advice about 
these requirements.665 With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act, the FRC 
became responsible for providing broad oversight of the process for setting accounting 
and auditing standards as well as a new function of giving strategic policy advice and 
reports to the Treasurer and professional accounting bodies concerning the quality of 
                                                 
662 ASIC Act s 235A. 
663 The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, above n 536. 
664 Group of 100 Inc, above n 541 and Telstra, above n 541. 
665 ASIC Act s 225(1). 
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audits conducted by Australian auditors.666 The new law replaced the FRC’s existing 
function of monitoring the effectiveness of auditor independence requirements in 
Australia. The matters on which advice and reports can be given by the FRC include 
strategic policy advice in relation to the auditor independence requirements in the 
Corporations Act, the auditing standards and the codes of professional conduct used by 
the professional accounting bodies for audit work undertaken by Australian auditors.667  
The FRC has the ability to promote the public interest by providing 
recommendations to the Treasurer that encourage auditors to form objective unbiased 
judgments through adherence to an ethical code of behaviour. This supports 
independence in fact.  The FRC also has the potential to advance the public interest by 
offering advice to the Treasurer on measures that promote the appearance of 
independence. These mechanisms can be in the form of appropriately visible and credible 
monitoring and sanctions that seek to avoid any conduct that may lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that the auditor is not impartial. 
The ASIC Act provides the Treasurer with the discretion to determine the number 
of appointments on the FRC.668 The current FRC membership (being 16 members) 
allows for a broad spectrum of other stakeholders to be appointed on the FRC despite the 
Selected Interest Groups having a combined total of more than 4 members on the FRC.669 
The ASIC Act also supports the appointment of FRC members from key stakeholder 
groups in addition to those that are appointed independently and are not associated with 
such groups.670 The discretion provided to the Treasurer to determine the number of 
appointments on the FRC and the support for the appointment of FRC members from key 
stakeholder groups in addition to those that are appointed independently and are not 
associated with such groups in the ASIC Act are consistent with ideal auditor 
                                                 
666 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 8 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5. 
667 Ibid. 
668 ASIC Act s 235A. 
669 FRC, Members as at 25 January 2014 <http://www.frc.gov.au/about/members.asp>. Three members 
from the current FRC membership comprise of representatives from each of the Accounting Associations. 
The other members were nominated by the Commonwealth, Australian Institute of Company Directors, 
Business Council of Australia, Group of 100, Financial Services Council, ASFA, Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority, ASX, ASIC and the New Zealand Minister of Commerce.  
670 ASIC Act s 235A. 
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independence which is in the public interest. The inclusion of FRC members independent 
of stakeholder interests reduces the risk that reports and advice from the FRC will benefit 
particular interest groups at the expense of others. This promotes the appearance of 
independence. There is a social gain to be distributed for all interest groups to benefit 
where FRC members are appointed from nominations put forward by key stakeholder 
groups, as well as independently of stakeholder interests. 
For example, the risk that FRC members comprising of representatives from the 
Accounting Associations will endeavour to influence policies related to auditor 
independence for their benefit at the expense of others is mitigated. The inclusion of FRC 
members independent of stakeholder interests is a mechanism which will encourage a 
reasonable person to conclude that reports and advice from the FRC to the Treasurer in 
relation to auditor independence will not compromise the auditor’s objectivity. This is 
because the FRC members, independent of stakeholder interests, will strive to ensure that 
no one particular interest group (for example, the Accounting Associations) will stand to 
benefit at the expense of others. This is also consistent with the objectives in the 
explanatory memorandum which are to achieve independent oversight of the profession 
and to attain this through building on the existing arrangements.671 
It is important to note however, that the discretion in the ASIC Act provided to the 
Treasurer on the number of FRC appointments is very wide. The ASIC Act does not 
provide the Treasurer with a specific number of appointments on the FRC. In fact, there 
is no specific minimum or maximum number of FRC appointments required at any one 
time. In addition, the ASIC Act only provides indirect support for the appointment of 
FRC members from key stakeholder groups in addition to those that are appointed 
independently and are not associated with such groups as the ASIC Act states (amongst 
other things) that ‘the Minister may appoint a person by specifying an organisation or 
body that is to choose the person who is appointed.’672  
There is still a risk that reports and advice from the FRC will benefit particular 
interest groups (for example, the Selected Interest Groups), at the expense of others in 
                                                 
671 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) 24. 
672 ASIC Act s 235A(1). 
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circumstances where these interest groups are able to influence the decision making 
process of the FRC. As such, ideal auditor independence can be compromised, in 
circumstances where any FRC decision in relation to auditor independence has been 
influenced by these interest groups represented on the FRC. The Selected Interest Groups  
stand to benefit from the legal reforms in relation to the composition of the FRC 
membership. This is because these legal reforms do not curb or reduce their influence in 
the audit standard setting process. These legal reforms instead increase and enhance their 
influence by providing them with the opportunity to be represented on the FRC. As a 
result of this risk, these reforms cannot be considered as being consistent with ideal 
auditor independence. 
A more specific and definite outcome can be achieved with a rewording of section 
235A of the ASIC Act (with the proposed amendments in italics and bold) as follows:- 
 
 
Membership of FRC 
(1) The membership of the FRC is to comprise of a minimum of 16 members 
including the Chair and the Deputy Chair of the FRC. The members are to be 
appointed by the Minister in writing from nominations put forward by key stakeholder 
groups, as well as independently of stakeholder interests. 
Where the member is appointed by the Minister from a nomination by a key 
stakeholder group, the Minister must appoint that person by specifying the 
organisation or body that chose the person.   
(2) The members hold office on the terms and conditions that are determined by the 
Minister. 
(3) The Minister must appoint one of the members to be Chair of the FRC. The 
appointment must be in writing. The FRC may appoint one of its members to be Deputy 
Chair of the FRC. 
 
  167 
This proposal requires that the Treasurer appoint FRC members from nominations 
put forward by key stakeholder groups, as well as independently of stakeholder interests. 
This proposal provides direct support for such nominations as compared to the indirect 
support envisaged under the existing requirements as stated above. In addition, by 
specifying a minimum number of 16 members, these requirements reduce the risk of the 
representatives from the Selected Interest Groups collaborating and forming a majority 
voice that can influence future policy direction in relation to auditor independence. 
The proposed requirements provide a better practical solution that enhances the 
public interest by stipulating that the FRC be widely represented. The proposed 
requirements also mitigate the risk that strategic policy advice from the FRC will be 
influenced by representatives from the Selected Interest Groups working in collaboration 
with each other, to the detriment of the public interest. The current requirements are not 
consistent with ideal auditor independence and are not the best solution from a practical 
point of view.  
 
5.5 AUDITOR’S INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION  
The Accounting Associations and the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) 
were successful in their lobbying efforts in the development of the content for the 
auditor’s independence declaration. The Corporations Act requires a written declaration 
by the individual auditor, that to the best of the individual auditor’s knowledge and belief, 
there have been no contraventions of the auditor independence requirements of the 
Corporations Act and any applicable code of professional conduct in relation to the audit 
or review and that any contravention is to be set out in the declaration.673 This requires 
adherence to the Accounting Associations’ applicable code of professional conduct and 
allows for the issuing of a qualified declaration (both of which were successfully lobbied 
by the IPA).  
 
                                                 
673 Corporations Act s 307C(1). 
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5.5.1 Ideal auditor independence analysed 
It is in the public interest for auditors to adhere to applicable codes of professional 
conduct. As discussed in Chapter 2, accounting associations use codes of ethics to create 
expectations of professional behaviour that are aimed at benefiting the public. According 
to Dellaportas and Davenport, ethical codes of conduct that define the public interest aim 
‘to benefit the entire or majority population affected by the services provided by 
members of the accounting profession.’674  
It is also in the public interest for the Corporations Act to allow for the issuing of a 
qualified declaration to enable the auditor to provide a declaration as suggested by the 
IPA ‘that states the circumstance of any breach rather than the auditor simply not making 
a statement, which may require the auditor to step down and cause problems for the audit 
process’.675 
This is consistent with the objective in the explanatory memorandum which is to 
provide assurance to investors of the integrity of financial reports which in turn supports 
ideal auditor independence.676 
As such, the requirement for auditors to adhere to applicable codes of professional 
conduct and the provision for the issuing of a qualified auditor’s declaration can both be 
considered to be consistent with ideal auditor independence. 
 
                                                 
674 Dellaportas & Davenport, above n 31, 1093-1094. The Accounting Associations are all members of the 
IFAC which at the time CLERP 9 was being enacted, represented 163 member organisations in 120 
countries. (Treasury, Australian Auditor Independence Requirements 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1184/PDF/Australian Auditor Independence Requirements.pdf>). 
The Accounting Associations as members of the IFAC are required to ensure that their ethical codes of 
conduct reflect, as a minimum, the standards in the IFAC Code.  The IFAC Code emphasises five 
fundamental values which are integrity, objectivity, professional competence, due care, confidentiality and 
professional behavior that provide the foundation for the auditor independence rules adopted by the 
Accounting Associations. (<http://web.ifac.org/about/member-bodies> and International Federation of 
Accountants, 2013 Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (2013) Sections 100.1 
and 100.5). The adoption of the IFAC Code by the Accounting Associations was consistent with the IFAC 
objective to encourage its members to act in the public interest (Treasury, Australian Auditor Independence 
Requirements  http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1184/PDF/Australian Auditor Independence 
Requirements.pdf and International Federation of Accountants, 2013 Handbook of the Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants (2013) Section 100.1). 
675 National Institute of Accountants, above n 358 and National Institute of Accountants PJ, above n 358.  
676 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) 14. 
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5.6 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 
The Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms and ASX have had an influence in 
narrowing the restrictions applying to employment relationships. The Corporations Act 
prohibits a person from becoming an officer of the audited body for 2 years where the 
person ceases to be a member of an audit firm or director of an audit company and was a 
professional member of the audit team for the audit.677 The Corporations Act defines 
‘professional members of the audit team’ as the external auditor that conducts the audit, 
any person that exercises professional judgment during the audit and any other person 
capable of directly influencing the audit.678 
The Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms and ASX were successful in their 
lobbying efforts to limit the ‘cooling off’ period to 2 years679 instead of the proposed 4 
years. These interest groups were also successful in their lobbying efforts in limiting the 
restrictions to partners and key senior members of the audit team.680  
 
5.6.1 Ideal auditor independence analysed 
Ideal auditor independence means that the ‘cooling off’ period be extended for an 
indefinite period of time instead of the 2 year prohibition in the Corporations Act.681 This 
will reduce the number of qualified directors and audit firm staff available to be 
employed by companies. The current requirements provide a practical solution which 
attempts to address auditor independence by introducing a specified ‘cooling off’ period 
whilst at the same time this solution also takes into consideration the need for accountants 
to be available to companies after the ‘cooling off’ period has expired. It would appear 
that the current requirements although may not be consistent with ideal auditor 
independence is arguably the next best solution from a practical point of view.  
According to Deloitte and EY, at the time when the legislation was being drafted, the US 
                                                 
677 Corporations Act s 324CI. 
678 Ibid s 324AE. 
679 Ibid s 324CI. 
680 Ibid s 324AE. 
681 Ibid s 324CI. 
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requirement was 1 year and the European requirement was 2 years.682 PWC was of the 
view that a time period exceeding 2 years was considered to be unnecessary as these were 
inconsistent with comparable international markets (other than the US).683 The AICD 
suggested that business efficiency is the reason for not wanting to unduly impede 
employment opportunities for those who want to move from audit firms to companies. 
The wealth of knowledge that competent external auditors can bring to the company can 
be a significant factor that can potentially improve the bottom line of the company.684 In 
addition, Deloitte was of the view that limiting the cooling off period to 2 years would 
also not discourage potential students from entering the auditing profession. These 
students would not pursue auditing as a profession if their movement as auditors was to 
be unnecessarily restricted for a prolonged period. The talent pool available for 
companies to recruit the best and brightest graduates from audit firms will be 
significantly reduced.685  
Restrictions applying to partners and key senior members of the audit team are 
consistent with ideal auditor independence as these are the members of the audit team 
that participate in the conduct of the audit, exercise professional judgment and are in a 
position to directly influence the audit outcome. 
The specified ‘cooling off’ period and the restrictions applying to partners and key 
senior members of the audit team are consistent with ideal auditor independence and with 
the objectives in the explanatory memorandum which are envisaged ‘to strike an 
appropriate balance between promoting auditor independence and not unduly impeding 
audit professionals joining companies and bringing with them valuable financial 
expertise’.686 
 
                                                 
682 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, above n 453, 4 and Ernst & Young, above n 453. 
683 PricewaterhouseCoopers, above n 459. 
684 Australian Institute of Company Directors, above n 552, 12. 
685 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, above n 453, 4. 
686 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) 16. 
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5.7 AUDITOR ROTATION 
With the enactment of the Audit Enhancement Act, the Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms, APPC, APESB and the FRC have had an influence in 
the increase from 5 years to 7 years for audit engagement partner and audit review 
partner rotation. The amended Corporations Act enables the directors to permit the 
external auditor who had a key role in the audit of a listed company for 5 successive 
years to continue to have a key role for up to a further 2 years provided requirements are 
satisfied in relation to the safeguarding of audit quality and auditor independence.687 
 
5.7.1 Ideal auditor independence analysed 
Ideal auditor independence means that the auditors who have played a significant 
role in the audit of a listed company should be rotated on a more regular basis than the 
current requirement of 7 years as stipulated in the amended Corporations Act.688 Ideally, 
it can be argued that the audit firm should be rotated yearly. This can enhance the 
appearance of independence as auditors from a new firm will always be reviewing the 
work of the previous year’s auditors. Increasing the frequency of compulsory auditor 
rotation however, will inevitably increase audit costs to companies. These additional 
costs will have a detrimental impact on the profitability of these companies. As a 
consequence, the decrease/loss in market value of these companies will be ultimately 
borne by the shareholders of these companies who (amongst others) are the primary users 
of accounting information which CLERP 9 has sought to protect (as implied in the key 
CLERP principles).689 
The current requirements provide a practical solution which attempts to address 
auditor independence whilst at the same time seeks to avoid imposing additional financial 
burden on these companies. The stipulated auditor rotation period achieves significant 
cost savings as compared to compulsory yearly audit firm rotation which results in the 
                                                 
687 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 4 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 1 Part 1 item 7. 
688 Ibid. 
689 As discussed in Chapter 1, individual investors and those in the financial community who rely on the 
objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on behalf of these individual investors are the primary 
users of accounting information for the purposes of this study. 
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enhancement of the economic needs of the shareholders of these companies, being 
(amongst others) the primary users of accounting information. The stipulated auditor 
rotation period is consistent with internationally accepted standards (including the ethical 
codes for professional accountants) which have showed a preference for 7 years in 
jurisdictions other than the US.690 It considers the smaller Australian market (as 
compared to the US), the increased costs to companies as a consequence of unnecessary 
rotation and the resultant loss of business to small audit firms that may not have the 
capability to rotate partners.691 It would appear that the current requirements although 
may not be consistent with ideal auditor independence is arguably the next best solution 
from a practical point of view. 
 
5.8 COMPOSITION OF THE MEMBERSHIPS OF THE CALDB  
The Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms, Managers of 
Companies (Producer Group) and the CALDB have had an influence in the development 
of the composition of the memberships of the CALDB. It would appear that the 
Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms, Managers of Companies 
(Producer Group) and the CALDB were generally successful in their lobbying efforts to 
ensure that the composition of the CALDB is not restricted to a majority of non-
accountants. The ASIC Act has stipulated that the current membership of the CALDB 
comprise of 14 members and that the 6 accounting members comprise of representatives 
from a professional accounting body which could mean either the CPA, the Institute 
and/or the IPA.692 The ASIC Act has also stipulated that the 6 business members 
comprise of representatives from the business industry (who possess the requisite skills 
and experience in the specified category(ies)).693 This means that additional members 
from the Accounting Associations (from the CPA, the Institute and/or the IPA) can be 
appointed as a business member as long as that person fulfils the requisite criteria as a 
business member. Members from the Accounting Associations are not excluded from 
                                                 
690 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, above n 448, 8, KPMG, above n 449, 11 and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
above n 462, 5 and CPA Australia, above n 360. 
691 Australian Institute of Company Directors, above n 546, 9. 
692 ASIC Act s 203. 
693 Ibid. 
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being appointed as a business member. The composition of the CALDB is therefore not 
restricted to a majority of non-accountants. 
 
5.8.1 Ideal auditor independence analysed 
Ideal auditor independence means that the composition of the CALDB consists of 
at least a majority of non-accountants. This is because by having at least a majority of 
non-accountants on the CALDB, it is reasonable to conclude that on matters concerning 
auditor independence, the majority views of non-accountants will always be considered. 
This way, the appearance of independence can at least be maintained. It is submitted 
however, that a level of technical knowledge is required to interpret the quality of 
auditing and compliance with auditing standards in relation to auditor independence. The 
current requirements which require the composition of the CALDB to consist of at least a 
majority of accountants are not consistent with ideal auditor independence.  
The CALDB is a disciplinary body that conducts hearings to determine whether an 
auditor has contravened the Corporations Act.694 The CALDB only hears matters brought 
by ASIC as it has no jurisdiction to investigate an auditor’s conduct.695 The CALDB has 
the power to suspend or cancel an auditor’s registration696 and is regarded as carrying out 
a ‘public protective role’.697 In fulfilling this role it is important that it is and perceived to 
be independent. 
The CALDB has the ability to promote the public interest as the threat of 
disciplinary proceedings against registered auditors for failure to comply with the 
Corporations Act provides an incentive for registered auditors to ensure that they 
maintain the highest professional standards possible in relation to auditor independence. 
This approach encourages registered auditors to adhere to their respective codes. 
Registered auditors can be disciplined for breaches of their respective codes where 
                                                 
694 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters (January 2011) 3 and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters (June 2012) 3. 
695 Corporations Act s 1292(1).  
696 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters, (January 2011), 4-5 and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters, (June 2012), 5. 
697 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, above n 341. 
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auditor independence has been compromised. This supports independence in fact. There 
is a social gain to be distributed for all interest groups to benefit as the threat of 
disciplinary proceedings against registered auditors for failure to comply with the 
Corporations Act provides an incentive for registered auditors to ensure that they 
maintain the highest professional standards possible in relation to auditor independence. 
This is because adherence by auditors with the highest ethical standards in relation to 
auditor independence can strengthen the reliability of financial statements that can 
potentially enhance the financial well-being of all groups.  
The CALDB also has the potential to advance the public interest by strengthening 
the appearance of independence. A reasonable person will conclude that it is difficult for 
the Accounting Associations to be impartial in the enforcement process when there is a 
conflict of interest if the Accounting Associations are to be relied on solely to enforce the 
auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act. However, when combined 
with the efforts of ASIC to carry out auditor inspection and surveillance programs and 
enforcement and the CALDB to enforce the auditor independence requirements for 
registered auditors in the Corporations Act, the public interest is advanced. The 
appearance of independence is strengthened by the comprehensive approach adopted by 
the Accounting Associations, ASIC and the CALDB to enforce the auditor independence 
requirements in the Corporations Act. This is consistent with ideal auditor independence 
as the CALDB (in conjunction with ASIC) has the ability to ensure that there are checks 
and balances in place in order for the CALDB to fulfil its public protective role. 
There are 2 types of applications to the CALDB. These comprise either 
administrative or conduct matters. Generally administrative matters are heard by a panel 
of 3 people whereas conduct matters are heard by a panel of 5 people.698 
A 5 person panel is constituted by the Chairperson (or Deputy Chairperson) with 2 
accounting members and 2 business members and a 3 person panel is constituted by the 
Chairperson (or Deputy Chairperson) with 1 accounting member and 1 business 
                                                 
698 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters, (January 2011), 2 and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters, (June 2012), 2. 
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member.699 Conduct matters concern the more serious matters where an auditor has 
allegedly contravened the Corporations Act and this can include auditor independence 
issues. Administration matters on the other hand would include instances where an 
auditor has allegedly failed to lodge the required documentation as required by the 
Corporations Act such as an annual statement or to provide the necessary notification that 
the auditor is no longer an Australian resident.700 
Ideal auditor independence means that the composition of each panel of the 
CALDB constituted to conduct the hearing of each application consists of at least a 
majority of non-accountants. Members from the Accounting Associations are not 
excluded from being appointed as a business member. Ideal auditor independence is 
compromised when additional members from the Accounting Associations are appointed 
as a business member where that person fulfils the requisite criteria as a business 
member.  
The composition of each panel of the CALDB constituted to conduct the hearing of 
each application should be restricted to a majority of non-accountants. The appearance of 
independence cannot be maintained as long as the ASIC Act allows members from the 
Accounting Associations to be accounting members as well as business members.701 A 
reasonable person will conclude that it is difficult for a panel comprised of a majority of 
members from the Accounting Associations to be impartial when deciding on questions 
that concern auditor independence. This is because these members will (or be seen to) 
seek to protect the interests of their own respective Accounting Associations first and 
foremost and as such, the panel’s subsequent decision on questions that concern auditor 
independence cannot be or seem to be impartial.702 For the panel to be or seem to be 
                                                 
699 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters, (January 2011), 5 and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters, (June 2012), 5. 
700  Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters, (January 2011), 2-3 and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters, (June 2012), 2-3. 
701 ASIC Act s 203. 
702 It is acknowledged that members of the Accounting Associations that comprise the CALDB need not 
necessarily be auditors. Members of the Accounting Associations can include a wide range of other 
specialisations such as tax accountants, management consultants and insolvency practitioners. It is argued 
however that these individuals (regardless of their area of specialisation) will seek to protect the interests of 
their respective Accounting Associations. As set out earlier in Section 4.2, these self-seeking interests can 
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impartial, the composition of each panel must be restricted to a majority of non-
accountants. This approach will encourage a reasonable person to conclude that the 
decisions of the CALDB are impartial and in the public interest and that the CALDB is 
fulfilling its public protective role. 
The Accounting Associations stand to benefit from the legal reforms in relation to 
the composition of the CALDB membership. This is because these legal reforms do not 
curb or reduce their influence in decisions pertaining to auditor independence. These 
legal reforms instead increase and enhance their influence by providing them with the 
opportunity to be represented on the CALDB. 
A better outcome which will improve the appearance of independence can be 
achieved by the insertion of a new section 203 (2B) of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act as follows:- 
 
 (2B) A person is not eligible under this subsection for appointment as a business 
member if the person is a member or has been a member (within the last 5 years prior to 
the date of the proposed appointment) of: 
(a) a professional accounting body; or 
(b) any other body prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this 
subparagraph. 
 
This proposal excludes members from the Accounting Associations and persons 
who were members of the Accounting Associations within the last 5 years prior to the 
date of the proposed appointment from being appointed as a business member. This 
proposal promotes auditor independence by ensuring that the composition of each panel 
of the CALDB constituted to conduct the hearing of each application is restricted to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
arise as a consequence of the need for its respective members to be profitable in their business endeavours. 
For example, the loss of significant audit fees can affect other business units of the same accounting firm in 
circumstances where the firm is heavily reliant on such audit fees to fund these other business units. The 
decrease in audit fees can potentially lead to a reduction in the number of tax accountants, management 
consultants and insolvency practitioners employed by the firm. 
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majority of non-accountants. In addition, the proposed panel requirement for 2 
accounting members to be part of a 5 person panel for conduct matters and for 1 
accounting member to be part of a 3 person panel for administrative matters, will have 
the necessary level of technical knowledge required to interpret the quality of auditing 
and compliance with auditing standards in relation to auditor independence. This 
proposal is consistent with ideal auditor independence as the composition of the CALDB 
is restricted to a majority of non-accountants. At any one time, the CALDB will comprise 
of 6 accounting members and 8 non-accountants. 
The proposed requirements provide a better practical solution which accommodates 
the technical knowledge requirement whilst at the same time this solution also takes into 
consideration the need for non-accountants to assess whether accountants have failed in 
their duty as auditors. The current requirements are not consistent with ideal auditor 
independence and are not the best solution from a practical point of view.  
The CALDB also acts as a disciplinary body to liquidators in addition to 
auditors.703 As in the case of auditors, the CALDB also conducts hearings to determine 
whether a liquidator has adequately fulfilled the duties of a liquidator.704  
It may be timely to revisit the utility of the CALDB’s dual role from the perspective 
of enhancing auditor independence. It may be necessary to replace the CALDB instead 
with 2 separate entities, such as a Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board to address 
solely auditor disciplinary matters and the other a Companies Liquidators Disciplinary 
Board to deliberate on purely liquidator disciplinary concerns.  
This way the members of the Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board can be 
comprised of a majority of non-accountants as suggested by the recommendations above 
whilst it may be deemed necessary (for various reasons beyond the scope of this thesis) to 
enable the Companies Liquidators Disciplinary Board to continue to be comprised as it is. 
                                                 
703 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters (January 2011) 3 and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters (June 2012) 3. 
704 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
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It may well be that the Companies Liquidators Disciplinary Board ought to continue to be 
comprised by a majority of accountants as allowed by the existing regulations.705 
The replacement of the CALDB with 2 distinct entities assuming different 
responsibilities can potentially improve auditor independence by enhancing the 
appearance of audit independence and as a consequence, the CALDB’s concept of a 
‘public protective role’ can still be achieved.706  
 
 
5.9 ESTABLISHMENT OF A SHAREHOLDERS AND INVESTORS 
ADVISORY COUNCIL 
The Big 4 Firms were successful in their lobbying efforts as to the establishment of 
a Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council. Treasury has confirmed that the 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council was established in 2004, to be chaired by 
the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer. The Shareholders and Investors Advisory 
Council held 2 meetings over 2004 and 2005. However, as the meetings proved to be 
unproductive, it was agreed by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer that there 
should not be further meetings of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council. This 
resulted in the cessation of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council. Since then, 
there has not been any successor body to the Shareholders and Investors Advisory 
Council that has served in a similar function.707 It is reasonable to conclude that the  
Accounting Associations and the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) were 
successful in lobbying against the existence of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory 
Council.708 
 
                                                 
705 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters (January 2011) 3 and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters (June 2012) 3. 
706 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, above n 341. 
707 Treasury, above n 431. 
708 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, above n 360, 22, Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, above n 546, 17 and Compostela Pty Limited, above n 561, 15. 
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5.9.1 Ideal auditor independence analysed 
The Government’s intention to establish a Shareholders and Investors Advisory 
Council, to be chaired by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, which it was to 
consult on all proposals for legal reform concerning the disclosure of information to 
ensure these met the needs of retail investors709 was consistent with ideal auditor 
independence. The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council had the ability to 
promote the public interest as the concept of a shareholder reference group has been 
considered as a way of ensuring that the concerns of retail investors are appropriately 
considered in the context of policy issues affecting them. Such a group would act as an 
external advisory body reporting directly to the government on issues of corporate law 
and governance affecting shareholders.710 Where these concerns included matters that 
relate to auditor independence, the existence of this shareholder reference group provided 
a convenient forum for these matters to be collated, considered and if required to be acted 
upon, referred to the Treasurer for further deliberation. The cessation of the Shareholders 
and Investors Advisory Council is not consistent with ideal auditor independence as retail 
investors are not being given the opportunity to convey auditor independence concerns. 
The successful lobbying efforts of the Accounting Associations and the Managers 
of Companies (Producer Group) provide support for the subsequent cessation of the 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council.711 The Accounting Associations and the 
Managers of Companies (Producer Group) stand to benefit from the cessation of the 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council. This is because the actions of the members 
from the Accounting Associations and the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) 
will no longer be open to the scrutiny of a shareholder reference group comprised of 
(amongst others) retail investors. Retail investors now no longer have the opportunity to 
investigate disclosure-related concerns that relate to auditor independence in order to 
ensure that these concerns are consistent with ideal auditor independence. 
It was envisaged that the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council would be 
requested to consider future proposals to change aspects of the corporate regulatory 
                                                 
709 Treasury, above n 26.  
710 Ibid. 
711 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, above n 360, 22, Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, above n 546, 17 and Compostela Pty Limited, above n 561, 15. 
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framework. The Council would make its comments directly to the Treasurer and where 
possible the Council would be consulted at an early stage of the policy development 
process.712 Policies that did not support independence in fact or in appearance could be 
identified and reported directly to the government. There was a direct channel of 
communication for improvements (where applicable) to be promptly recommended.  
It is debatable as to whether the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council, if it 
existed today would comprise members that would represent the interests of the public. 
Members were to be appointed by the government and were to include individual retail 
investors as well as nominees from appropriate retail investor bodies.713 It is difficult to 
predict how the government appointed members representing certain groups would seek 
to promote their respective group interests at the expense of others, without knowing 
which groups were involved. The exact number of individual retail investors the 
government would have appointed as members is also debatable.714 The appearance of 
independence can be strengthened if the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
was to comprise of a more diverse membership capable of collectively providing 
impartial advice to the government on auditor independence. 
 
5.9.2 CAMAC’s role as an independent entity that can provide advice and 
recommendations in relation to auditor independence  
There is another body, CAMAC that was set up in 1989 to advise the government 
independently in relation to matters concerning the corporations law.715 CAMAC 
members are appointed on the basis of industry experience and not in a representative 
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capacity. Only one ASIC nominee is appointed to provide a ‘regulatory perspective’.716 
CAMAC’s function is to advise the Treasurer on any changes to the corporations 
legislation.717 As such, auditor independence concerns would be well within the purview 
of CAMAC.  
The potential benefits from the continued existence of CAMAC (as an alternative 
to the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council) can be considered a social gain to be 
distributed for all interest groups to benefit. Unlike the Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council, there is no requirement for CAMAC to include individual retail 
investors as well as nominees from appropriate retail investor bodies as members. There 
is a social gain to be distributed for all interest groups to benefit. The social gain is the 
enhancement of the appearance of independence by not having this requirement. It is  
reasonable to conclude that the absence of nominees from appropriate retail investor 
bodies eliminates the risk that government appointed members representing certain 
groups would seek to promote their respective group interests at the expense of others. As 
such, CAMAC has (and can be seen to have) the ability to provide impartial advice to the 
government on auditor independence.718 
Both the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council and CAMAC should not be 
relied upon solely to address auditor independence concerns. This is because both of 
them serve in advisory capacities to the government. They are not able to control the 
outcome of their respective recommendations. At best, even if their recommendations are 
taken on board, the process of approving the relevant legislation and adoption by the 
respective entities will be time consuming. Any legislation created as a result will also 
                                                 
716 ASIC Act s 147. 
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have a broad application and may not have a retrospective effect. A large number of 
entities may be required to comply with the latest requirements. There is no remedy that 
can be acted upon expeditiously. Despite best intentions, the Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council and CAMAC are not able to rectify the problem at the source 
efficiently before it becomes a problem. 
At the other extreme is the argument that government intervention is not necessary. 
This passive alternative allows for the capital market to self correct. This means that 
investors will penalize or reward an entity based on the price investors are willing to pay 
for shares in the entity. For example, in the case of a listed entity, its share price will 
reflect the various degrees of auditor independence that investors are willing to accept 
and pay for. This alternative is not in the public interest as it does not protect investors 
from suffering financial loss. In these circumstances, any decrease in share price as a 
result of any auditor independence concern, will cause investors to suffer financial loss. 
 
5.9.3 The role of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council could provide another channel of 
communication (other than ASIC), where retail shareholders could raise their specific 
auditor independence concerns. This role would not take the place of ASIC as regulator 
but could potentially facilitate the reporting of shareholder concerns to ASIC. Specific 
auditor independence concerns raised through this channel of communication could 
provide ASIC with valuable information. This information would have the potential to 
enhance ASIC’s ongoing audit firm inspection and auditor surveillance programs.  
The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council could be a suitable forum for 
existing and/or potential investors to convey their concerns regarding potential breaches 
of the Corporations Act which could include specific questions relating to auditor 
independence. Investor concerns could be considered by the Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council in a more expeditious manner (as compared to CAMAC). This is 
because the objective of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council would be to 
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promote and protect the interests of retail investors.719 The Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council would be more motivated to ensure that any accounting irregularities 
as a result of (amongst other things) auditor independence concerns be addressed as soon 
as possible as the outcome of such an investigation would have a direct financial impact 
on retail investors. These concerns could potentially be reported by the Shareholders and 
Investors Advisory Council to ASIC sooner rather than later. Earlier detection of the 
accounting irregularities by ASIC could prevent further financial loss to retail investors. 
The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council could also act as an external 
advisory body reporting directly to the government on (amongst other things) general 
auditor independence concerns.720 These concerns could involve proposals which pertain 
to the formulation of new corporate law. These concerns would extend beyond the scope 
of ASIC’s jurisdiction as ASIC’s powers are limited to the application of the existing 
corporations law. The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council, as a shareholder 
reference group, could represent the views of retail investors for proposals to change 
aspects of the corporate regulatory framework. The Shareholders and Investors Advisory 
Council would not replace CAMAC as an advisory body to the government but could 
work in conjunction with and complement CAMAC’s role. Proposals for (amongst other 
things) auditor independence law reform can be provided to the government for 
consideration on behalf of retail investors. Where in the opinion of the Treasurer, such 
proposals are considered to be in the public interest, the Treasurer can then refer this 
matter to CAMAC for independent advice. Where possible, the Shareholders and 
Investors Advisory Council would be consulted at an early stage of the policy 
development process. There will be no duplication of roles, as the Shareholders and 
Investors Advisory Council can be seen to represent the views of retail investors whilst 
CAMAC can be seen to provide independent and impartial advice to the government. 
This mechanism has the potential to enhance the appearance of independence as the 
views of retail investors can be represented by the Shareholders and Investors Advisory 
Council. The subsequent enactment of auditor independence law reforms as a result of 
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this process can be said to have considered the views of retail investors through this 
shareholder reference group.  
It is difficult to predict how successful this initiative would have been if the 
Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council were to exist today. Further investigation 
by Treasury would be required to assess the economic benefits of such an initiative. A 
highly regarded Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council that represents retail 
investors can enhance the appearance of independence. In order for this to occur, a 
reasonable person must be able to conclude that the Shareholders and Investors Advisory 
Council will represent and promote the interests of retail investors in relation to auditor 
independence law reform. 
The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council was considered to be 
unproductive in the past.721 This resulted in its subsequent demise.722 If the concept of 
this shareholder reference group is to be mooted again, measures need to be taken to 
ensure that the new Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council can enhance the 
appearance of independence. Careful consideration will need to be made in the selection 
of its advisory committee members so that it can be perceived by the public to represent 
the views of retail investors. The advisory committee members will also need to have the 
requisite skill, knowledge and experience, to be able to present these views in a timely 
manner, for consideration by ASIC or the government, as the case may be, depending on 
whether these concern the application of the existing corporations law or the formulation 
of new corporations law. The government will also have to provide the necessary funding 
for the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council to operate effectively. These 
recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive but instead are general comments on 
how the new Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council should be established in order 
to be considered productive and therefore avoid the same fate as the earlier government 
initiative. 
The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council was potentially a suitable and 
convenient platform to facilitate discussions with a view to addressing any concerns in an 
                                                 
721 Treasury, above n 431. 
722 Ibid. 
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efficient and timely manner. A practical solution that provides retail investors with the 
opportunity to convey auditor independence concerns needs to be formulated. 
Amendments to the current regime for audit committees have the potential to support this 
objective. 
 
5.10 AUDIT COMMITTEE 
According to Bradbury, the audit committee can enhance the credibility of financial 
statements by promoting audit independence.723 Commentators have claimed that audit 
committees can achieve this objective through providing a means by which the various 
structures of an entity, being the board of directors, internal auditors, external auditors 
and audit committee can communicate on audit independence matters.724 
Lama is of the view that an independent audit committee can assist in causing the 
decision making process of management to be more transparent. This is because the 
decisions of management can be scrutinized by the audit committee and as a result, 
management can be held accountable for their actions. This way selfish decisions by 
management can be discouraged whilst at the same time, the existence of an independent 
audit committee can give rise to the perception (from the investing public’s perspective) 
that such entities are more likely to scrutinize the actions of management and to make 
management accountable for their actions.725 
Audit committees have been advocated by some commentators to be an effective 
deterrent to fraud in financial reporting. According to McMullen, listed entities in the 
United States that had audit committees were ‘associated with a reduced incidence of 
errors, irregularities and other indicators of unreliable financial reporting.’726 Likewise 
                                                 
723 Michael Bradbury, ‘The Incentives for Voluntary Audit Committee Formation’ (1990) Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy 19, 21. 
724 Blue Ribbon Committee, Report and Recommendations of Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Corporate Audit Committee (1999) 30-31. 
725 Mandatory Audit Committees in Australia: Are There Economic Justifications? Tek Lama, 
<http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1721315>. 
726 Dorothy McMullen, ‘Audit Committee Performance: An Investigation of the Consequences Associated 
with Audit Committees’ (1996) 15(1) A Journal of Practice and Theory 87, 96. 
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commentators such as Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny727 and Defond and Jiambalvo728 have 
found that firms with audit committees were less likely to manipulate earnings. 
Notwithstanding the above, various other findings also support arguments that the 
mere existence of an audit committee does not necessarily improve the quality of 
financial reporting. Beasley found that the existence of an audit committee did not 
significantly act as a deterrent to fraudulent financial reporting.729 Lama also concluded 
that firms with an audit committee were not necessarily ‘better able to manage risk and 
utilize the firms’ resources more effectively than those without audit committees.’730 
Bradbury examined the motivations behind voluntary audit committees for listed entities 
in New Zealand and suggested that ‘audit committees are often created for the purposes 
of appearances rather than to enhance stockholders’ control of management.’731 Bradbury 
alluded to audit committees as having high perceived worth732 in the United States, where 
they provide a method for delaying the introduction of new legislation and appeasing the 
mass media.733 
Despite the inconclusive research findings which support the benefits for the 
existence of the audit committee, it is submitted that until such time when it is proven 
otherwise, the audit committee has the potential to enhance shareholder value even if it 
means that it is created for the purposes of appearances rather than to enhance 
stockholders’ control of management. The existence of a properly constituted and 
functioning audit committee can enhance the appearance of independence, as the audit 
committee’s role is to (amongst others) ensure the independence of its external auditors. 
It is for this reason that the creation of the audit committee is advocated in this study.  
                                                 
727 Patricia Dechow, Richard Sloan and Amy Sweeney, ‘Causes and Consequences of Earning 
Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC’ (1996) 13(1) 
Contemporary Accounting Research 1, 31. 
728 Mark DeFond and James Jiambalvo, ‘Incidence and Circumstances of Accounting Errors’ (1991) 66(3) 
The Accounting Review 643, 653. 
729 Mark Beasley, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and 
Financial Statement Fraud’ (1996) 71(4) The Accounting Review 443, 463. 
730  Lama, above n 725. 
731 Bradbury, above n 723, 25. 
732 Ibid 24. 
733 Ibid 33. 
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The audit committee is a suitable forum which has the potential to enhance auditor 
independence. This is because the ASX already has in place listing requirements which 
require certain listed entities to have audit committees and best practice recommendations 
in relation to audit committees for other listed entities to aspire to achieve. The ASX 
requires that an entity included in the S&P All Ordinaries Index at the beginning of its 
financial year have an audit committee during that year.734 If an entity is included in the 
S&P / ASX 300 Index at the beginning of its financial year, it must follow the 
recommendations in Principle 4 of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles on the 
composition, operation and responsibilities of the audit committee.735  
The existing Recommendation 4.2 requires that the audit committee be structured 
so that it consists only of non-executive directors, consists of a majority of independent 
directors, is chaired by an independent chair (who is not chair of the board) and has at 
least 3 members.736 The commentary under the subheading ‘Technical expertise’ states: 
That the audit committee should include members who are all financially literate (that is, 
be able to read and understand financial statements); at least 1 member should have 
relevant qualifications and experience (that is, should be a qualified accountant or other 
finance professional with experience of financial and accounting matters); and some 
members should have an understanding of the industry in which the entity operates.737  
The commentary under the subheading ‘Responsibilities’ states: 
That the audit committee should review the integrity of the company’s financial reporting 
and oversee the independence of the external auditors.738 
A better solution that enhances auditor independence can be achieved by 
amendments to the commentary under the subheading ‘Technical expertise’ (with the 
proposed amendments in italics and bold) as follows:- 
 
                                                 
734 ASX Listing Rule 12.7. 
735 Ibid. 
736 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations with 
2010 Amendments (2nd ed, 2010) 26. 
737 Ibid 27. 
738 Ibid. 
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The audit committee should comprise members who are qualified accountants 
and have an understanding of the industry in which the entity operates. 
 
A better solution that provides retail investors with the opportunity to convey 
auditor independence concerns can be achieved by amendments to the commentary under 
the subheading ‘Responsibilities’ (with the proposed amendments in italics and bold) as 
follows:- 
 
The audit committee should review the integrity of the company’s financial 
reporting and oversee the independence of the external auditors. This will include 
addressing any auditor independence concerns conveyed by retail investors. The 
company must endeavour to ensure that all shareholders (regardless of the number of 
shareholdings) are made aware that a shareholder can convey any auditor 
independence concern in relation to the company, directly to the audit committee. 
 
Where there is no audit committee, the board of directors should review the 
integrity of the company’s financial reporting and oversee the independence of the 
external auditors. This will include addressing any auditor independence concerns 
conveyed by retail investors. The company must endeavour to ensure that all 
shareholders (regardless of the number of shareholdings) are made aware that a 
shareholder can convey any auditor independence concern in relation to the company, 
directly to the board of directors. 
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5.11 A CHECKLIST TO ASSIST WITH THE EVALUATION AS TO WHETHER 
A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 
 
There is a need for a comprehensive checklist to be compiled by the Treasury in 
order for the government of the day to refer to when evaluating whether new legislative 
proposals are in the public interest in relation to proposals concerning auditor 
independence. This checklist should include an analysis of the various interest groups 
that stand to gain (or lose) from such proposals.   
This would not only assist in making the lobbying process more transparent but 
could also enhance the public interest by making the government of the day more 
accountable for its actions. The checklist can include the cost benefit analysis provided 
by the Treasury for each new proposal. In addition, the Treasury can also be requested to 
extend its findings to include a cost benefit analysis for each of the various interest 
groups that stand to gain (or lose) from the implementation of such proposals as well.  
Where possible, estimates of the financial impact of such proposals could be 
provided by the Treasury to provide supporting evidence for the gain (or loss) to each of 
the interest groups being analysed. It is acknowledged that Treasury already includes 
estimates of the financial impact of such proposals in a broad way. However, the 
additional inclusion of specific estimates of the gain (or loss) to each of the relevant 
lobby groups would provide a clearer picture to the public of the financial impact of these 
proposals.739  
The appearance of independence can be potentially enhanced when legal proposals 
(in relation to audit independence) consistent with the public interest are seen to be 
adopted. In circumstances where legal proposals may not be entirely in the public interest 
but are introduced into law anyway, audit independence can still be promoted where 
reasonable explanations are provided by the Treasury to the public in a timely manner.  
 
 
                                                 
739 A sample checklist has been included in Appendix 5 for reference. 
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5.12 SUMMARY 
From the findings above, the Selected Interest Groups may have had a significant 
impact in the development of the current regime. The members of accounting 
professional bodies (in particular, the Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms and Middle 
Tier Firms, APPC), managers of companies (ASFA) and government officials (APESB, 
ASIC, ASX, CALDB, FRC) lobbied successfully for various proposals.  
The findings from this study support the proposal of the thesis that there is a case 
for reform of the existing requirements in the current regime in respect of auditor 
independence because some provisions have developed to serve private rather than the 
stated goal of the public interest. Based on the submissions examined, lobbying by the 
Selected Interest Groups in some instances has the ability to influence the outcome of the 
CLERP 9 Policy Paper. This has resulted in some circumstances, a less than ideal version 
of auditor independence.  
Certain aspects of the current regime discussed above, reflect the interests of the 
most powerful groups being the Selected Interest Groups. The current regime however, is 
not only the outcome of intense lobbying among various interest groups but also a 
moderated final outcome in order for the appearance of social gain to be distributed. This 
is consistent with Hirshleifer’s view that it is generally in the political interest of the 
government to ensure that some benefits go to all interest groups involved, if there is a 
social gain to be distributed. Similarly, the government will tend to assure that burdens 
are spread among all parties, if a social loss has been incurred.740  
Sections 5.4, 5.8 and 5.9 in this thesis described instances where the proposals in 
the CLERP 9 Policy Paper would cause some to gain and others to lose certain benefits 
and in these circumstances, the government will ‘lean against the wind’ so as to moderate 
the final outcome. The successful lobbying by the Selected Interest Groups (in relation to 
the composition of the FRC and the CALDB), the successful lobbying by the ASFA (in 
relation to the composition of the FRC) and the successful lobbying by the Accounting 
Associations and the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) (in relation to the 
cessation of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council), are instances where 
                                                 
740 Hirshleifer, above n 295. 
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adoption or non-adoption (as the case may be) of the respective proposals have benefited 
these interest groups at the expense of greater auditor independence (the public interest). 
The government has in these circumstances, endeavoured to ensure that some portion of 
the social gain goes to all interest groups as well.  
The inclusion of FRC members independent of stakeholder interests promotes the 
appearance of independence as it appears to reduce the risk that reports and advice from 
the FRC will benefit particular interest groups at the expense of others. Where FRC 
members are appointed from nominations put forward by key stakeholder groups, as well 
as independently of stakeholder interests, there is a social gain to be distributed for all 
interest groups to benefit, as the FRC can be seen to have the ability to provide impartial 
advice to the government on auditor independence. 
The threat of disciplinary proceedings by the CALDB against registered auditors 
for failure to comply with the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act 
supports independence in fact. This threat of disciplinary action by the CALDB provides 
an incentive for registered auditors to ensure that they maintain the highest professional 
standards possible. This has the ability to promote the public interest and as such, is a 
social gain to be distributed for all interest groups to benefit. 
The absence of nominees from appropriate retail investor bodies from CAMAC 
eliminates the risk that government appointed members representing certain groups 
would seek to promote their respective group interests at the expense of others. There is a 
social gain for all interest groups to benefit as the appearance of independence is 
enhanced as CAMAC can be seen to have the ability to provide impartial advice to the 
government on auditor independence. 
This less than ideal version of auditor independence reflected in the current regime 
is the government’s practical solution to ensure that all parties benefit from the new 
legislation. It may be questioned whether this solution represents the public interest or 
private interests. This practical solution cannot and should not be considered as the ideal 
solution. This is because the submissions analysed above indicate that some interest 
groups (being the Selected Interest Groups) stand to benefit more by the introduction of 
the various proposals successfully lobbied by them. As such, it can be argued that the 
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introduction of the various proposals successfully lobbied by these respective interest 
groups may not necessarily be in the best interests of the public and may even be at the 
expense of the public.  
Sections 5.4.1, 5.8.1, 5.9.3, 5.10 and 5.11 presented improvements that should be 
made to the current regime in relation to the composition of the memberships of the FRC, 
CALDB, the establishment of a new Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council, the 
role of the audit committee and a recommendation for the Treasury to adopt a suitable 
checklist in order to enhance the appearance of independence. These are introduced 
through a combination of self and mandatory regulation. 
The discretion in the ASIC Act provided to the Treasurer on the number of FRC 
appointments is very wide. In addition, the ASIC Act only provides indirect support for 
the appointment of FRC members from key stakeholder groups in addition to those that 
are appointed independently and are not associated with such groups.741 The ASIC Act 
needs to be amended by specifically providing for a minimum number of 16 FRC 
members and for the Treasurer to appoint FRC members from nominations put forward 
by key stakeholder groups, as well as independently of stakeholder interests. 
The appearance of independence on the CALDB cannot be maintained as long as 
the ASIC Act allows members from the Accounting Associations to be accounting 
members as well as business members.742 Members from the Accounting Associations 
and persons who were members of the Accounting Associations within the last 5 years 
prior to the date of the proposed appointment must be excluded from being appointed as a 
business member. This proposal promotes auditor independence by ensuring that the 
composition of each panel of the CALDB constituted to conduct the hearing of each 
application is restricted to a majority of non-accountants. 
A new Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council could potentially facilitate the 
reporting of specific auditor independence concerns by retail shareholders to ASIC. 
ASIC’s ongoing audit firm inspection and auditor surveillance programs could potentially 
be enhanced by this information. The appearance of independence can be promoted as the 
                                                 
741 ASIC Act s 235A(1). 
742 Ibid s 203. 
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views of retail investors can be seen to be represented by this shareholder reference 
group. 
A new Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council could also act as an external 
advisory body reporting directly to the government on proposals in relation to general 
auditor independence concerns which pertain to the formulation of new corporations law. 
The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council could complement any future 
consultative mechanism to be created by the government (acting in a similar capacity to 
CAMAC) as an advisory body to the government. The appearance of independence can 
be strengthened as the subsequent enactment of auditor independence law reforms as a 
result of this process can be said to have considered the views of retail investors through 
this shareholder reference group.  
The audit committee should comprise of members who are qualified accountants 
and have an understanding of the industry in which the entity operates. The larger ASX 
listed companies must endeavour to ensure that all shareholders (regardless of the number 
of shareholdings) are made aware that a shareholder can convey any auditor 
independence concern in relation to the company, directly to the audit committee at first 
instance and where there is no audit committee, to the board of directors. It is envisaged 
that this will address any auditor independence concerns conveyed by retail investors in 
addition to the proposed creation of a new Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
as set out above. 
It is recommended in Section 5.11 that the Treasury utilise an appropriate checklist 
in order to ensure that legislative proposals concerning audit independence are consistent 
with the public interest and to provide reasons in circumstances where this objective 
cannot be entirely achieved. Its findings should also be made publicly available. The 
appearance of independence can be promoted as the general public will be able to have a 
better understanding of the cost and benefit to each interest group that may seek to 
influence the development of audit independence legislation.  
It is envisaged that the implementation of all of the proposals mentioned above can 
potentially improve audit independence. This is because these proposals promote the 
appearance of independence. Achieving this objective can be considered to be in the 
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economic interests of the primary users of accounting information and therefore is 
consistent with promoting the public interest. 
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Commentators have suggested that the fundamental role of the external auditor is to 
provide an independent attestation of a corporation’s financial statements.743 An 
independent audit process does not have the capability on its own to prevent corporate 
collapses but it has the potential to enhance the credibility and integrity of financial 
reporting. 
It has been established earlier in this thesis that independence is a critical 
component to the auditing process as the independence of the external auditor can 
enhance the credibility of a corporation’s financial statements. Without the independence 
of the external auditor, the credibility of a corporation’s financial statements can be 
questioned as these statements would generally comprise representations from 
management.744 This is consistent with Briloff’s view that the financial reports of an 
entity would be perceived by the investing public to have no value without the 
independence of the external auditor, as the financial reports of an entity cannot be relied 
upon to give a true and fair view of the entity’s financial position.745 
Commentators have proposed that the corporate collapses of multi-million dollar 
companies provided the impetus for policy makers to examine the corporate governance 
systems which existed at that time.746 Examples of these corporate collapses include  
Enron and WorldCom in the United States747 and HIH and One.Tel in Australia748 in 
early 2000. The resultant public outcry  caused the respective governments to move 
swiftly to introduce legal reforms to auditor independence that were perceived by these 
                                                 
743 du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 5, 243 and Ladakis, above n 5. 
744 Mautz and Sharaf, above n 19. 
745 Briloff, above n 21. 
746 De Martinis, above n 2, du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 5, 243 and Ladakis, above n 5. 
747 De Martinis, above n 2, du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 5, 243 and Ladakis, above n 5. 
748 De Martinis, above n 2, du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 5, 243 and Ladakis, above n 5. 
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policy makers to remedy the problems that contributed to the collapse of those entities in 
their respective jurisdictions.749  
According to these commentators, CLERP 9 was the Australian policy makers’ 
perceived legislative solution to remedy the deficiencies in auditor independence in 
Australia.750 The rationale for CLERP can be determined from the six ‘key principles’ 
provided by the Treasury in a discussion paper titled, CLERP – Policy Framework.751  
The emphasis on market integrity, reasonable access to information for all investors, the 
confidence of individual investors in the fairness and integrity of financial markets, the 
provision of necessary investor and consumer protection and the consistent and fair 
application of regulation to encourage high standards of business practice and ethics, are 
themes in these ‘key principles’ that consistently aim to safeguard the public interest.   
CLERP 9 introduced auditor independence requirements which comprised of 
(amongst others) a general requirement that prohibits the auditor from auditing the 
auditee where a conflict of interest situation exists752 and specific auditor independence 
requirements which included stipulated auditor declarations753, regulated employment754 
and financial relationships755, provided requirements for disclosure of non-audit 
services756, auditor rotation rules757 and prescribed auditor notifications758. The Financial 
Reporting Council was also entrusted with the task of providing strategic policy advice to 
the government in relation to the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations 
Act.759 
The reliability of a corporation’s financial statements can be enhanced in 
circumstances where legal measures are designed to promote ideal auditor independence. 
                                                 
749 De Martinis, above n 2, du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 5, 243 and Ladakis, above n 5. 
750 De Martinis, above n 2, see generally, Ramsay, above n 3, du Plessis, McConvill and Bagaric, above n 
5, 243 and Ladakis, above n 5. 
751 Treasury, above n 6. 
752 Corporations Act s324CA-324CC. 
753 Ibid s307C(1). 
754 Ibid s324CI. 
755 Ibid s324CH(1). 
756 Ibid s300(11B). 
757 Ibid s324DA. 
758 Ibid s311. 
759  Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 8 
and Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5. 
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Legal reform that seeks to promote ideal auditor independence is consistent with the 
public interest, can be considered as advancing the public interest and as such, is in the 
public interest.760 
The use of private interest theory to evaluate the development of CLERP 9 has 
indicated that in some circumstances, the public interest objective has not been achieved. 
The research findings from this study support the proposal of the research project that 
there is a case for reform of the existing requirements in the current regime in respect of 
auditor independence as some provisions are currently structured to serve private rather 
than the stated goal of the public interest. This thesis evaluated how the current 
legislation was established as a result of lobbying efforts on the part of specific interest 
groups rather than by consideration of the public interest. This study proposed practical 
solutions and alternatives to the existing corporate governance framework to improve the 
existing requirements for it to be consistent with greater independence (the public 
interest).761  
This chapter draws conclusions from the research findings and explains how these 
findings can be applied to legal reform. In addition, the findings also support the use of 
private interest theory as an alternative method by which legal proposals in relation to 
auditor independence can be evaluated.  
 
6.2 THE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This thesis demonstrated that ideal independence means that the external auditor 
must be free from all conflicts of interest, actual and/or perceived. Ideal independence 
from the perspective of ‘operational independence’ (for the reasons provided in Section 
2.4.4) is impossible to achieve under current institutional arrangements.  It is 
acknowledged that there exists a nexus between the audit client as the auditor’s 
                                                 
760 This is consistent with the accountants’ ethical code of conduct to serve the public interest which 
appears in Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited, Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants APES 110 (2013) Section 100.1.     
761 The public interest is the rationale (or one of the main considerations) for new legislation to be 
introduced as can be inferred from each of the six key CLERP principles as discussed in Chapter 2. Chapter 
5 identifies circumstances in which the public interest can be promoted and introduces various proposals 
that seek to support greater independence on the part of auditors. 
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paymaster and the auditor within current institutional arrangements which can potentially 
impair auditor independence. As long as external auditors are still being remunerated for 
the audit services they provide by the very same companies they audit, ideal auditor 
independence is impossible to attain. Despite this however, there is still scope for legal 
reform that can potentially enhance ideal auditor independence within existing 
arrangements in areas where this ideal is found to be inadequate without abolishing this 
nexus between the audit client as the auditor’s paymaster and the auditor.   
In addition, this thesis has explained that the current practice of auditing 
significantly relies on the auditee’s management for information. This practice reduces 
the need for the auditor to obtain the relevant information on many instances directly 
from its source in order to keep audit costs at an acceptable level. Notwithstanding this, 
legal reforms that are consistent with ideal auditor independence can still be proposed 
within the existing arrangements without the need to change the practice of auditing. 
The various facets of independence were outlined, namely organizational 
independence and operational independence. The former can be further segregated into 
independence in fact and independence in appearance and the latter, into informational 
independence and epistemic independence. This thesis evaluated the existing 
requirements with a view to providing proposals which support ideal auditor 
independence in the area of organizational independence in circumstances where ideal 
auditor independence was found to be lacking.  This meant that practical measures that 
could potentially enhance independence in fact and independence in appearance were 
considered for the purposes of this thesis in the evaluation of the existing requirements 
and the development of proposals for legal reform. 
In order to address ideal auditor independence inadequacies in the current regime, 
the public interest requirement was first established. This is because auditor 
independence legal reform had to be developed with the objective of benefitting clearly 
identified individuals and focused on efforts to support specific interests. The established 
definition of the public interest assisted in the evaluation of whether these clearly 
identified individual interests had been promoted in the current regime.  
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This thesis critically evaluated the meaning of ‘the public interest’ using the 
framework developed by Cochran.762 It provided a definition of ‘the public interest’ in 
order to establish a measure to assess the adequacy of the current regime. Chapter 2 used 
this framework to answer 2 questions (1) who exactly is the public and (2) what are the 
interests of the public.  
In order to determine who exactly is the public, reference was made to the code of 
ethics which defined the ‘public’ as ‘the collective well-being of the community of 
people and institutions that the members serve’.763 The key CLERP principles limit the 
scope of this broad definition of the ‘public’ to primary users of accounting information.  
As explained in Section 2.2, the objectives identified in the key CLERP principles 
(objectives that provided support for market integrity, reasonable access to information 
for all investors, the confidence of individual investors in the fairness and integrity of 
financial markets, the provision of necessary investor and consumer protection and the 
consistent and fair application of regulation to encourage high standards of business 
practice and ethics) consistently aimed to safeguard the primary users of accounting 
information. In doing so, it can be implied that this broad definition of the ‘public’ was 
intended to comprise a relatively large number of people but not the whole community. 
The code of ethics described these users of accounting information as ‘investors, the 
business and financial community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of 
members to maintain the orderly functioning of commerce’.764 The focus of any legal 
reform will be concerned with the primary users of accounting information, namely 
individual investors and those in the financial community who rely on the objectivity and 
integrity of auditors in order to invest on behalf of these individual investors. This is the 
definition of the ‘public’ which has been adopted for the purposes of this thesis.    
In order to determine what are the interests of the public, reference was made to the 
key CLERP principles to elaborate on the meaning of the ‘collective well-being’. The key 
CLERP principles that aim to safeguard the primary users of accounting information as 
                                                 
762 Cochran, above n 31, 329. 
763 The definition of the public interest can be found in the now superseded Accounting Professional & 
Ethical Standards Board Limited, Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants APES 110 (2006) Section 
100.1.1.  
764 Ibid. 
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discussed above, were also consistent with safeguarding the economic interests of the 
primary users of accounting information. Support for this is also provided for in the 
Second Reading Speech of the CLERP 9 Bill which stated that CLERP 9 was designed 
‘to modernise business regulation and foster a strong and vibrant economy, progressing 
the principles of market freedom, investor protection and quality disclosure of relevant 
information to the market.’765 This indicates that the development of CLERP 9 was 
strongly influenced by economic objectives for law reform with emphasis on 
safeguarding the economic interests of the primary users of accounting information. 
Therefore, this implies that interests are concerned with the economic needs of the 
primary users of accounting information. This is the definition of ‘interests’ which has 
been adopted for the purposes of this thesis.  
This thesis established that ideal independence (practical measures that could 
potentially enhance independence in fact and independence in appearance) can be 
promoted where auditor independence legal reform is aimed at benefiting the public 
interest. Such legal reforms should support the economic needs of the primary users of 
accounting information, the individual investors and those in the financial community 
who rely on the objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on behalf of these 
individual investors.  
Private interest theory was adopted to evaluate how the current regime emerged as 
it takes into consideration the special interest that the Selected Interest Groups have in 
seeking to influence the regulation of financial reporting. This thesis examined the 
adequacy of the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act and found 
that in some circumstances, the current regime was designed to serve private interests at 
the expense of the public interest. This was shown to be not consistent with the public 
interest rationale for the current regime as can be inferred from the six key CLERP 
principles.  
The findings from this thesis indicate that some provisions in the current regime 
can be attributed to (amongst other things) the lobbying efforts of particular interest 
groups. Had it not been for the lobbying efforts of these interest groups, the development 
                                                 
765 Costello, above n 104. 
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of these provisions is likely to have resulted in a different outcome. These proposals 
could have been developed to achieve outcomes that would have better served the 
economic needs of the primary users of accounting information consistent with the 
original intentions and objectives of CLERP, rather than the private interests of the 
various interest groups. The members of accounting professional bodies (in particular, the 
Accounting Associations, Big 4 Firms and Middle Tier Firms, APPC), managers of 
companies (ASFA) and government officials (APESB, ASIC, ASX, CALDB, FRC) 
lobbied successfully for various proposals.  
 
6.3 SUCCESSFUL LOBBYING IN SOME INSTANCES HAVE RESULTED IN 
PRACTICAL LEGAL REFORM 
The successful lobbying efforts of the Selected Interest Groups resulted in practical 
legal reform that is consistent with the public interest in some instances. The legal 
reforms that promoted the public interest (which is consistent with ideal independence) 
were identified as the enforcement of the auditor independence requirements in the 
current regime by both the Accounting Associations and ASIC, the requirements for 
auditors to adhere to applicable codes of professional conduct and for the issuing of a 
qualified declaration and the restrictions applying to partners and key senior members of 
the audit team. 
A conflict of interest can exist if the Accounting Associations are to be relied on 
solely to enforce the auditor independence requirements in the Corporations Act. The 
mechanisms employed by ASIC766 in addition to the measures utilised by the Accounting 
Associations767 to enforce such breaches can be perceived by a reasonable person as an 
independent check on the impartiality of the Accounting Associations. Such efforts were 
concluded as enhancing the appearance of independence, are consistent with ideal auditor 
independence and are in the public interest. 
                                                 
766 See generally, Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 630.  
767 For examples of tribunal decisions, see decisions from CPA Australia above n 629, The Institute of 
Chartered Accountants above n 629 and National Institute of Accountants above n 629.  
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Likewise, the requirements for auditors to adhere to applicable codes of 
professional conduct that are based on a universal standard768 which aim to benefit the 
collective well-being of the community is in the public interest. This is because  
Accounting Associations use codes of ethics to create expectations of professional 
behaviour that are aimed at benefiting the public.769 
The provision for the issue of a qualified declaration in the Corporations Act which 
allows the auditor to provide a declaration that states the circumstance of any breach 
rather than the auditor simply not making a statement is in the public interest. As 
suggested by the IPA, the prevention of the auditor from making such a qualified 
declaration can potentially cause the auditor to resign and as a consequence complicate 
the audit process.770 This is also consistent with the objective in the explanatory 
memorandum which is to provide assurance to investors of the integrity of financial 
reports which in turn supports ideal auditor independence.771 
The members of the audit team that are in a position to directly influence the audit 
outcome are those members that participate in the conduct of the audit and exercise 
professional judgment regarding accounting standards and legal requirements. These are 
generally partners and key senior members of the audit team. As such, restrictions 
applying to partners and key senior members of the audit team are consistent with ideal 
auditor independence. In addition, these restrictions are also consistent with the 
                                                 
768 The Accounting Associations are all members of the IFAC which at the time CLERP 9 was being 
enacted, represented 163 member organisations in 120 countries. (Treasury, Australian Auditor 
Independence Requirements <http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1184/PDF/Australian Auditor 
Independence Requirements.pdf>). The Accounting Associations as members of the IFAC are required to 
ensure that their ethical codes of conduct reflect, as a minimum, the standards in the IFAC Code.  The 
IFAC Code emphasises five fundamental values which are integrity, objectivity, professional competence, 
due care, confidentiality and professional behavior that provide the foundation for the auditor independence 
rules adopted by the Accounting Associations. (<http://web.ifac.org/about/member-bodies> and 
International Federation of Accountants, 2013 Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants (2013) Sections 100.1 and 100.5). The adoption of the IFAC Code by the Accounting 
Associations was consistent with the IFAC objective to encourage its members to act in the public interest 
(Treasury, Australian Auditor Independence Requirements  
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1184/PDF/Australian Auditor Independence Requirements.pdf and 
International Federation of Accountants, 2013 Handbook of the Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants (2013) Section 100.1). 
769 Dellaportas & Davenport, above n 31, 1093-1094. 
770 National Institute of Accountants, above n 358 and National Institute of Accountants PJ, above n 358. 
771 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate 
Disclosure) Bill 2003 (Cth) 14. 
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objectives in the explanatory memorandum which are ‘envisaged to strike an appropriate 
balance between promoting auditor independence and not unduly impeding audit 
professionals joining companies and bringing with them valuable financial expertise’.772 
 
6.4 SUCCESSFUL LOBBYING IN OTHER INSTANCES HAVE RESULTED IN 
LEGAL REFORM THAT IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH IDEAL AUDITOR 
INDEPENDENCE 
As discussed in Chapter 5, some of the other legal reforms do not go far enough to 
promote the economic needs of the primary users of accounting information and these 
relate to the composition of the memberships of the FRC and the CALDB and to the 
subsequent cessation of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council. 
As the FRC is responsible for (amongst other things) providing broad oversight of 
the process for setting accounting and auditing standards as well as a new function of 
giving strategic policy advice and reports to the Treasurer and professional accounting 
bodies concerning the quality of audits conducted by Australian auditors,773  the 
appearance of independence can potentially be enhanced where a reasonable person 
would conclude that the FRC’s objectivity has not been compromised. Ideal auditor 
independence means that the membership of the FRC should comprise a combination of 
people that have the relevant industry experience, are independent, are concerned with 
the public interest and not only associated with interest groups. The discretion in the 
ASIC Act provided to the Treasurer on the number of FRC appointments is very wide as 
it does not provide the Treasurer with a specific minimum or maximum number of FRC 
appointments required at any one time. It also does not provide for a specific number of 
FRC members to be appointed by key stakeholder groups and for FRC members to be 
appointed independently of stakeholder interests.774 Mechanisms need to be in place in 
the legislation to provide for a specific number of FRC members to be appointed by key 
stakeholder groups as well as for FRC members to be appointed independently of 
stakeholder interests. 
                                                 
772 Ibid 16. 
773 Explanatory Material, Corporations Legislation Amendment (Audit Enhancement) Bill 2011 (Cth) 8 and 
Audit Enhancement Act Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5. 
774 ASIC Act s 235A(1). 
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Likewise, the appearance of independence can be strengthened where the 
composition of each panel of the CALDB constituted to conduct the hearing of each 
application consists of at least a majority of non-accountants. The CALDB conducts 
disciplinary hearings to determine (amongst other things) whether an auditor has 
contravened the auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act.775 It is 
important that each panel of the CALDB is and be seen to be independent.776 Currently, 
each panel of the CALDB can potentially be comprised of a majority of accountants.777 
This is because members from the Accounting Associations are not excluded from being 
appointed as a business member. The appearance of independence cannot be maintained 
as a reasonable person will conclude that it is difficult for a panel comprised of a majority 
of members from the Accounting Associations to be impartial when deciding on 
questions that concern auditor independence. In order for the CALDB to fulfil its public 
protective role, measures need to be in place to ensure that each panel of the CALDB 
constituted to conduct the hearing of each application consists of at least a majority of 
non-accountants. 
The establishment of a Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council was consistent 
with ideal auditor independence as this shareholder reference group provided a 
convenient forum for retail investors to report directly to the government on issues of 
corporate law and governance affecting shareholders (including concerns that relate to 
auditor independence).778 The successful lobbying efforts of the Accounting Associations 
and the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) provide support for the subsequent 
cessation of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council.779 The Accounting 
Associations and the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) stand to benefit from the 
cessation of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council as the actions of the 
members from the Accounting Associations and the Managers of Companies (Producer 
                                                 
775 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters, (January 2011) and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters, (June 2012). 
776 Corporations Act s 1292(1). 
777 Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, Manual of Practice and Procedure 
Administrative Matters, (January 2011), 5 and Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary Board, 
Manual of Practice and Procedure Conduct Matters, (June 2012), 5. 
778 Treasury, above n 26. 
779 Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, above n 360, 22, Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, above n 546, 17 and Compostela Pty Limited, above n 561, 15. 
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Group) will no longer be open to the scrutiny of a shareholder reference group comprised 
of (amongst others) retail investors. Retail investors now no longer have this opportunity 
to investigate disclosure-related concerns that relate to auditor independence in order to 
ensure that these concerns are consistent with ideal auditor independence. 
As such, there is scope for law reform in order for the public interest to be served 
better. This thesis has looked at ways of improving the auditor independence 
requirements by providing practical solutions consistent with greater independence (the 
public interest) where the current regime is not consistent with the public interest. These 
proposals which promote greater auditor independence, do not have the capability on 
their own to prevent corporate collapses but rather have the potential to enhance the 
credibility and integrity of financial reporting consistent with the public interest. 
6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Proposals for legal reform were developed with the objective of promoting auditor 
independence and these were set out in Chapter 5. These recommendations are as 
follows:- 
Recommendation 1 – A diverse FRC 
In order to promote a more widely represented FRC, specific amendments to the 
ASIC Act could ensure that FRC appointments independent of stakeholder interests 
would need to be considered. In addition, as the ASIC Act is silent on the minimum 
number of FRC members, the risk that the Selected Interest Groups may collaborate and 
form a majority voice can be reduced by stipulating in the ASIC Act that the FRC 
comprise a minimum of 16 members. 
 
Recommendation 2 – A majority of non-accountants on the CALDB 
The composition of the CALDB should be restricted to a majority of non-
accountants so as to improve the appearance of independence. The insertion of a new 
section in the ASIC Act that specifically excludes members from the Accounting 
Associations and persons who were members of the Accounting Associations within the 
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last 5 years from being appointed (as a business member) on the CALDB will ensure that 
at any one time, the CALDB will comprise of 6 accounting members and 8 non-
accountants (a majority of non-accountants).  
As Recommendation 2 would be easier to implement than Recommendation 3 
(minor amendments to the existing CALDB structure rather than replacing the CALDB 
outright with 2 different entities), Recommendation 2 should be implemented first as an 
alternative to Recommendation 3.   
 
Recommendation 3 – 2 new boards, a Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board and 
a Companies Liquidators Disciplinary Board to replace the existing CALDB 
Consideration should also be given for the CALDB to be replaced by 2 distinct and 
independent entities such as a Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board to address solely 
auditor disciplinary matters and the other a Companies Liquidators Disciplinary Board to 
deliberate on purely liquidator disciplinary concerns. This way, 1 single entity need not 
have to assume the dual responsibility for deciding on both auditor and liquidator 
disciplinary matters.   
 
Recommendation 4 – A new Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council 
The Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council should be reinstated. This is 
because it is another useful mechanism by which the auditor independence concerns of 
retail investors can be considered. The government can be promptly informed of issues 
pertaining to auditor independence by this direct channel of communication and therefore 
seek to address such concerns expeditiously.   
 
Recommendation 5 – Amendments to the ASX Corporate Governance Principles 
The board of directors and the audit committees (where constituted) of listed 
entities are existing governance structures that can be utilised to enhance the appearance 
of independence. The proposed amendments to Principle 4 of the ASX Corporate 
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Governance Principles encourage the board of directors and the audit committees (where 
constituted) of listed entities to pay attention to the views of any shareholder (regardless 
of the number of shareholdings) in relation to auditor independence matters of the 
respective listed entity. In addition, the proposed changes to the existing 
Recommendation 4.2 of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles promote auditor 
independence as the amended recommendation seeks to appoint audit committee 
members that have the requisite qualifications and expertise to deliberate on auditor 
independence matters. 
 
Recommendation 6 – Adherence by the Treasury to a checklist that promotes 
auditor independence   
The Treasury should prepare and utilise a suitable checklist to ensure that future 
legislative proposals to be developed with auditor independence in mind are consistent 
with the public interest. Where this objective cannot be met in its entirety, adequate 
reasons should be disseminated by the Treasury to the public in a timely manner. It is 
envisaged that by making this information publicly available, the appearance of 
independence can be enhanced. 
 
It would be prudent for the government to introduce these proposals in a systematic 
and sustained manner in order for the anticipated benefits to be fully realised. This way, 
further improvements consistent with the public interest can be identified from time to 
time and incorporated in a timely manner.  
These proposals can be implemented one at a time. There is no requirement for 
them to be introduced simultaneously. Recommendation 2 should be trialled for a 
specific period of time and its effectiveness evaluated before Recommendation 3 is 
considered.   
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6.6 HOW THE RESEARCH FINDINGS CAN BE APPLIED TO NEW 
PROPOSALS FOR LEGAL REFORM 
The recommendations stated in the previous section are envisaged to be practical 
mechanisms by which the appearance of auditor independence can be promoted. The 
findings from this thesis are also consistent with private interest theory in that powerful 
interest groups can and will seek to influence the development of corporate law (in 
particular, auditor independence) in Australia. These findings however can also be 
applied to the development of future legislation. New legislative proposals can also be 
similarly examined by applying private interest theory.  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, the private interest theory of regulation assumes that 
groups will form to protect particular economic interests. Different groups are viewed as 
often being in conflict with each other and the different groups will lobby government to 
put in place legislation that economically benefits them (at the expense of others).780 The 
regulatory outcomes reflect the interests of the most powerful group(s).781  
This thesis analysed the lobbying process of the Selected Interest Groups over a 
specific period of time. It investigated the lobbying process of the Selected Interest 
Groups from the time when CLERP 9 was being deliberated until the introduction of the 
Audit Enhancement Act. The conclusions reached provide supporting evidence that the 
lobbying efforts of the Selected Interest Groups have (in some instances) influenced the 
final legislated outcome. 
As such, amendments to the current regime will also be subject to similar pressures 
from the various interest groups that seek to influence the final outcome. The challenge 
for the government of the day is always to ensure that the public interest can still be 
upheld, despite the much anticipated lobbying by influential and powerful group(s). This 
would mean that reforms must be consistent with the original intentions and objectives of 
CLERP, rather than the private interests of the various lobbying groups.  
In upholding the public interest, the government needs to ensure that the legislated 
outcome does not result in a less than ideal version of auditor independence. This less 
                                                 
780 Craig Deegan, Financial Accounting Theory (McGraw Hill Book Co., 1st ed, 2001) 66. 
781 Peltzman, above n 29, 6-7.  
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than ideal version of auditor independence can be observed in the composition of the 
memberships of the FRC and the CALDB and the cessation of the Shareholders and 
Investors Advisory Council, as reflected in the current regime. This is the government’s 
solution which results in all parties benefiting from the new legislation that compromised 
ideal auditor independence in the circumstances as discussed in Chapter 5. This 
moderated final outcome in order for the appearance of social gain to be distributed is 
inconsistent with the concept of ideal auditor independence and cannot be considered to 
be in the public interest.  
The successful lobbying by the Selected Interest Groups (in relation to the 
composition of the FRC and the CALDB), the successful lobbying by the ASFA (in 
relation to the composition of the FRC) and the successful lobbying by the Accounting 
Associations and the Managers of Companies (Producer Group) (in relation to the 
subsequent cessation of the Shareholders and Investors Advisory Council), are instances 
where adoption or non-adoption (as the case may be) of the respective proposals have 
benefited these interest groups at the expense of greater auditor independence (the public 
interest). The government however, has not adopted all of their respective proposals, 
assuring that some portion of the social gain goes to the public as well.  
In view of these findings, new legislative proposals need to be carefully examined 
to ensure that these are consistent with the interests of the primary users of accounting 
information, being the individual investors and those in the financial community who rely 
on the objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on behalf of these individual 
investors. These proposals need to be adequately scrutinized to ensure that these do not 
promote the self-serving interests of the most influential groups that stand to benefit more 
by the introduction of the various proposals successfully lobbied by them.  
 
6.7 THE WAY FORWARD 
The findings from this study support the proposal of this research project that there 
is a case for reform of the existing requirements in the current regime in respect of 
independence. This is because in some instances, these have been structured to serve 
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private interests rather than the public interest. These have benefited the Selected Interest 
Groups at the expense of greater auditor independence (the public interest).  
Not everyone however, will be enthusiastic about embracing further legal reforms. 
Some commentators have surveyed the views of members of the audit committee and 
have found that these people would be less enthusiastic to embrace further legislative 
auditor independence reforms as those surveyed ‘do not view further legislative 
intervention as warranted or necessary.’782  
The proposed legal reform should be trialed for a specific period of time. This 
could be over a period of two years or perhaps even longer if more time is required by the 
Treasury to evaluate the benefits of such proposals. If the change involves significant 
financial or other costs, the new system may need to be revisited, as the proposed benefit 
of greater auditor independence may not be justified. 
It is envisaged that the lobbying efforts of the various interest groups will continue, 
as and when new proposals for legal reform arise. This thesis only analyses the lobbying 
process for CLERP 9 and the Audit Enhancement Act. From the discussions in Chapter 4, 
it was evident that the Treasury was keen to consult with various stakeholders on the 
proposals for legal reform. Whether legal reforms in the future would be in the public 
interest, would need to be investigated further and be the subject of another analysis and 
discussion. 
 
ASIC has stated that it will continue to monitor and examine the causes of recent 
corporate collapses. Where deficiencies (for example, the lack of auditor independence) 
in auditor conduct appear to have contributed to insufficient transparency in the financial 
position and financial performance of an entity leading up to the collapse, ASIC will 
focus on these areas in future audit inspections.783 As such, auditor independence has 
been and will continue to be an important ongoing consideration. Auditor independence 
                                                 
782Albie Brooks, et al, ‘Auditor independence reforms: Audit committee members’ views’ (2005) 23(3) 
Company & Securities Law Journal 151, 164. 
783 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, above n 647, 25.  
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legal reform needs to be regularly reviewed in order for it to be consistent with the public 
interest. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Treasury CLERP – Policy Framework ‘Economic Approach to Business Regulation’ 784  
 
3.1 Market Freedom 
 
Competition plays a key role in driving efficiency and enhancing community welfare. 
However, free markets do not always operate in a sufficiently competitive, equitable or 
efficient manner. Business regulation can and should help markets work by enhancing 
market integrity and capital market efficiency. At the same time, the regulatory 
framework needs to be sufficiently flexible so that it does not impede market evolution 
(for example, new products and technologies) and competition. 
 
3.2 Investor Protection 
 
With an increasing number of retail investors participating in the market for the first 
time, business regulation should ensure that all investors have reasonable access to 
information regarding the risks of particular investment opportunities. Regulation should 
be cognisant of the differences between sophisticated and retail investors in access to 
information and the ability to analyse it. 
 
3.3 Information Transparency 
 
Disclosure is a key to promoting a more efficient and competitive marketplace. 
Disclosure of relevant information enables rational investment decision making and 
facilitates the efficient use of resources by companies. Disclosure requirements increase 
the confidence of individual investors in the fairness and integrity of financial markets 
and, by fostering confidence, encourage investment. Different levels of disclosure may be 
required for sophisticated and retail investors. 
 
3.4 Cost Effectiveness 
 
The benefits of business regulation must outweigh its associated costs. The regulatory 
framework should take into account the direct and indirect costs imposed by regulation 
on business and the community as a whole. What Australia must avoid is outmoded 
business laws which impose unnecessary costs through reducing the range of products or 
services, impeding the development of new products or imposing system-wide costs. 
 
The regulatory framework for business needs to be well targeted to ensure that the 
benefits clearly exceed the costs. A flexible and transparent framework will be more 
                                                 
784 Treasury, above n 6. 
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conducive to innovation and risk taking, which are fundamental elements of a thriving 
market economy, while providing necessary investor and consumer protection. 
 
3.5 Regulatory Neutrality and Flexibility 
 
Regulation should be applied consistently and fairly across the marketplace. Regulatory 
distinctions or advantages should not be conferred on particular market structures or 
products unless there is a clear regulatory justification. The regulatory framework should 
also avoid creating incentives or opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. 
 
The regulatory framework should be sufficiently flexible to permit market participants to 
respond to future changes in an innovative, timely and efficient manner. Regulation 
should be designed to facilitate predictability and certainty. 
 
3.6 Business Ethics and Compliance 
 
Clear guidance regarding appropriate corporate behaviour and swift enforcement if 
breaches occur are key elements in ensuring that markets function optimally. 
 
The Government is committed to the strong and effective enforcement of corporate law 
and will continue to provide substantial resources to the Australian Securities 
Commission [now the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)] to 
enforce the law. 
 
Fostering an environment which encourages high standards of business practice and 
ethics will remain a central objective of regulation, as will effective enforcement. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 317: Audit inspection 
program public report for 2011-12 
 
The text of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 317: 
Audit inspection program public report for 2011-12 is attached as Appendix 2. 
  
  
REPORT 317 
Audit inspection program 
report for 2011–12 
 
December 2012 
 
About this report 
This report summarises the observations and findings identified by ASIC’s 
audit inspection program in the 18 months to 30 June 2012. 
We expect this report to be of significant interest both to the inspected firms 
and those firms we have not inspected, as well as companies, audit 
committees, investors and other stakeholders interested in financial 
reporting. 
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About ASIC regulatory documents 
In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory 
documents. 
Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC 
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance. 
Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by: 
 explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under 
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act) 
 explaining how ASIC interprets the law 
 describing the principles underlying ASIC’s approach 
 giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such 
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how 
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations). 
Information sheets: provide concise guidance on a specific process or 
compliance issue or an overview of detailed guidance. 
Reports: describe ASIC compliance or relief activity or the results of a 
research project. 
Scope  
Sections of this report may describe deficiencies or potential deficiencies in 
the systems, policies, procedures, practices or conduct of some of the 
20 audit firms inspected. The absence of a reference in this report to any 
other aspect of a firm’s systems, policies, procedures, practices or conduct 
is not an approval by ASIC of those aspects, or any indication that in ASIC’s 
view those aspects comply with relevant laws and standards.  
In the course of reviewing specific areas in a limited sample of selected audit 
engagements, an inspection may identify ways in which a particular audit is 
deficient. It is not the purpose of an inspection, however, to review all of the 
firm’s audit engagements or to identify every aspect in which a reviewed audit 
may be deficient. Accordingly, this report does not provide assurance that the 
firms’ audits, or their clients’ financial statements, are free of deficiencies apart 
from those described in this report. 
Unless stated otherwise, not all matters in this report apply to every firm and, 
where they do apply to more than one firm, there will often be differences in 
degree. Our observations and findings relate only to the individual firms 
inspected. Our observations and findings can differ significantly, even 
between firms of similar size, and for that reason we caution against drawing 
conclusions about any individual firms. 
This report covers audit firm inspections only and does not include any 
matters arising from other ASIC regulatory activities, such as our financial 
reporting surveillance program, and investigations or surveillances of the 
firms or the entities that they audit. However, these other activities may 
inform general areas of focus in inspections. 
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Executive summary 
1 This report covers the findings from our inspections of 20 Australian audit 
firms substantially undertaken in the 18 months to 30 June 2012. Our 
inspections focus on audits of financial reports of public interest entities 
prepared under the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act). 
2 We are disappointed that there has not been an improvement in audit quality 
since our last report for the 18 months to 31 December 2010. Our risk-based 
reviews have shown an increase in instances where auditors did not perform 
all of the procedures necessary to obtain reasonable assurance that the 
audited financial report was not materially misstated. 
3 Australia’s audit regime is similar to the regimes in other major developed 
countries. We understand that audit oversight regulators in a number of other 
countries have experienced similar trends in audit quality. 
4 Firms should increase their efforts to improve audit quality and the 
consistency of audit execution. This report identifies some important areas 
where the firms need to focus their attention and make improvements to 
ensure consistent audit quality.  
5 We have identified three broad areas requiring improvement by audit firms: 
(a) the sufficiency and appropriateness of audit evidence obtained by the 
auditor; 
(b) the level of professional scepticism exercised by auditors; and 
(c) the extent of reliance that can be placed on the work of other auditors 
and experts.  
6 We found that, in 18% of the 602 key audit areas that we reviewed across 
117 audit files over firms of all sizes, auditors did not obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence, exercise sufficient scepticism, or otherwise 
comply with auditing standards in a significant audit area. While the 
financial reports audited may not have been materially misstated, in these 
instances, the auditor had not obtained reasonable assurance that the 
financial report as a whole was free of material misstatement: see Section A. 
7 Some audit firms inspected need to improve their quality control systems: 
see Section B. 
8 Further, we believe there are a number of actions that audit firms should 
consider to improve and maintain audit quality: see Section C. 
9 In this report, we also outline future areas of focus for audit firms and our 
inspections: see Section D. 
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A Key findings: Audit file reviews 
Key points 
We have identified three broad areas requiring improvement by audit firms: 
• the sufficiency and appropriateness of audit evidence obtained by the 
auditor; 
• the level of professional scepticism exercised by auditors; and  
• the extent of reliance that can be placed on the work of other auditors 
and experts.  
We found that, in 18% of the 602 key audit areas reviewed by us across 
117 audit files over firms of all sizes, auditors did not obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence, exercise sufficient professional scepticism, or 
otherwise comply with auditing standards in at least one significant audit 
area.  
While the financial reports audited may not have been materially misstated, 
in these instances, the auditor had not obtained reasonable assurance that 
the financial report as a whole was free of material misstatement. 
In this section, we also outline our findings on audits for specific industries. 
Adequacy of audit procedures 
10 Auditors are important ‘gatekeepers’ in our financial system. The quality of 
an audit supports high quality financial reports, informed investors and 
market confidence. 
11 The objective of our inspections is to work co-operatively with firms to 
improve and maintain audit quality. 
12 We are disappointed there has not been an improvement in audit quality 
since our last report for the 18 months to 31 December 2010. Our risk-based 
reviews have shown an increase in instances where auditors did not perform 
all of the procedures necessary to obtain reasonable assurance that audited 
financial reports were not materially misstated. 
13 Australia’s audit regime is similar to the regimes in other major developed 
countries. We understand that audit oversight regulators in a number of other 
countries have experienced similar trends in audit quality. 
14 There are some important areas where the firms need to focus their attention 
and make improvements to ensure audit quality. While firms have indicated 
a commitment to improving audit quality, they should increase their efforts 
to improve audit quality and the consistency of audit execution. 
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15 We reviewed a number of key aspects in 117 audit files at the 20 audit firms 
that we inspected during the 18 months to 30 June 2012. Our inspections 
covered four to six key audit areas on each file. Across the 117 files, we 
reviewed 602 key audit areas in total. The appendix contains further 
information about our inspection approach and the 20 audit firms inspected. 
16 In 18% of the 602 key audit areas reviewed in 117 audit files, in our view 
auditors did not obtain sufficient appropriate evidence, exercise sufficient 
professional scepticism, or otherwise comply with auditing standards. In 
these instances, the auditor had not obtained reasonable assurance that the 
financial report as a whole was free of material misstatement. For the 
previous 18-month reporting period to 31 December 2010, we noted the same 
findings in 14% of the key audit areas we reviewed.  
17 The occurrence of the above findings at the larger firms was: 
(a) Larger National firms—13% (10% in the previous 18-month period); 
and 
(b) Other National and Network firms—21% (18% in the previous 18-
month period). 
Note: See paragraph 90 in the appendix for an explanation of the firm size categories. 
18 Matters relevant to understanding our findings and the percentages reported 
above are outlined in Table 1. The percentages reflect findings in the areas 
discussed later in this section. 
19 The auditing standards state that the fundamental objective of the audit is to 
obtain reasonable assurance that the financial report as a whole is free of 
material misstatement. Audit firms should consider ways to further improve 
audit quality and significantly reduce the number of instances where this 
assurance is not obtained. 
20 Section C of this report outlines good practices adopted by auditors, and 
other matters for consideration by firms to promote improved audit quality. 
Section D contains specific focus areas for firms. We will also engage with 
firms on how they propose to address the findings in this report and reduce 
the percentages of findings. 
21 Better auditors appropriately balance commercial pressures with risks and 
maintaining audit quality. They ensure that they understand the audited 
entity’s business model, its internal and external risks, and how these factors 
affect the nature and extent of audit procedures. 
22 There will be instances where auditors detect material misstatements during 
the audit process and these misstatements are corrected before a financial 
report is completed and released. These instances are not measured in this 
report. 
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Table 1: Matters relevant to understanding findings 
Matter Explanation 
Quality of financial 
reports 
An adverse finding on a matter during our review does not necessarily mean that 
there will be material misstatements in the overall financial report. Rather it means 
that the auditor has not in ASIC’s view obtained reasonable assurance that there 
are no such misstatements. 
In two separate instances, where we had identified concerns with audit work, we 
followed up the matters directly with the companies, resulting in material changes to 
their financial reports. In one case, where we identified inadequate audit work, the 
firm performed additional audit work and did not identify material misstatements in 
the financial report concerned. 
Generally, firms implement our suggested remedial actions for future company 
audits where we identify concerns. 
Auditors play an important role in checking financial information to ensure that it is 
accurate before financial reports are released to the market. 
Level of assurance An audit is not intended to provide absolute assurance that there are no material 
misstatements in the financial report. Our findings relate to instances where we 
believe that the auditor has not obtained reasonable assurance that the financial 
report as a whole is free of material misstatements. 
What is measured? The percentages listed in paragraph 17 relate to cases where auditors did not 
obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence, exercise sufficient judgement, or 
otherwise comply with auditing standards in key audit areas, such that the auditor 
had not obtained reasonable assurance that the financial report as a whole was free 
of material misstatement. 
The percentages do not include other findings relating to audit quality and compliance 
with auditing standards, such as the adequacy of planning, obtaining an 
understanding of business, risk assessment, reviews and reliance on internal 
controls, non-substantive analytical procedures, documentation, supervision and 
review, auditor independence, firm quality control systems, and training of partners 
and staff. 
The percentages also exclude findings concerning insufficient work for related party 
transactions, reviews for unusual journal entries, review of legal expenses and legal 
representation letters, and subsequent event reviews. These matters could have 
resulted in material misstatements not being detected. Although excluded from the 
percentages, these remain important areas for improvement by firms. 
Other National and 
Network firms 
We inspected different groups of Other National and Network firms in the 18 months 
to 30 June 2012 and the 18 months to 31 December 2011. Firms inspected generally 
improve audit quality after our first inspection. In the 18 months to 30 June 2012, 
all firms had been previously inspected. In the 18 months to 31 December 2011, 
two firms had been inspected for the first time. This may have resulted in a smaller 
increase in the percentages above than would otherwise have been the case.  
Subjectivity Our findings relate to compliance with the auditing standards. Audits necessarily 
involve the application of professional judgement and there are some instances 
where different individuals will reach different judgements on whether the audit work 
performed is sufficient. Each of our inspection findings is subject to quality review 
within ASIC, and extensive discussion and consultation with the engagement 
partners and firms.  
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Matter Explanation 
Enforcement action The objective of our inspections is to work co-operatively with audit firms to improve 
and maintain audit quality. We expect audit firms to make changes and to undertake 
work in response to our findings. However, there are some cases where findings 
are so serious as to warrant enforcement or similar action. We are currently 
considering possible enforcement action on concerns arising in the 2011–12 review 
period from our inspection of a Smaller firm. Further, as a result of inspections 
conducted in the 2009–10 review period and reported on in our previous report, one 
auditor from an Other National and Network firm and one auditor from a Smaller 
firm have chosen not to continue as registered company auditors. 
Impact of risk-based 
approach 
Our reviews of audit files do not cover all areas of an audit engagement or all 
subsidiaries and divisions in a group. Typically, four to six key audit areas are 
covered and, for groups, only one major operating component. 
We select audit engagements and key audit areas for review in our audit 
inspections using a risk-based approach. Some have suggested that this approach 
could result in the percentages reported being greater than would be the case with 
random reviews. On the other hand, more experienced partners and staff are 
usually allocated to such audits, and there are generally more extensive firm 
reviews and consultation processes for these audits and the key audit areas. Our 
experience is that there can be more findings relating to smaller audit engagements. 
Documentation versus 
audit evidence 
If audit work is not documented, our presumption is that the work has not been 
performed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. This is the same approach 
applied by other audit oversight regulators and by most firms in their internal quality 
review programs. 
Surveillances and 
investigations 
ASIC is both an audit oversight regulator and a securities regulator. In addition to 
audit inspections, we conduct a range of other activities that relate to the work of 
audit firms. These other activities include our financial reporting surveillance 
program, surveillances where there is a concern about a specific audit or an 
individual auditor, and investigations into corporate failures. 
Where our concerns about material misstatements in financial reports have originated 
from these other activities, the audits are not reviewed in our audit inspection program 
but are the subject of separate auditor surveillance activities. This report does not 
cover any of these other activities. The outcomes of these activities are reported in 
separate media releases and our regular enforcement reports. 
However, these other activities can inform our general areas of inspection focus and 
the timing of future audit firm inspections. 
Number of procedures 
and findings 
There may be a number of audit procedures in a key audit area. Findings have 
been included in the percentages reported where there was only one instance of the 
auditor not performing an audit procedure in any given key audit area, if that meant 
the auditor had not obtained reasonable assurance that the financial report as a 
whole was free of material misstatement. 
The percentages reported refer to audit areas where we had findings that insufficient 
work had been performed such that material misstatements would not be detected, 
irrespective of the number of findings for any particular audit area. There were a 
number of cases where we found more than one deficiency in a key audit area, each 
of which could have resulted in material misstatements not being detected. 
Process improvement Where firms put in place initiatives to improve audit quality, there can be a period 
before the benefits are realised through improved audits. 
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Audit evidence  
23 Our reviews of audit files across the firms inspected raised a high number of 
concerns about the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence obtained by 
auditors to support their conclusions on significant areas of the audit. 
Findings were mainly in the areas outlined below. 
Impairment testing and fair value measurement  
24 In an environment of global economic uncertainty, we continued to focus on 
impairment of assets and the measurement of assets and liabilities at fair value, 
which are important areas of judgement. In many audit files, auditors had not 
obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support the values of assets and 
liabilities in the financial report. This included, but was not limited to, financial 
instruments, goodwill, other intangible assets, development property inventories, 
property plant and equipment, carrying values of a controlled entity or joint 
venture investment in an associate, capitalised expenditure and provisions.  
25 In many files, we found the auditor had not adequately tested: 
(a) the audited entity’s impairment model and assumptions, including the 
discount rates, forecast cash flows, growth rates, number of cash 
generating units (CGUs), and inclusion or exclusion of items such as 
working capital and tax losses; and 
(b) the accuracy of the source data used by the audited entity in estimating 
future cash flows used for impairment assessments.  
26 In some files, audit evidence was insufficient or inappropriate to confirm: 
(a) the valuation of financial assets recorded at fair value because the 
auditor relied on external confirmations, which verified the existence 
but not necessarily the valuation of the assets; 
(b) the annual assessment of impairment of goodwill (instead, the auditor 
relied on assessments prepared by the audited entity in a previous year); 
and 
(c) consideration by the auditor of whether an expert may be required to 
assist the auditor, particularly with complex impairment calculations 
relying on significant judgement. 
27 We also found insufficient evidence that the auditor exercised professional 
scepticism in: 
(a) critically evaluating whether discount rates used by audited entities 
reflected the risks specific to the relevant industry or a particular CGU, 
or challenged the appropriateness of high growth rates used by clients 
even though the audited entity’s historical performance indicated 
otherwise; and 
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(b) considering whether disclosures in the financial report about fair value 
and impairment were in accordance with the relevant accounting 
standards. In particular, we noted that, even though impairment 
indicators and sensitivities about a reasonable possible change in 
assumptions leading to impairment were communicated to those 
charged with governance of the audited entity, these were not disclosed 
in the financial report. Where disclosure deficiencies were identified, 
it often appeared that the auditor was willing to agree with the audited 
entity’s disclosures rather than challenge them. 
Assessment of going concern 
28 Our inspections continued to show that auditors had not always obtained 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence to demonstrate their consideration of 
the going concern assumption or whether an emphasis-of-matter paragraph 
(or qualification) should be included in the audit report. 
29 In many of the audit files we reviewed, we had concerns about the adequacy 
of the audit procedures undertaken and the level of professional scepticism 
applied by the auditor in assessing whether:  
(a) the auditor’s report should be modified with an emphasis-of-matter 
paragraph about the use of the going concern assumption. In one instance, 
an emphasis-of-matter paragraph had previously been included in the 
auditor’s report but was removed when there did not appear to be a 
substantial change in the financial performance of the audited entity;  
(b) the entity’s going concern assumption was appropriate, particularly 
where the entity operated in an environment of significant 
environmental and political risk; and 
(c) the audited entity’s budgeting and cash flow forecasting were 
reasonable and the auditor was able to rely on management’s key 
assumptions about the budget and forecast. 
Substantive analytical procedures 
30 In many audit files, the auditor had not complied with auditing standards in 
the application of substantive analytical procedures used as the primary 
substantive test for a material balance. 
31 When using substantive analytical procedures, the auditor should ensure that 
there are appropriate relationships between the data used and the balances 
tested, that the source data is adequately tested, and that suitable thresholds 
are developed and explanations for variances are obtained and corroborated. 
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32 While our findings relate to the audit of all types of companies and industries, 
the findings were particularly common in the audit of financial institutions: 
see paragraphs 48–54. We found many instances where auditors: 
(a) relied on substantive analytical procedures as the only substantive test 
for a material balance where other procedures such as testing of controls 
and substantive tests of detail were not undertaken; 
(b) did not ascertain the accuracy of the data used in the analytical 
procedure and whether there was an appropriate relationship between 
the data used and the population being audited; 
(c) did not adequately set expectations before carrying out the analytical 
procedure; 
(d) did not sufficiently investigate differences between the expectation set 
and the recorded balance;  
(e) used disaggregated data for the substantive analytics, but did not set 
appropriate disaggregated thresholds for following up variances from 
expectations; and  
(f) used simplistic analytical comparisons which did not satisfy the 
requirements of the auditing standard for designing and performing 
substantive analytical procedures. 
Journal entry testing 
33 Auditing standards require an auditor, in considering the risk of fraud in an 
audit of a financial report, to test the appropriateness of journal entries 
during the preparation of the final report. Further, the auditor should 
consider the need to test journal entries throughout the reporting period. 
34 We found many audit files where the auditor: 
(a) did not test journal entries during the year-end reporting or 
consolidation process; and/or 
(b) did not test journal entries throughout the year.  
Related party transactions 
35 In many audit files, the auditor did not perform adequate procedures to gain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence about whether all related parties and 
related party transactions were fully identified and disclosed in the financial 
report. We often found that auditors: 
(a) did not adequately assess, discuss and document, at the planning stage 
of the audit, the risk of undetected related parties and related party 
transactions;  
(b) did not adequately discuss with management the risks of undetected 
related party transactions or obtain an understanding of the audited 
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entity’s systems and controls for identifying them, but instead relied on 
a list of related parties and related party transactions provided by the 
audited entity without undertaking additional work to determine 
whether there were any undetected related party transactions; 
(c) did not document the design and operation of the audited entity’s 
controls to detect related party transactions; and 
(d) did not assess whether related party transactions were fully disclosed in 
the audited entity’s financial report.  
Subsequent events review 
36 We noted many instances where auditors did not obtain sufficient evidence 
to support their conclusions about subsequent events. We found cases where: 
(a) there was no evidence in audit files that subsequent event procedures 
were performed by the auditor;  
(b) the auditor conducted subsequent event procedures but did not ensure 
they were carried out up to the date of signing the audit report; and  
(c) a subsequent event was disclosed in a financial report but there was no 
evidence that the auditor had performed procedures on the item or 
considered whether other material subsequent events had occurred.  
External confirmations 
37 While there is no mandatory requirement to obtain external confirmations, 
we consider that they are a reliable source of independent evidence. Despite 
this, we found instances where the auditor:  
(a) did not carry out adequate alternative procedures to verify the existence 
and valuation of assets held overseas where confirmations requested by 
the auditor for those assets had not been received; and 
(b) did not evidence why external bank confirmations were not obtained for 
material cash balances but instead relied on bank statements provided 
by the audited entity. 
Consideration of the risk of fraud 
38 In many instances, we found that the auditor had not discussed with 
management, or those charged with the governance of the audited entity, the 
risks of fraud that could have a material impact on the financial report.  
39 We found other instances where the auditor did not adequately consider the 
risk of fraud in relation to revenue recognition, which might be considered a 
heightened risk in the current economic environment. 
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Professional scepticism 
40 Exercising professional scepticism is a critical part of conducting quality audits. 
Professional scepticism means the auditor makes a critical assessment, with a 
questioning mind, of the validity of the audit evidence obtained and the 
management’s judgements on accounting treatments and estimates.  
41 Our reviews of audit files showed insufficient professional scepticism was 
applied, particularly in relation to fair value measurement, impairment 
testing, and going concern assessments: see paragraphs 24–29.  
42 We found many instances where auditors: 
(a) appeared to have been over-reliant on, or readily accepted, the 
management’s explanations and representations without challenging the 
underlying assumption, or instead sought out evidence to corroborate 
the estimations or judgements rather than challenging them;  
(b) had not explored the evidence available in other parts of the audit file 
that appeared inconsistent or contradictory; and  
(c) had not given sufficient consideration to historical outcomes in 
assessing the reasonableness of the forecasts and assumptions 
underlying the management’s decisions.  
43 Auditors did not always evidence why an accounting treatment proposed by 
management was accepted and whether alternative scenarios or accounting 
treatments were fully considered. In judgement areas, it is necessary at times 
to rely on evidence that is persuasive rather than conclusive. However, in 
some instances the auditor did not give sufficient weight to evidence that 
appeared to contradict the accounting treatment adopted.  
Using the work of other auditors and experts 
44 Often, if an auditor is responsible for the audit of a financial report 
consolidating many business components, the firm relies on the audit work 
performed by component auditors that may be affiliated, or separate firms, 
potentially located in a foreign jurisdiction. 
45 Where financial reports include complex or subjective matters requiring 
specialist skills or knowledge (e.g. valuations of assets), audited entities may 
obtain advice from external or internal experts. Auditors may also use their 
own specialists to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence for significant 
account balances in the financial report.  
46 For an auditor to rely on the work of other auditors and experts, the auditor 
needs to assess their competence and objectivity, and evaluate the 
appropriateness of the work performed by them. 
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47 We found instances where the audit files did not contain sufficient 
appropriate evidence of:  
(a) the auditor’s evaluation of the competence and independence of 
component auditors and the evaluation of the component auditors’ 
work, including the resolution of matters raised by component auditors;  
(b) the auditor’s evaluation of the adequacy and reliability of the work of 
experts engaged by the audited entity, particularly in the case of 
financial institutions where experts are used to measure complex and 
material liabilities and provisions, or to provide pricing information;  
(c) where financial institutions use a service organisation to process a material 
transaction stream, the auditor’s assessment of the work of the auditor of 
the service organisation and whether it could be relied on; and 
(d) the appropriate translation of source documents from a foreign language 
into English (e.g. bank statements). 
Industry-specific findings 
Financial institutions 
48 We reviewed audit files for financial institutions, including banks, credit 
unions, insurance companies and managed investment schemes. We reviewed 
the audits of Australian financial services (AFS) licensee obligations (see 
paragraph 54) and compliance plan obligations (see paragraphs 55–57). 
49 Our reviews of these files highlighted findings common to all industries, 
such as not obtaining sufficient appropriate evidence to support audit 
procedures conducted in relation to assessing impairment, the application of 
professional scepticism, the performance of substantive analytical reviews, 
and relying on the work of others: see paragraphs 23–47. 
50 Key findings specific to the audit of banks and credit unions include: 
(a) insufficient and inappropriate audit evidence obtained to support the 
valuation of significant financial assets, such as trading derivatives, 
trading securities and available-for-sale securities. In particular, we 
found instances where the auditor’s substantive procedures were 
inadequate and the auditor placed inappropriate reliance on controls and 
external confirmations to validate the valuation assertion; 
(b) insufficient testing to assess the adequacy of provisions for loan losses. In 
designing a disaggregated substantive analytical procedure, one auditor used 
an aggregated threshold for testing, and did not clearly identify a threshold for 
investigating differences or sufficiently corroborate variations identified; and 
(c) insufficient testing of the reported net interest margin, including the 
inappropriate application of substantive analytical procedures or 
reliance on the audited entity’s controls without detailed substantive 
testing where the balance was material. 
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51 Key findings specific to the audit of insurance companies include: 
(a) not exercising sufficient professional scepticism about the sufficiency of 
the level of the ‘liability adequacy’ provision and the calculation of the 
‘probability of adequacy’ for outstanding claim provisions where a 
significant amount of judgement is applied in the calculation. We found 
that the auditor accepted and relied on the audited entity’s assumptions and 
assertions without sufficient challenge, including, in one instance, not 
questioning a material change to the probability of adequacy calculation; 
(b) insufficient assessment by the auditor of whether work performed by 
the firm’s internal actuarial experts on insurance liability provisions 
(including outstanding claims liabilities, premium liabilities and 
liability adequacy test) could be relied on and was sufficient to support 
their conclusions on the adequacy of the provisions;  
(c) inappropriate assessment of risk and, consequently, insufficient 
substantive testing of material management fee revenue; and 
(d) inadequate testing of key controls in the audited entity’s underwriting 
system and insufficient testing to confirm internal controls operated for 
the entire audit period, where the controls were tested at the interim 
audit and the auditor relied on those controls. 
52 The findings in paragraphs 50–51 do not necessarily mean that there were 
deficiencies in the systems of any of the regulated entities concerned.  
53 In addition, our reviews of audits of banks, credit unions and insurance 
companies found that sampling procedures were often inappropriate. For 
example, there was often insufficient evidence that the auditor considered 
whether the sample selected was representative of the whole population or 
whether sampling was undertaken in accordance with the firm’s policy.  
54 We conducted reviews of audits of AFS licensees and found instances where 
the auditor’s procedures for testing net tangible assets (NTA) could have 
been improved by selecting an adequate sample size to support conclusions 
on the maintenance of NTA requirements and by sufficiently reviewing the 
audited entity’s adjustments to NTA.  
Compliance plans 
55 In this reporting period, we carried out inspections of compliance plan audits 
for managed investment schemes conducted under s601HG(1) of the 
Corporations Act.  
56 Where functions such as custodial or investment administration or back-
office accounting are outsourced, auditors often choose to rely on a report 
prepared by the auditor of the service organisation reporting on the design, 
implementation and/or effectiveness of operating controls, or in relation to 
specific assertions such as valuation and existence of investments. 
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57 We found that auditors of compliance plans did not always obtain sufficient 
and appropriate audit evidence on which to base their conclusions in areas 
such as: 
(a) whether the compliance plan continued to meet the requirements of 
Pt 5C.4 of the Corporations Act; 
(b) the adequacy of procedures for reporting and assessing breaches of the 
compliance plan; 
(c) the assessment of whether the service organisation auditor’s report 
could be relied on in relation to outsourced functions, risk assessments 
performed by the auditors, and the relationship to work performed on 
areas of the compliance plan audit; and 
(d) the testing of specific areas, such as subsequent events up to the date of 
issuing the compliance plan audit report, NTA calculations (for the 
responsible entity), and cash flow projections. 
Mining and energy  
58 Companies in the mining and energy sector often have associations with 
overseas countries, including emerging economies where the materials and 
resources are situated. Consequently, auditors need to rely on the work of 
other auditors in the overseas countries, which may have different regulatory 
frameworks, professional standards and culture. 
59 In the majority of mining and energy sector files reviewed, we found common 
cases where the auditor did not obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to: 
(a) corroborate the existence of tenements;  
(b) confirm the existence and valuation of other significant and material 
asset balances, such as capitalised exploration, evaluation or 
development expenditure; and 
(c) assess the reliance that could be placed on the work of the audited 
entity’s expert. 
60 In many of these cases, the auditor did not exercise professional scepticism. 
Often the auditor did not challenge the audited entity’s key assumptions and 
relied on evidence presented by management to support judgements such as 
forecast cash flows. We noted that, although mining and energy entities 
often operate in an environment subject to significant uncertainty, or 
political and/or environmental risk, there was insufficient evidence of the 
auditor’s procedures to objectively assess the going concern assumption.  
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B Key findings: Quality control 
Key points 
Some firms need to improve their quality control systems to ensure they 
comply with the independence requirements of the Corporations Act and 
professional standards. In particular, firms need to manage auditor rotation 
more effectively. 
Although firms have generally implemented the Clarity auditing standards 
well, compliance with certain aspects of these standards can be improved. 
Some of the Other National and Network firms and the Smaller firms can 
improve their human resources policies and systems, and the effectiveness 
of their internal monitoring programs. 
Ethical requirements and independence 
61 Larger National firms and Other National and Network firms have 
established independence policies and processes to facilitate compliance 
with the auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act and 
professional standards. Across these firms, leaders remain committed to an 
appropriate ‘tone at the top’ that emphasises the importance of audit 
independence. However, we noted the following instances of non-
compliance with legislative and professional requirements. 
Contraventions of the auditor rotation requirement  
62 One Larger National firm advised us of two contraventions of the Corporations 
Act, where the engagement quality control reviewer (EQCR) played a 
significant role on an engagement for more than five years. While the firm had 
a process for recording and monitoring the period of time an EQCR is assigned 
to an engagement, the contraventions occurred because the partner rotation 
information recorded in the audit file was not reconciled to the firm’s central 
record. After considering the circumstances specific to each case, the firm 
disciplined the engagement partner and EQCR in relation to one of the breaches. 
In addition, the firm reminded all audit partners to ensure that the rotation 
information recorded in the audit file agrees with the firm’s central record.  
63 At a Smaller firm, we found that the auditor rotation requirements had been 
contravened for two listed audit clients, where both the engagement partner and 
EQCR had acted in their roles for more than five years, and there was a risk that 
the rotation requirements would be contravened for three other listed clients. 
The Smaller firm has since established an authorised audit company with three 
directors. This will enable the firm to meet the auditor rotation requirements. 
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64 Our inspection of Smaller firms identified that Smaller firms are at a higher 
risk of not managing mandatory auditor rotation effectively. Smaller firms 
need to put in place systems to ensure that they can comply with the auditor 
rotation requirements of the Corporations Act. 
Contraventions of other independence requirements 
65 At one Larger National firm, we found two instances of threats to perceived 
independence in connection with listed clients. One instance concerned the 
non-routine change of the engagement partner following a deterioration in the 
relationship with the Chief Financial Officer after the partner challenged an 
accounting treatment that was changed with agreement of the audit committee. 
The other instance concerned the provision of non-audit services to the client. 
We believe that more extensive and complete consultations, outlining all 
relevant circumstances, should have taken place within the firm in question 
and with those charged with governance of the clients. The assessment of 
threats and safeguards to independence should have been more thoroughly 
considered and documented by the firm. 
Testing of independence systems 
66 Many of the Other National and Network firms inspected did not test their 
independence systems and processes, including the declaration of financial 
interests, to ensure they were meeting the requirements of the Corporations 
Act and professional standards. While this is not a requirement of the Act, 
testing independence systems would enable the firms to place greater 
reliance on the effectiveness of their systems, and could highlight potential 
non-compliance with the independence requirements. Without an 
appropriate testing program, firms can only place limited reliance on the 
effectiveness of their independence systems and processes.  
Acceptance and continuance 
67 Client acceptance and continuance procedures should focus on independence 
considerations, possible conflicts of interest, and whether the firm has the 
requisite skills to conduct an engagement (as required by auditing standard 
ASQC 1 Quality control for firms that perform audits and reviews of financial 
reports and other financial information, and other assurance engagements).  
Opinion shopping 
68 A potential audit client sought assurances from one Larger National firm that 
the firm did not foresee challenging the company’s existing accounting 
treatments, and questioned the potential for the firm to qualify its audit 
opinion on a particular accounting treatment where the firm had qualified its 
audit report on another company’s financial statements on a similar matter. 
Leaders of firms should be vigilant about the possibility of ‘opinion 
shopping’ and ensure that firm acceptance and continuance processes and 
training for partners and staff specifically address this threat. 
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Conflict checking 
69 One Smaller firm relied on a national database to check for conflicts of 
interest and threats to independence when accepting a new client. The 
national database appeared to be updated periodically and used on an ad hoc 
basis. The Smaller firm did not obtain positive confirmations from all 
partners and directors about potential conflicts and threats to independence 
when assessing the acceptance of a new listed client. 
70 Leaders of all firms need to continue to give strong and clear messages about 
the importance of complying with independence requirements, and take 
strong and timely action where non-compliance is noted to ensure that an 
appropriate ‘tone at the top’ is maintained.  
Engagement performance 
71 Although the Clarity auditing standards have been implemented well across 
the firms, some Other National and Network firms can improve systems and 
processes for compliance with certain aspects of the standards relating to:  
(a) relying on the work of component auditors (see paragraphs 44–47); 
(b) testing journal entries throughout the year (see paragraphs 33–34); and 
(c) related party transactions (see paragraph 35).  
Human resources 
72 Larger National firms have mature quality control systems with clear links 
between audit quality, independence and ethical requirements, and partner 
and director appraisal and remuneration. However, we found that some of 
the Other National and Network firms and the Smaller firms can improve 
their policies and internal systems in this area. 
Monitoring 
73 Larger National firms have comprehensive policies and procedures for 
monitoring their audit quality in accordance with legal and professional 
requirements. These firms undertake regular reviews of a selection of 
completed audit engagements. They use the results of these reviews to 
enhance their audit quality systems and direct the focus of staff training. 
74 Although Other National and Network firms have procedures in place to 
facilitate the monitoring of audit quality as required by ASQC 1, we note 
that improvements can be made to these programs, including: 
(a) ensuring that: 
(i) monitoring programs cover an effective partner spread;  
(ii) files are selected on the basis of risk;  
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(iii) files are reviewed for compliance with auditing standards; and  
(iv) the results of reviews are documented and communicated to 
partners and staff; 
(b) promptly following up and remediating issues identified through 
monitoring programs, including taking appropriate action against 
partners who are repeat offenders; 
(c) ensuring that internal monitoring programs not only review individual 
audit files, but also review the firm’s compliance with quality controls 
systems as required by ASQC 1; and 
(d) sharing the results of internal monitoring programs and peer reviews 
across firms that are members of a network to further promote and 
enhance audit quality across the network.  
75 Firms need to improve their processes for recording and notifying ASIC of 
contraventions and suspected contraventions of the Corporations Act, including 
contraventions of the independence requirements. Members of network firms 
should also implement a national register of notifications to ensure consistency 
in the identification, consideration and reporting of matters. For guidance about 
the auditor’s obligation to report to ASIC, see Regulatory Guide 34 Auditor’s 
obligations: Reporting to ASIC (RG 34) at www.asic.gov.au/rg. 
76 We found that the majority of Smaller firms had not established a monitoring 
program to periodically review a selection of completed audit files. Through 
the evaluation and monitoring of their quality control systems, these firms can 
assess whether their systems are operating effectively to facilitate compliance 
with professional standards and other relevant legal and regulatory 
requirements. Some Smaller firms rely on the reviews undertaken by ASIC, 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and CPA Australia, but 
these are not a substitute for the firm’s own internal monitoring program. 
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C Improving and maintaining audit quality 
Key points 
Firms should consider ways to improve and maintain audit quality, 
particularly in relation to audit evidence, professional scepticism, and the 
use of other auditors and experts.  
This section summarises matters raised by ASIC with individual firms to 
improve audit quality in their circumstances. 
Areas to consider 
77 Firms should consider ways to improve and maintain audit quality, 
particularly in relation to audit evidence, professional scepticism, and the use 
of other auditors and experts. There should be clear individual accountability 
for making improvements necessary to achieve a firm’s overall plan. 
78 Table 2 contains examples of good practice and suggested actions that ASIC 
has included in private audit inspection reports issued to audit firms 
inspected during the 18 months to 30 June 2012. These matters may also be 
of assistance to other firms. 
79 Of course, the relative importance of each matter for a firm, and the extent of 
work to be done, will vary from case to case. Firms may have taken some 
actions in the areas outlined in Table 2, but may need to do more to reduce 
the cases where reasonable assurance is not obtained about whether the 
financial report as a whole is free from material misstatement. 
Table 2: Examples of good practice and matters reported by ASIC to individual firms 
Area Good practice suggestions 
Audit evidence This table includes matters that are relevant to reducing the number of cases where sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence is not obtained to support the auditor’s opinion. These include 
training, guidance, supervision and review, remuneration policies and firm quality reviews. 
Professional 
scepticism 
Professional scepticism must be maintained and exercised throughout the planning and 
performance of an audit.  
Engagement partners and staff should have questioning minds, obtain a full understanding of 
all relevant facts, not be over reliant on management’s explanations and representations, and 
not just seek to obtain audit evidence that corroborates rather than challenges management’s 
judgement. 
Partners and staff must have a sound knowledge of the accounting standards and framework 
to conduct an effective audit. 
When considering accounting treatments, partners and staff should consider the substance 
of arrangements, alternative views and the principles and intent of accounting standards in 
making their judgments. 
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Area Good practice suggestions 
In our reviews, we observed that firms with better practices supported professional 
scepticism through measures including:  
 fostering a strong firm culture of promoting and supporting professional scepticism (e.g. 
through strong and consistent messages from firm leaders and supporting professional 
scepticism in individual cases); 
 sending clear, consistent and genuine messages from firm leadership, partners and 
managers that professional scepticism and audit quality must not be compromised to meet 
deadlines and budgets, to support a particular outcome desired by management, or to 
protect fees; 
 ensuring that partners and staff assigned to audit engagements had strong understanding 
of the audited entity’s business, appropriate industry knowledge, experience and a sound 
understanding of the financial reporting requirements; 
 providing education and training, firm guidance and procedures, consultation processes, 
technical support, effective supervision and review (including engagement quality control 
reviews), and firm quality control reviews;  
 not using emphasis-of-matter provisions as an ‘easy’ alternative to issuing a qualified audit 
opinion; and 
 implementing independence policies, systems and processes to support objectivity. This 
includes re-evaluating decisions made in previous audits and regularly bringing fresh minds 
to bear. 
Use of other 
auditors 
We reported instances where firms should review their approaches to the use of other 
auditors to ensure that they obtain sufficient appropriate independent evidence to support 
their audit opinions. This included in the context of group audits (particularly in connection 
with business components in emerging markets), interests in joint ventures, and the use of 
service organisations. This work can include assessing the other auditors and reviewing their 
audit work. There may be a cost associated with this work. 
Use of experts Auditors should obtain independent assurance in relation to the work undertaken by company 
experts and experts engaged by companies.  
We reported instances where firms should have engaged their own independent expert as 
the auditor did not have the necessary skills, knowledge and experience. 
Where the auditor uses internal firm experts or external experts, sufficient audit work must be 
performed on any source information used by those experts. 
Understanding 
the business 
and risks 
In the better audits, engagement partners brought their knowledge and experience to the 
process of assessing the audited entity’s business model, its internal and external 
environment and risks, and how these factors affect the nature and extent of audit 
procedures. 
Expertise and 
experience 
In some cases, firms needed to ensure that partners and staff assigned to particular 
individual engagements had suitable industry and audit experience, taking into account the 
nature of the audited entity, the risks associated with the audited entity and its business 
environment, any complexities (e.g. the use of complex financial instruments), the level of 
professional judgement required and the likely planned audit approach. 
Training and 
guidance 
Many firms have introduced additional training and guidance on audit evidence, professional 
scepticism, professional judgement and reliance on other auditors and the use of experts. We 
reported that consideration should be given to further training and guidance to address 
adverse findings. 
Smaller firms may outsource additional training and development of guidance, and/or use 
any relevant training courses and guidance produced by accounting bodies or others. 
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Area Good practice suggestions 
Supervision 
and review 
Firms with better practices ensure strong and effective supervision and review at all stages of 
the audit, from planning and performance to concluding procedures, which are essential to 
audit quality. Reviews are timely and comments raised are properly addressed and cleared 
by the reviewer. The importance of supervision and review is emphasised through training 
and quality reviews. 
Reliance on 
internal 
auditors 
Given that internal auditors are employed by the audited entity and cannot be fully 
independent, firms with better practices consider the extent to which internal audit work can 
be relied upon in the external audit and limit the use work of internal auditors in important 
audit areas. 
Deadline 
pressures 
To deal with tight reporting deadlines, examples of better practices adopted by firms include 
reviewing major new transactions, contentious accounting treatments and financial report 
formats before year end. 
Use of 
substantive 
analytical 
procedures 
We reported that firms should ensure that any reliance on substantive analytical procedures 
is appropriate and does not lead to false efficiencies. For example, there should be strong 
messages from firm leadership and through training that: 
 models to predict balances in the financial report are based on relationships that make 
sense; 
 data used is independent of the population being predicted; 
 thresholds are appropriate and not revised based on variances identified; 
 auditors exercise scepticism in considering management’s explanations for significant 
variances noted; and 
 independent audit evidence is obtained to corroborate explanations for variances. 
Auditor 
independence 
Larger firms have systems and monitoring processes relating to audit independence, as well 
as training, guidance and support in considering possible threats to independence. More 
should be done, particularly by other firms. 
Remuneration The remuneration of partners and managers should be linked to audit quality, as assessed 
through firm quality reviews and audit inspection findings. We reported that a number of firms 
need to improve their policies and processes in this area. 
Material 
disclosures 
We reported that some firms should consider additional training, guidance and quality reviews 
covering the materiality of disclosures. 
Firm quality 
reviews 
It is good practice for quality reviewers to have sufficient authority, knowledge and 
experience, as well as a commitment to audit quality. Findings need to be communicated 
throughout a firm to promote improvements in audit quality for engagements that are not 
reviewed. 
Advice by 
firms that are 
not the auditor 
A firm should have review processes in place to ensure that advice given to non-audit clients 
on accounting treatments is appropriate. Inappropriate accounting advice may place pressure 
on the external auditor to accept an inappropriate treatment. 
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Remediation 
80 Where sufficient appropriate audit evidence has not been obtained, firms 
should voluntarily remediate deficiencies by obtaining the evidence 
necessary to support the audit opinion. Otherwise, the audit has not been 
completed in accordance with the legally enforceable auditing standards and 
there is a risk that a material misstatement remains undetected.  
81 Given the risks associated with not remediating deficiencies, partners and 
firms should not hesitate to take remedial action because of possible 
embarrassment in revisiting a client. Firms should have processes in place to 
require partners to take remedial action. In significant cases, where firms do 
not accept and implement findings, we will consider issuing an audit 
deficiency report, or taking court or other regulatory action as needed. 
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D Areas of future focus 
Key points 
We will continue to inspect firms that audit significant public interest 
entities, focusing on entities and industries with perceived heightened risks. 
Areas of future focus for firms and our inspections include: 
• audit evidence, professional scepticism, and the use of other auditors 
and experts; and 
• the focus areas identified in our six-monthly financial reporting 
surveillance media releases.  
Inspection focus 
82 Our audit inspection program will continue to focus on firms that audit 
entities that are likely to be of significant public interest, and those entities 
and industries that are more vulnerable to risks arising from existing and 
emerging market conditions.  
83 We will continue to conduct follow-up inspections of firms. Where 
significant issues have been identified in previous inspections, we will 
escalate follow-up inspections to ensure that the firms are taking prompt and 
appropriate action to address our observations and findings. 
84 Our reviews of audit files will focus primarily on financial statement audits 
of listed entities and other public interest entities such as financial 
institutions and large registered schemes. We will also review a smaller 
number of compliance plan audits for registered schemes and audits of AFS 
licensees.  
85 In recent years, our inspections have shifted from focusing on processes to 
assessing the quality of judgements and decisions made by the auditor. 
86 We will continue to monitor and examine the causes of recent corporate 
collapses. Where deficiencies in auditor conduct appear to have contributed 
to insufficient transparency in the financial position and financial 
performance of an entity leading up to the collapse, we will focus on these 
areas in our future audit inspections. 
Specific areas of focus 
87 Some specific areas of focus for firms and our coming inspections are listed 
in Table 3. 
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Table 3: ‘Top 10’ focus areas 
Focus area Details 
Audit evidence Whether auditors have obtained sufficient appropriate audit evidence to conclude whether 
the financial report is free of material misstatement and to support their audit opinions. 
Professional 
scepticism 
The professional scepticism exercised by auditors, focusing on significant judgements in 
relation to audit evidence, accounting estimates, going concern and accounting treatments. 
Reliance on other 
auditors and use 
of experts 
The reliance placed on: 
 the work of other auditors, including in the context of group audits (particularly in 
connection with business components in emerging markets), interests in joint ventures, 
and the use of service organisations; and 
 experts, whether employed or engaged by the audited entity or employed or engaged by 
the auditor. 
We will review the processes of a firm’s internal specialist groups (e.g. technical 
accounting, business valuation, treasury, actuarial and taxation) in supporting audit 
engagement teams and the quality of their advice and judgements. 
Financial 
reporting  
Focus areas identified in our six-monthly financial reporting surveillance program media 
releases. 
Fee reductions Maintaining audit quality for engagements where there have been large fee reductions for 
new or existing audits without underlying changes to business operations. Attempts to sell 
additional services to these clients can also raise auditor independence issues. 
We will review audit files where there have been fee reductions that do not reflect changes 
in the business of the audited entity. We will also review whether there is evidence that firm 
leaders have given strong, consistent and genuine messages that, where fees are 
reduced, audit teams must still perform quality audits. 
Audit efficiency 
measures 
Whether audit efficiency measures have led to audit quality being compromised on 
individual engagements. 
In addition to our reviews of audit files, we will review whether there is evidence that firm 
leadership has given consistent and genuine strong messages to partners and staff that 
improvements in efficiency do not mean compromising on audit quality. We will also 
consider outcomes from firm quality reviews. 
Business models 
and risk 
assessments 
The adequacy of an auditor’s understanding of the business model of the entity and risk 
assessment for individual engagements, and the auditor’s interaction with the audit 
committee to ensure that key areas of risk are included in the audit strategy. 
Supervision and 
review 
The involvement of the engagement partners and EQCRs at all stages of the audit, 
including planning, and reviewing key judgements and the conclusions reached. 
Auditor 
independence 
Compliance with the auditor independence requirements, including: 
 complying with the auditor rotation requirements of the Corporations Act, including the 
rotation of EQCRs as they are required to be registered company auditors; and 
 resisting possible ‘opinion shopping’, particularly where an audit firm’s views are sought 
on specific accounting treatments before a decision is made about whether to appoint 
the auditor. 
Reporting matters 
to ASIC 
The adequacy and timeliness of auditors reporting suspected contraventions under s311 
and 601HG of the Corporations Act, reporting under s990K, and reporting under the 
national credit legislation. 
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Appendix: Our inspection approach  
Scope of this report 
88 Our audit inspection program focused primarily on the review of audits of 
listed entities and other public interest entities. We also reviewed some 
compliance plan audits and audits of AFS licensees. 
89 This report outlines the results of the inspections of 20 audit firms 
substantially completed in the 18 months to 30 June 2012. These firms, 
in aggregate, audit 87% of listed entities by market capitalisation. In the 
18-month period to 31 December 2010 (2009–10), we inspected 21 firms.  
90 The firms we inspected ranged in size as follows: 
(a) Larger National firms—large firms that audit numerous listed entities 
(more than 5% by market capitalisation) and are national partnerships 
and members of a global network with multiple offices;  
Note: ‘Network’ is defined in Accounting Professional and Ethical Standard APES 110 
Code of ethics for professional accountants (APES 110). 
(b) Other National and Network firms—firms with national partnerships or 
individual offices that audit many listed entities and are members of a 
national or international network; and  
(c) Smaller firms—firms that audit a limited number of listed entities and 
have a small number of partners.  
91 A summary of the number of firms we inspected is provided in Table 4. 
Table 4: Number of firms inspected 
Firms 2011–12 2009–10 
Larger national 4 4 
Other national and network 6 9 
Smaller  10 8 
Total 20 21 
Note: All of the Larger National and Other National and Network firms have been inspected 
more than once. All of the Smaller firms inspected in 2011–12 were inspected for the first time.  
92 ASIC has arrangements to assist the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) of the United States and the Canadian Public 
Accountability Board (CPAB) with their audit inspections of Australian 
auditors to ascertain compliance with the relevant requirements in each of 
those jurisdictions. During 2011–12, three inspections were conducted 
jointly with the PCAOB and two were conducted jointly with CPAB.  
 REPORT 317: Audit inspection program report for 2011–12 
© Australian Securities and Investments Commission December 2012  Page 28 
Our inspection process 
Larger National and Other National and Network firms 
93 We reviewed selected key audit areas in the audit working papers for 
selected audit engagements. Each review concentrated on the substance of 
work and on whether sufficient appropriate audit evidence was obtained to 
support the auditor’s conclusions. 
94 We focused on key risk areas for each audit. Our procedures are not 
designed to find minor instances of non-compliance. We challenge 
engagement partners on the basis on which significant judgements are made. 
95 We assess whether each firm’s quality control systems comply with 
ASQC 1, are designed to ensure that audits are performed in accordance with 
auditing standards, and ensure auditors comply with the auditor 
independence requirements. 
96 During our inspections, we highlighted to each firm suggested areas for 
improvement. 
Smaller firms 
97 To reflect the size and client profile of Smaller firms, our inspection 
approach is limited to:  
(a) conducting a review of certain aspects of, generally, one audit file of a 
listed entity for compliance with the auditing standards; and 
(b) holding discussions with leaders, engagement partners and other senior 
members of the engagement team about the audit file reviewed and 
certain policies and procedures relating to auditor independence and 
audit quality in the context of that file. 
Audit independence report 
98 In July 2012, we issued our final report to the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) of our findings on auditor independence. This report covered the 12 
months to 30 June 2012 and is included in the FRC’s annual report. As the 
FRC no longer has responsibility to issue an annual report on such matters, 
we will report our findings in our future audit inspection reports. 
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Key terms 
Term Meaning in this document 
AASB 101 (for 
example) 
An accounting standard (in this example numbered 101)  
accounting standards Standards made by the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board under s334 of the Corporations Act 
AFS licence An Australian financial services licence under s913B of 
the Corporations Act that authorises a person who carries 
on a financial services business to provide financial 
services 
Note: This is a definition contained in s761A of the 
Corporations Act. 
AFS licensee A person who holds an AFS licence under s913B of the 
Corporations Act 
Note: This is a definition contained in s761A of the 
Corporations Act. 
APES 110 (for 
example) 
An accounting professional and ethical standard issued 
by the APESB (in this example numbered 110)  
APESB Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 
ASA 200 (for 
example) 
An auditing standard (in this example numbered 200)  
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
ASQC 1 Auditing standard ASQC1 Quality control for firms that 
perform audits and reviews of financial reports and other 
financial information, and other assurance engagements  
AUASB Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
auditing standards Standards made by the AUASB under s336 of the 
Corporations Act 
CGU Cash generating unit 
Clarity auditing 
standards 
Auditing standards revised and redrafted to conform with 
the ‘Clarity’ International Standards on Auditing issued by 
the International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board  
Corporations Act Corporations Act 2001, including regulations made for the 
purposes of that Act 
CPAB Canadian Public Accountability Board  
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Term Meaning in this document 
engagement quality 
control review 
A process designed to provide an objective evaluation, 
before the auditor’s report is issued, of the significant 
judgements the engagement team made and the 
conclusions they reached in formulating the auditor’s 
report 
EQCR Engagement quality control reviewer 
FRC Financial Reporting Council 
Larger National firms Large firms that audit numerous listed entities (more than 
5% by market capitalisation) and are national 
partnerships and members of a global network with 
multiple offices 
NTA Net tangible assets 
Other National and 
Network firms 
Firms with national partnerships or individual offices that 
audit many listed entities and are members of a national 
or international network 
PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (US) 
s311 (for example) A section of the Corporations Act (in this example 
numbered 311), unless otherwise specified 
Smaller firms Firms with a small number of audit partners that audit a 
limited number of listed entities 
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Related information 
Regulatory guides  
RG 34 Auditor’s obligations: Reporting to ASIC 
Legislation 
Corporations Act, Pts 2M.3, 2M.4 and 5C.4, Divs 3, 4 and 5, s311, 334, 336, 
601HG, 601HG(1), 761A, 913B, 990K 
Standards 
AASB 101 Presentation of financial statements 
AASB 136 Impairment of assets 
APES 110 Code of ethics for professional accountants 
APES 320 Quality control for firms 
ASA 200 Objective and general principles governing an audit of a financial report 
ASA 220 Quality control for audits of historical financial information  
ASA 230 Audit documentation  
ASA 240 The auditor’s responsibility to consider fraud in an audit of a 
financial report 
ASA 250 Consideration of laws and regulations in an audit of a financial report 
ASA 330 The auditor’s procedures in response to assessed risks 
ASA 500 Audit evidence 
ASA 505 External confirmations 
ASA 520 Analytical procedures 
ASA 530 Audit sampling 
ASA 540 Auditing accounting estimates, including fair value accounting 
estimates and related disclosures 
ASA 550 Related parties 
ASA 560 Subsequent events 
ASA 570 Going concern 
ASA 600 Using the work of another auditor 
ASA 610 Using the work of internal auditors 
ASA 620 Using the work of an expert 
ASQC 1 Quality control for firms that perform audits and reviews of financial 
reports and other financial information, and other assurance engagements 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 242: Audit inspection 
program public report for 2009-10 (June 2011) 
 
The text of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 242: 
Audit inspection program public report for 2009-10 (June 2011) is attached as Appendix 
3. 
  
  
REPORT 242 
Audit inspection program 
public report for 2009–10 
 
June 2011 
 
 
About this report 
This report summarises the observations and findings identified by ASIC’s 
audit inspection program in the 18 months to 31 December 2010. 
We expect this report to be of significant interest to the inspected firms as 
well as those we have not inspected, companies, audit committees, the 
investing public and other interested stakeholders in the financial reporting 
chain. 
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About ASIC regulatory documents 
In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory 
documents. 
Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC 
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance. 
Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by: 
 explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under 
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act) 
 explaining how ASIC interprets the law 
 describing the principles underlying ASIC’s approach 
 giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such 
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how 
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations). 
Information sheets: provide concise guidance on a specific process or 
compliance issue or an overview of detailed guidance. 
Reports: describe ASIC compliance or relief activity or the results of a 
research project. 
Scope/Disclaimer  
Sections of this report may describe deficiencies or potential deficiencies in 
the systems, policies, procedures, practices or conduct of some of the 
21 audit firms inspected (firms). The absence of a reference in this report to 
any other aspect of a firm’s systems, policies, procedures, practices or 
conduct should not be construed as approval by ASIC of those aspects, or 
any indication that in ASIC’s view those aspects comply with relevant laws 
and professional standards.  
In the course of reviewing aspects of a limited sample of selected audit 
engagements, an inspection may identify ways in which a particular audit 
engagement is deficient. It is not the purpose of an inspection, however, to 
review all of the firm’s audit engagements or to identify every aspect in which 
a reviewed audit may be deficient. Accordingly, this report does not provide 
assurance that the firms’ audits, or their clients’ financial statements, are free 
of deficiencies not specifically described in this report. 
Unless stated otherwise, not all matters in this report apply to every firm and, 
where they do apply to more than one firm, there will often be differences in 
degree. Our observations and findings relate only to the individual firms 
inspected and cannot be extrapolated across the auditing profession in 
Australia. Our observations and findings can differ significantly, even 
between firms of similar size, and for that reason we caution against drawing 
conclusions about any firms not yet inspected by ASIC. 
Unlike some other jurisdictions, ASIC is also the securities regulator in 
Australia. This report covers inspections but does not include any matters 
arising from other regulatory activities, such as investigations or surveillance 
of the firms or their clients, although these matters may inform focus areas in 
inspections. 
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Executive summary 
1 This report covers inspections of 21 firms substantially completed in the 
18 months to 31 December 2010. 
2 Australia’s audit regime is similar to the regimes in other major developed 
countries. However, this report identifies some important audit areas where 
the firms need to focus their attention and make improvements to ensure 
audit quality. 
3 As a part of our ongoing review of the focuses of our program, and in 
response to factors such as the global financial crisis and benchmarking with 
other audit oversight regulators, we increased the number of audit 
engagement files selected for review at inspections of larger firms in 2009–
10. We also reviewed additional key audit areas on each engagement file. 
These changes would have impacted on the number of findings on each audit 
file and in each area. A risk-based method was used to select firms, 
engagement files and audit areas for review. 
4 Across the firms inspected, the majority of the engagement files reviewed 
contained sufficient appropriate audit evidence in key audit areas and audit 
work in those areas was conducted in accordance with the relevant 
Australian auditing standards. However, for the large firms 17% of 
engagement files reviewed did not contain sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence and for other firms the figure was 31%. Generally where we 
concluded that audit engagement files did not contain sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence, this was based on shortcomings identified for specific areas 
of the audit. Overall, we identified three broad areas where improvements 
need to be made by the firms. Many of the observations and findings in this 
report relate to shortcomings in the areas of:  
(a) the sufficiency and appropriateness of audit evidence on engagement 
files. The evidence should support the audit opinion by clearly 
demonstrating the auditor’s procedures and conclusions on key audit 
judgement or risk areas. Areas where improvements are required 
include when relying on the work of experts or other auditors, 
confirmation of key balances, classification of material loan balances, 
consideration of the risk of fraud, and financial statement disclosures; 
(b) the level of professional scepticism exercised or evidenced on the 
engagement files by auditors in key areas of audit judgement, including 
fair value measurement of assets, impairment calculations, going 
concern assessments and other fundamental areas of the audit; and 
(c) the lack of evidence on audit engagement files about the nature, timing 
and extent of engagement quality control reviews.  
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5 To further enhance audit quality and to ensure that the auditors’ judgements 
are robust and well supported, leaders of firms should continue to send 
strong and consistent messages to partners and staff about the importance of 
these three areas. It is important that these messages continue to be 
complemented by education and training, firm guidance, effective technical 
support and internal monitoring. 
6 Firms we have previously inspected continued to maintain or improve their 
quality control systems to facilitate compliance with the requirements of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), Australian auditing standards, 
and Australian professional and ethical standards. This demonstrates the 
firms’ commitment to high quality audits and auditor independence, and the 
continued positive impact of our inspection program.  
7 The extent of quality control systems varies between firms due to their size 
and structure. Aspects of some firm quality control systems can be improved 
to comply with legal and professional requirements: see Section D.  
8 Future focus areas for firms are highlighted in Section E. We will continue 
to inspect firms that audit significant public interest entities, monitor 
regulatory developments in auditing and collaborate with foreign regulators 
to minimise the regulatory burden on Australian firms. 
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A Overview of the inspection process 
Key points 
The aim of ASIC’s audit inspection program is to promote high quality 
external audits of financial reports of listed entities and other public interest 
entities so that users can have greater confidence in these financial reports 
and Australia’s capital markets. 
During this inspection cycle, we increased the number of audit engagement 
files reviewed at inspections of larger firms, reviewed additional key audit 
areas, reviewed some fundamental audit procedures and reviewed audit 
areas that were identified as potential risk areas in the future focus section 
of our last public report. 
This is the fifth public report on our audit inspection program. The report 
outlines the results of the inspection of 21 audit firms substantially 
completed in the 18 month period from 1 July 2009 to 31 December 2010. 
As ASIC is both an audit oversight regulator and a securities regulator, in 
addition to audit inspections we conduct a range of other activities that 
cover the work of the firms. This report covers the results of our audit 
inspection program only and does not include any matters arising from our 
other regulatory activities. 
Objectives of the audit inspection program 
9 A strong audit profession helps maintain and promote confidence and 
integrity in Australia’s capital markets. The aim of ASIC’s audit inspection 
program is to promote high quality external audits of financial reports of 
entities listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) or other 
Australian exchanges (listed entities) and other public interest entities in 
accordance with Ch 2M of the Corporations Act so that users can have 
greater confidence in these financial reports.  
10 Our audit oversight activities help maintain and raise the standard of conduct 
in the auditing profession. We focus on audit quality and promoting 
compliance with the requirements of the Corporations Act, Australian 
auditing standards, and Australian accounting professional and ethical 
standards (issued by the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards 
Board (APESB)).  
11 Any improvement areas identified through the inspection program about 
compliance with Australian auditing standards or other requirements, and 
best practice enhancements, are included in a private individual report to 
each firm and they are responsible for addressing these areas. The purpose of 
the inspection program is not to benchmark firms. 
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12 While our inspection program has an education and compliance focus, 
enforcement action may be taken where significant non-compliance is 
identified. Such enforcement actions are outside the scope of the audit 
inspection program and are referred to ASIC’s Deterrence teams for further 
consideration and action.  
Changes to the audit inspection program 
13 Our audit inspection program focuses on reviewing the firms’ quality control 
systems and examining aspects of a sample of the firms’ individual audit and 
review engagement files to assess audit quality. Each year we conduct 
follow up inspections of firms we had previously visited and, on each 
occasion, we identify fewer deficiencies in the firm quality control systems 
or areas that require improvement.  
14 As most of the larger firms that audit the majority of the listed entities have 
sound and well established quality control systems, we changed the approach 
of the inspection program to focus on significant changes to these systems. 
This enabled us to devote more time to the assessment of audit quality at the 
firms through engagement file reviews. 
15 The key changes to our 2009–10 inspection program included: 
(a) significantly increasing the number of audit engagements selected for 
review to 131, compared to 101 in the previous 18 month period to 
30 June 2009 (see Figure 1); 
(b)  reviewing a greater number of key audit areas in more depth on each 
engagement file;  
(c) on each engagement file, reviewing a fundamental audit area. That area 
may have been identified as potential risk from our recent reviews of 
corporate collapses, results of other investigations or findings about 
Australian auditing standards that had been previously poorly applied 
by the firms; 
(d) in some cases reviewing an engagement file from cover-to-cover; 
(e) extending the period of the on-site inspection at the firms to facilitate 
the above changes; and 
(f) enhancing the structure and content of our private inspection reports to 
firms to include best practice considerations, suggested remedial actions 
and the firms’ responses to our observations and findings. 
16 We also benchmarked our inspection process with those of other 
international jurisdictions that have independent audit inspection programs 
and, where appropriate, enhanced our inspection approach to ensure we 
continue to apply best practice. 
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Figure 1: Number of engagement files reviewed 
 
17 The appendix contains further details about how we conducted our work. 
Scope of this report 
18 This is the fifth public report on our audit inspection program since the 
enactment of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform 
and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9 Act) on 1 July 2004. 
19 As ASIC is both an audit oversight regulator and a securities regulator, in 
addition to audit inspections we conduct a range of other activities that relate 
to the work of the firms. These other activities include our financial 
reporting surveillance program, surveillances of individual audits and 
investigations into corporate failures. While these activities inform our areas 
of focus and determine the frequency of future audit firm inspections, this 
report covers the results of our audit inspection program only and does not 
include any matters arising from our other regulatory activities. 
20 This report outlines the results of audit inspections substantially completed 
in the 18 month period from 1 July 2009 to 31 December 2010. During that 
period we inspected 21 audit firms (firms) that, in aggregate, audit 87% of 
listed entities by market capitalisation. In the prior 18 month period from 
1 January 2008 to 30 June 2009 (2008–09) we inspected 19 firms.  
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21 The firms inspected range in size as follows: 
(a) large firms that audit numerous listed entities (more than 5% by market 
capitalisation) and are national partnerships and members of a global 
network1 with multiple offices (Larger National firms);  
(b) firms with national partnerships or individual offices that audit many 
listed entities and are members of a national or international network 
(Other National and Network firms); and  
(c) firms that audit a limited number of listed entities and have a small 
number of partners (Smaller firms). 
22 A summary of our inspection of the firms is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of firms inspected 
Firms 2009–10 Total inspected 
2008–09 
Total inspected 
Larger National 4 4 
Other National and Network 9 9 
Smaller  8 6 
Total 21 19 
Note: In 2009–10, two Other National and Network firms and all of the Smaller firms were 
inspected for the first time. Each of the Larger National firms has been inspected more than 
once. 
23 During 2008–09, our inspection approach for Other National and Network 
firms changed from reviewing an individual office of a network to reviewing 
a number of the member firms of the network at each inspection. We 
continued this approach during the 2009–10 inspections. Other National and 
Network firms visited for the first time were subject to a full-scope 
inspection comprising the review of network-wide quality control systems 
and review of a sample of individual audit engagements from various offices 
within that network. 
24 Larger National firms and Other National and Network firms that we 
inspected previously were subject to a subsequent review inspection. The 
scope of a subsequent inspection consists of following up matters noted in 
prior inspection reports, reviewing significant changes to the firms’ quality 
control systems, limited testing of those systems and reviewing a sample of 
individual audit engagement files. 
                                                     
1 Network is defined in Accounting Professional and Ethical Standard APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants (APES 110). 
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25 Smaller firms are subject to a limited scope inspection due to the size, client 
profile and nature of these firms. The inspection of a Smaller firm generally 
involves reviewing one listed entity audit engagement file and enquiring 
about the key features of the firm’s quality control systems as they relate to 
that engagement. 
26 Our review of aspects of a sample of audit engagement files at the firms had 
regard to the Australian auditing standards that were in force at the time. The 
Australian auditing standards were reissued in October 2009 as part of the 
‘Clarity’ project, to present them in a clearer format. However, the Clarity 
auditing standards are applicable for audits of financial reports for periods 
commencing on or after 1 January 2010 and, therefore, did not apply to 
audits that were within the scope of the audit inspection program for  
2009–10. 
27 ASIC has an arrangement with the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) of the United States to assist the PCAOB with their audit 
inspections of Australian auditors to ascertain compliance with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (US) (Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US)). During  
2009–10, four inspections were conducted jointly with the PCAOB. Where 
the timing of the PCAOB and ASIC audit inspections did not coincide we 
were able to share our private firm inspection reports with the PCAOB to 
assist them in their oversight function, in accordance with the confidentiality 
requirements of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 (ASIC Act). 
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B Major findings 
Key points 
In this cycle of audit inspections, the firms we had inspected previously 
continued to maintain or improve their quality control systems, 
demonstrating their commitment to high quality audits. The level of 
engagement and responsiveness by the firms to our observations and 
findings demonstrates the positive impact of our audit inspection program. 
The three broad areas where the firms need to make improvements to 
further enhance audit quality are: 
• the quality of audit evidence on engagement files to corroborate the 
auditor’s conclusion on key judgement areas; 
• the level and attitude of professional scepticism exercised or 
demonstrated by auditors; and  
• the lack of evidence on engagement files to demonstrate the 
involvement of the engagement quality control reviewer (EQCR) during 
the engagement.  
We also continue to have concerns about shortcomings in the 
independence systems of some of the firms and, in particular, about 
contraventions of the independence requirements of the Corporations Act. 
Impact of the audit inspection program 
28 In this cycle of audit inspections, the firms we had inspected previously 
continued to maintain or improve their quality control systems, 
demonstrating their commitment to independence and high quality audits. 
However, there are still a number of important audit areas where the firms 
should give continued focus and attention and make further improvements. 
29 The firms have implemented quality control systems to ensure compliance 
with the independence requirements of the Corporations Act and 
professional quality control and ethical standards. Although the extent and 
complexity of these systems varies depending on the size and nature of the 
firm, the implementation of quality control systems demonstrates that the 
firms understand their obligation to comply with these requirements. 
30 Since the commencement of our audit inspection program we have inspected 
all Larger National firms and Other National and Network firms once, with a 
large number of these firms being inspected more than once. We have also 
made good progress in inspecting Smaller firms over the last three years.  
31 The results of our first inspection of a firm often indicate that some aspects 
of quality control have not been addressed or fully developed. Subsequent 
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inspections of a firm almost always show a marked improvement in most, if 
not all, areas identified in the first inspection. This indicates that the firms 
recognise the importance of our inspection program in promoting high 
quality external audits.  
32 Our inspection program provides an objective assessment of the quality of 
audits conducted. The firms and ASIC have a common objective to enhance 
audit quality. The firms have generally been cooperative and receptive to our 
observations and findings, and suggested remedial actions, demonstrating 
the positive impact of our audit inspection program.  
Major findings: Audit quality 
33 As a part of our ongoing review of the focuses of our program, and in 
response to factors such as the global financial crisis and benchmarking with 
other audit oversight regulators, we increased the number of audit 
engagement files selected for review at inspections of larger firms in 2009–
10. We also reviewed additional key audit areas on each engagement file. 
These changes would have impacted on the quantity of findings on each 
audit file and in each area. 
34 Our review of individual audit engagements informs our assessment of audit 
quality at the firms. We focus our reviews on aspects of the engagement files 
that contribute to safeguarding and enhancing audit quality. In 2009–10 we 
paid particular attention to those key audit areas most affected by the global 
economic downturn and identified a number of audit areas that need to be 
improved by all the firms. The majority of the engagement files reviewed 
contained sufficient appropriate audit evidence in key audit areas and audit 
work in those areas was conducted in accordance with the relevant 
Australian auditing standards. Generally where we concluded that audit 
engagement files did not contain sufficient appropriate audit evidence, this 
was based on shortcomings identified for specific areas of the audit. We 
identified three broad areas where improvements need to be made by the 
firms (as outlined in paragraphs 35–48). While there may be differences in 
the size and structure of the firms, and variation in the conduct of an audit by 
the different firms, the overall themes from the review of the firms’ 
engagement files is not markedly dissimilar. 
Quality of audit evidence 
35 We continue to have concerns about the quality (sufficiency and 
appropriateness) of audit evidence on the engagement files to corroborate the 
auditor’s conclusions on key judgement and risk areas. In many instances, 
these areas included areas affected by the global economic downturn. Our 
review of approximately 32 of the 131 audit engagements resulted in 
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numerous concerns about the adequacy of evidence to corroborate the 
auditor’s work or conclusions in key areas, including:  
(a) fair value measurement and impairment calculations;  
(b) classification of material loan balances; 
(c) consideration of the risk of fraud; and 
(d) assessment of the competence and the work of experts engaged by 
clients.  
36 In past reports we accepted that there may be cases where the necessary 
audit evidence was obtained and appropriate consideration was given to 
significant judgement areas, but this was not documented. However, in the 
absence of adequate documentation on the engagement files, it can be 
difficult to assess whether sufficient appropriate audit evidence was 
gathered, and whether the requirements of the Australian auditing standards 
were complied with, even allowing for oral explanations provided by the 
auditor about the audit work performed and evidence obtained. Therefore, if 
there is no documentation on the engagement file, the presumption must be 
that the auditor did not obtain the necessary audit evidence.  
37 Audit engagement files need to contain sufficient appropriate evidence to 
reduce the risk that the auditor’s procedures or conclusions on key 
judgement areas, and ultimately the auditor’s report, could be challenged. In 
particular, the engagement file should contain evidence of the nature, extent 
and timing of procedures performed over specific audit assertions about key 
account balances in the financial report. To ensure that engagement files and 
the auditor’s judgements are supported, the leaders of the firms should send 
strong and consistent messages about the importance of sufficient and 
appropriate audit evidence and reinforce this through training and effective 
internal monitoring programs.  
Professional scepticism 
38 Our audit inspection program has identified a number of instances where we 
have concerns about the auditors’ judgement, and the level and attitude of 
professional scepticism. Auditing Standard ASA 200 Objective and General 
Principles Governing an Audit of a Financial Report (ASA 200) defines 
professional scepticism as ‘an attitude that includes a questioning mind, 
being alert to conditions which may indicate possible misstatement due to 
error or fraud, and a critical assessment of audit evidence’. 
39 An auditor is required to plan and perform an audit with an attitude of 
professional scepticism. An attitude of professional scepticism is critical in 
assessing evidence in routine areas of the audit, such as classification of 
material loan balances and reasons for large variances in analytical review 
procedures. 
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40 This scepticism should be heightened particularly when assessing evidence 
in areas that involve significant estimation or judgement by clients (such as 
asset valuation and impairment calculations, and when considering the 
appropriateness of a client’s accounting treatments or the going concern 
assumption).  
41 Our review of audit engagements has found instances where auditors: 
(a) appear to have been over reliant on a client’s explanations and 
representations (especially about fair value measurement, going concern 
assumptions and analytical review procedures); 
(b) have not explored evidence available on other parts of the engagement 
file that appears inconsistent or contradictory; and  
(c) have not had sufficient regard to historical outcomes in assessing the 
reasonableness of assumptions underlying the client’s decisions 
(especially about optimistic cash flow projections, growth rates and 
discount rates for impairment testing).  
42 In addition, we found instances where auditors have approached highly 
judgemental and subjective balances by seeking to obtain audit evidence that 
corroborates rather than challenges the client’s judgments. 
43 In some key audit areas that involve judgement it is necessary at times to 
rely on evidence that is persuasive rather than conclusive. Consequently, it is 
crucial that audit engagement files contain sufficient appropriate evidence to 
demonstrate the extent of professional scepticism exercised by the auditor. 
A lack of documentation to evidence the exercise and extent of professional 
scepticism by engagement partners and teams could lead to potential 
concerns relating to the objectivity and quality of audit work undertaken. 
44 An attitude of professional scepticism is a critical part of conducting quality 
audits. Therefore, a culture of professional scepticism needs to be supported 
and promoted through robust messages from leaders of the firms and 
complemented by education and training, firm guidance and procedures, 
effective technical support and engagement quality control reviews.  
Engagement quality control reviews 
45 The role of an engagement quality control reviewer (EQCR) is to objectively 
evaluate, before an audit report is issued, the work done and conclusions 
reached by the audit engagement team in significant judgement and risk 
areas. The engagement quality control review is a critical element of quality 
control and contributes to achieving audit quality. To ensure this quality 
control function is effective, it is essential that the EQCR is involved 
throughout the audit process. 
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46 Most firms have policies on the EQCR’s role and responsibility. Despite 
this, we noted deficiencies in the engagement quality control review in our 
previous public reports. We continue to be concerned that there are 
numerous findings from the 2009–10 audit inspection program about:  
(a) the lack of documented evidence on audit engagement files 
demonstrating the involvement of the EQCR during the engagement; 
and 
(b) the relatively low levels of time recorded by the EQCR for the 
engagement. 
47 To further enhance quality of an audit, the EQCR’s evaluation of the work 
performed and conclusions reached by the engagement team on significant 
judgement and risk areas needs to be sufficiently and appropriately 
evidenced on the engagement file. The leaders of the firm need to reinforce 
this to engagement partners and EQCRs. 
48 Detailed observations about our major findings relating to audit quality are 
set out in Section C. 
Major findings: Quality control  
49 Due to the difference in the size and structure of the firms, quality control 
systems will vary in sophistication and maturity. Generally, there are few, if 
any, findings in this area for the Larger National firms. Other National and 
Network firms that have been inspected more than once generally made 
improvements to their quality control systems, so there were fewer findings 
at these firms than those inspected for the first time. However, we continue 
to have concerns about the number of findings at many firms about 
independence processes and, in particular, about contraventions of the 
rotation and independence requirements of the Corporations Act.  
50 Independence is fundamental to the conduct of a quality audit. Leaders of the 
firms need to ensure that they give strong and clear messages about the 
importance of independence to set an appropriate ‘tone at the top’. Where 
relevant, the firm should take appropriate action against personnel that 
contravene the independence requirements of the Corporations Act and the 
firm’s own independence policies.  
51 Smaller firms need to continue to develop and implement many aspects of 
their quality control systems—in particular, systems to enable compliance 
with the independence requirements of the Corporations Act. In addition, 
Smaller firms require continued development of their systems relating to 
ethical and professional standards, and procedures to systematically and 
rigorously examine and monitor audit quality. 
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52 In June 2010, ASIC issued a report about auditor independence to the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in accordance with our Memorandum of 
Understanding with them. This report, which is provided annually to the 
FRC, includes more detail on our findings on auditor independence and is 
included in the FRC’s 2009–10 annual report.2  
53 Detailed observations about our major findings relating to quality control are 
set out in Section D. 
                                                     
2 Annual report 2009–10, Financial Reporting Council, 11 October 2010, 
www.frc.gov.au/reports/2009_2010/downloads/FRC_AR_2009-10.pdf. 
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C Detailed observations and findings: Audit 
quality 
Key points 
All the firms need to improve audit quality on engagements by ensuring 
that: 
• engagement files contain sufficient appropriate audit evidence. The 
evidence should support the audit opinion by clearly demonstrating the 
auditor’s procedures undertaken and conclusions on key audit 
judgement or risk areas. Areas where improvements are required 
include reliance on the work of experts or other auditors, consideration 
of the risk of fraud, and the audit of financial statement disclosures, 
including classification of material loan balances; 
• auditors exercise professional scepticism in the key areas of audit 
judgement, including fair value measurement of assets, impairment 
calculations, going concern assessments and other fundamental areas 
of the audit; and 
• that the nature, timing and extent of the engagement quality control 
review is adequate.  
Larger National and Other National and Network firms 
54 We reviewed aspects of 122 audit engagements files3 across the Larger 
National firms and the Other National and Network firms over the 18 month 
period to 31 December 2010. In a small number of these files, we conducted 
a cover-to-cover review considering all aspects of the audit process. Our file 
selections were spread across a range of sectors (see Figure 2) with financial 
reporting periods ended between 30 June 2008 and 30 June 2010 (10% were 
30 June 2008, 57% were 30 June 2009, 29% were 30 June 2010 and 4% 
were other year ends). We selected the files based on a number of factors, 
including entities or industries perceived to be at heightened risk as a result 
of the global economic downturn, audit engagements where there were 
substantial reductions in audit fees, and entities or industries identified in 
other ASIC activities. 
                                                     
3 During the period covered by the previous inspection report, we reviewed aspects of 88 audit and seven review 
engagements across the Larger National and Other National and Network firms. 
 REPORT 242: Audit inspection program public report for 2009–10 
© Australian Securities and Investments Commission June 2011 Page 18 
Figure 2: Number of engagement files reviewed by industry group 
 
55 As a part of our ongoing review of the focuses of our program, and in 
response to factors such as the global financial crisis and benchmarking with 
other audit oversight regulators, we increased the number of audit 
engagement files selected for review at inspections of larger firms in 2009–
10. We also reviewed additional key audit areas on each engagement file. 
These changes would have impacted on the quantity of findings on each 
audit file and in each area. A risk-based method was used to select firms, 
engagement files and audit areas for review. 
56 The majority of the engagement files reviewed contained sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence to support the conclusions reached and 
demonstrate that the audit was conducted in accordance with the relevant 
Australian auditing standards. However, for the Larger National Firms, 17% 
of engagement files reviewed did not contain sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence. For Other National and Network Firms this figure was 29%. 
Generally where we concluded that audit engagement files did not contain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence, this was based on shortcomings 
identified for specific areas of the audit. We identified three broad areas 
where improvements need to be made by the firms and these are detailed in 
paragraphs 61–121. 
57 The objectives of the review of engagement files were to assess the practical 
application of the audit methodologies of the Larger National firms and 
Other National and Network firms, and consider whether the key matters 
that contribute to the audit opinion had been adequately addressed by the 
engagement team. Our reviews were not designed to detect all instances of 
non-compliance or to confirm all aspects of the audit opinion. 
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58 Our review of the engagement files focused on the substance of the auditors’ 
work, to assess if there was sufficient appropriate audit evidence on the file 
to support the key audit considerations and the conclusions of the auditor on 
significant judgement areas; in particular, the areas affected by the global 
economic downturn.  
59 There are differences in the size, structure and extent of centralised 
resources, the international reach, and the risk management strategies among 
the Larger National and Other National and Network firms. While there may 
be variations in the conduct of audits by the different firms, the overall 
themes from the review of the 122 audit engagements was not markedly 
different. Consequently, we have not reported separately the findings 
relating to Larger National firms and those relating to Other National and 
Network firms.  
60 During 2009–10, we provided private reports separately to each of the firms 
on the findings from our reviews. In some cases where our findings at a firm 
were systemic or considered to be more serious, we accelerated our 
subsequent inspections to ensure that corrective actions taken by the firms 
were adequate. 
Common observations and findings 
61 Most of the engagement files reviewed contained sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence to support the conclusions reached and demonstrate that the audit 
was conducted in accordance with the relevant Australian auditing standards. 
However, we are concerned that there are several important findings 
common to the Larger National and Other National and Network firms that 
we reported on in 2008–09 and which we observed again in 2009–10. 
Shortcomings in the areas detailed in paragraphs 62–121 can have an 
adverse impact on the quality of the audit that is conducted and potentially 
the reliability of the auditor’s report. 
Audit evidence and documentation 
62 The Corporations Act requires audits to be conducted in accordance with the 
Australian auditing standards. Auditing Standard ASA 500 Audit Evidence 
(ASA 500) requires the auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence4 to be able to draw reasonable conclusions on which to base their 
opinion. Auditing Standard ASA 230 Audit Documentation (ASA 230) 
requires the auditor to prepare, on a timely basis, audit documentation that 
provides a sufficient and appropriate record of the basis for the auditor’s 
                                                     
4 ‘Sufficiency’ is the measure of the quantity of audit evidence obtained, while ‘appropriateness’ refers to the measure of the 
quality of the audit evidence (i.e. its relevance and reliability in providing support for the classes of transactions, account 
balances, disclosures and related assertions). A given set of audit procedures may provide audit evidence that is relevant to 
certain assertions, but not others. 
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report and evidence that the audit was performed in accordance with 
Australian auditing standards and applicable legal and regulatory 
requirements. If the evidence of the work done is not documented, it is 
difficult to ascertain what audit procedures the auditor performed to reach a 
conclusion and whether the auditor complied with the requirements of the 
Australian auditing standards.  
63 Audit evidence and documentation deficiencies are pervasive across most of 
the areas noted in this section.  
64 In a number of engagement files, the deficiencies related to sufficiency and 
appropriateness of evidence obtained to form conclusions about audit 
assertions for key areas or insufficient documentation of the audit procedures 
performed. In addition, we noted a small number of instances of incomplete 
or late assembly of engagement files. In these cases, there is a risk that the 
audit work was not adequately performed and that the conclusions reached 
were not appropriate at the time that the audit report was issued. 
65 In the majority of cases, the auditors provided oral explanations to us that the 
audit work had been performed but not documented. Accordingly, the firms 
often concluded that many of the deficiencies we identified on the 
engagement files about insufficient audit evidence were simply a lack of 
documentation. However, we did not always concur with the firms’ 
conclusions. Paragraph 13 of ASA 230 states that ‘ordinarily, oral 
explanations by the auditor, on their own, do not represent adequate support 
for the work the auditor performed or conclusions the auditor reached, but 
may be used to explain or clarify information contained in the audit 
documentation’.  
66 Our inspections also found instances where the auditor relied upon evidence 
that was not appropriate for providing the assurance required to reduce the 
risk of material misstatements for specific assertions to an acceptably low 
level. In these cases, there is a risk that the conclusions formed by the 
auditor are not properly supported by the evidence on the engagement file or 
a material misstatement is not identified or adequately addressed. 
67 To comply with the requirements of ASA 500, auditors must have sufficient 
and appropriate audit evidence on the file and design procedures around 
specific audit assertions that reduce the risk of a material misstatement. In 
accordance with ASA 230, the engagement file must contain sufficient and 
appropriate documentation to enable an experienced auditor with no 
previous connection with the audit to understand audit procedures 
performed, the results of those procedures and the audit evidence obtained to 
support the audit conclusions reached.  
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Relying on the work of experts 
68 Clients of the firms often rely on experts to assist with specialised areas of 
financial reporting, including asset valuations. The experts can be either 
individuals employed directly by the client or external experts engaged by 
the client to provide the specialised service.  
69 Auditing Standard ASA 620 Using the Work of an Expert (ASA 620) 
requires an auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that the 
scope of the expert’s work is adequate for the purpose of the audit. The 
auditor is also required to evaluate the expert’s competence and objectivity. 
The risk that an expert’s objectivity may be impaired increases where the 
expert is employed by the client. 
70 In some of the engagement files where an expert was used by the client, 
there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the auditor assessed the 
professional competence and objectivity of the expert and the 
appropriateness of the expert’s work as audit evidence.  
71 In the majority of the instances where there was insufficient evidence of the 
auditor’s assessment of the expert’s competence or objectivity, the expert 
was an external specialist engaged by the client. We were often advised by 
the auditor that, as the expert was well known in the relevant industry or 
provided services to other major entities in the industry, their assessment of 
the expert’s credentials and objectivity was not documented.  
72 The auditor must include sufficient documentation on the engagement file to 
enable an experienced auditor with no previous connection with the audit to 
understand the nature, timing and extent of the procedures performed to 
evaluate the competence and objectivity of an expert engaged by a client. 
Ordinarily, oral explanations on their own do not represent adequate support 
for the conclusions reached by the auditor. 
73 In a small number of instances the expert the client relied on was an internal 
employee of the client. While in some cases there was evidence the auditor 
assessed the professional competence of the employee providing the expert 
advice, there was no evidence that the auditor assessed the risk that the 
expert’s objectivity could have been impaired—for example, due to being 
financially reliant on the client. In addition, we did not see evidence of the 
auditor’s consideration of whether the client should have, perhaps on a 
cyclical basis, engaged an external expert to corroborate the work of the 
internal expert. 
74 In the cases where an external expert was engaged by the client, in a small 
number of instances the engagement file did not contain sufficient evidence 
that the auditor assessed the reasonableness of the assumptions used by the 
expert and whether the work performed by the expert was adequate for the 
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purposes of forming appropriate evidence to support the audit assertion 
being considered by the auditor.  
75 Given the level of estimation and judgement involved in valuing assets, even 
when undertaken by specialists, we would have expected to see evidence of 
a heightened level of professional scepticism by the auditor, particularly 
where reliance is placed on the client’s internal expert. 
Using the work of other auditors 
76 Auditing Standard ASA 600 Using the Work of Another Auditor (ASA 600) 
requires the principal auditor, when planning to use the work of another 
auditor, to consider the professional competence of the other auditor. In 
addition, the principal auditor should perform procedures to obtain sufficient 
appropriate evidence that the work of the other auditor is adequate for the 
purposes of the principal auditor. This might require the principal auditor to 
advise the other auditor of the relevant independence requirements, the use 
to be made of the other auditor’s work and matters requiring special 
consideration. This is often achieved by the principal auditor issuing 
instructions to the other auditor. 
77 The other auditor can be another auditor in the same network as the principal 
auditor or may be an unrelated auditor. The requirements of ASA 600 apply 
to both an auditor in the same network and an unrelated auditor. 
78 In some of the engagement files where other auditors were utilised we found 
instances where, although the principal auditor placed reliance on the work 
of another auditor, the engagement file did not contain sufficient evidence 
that the principal auditor:  
(a) issued specific instructions to the other auditor; 
(b) assessed the professional competence and/or independence of the other 
auditor; or 
(c) considered the appropriateness of the work performed by the other 
auditor, including:  
(i) assessing if materiality levels used by the other auditor were 
appropriate;  
(ii) evaluating whether significant matters noted by the other auditor 
had been addressed; and/or  
(iii) reviewing that the work done by the other auditor was in 
accordance with the instructions issued. 
79 In some of these cases, where the auditor advised that they visited the 
operations of overseas subsidiaries, held meetings with the other auditors or 
reviewed the other auditor’s working papers, evidence of this was not 
sufficiently documented on the audit engagement files. 
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80 In the majority of these cases the other auditor was part of the principal 
auditor’s network. Nevertheless, it is still necessary for the principal auditor 
to appropriately consider the independence and competence of the other 
auditor and evaluate the work done by the other auditor. This is particularly 
important where the other auditor is part of a firm in a network in another 
country where there may be limited regulatory oversight of auditors and a 
different culture within that firm. 
81 In a small number of these instances the other auditor was not part of the 
principal auditor’s network. This raises concerns about how the principal 
auditor was able to place reliance on the work of the auditor given there was 
insufficient evidence on the engagement files to show that the principal 
auditor: 
(a) appropriately assessed the competence and independence of the other 
auditor; 
(b) issued specific instructions; and/or  
(c) adequately reviewed the work of the other auditor. 
82 ASA 600 has been substantially revised as part of the Clarity auditing 
standards. While not applicable for the period under review, the new 
standard makes it clear that the group engagement partner is responsible for 
the direction, supervision and performance of the group audit and ensuring 
that sufficient appropriate audit evidence is obtained, regardless of who 
performs the work. The principal auditor needs to be adequately involved in 
the work of the other auditor throughout the engagement. We will focus on 
the application of this standard in our future inspections. 
Consideration of the risk of fraud 
83 Auditing Standard ASA 240 The Auditor’s Responsibility to Consider Fraud 
in an Audit of a Financial Report (ASA 240) requires the auditor to consider 
the risks of material misstatement in the financial report due to fraud. 
84 A number of the engagement files reviewed did not contain sufficient 
evidence of the auditor’s consideration of fraud. In most of these instances, 
there was no evidence that the engagement team discussed the susceptibility 
of the entity’s financial report to material misstatement due to fraud. While 
the auditor provided an oral explanation that the possibility of fraud was 
discussed by the engagement team, this was not sufficiently documented in 
the engagement file.  
85 In one instance, there was no evidence that fraud was specifically discussed 
by the auditor, when gaining an understanding of the entity, with either 
management or those charged with the governance of the entity. The lack of 
sufficient documentation of discussions about the risk of fraud does not 
comply with the documentation requirements of ASA 230 and also 
 REPORT 242: Audit inspection program public report for 2009–10 
© Australian Securities and Investments Commission June 2011 Page 24 
ASA 240, which has specific documentation requirements for fraud 
assessment. 
External confirmations 
86 ASA 500 sets out how the reliability of audit evidence is influenced by its 
source and nature. Evidence is more reliable when it is obtained from 
independent sources outside the entity. It is a generally accepted audit 
practice that independent confirmations should be obtained for material 
and/or significant balances (such as cash at bank, investments, and loans 
with financial institutions and debtors) to support the accuracy, existence 
and/or completeness audit assertions.  
87 In a small number of engagement files the auditor did not request external 
confirmations for significant financial statement balances. In addition, those 
files did not always contain an adequate explanation of why external 
confirmation requests were not sent by the auditor. 
88 Where external confirmations are not obtained, the auditor is required to 
perform alternative procedures that will provide sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence about the audit assertions that the confirmation was intended to 
cover. In some instances, the alternative procedures performed did not, in 
our view, provide sufficient appropriate evidence to support the key 
assertions of existence and completeness of the significant balances. For 
example, documents faxed directly to the client by the financial institution 
are not a substitute for confirmations obtained directly by the auditor from a 
financial institution. 
89 The failure to obtain an independent confirmation of a significant balance 
brings into question how the auditor gained the audit assurance required to 
reduce the risk of a material misstatement to an acceptably low level to 
conclude that the financial statements were presented correctly. 
Classification of loans 
90 The classification of loan balances has been an area of our focus in this cycle 
of inspections. The global economic downturn could seriously affect the 
ability of an entity to refinance debt. The classification of loan balances is 
important to understanding the financial position of an entity and we have 
highlighted it as a financial reporting finding in recent years.  
91 Australian accounting standard AASB 101 Presentation of Financial 
Statements (AASB 101) requires entities, when presenting information in 
financial reports, to disclose liabilities as current (due and payable within 
12 months) or non-current (due and payable later than 12 months). This 
information is useful for users of a financial report to assess the liquidity and 
solvency of an entity. We found that in a small number of engagement files 
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there was insufficient evidence of the procedures undertaken by the auditor 
in relation to the client’s classification of loan balances. 
92 In many instances, the auditor provided oral explanations of the work done 
to verify the classification of loans. However, in all of these cases the audit 
procedures undertaken were not adequately documented on the engagement 
file. Some engagement files did not contain sufficient evidence to show 
procedures undertaken by the auditor to verify the client’s compliance with 
complex loan covenants, or whether internal technical or legal consultations 
were undertaken on complex loan covenants and agreements. 
93 In some of these engagement files there was insufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the auditor exercised professional scepticism in assessing the 
appropriate classification of material loan balances. These engagement files 
did not contain evidence that the auditor critically examined the evidence 
provided by the client with a questioning mind, and there was no evidence 
that the auditor challenged the client’s assertions about the repayment of the 
debt in light of other evidence that was available to the auditor. 
Financial statement disclosures 
94 Auditing Standard ASA 330 The Auditor’s Procedures in Response to 
Assessed Risks (ASA 330) requires the auditor to perform audit procedures 
to evaluate whether the overall presentation of the financial report, and the 
disclosures therein, is in accordance with the applicable financial reporting 
framework.  
95 In some cases, we found incorrect or inadequate disclosures in the financial 
reports of the entities audited, particularly in the notes to the financial 
statements. In these cases, there was no evidence on the engagement file that 
the auditor complied with the requirements of ASA 330. In many instances, 
oral explanations were provided to us by the auditors that the disclosure 
deficiencies were not considered to be material. 
96 In some of these instances, there was insufficient evidence on the 
engagement file to demonstrate that the auditor had adequately: 
(a) reviewed the notes to the financial statements;  
(b) assessed the information in the notes in light of the audit procedures 
undertaken; and  
(c) challenged the assertions or representations of the client about the 
financial statement disclosures. 
97 In such circumstances, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, 
it is unclear whether the auditor performed detailed audit procedures to 
assess the accuracy of some key disclosures and consulted with internal 
accounting specialists about specific disclosure requirements of Australian 
accounting standard. Examples of disclosure deficiencies included 
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disclosures related to fair value measurement, impairment testing (see 
paragraph 110) and segment reporting.  
98 As set out in AASB 101, the notes to the financial statements are part of a 
complete financial report and the objective of financial reports is to provide 
information about the financial position, financial performance and cash 
flows of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic 
decisions. In light of this, we would expect auditors to assign appropriate 
importance to reviewing financial report disclosures. 
Technical consultations  
99 To manage the risks associated with auditing during the global economic 
downturn, many of the firms increased their requirements for engagement 
teams to consult with internal technical specialists about complex audit areas 
such as fair value measurements, review of impairment calculations and the 
appropriateness of going concern assumptions. The majority of the Larger 
National and Other National and Network firms have policies about such 
technical consultations. 
100 In some of the engagement files there was insufficient evidence about the 
engagement team’s consultations on complex or specialist areas with the 
firm’s internal technical specialists. 
101 In the majority of these instances, the evidence on the engagement file was 
not sufficient to demonstrate the extent and nature of discussions between 
the engagement team and the firm’s internal technical specialists. In 
particular, the evidence did not clearly describe the role or the work 
performed by the firm’s internal technical specialists. In those 
circumstances, it was difficult to assess whether the engagement team was 
able to rely on the results of the technical consultations.  
102 In the future we will extend the focus of our inspections to the operation of 
the firm’s internal technical specialist groups in supporting audit 
judgements, including a review of the relevant quality control systems within 
these groups. 
Professional scepticism 
103 ASA 200 requires an auditor to plan and perform an audit with an attitude of 
professional scepticism. Professional scepticism means the auditor makes a 
critical assessment, with a questioning mind, of the validity of the audit 
evidence obtained and the client’s judgements on accounting treatments and 
estimates. In many of the engagement files there was insufficient evidence 
that the auditor exercised an attitude of professional scepticism and 
objectively assessed the evidence presented by clients and client judgements. 
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104 A questioning mind and objective approach to assessing evidence is critical 
where entities are required to make estimates and/or judgements in 
significant and material areas of a financial report. In many engagement 
files, at least one of our observations related to fair value measurements, 
impairment calculations and going concern assessments where, in our view, 
the auditor did not demonstrate adequate professional scepticism. In a 
number of these instances, we were concerned by the lack of evidence that 
the auditor clearly challenged the client; it instead appeared that the auditor 
sought out evidence to corroborate what they were told by the client. 
Fair value measures and impairment 
105 Given that the global economic downturn increased the likelihood that the 
value of assets could be impaired, we paid particular attention in our 
inspections to the key audit areas of measuring the fair value of assets and 
the associated audit procedures performed on asset impairment calculations. 
106 It is the responsibility of an entity to determine if the value of an asset may 
be impaired and then to estimate the recoverable amount of the asset as set 
out in Australian accounting standard AASB 136 Impairment of Assets 
(AASB 136). It is the responsibility of the auditor to make a critical 
assessment, with a questioning mind, of the validity of the evidence provided 
by the client. 
107 Auditing Standard ASA 545 Auditing Fair Value Measurements and 
Disclosures (ASA 545) specifically requires the auditor to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence that fair value measurements and disclosures are 
in accordance with the entity’s applicable financial reporting framework. 
ASA 545 applies to fair value measurement for the purpose of impairment 
testing under the Australian accounting standards and similar impairment 
calculations, such as ‘value in use’ calculations. 
108 In many engagement files there was insufficient evidence that the auditor 
had exercised professional scepticism when assessing the key assumptions 
used by the clients in measuring the fair value of assets and the judgement 
about whether impairment charges were necessary or adequate.  
109 In the majority of those instances. there was insufficient evidence that the 
auditor challenged:  
(a) the appropriateness of the growth rates used by the client. Often the 
growth rates appeared unrealistically high, but there was no evidence 
that this was questioned by the auditor or compared to the client’s 
historical performance; 
(b) the correctness of the discount rates applied by the client. Frequently, 
the auditor did not critically evaluate whether a discount rate used by a 
client reflected the risks specific to the relevant industry. This may 
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suggest that the auditor did not have had sufficient competence to 
properly evaluate the client’s assumptions or calculations; and 
(c) the accuracy of the source data used by the client in estimating future 
cash flows. Future cash flows are used when measuring the recoverable 
amount of an asset using the ‘value in use’ method and may be used in 
determining fair value less costs to sell. Often the engagement file did 
not contain evidence that the auditor had objectively evaluated whether 
the cash flows were complete, accurate and prepared in accordance with 
AASB 136 and consistent with other areas of the file (e.g. deferred tax 
assessments or going concern assessments). 
110 In a smaller number of instances there was insufficient evidence that the 
auditor exercised professional scepticism in considering: 
(a) whether the disclosures about fair value in the financial report were in 
accordance with the relevant Australian accounting standards in 
particular, if sensitivities were disclosed when a reasonable possible 
change in assumptions could lead to impairment. Where disclosure 
deficiencies were identified, it often appeared that the auditor was 
willing to agree with the client’s disclosures rather than challenge them; 
and 
(b) the number of cash generating units identified by the client and whether 
it was appropriate to apply the same discount rate to different cash 
generating units.  
111 In some engagement files, the documentation on the file raised concerns 
about the competence of members of the audit engagement team to audit 
complex components of the client’s fair value and impairment calculations. 
Where we have raised this concern, the firms have indicated that they will 
provide the relevant training and, where appropriate, ensure engagement 
teams consult with the internal technical specialists in the firm.  
112 In some instances when the firm’s internal technical specialists were 
consulted about fair value and impairment calculations, they raised matters 
of concern for the engagement team’s consideration. However, the 
documentation on the engagement file did not always demonstrate that the 
engagement team conducted adequate additional procedures to address the 
matters raised by the technical specialists or sought the endorsement of 
technical specialists on the conclusions reached. 
Going concern assessments 
113 Auditing Standard ASA 570 Going Concern (ASA 570) requires an auditor 
to evaluate a client’s assessment of an entity’s ability to continue as a going 
concern. It also requires auditors to undertake specific procedures when 
events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on an entity’s ability to 
continue as a going concern have been identified. During a global economic 
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downturn when there is reduced liquidity and reduced ability for companies 
to refinance debt or raise new funds, and/or pressure on results and asset 
values, an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern can be at risk and 
accordingly this was a key audit area that we focused on. 
114 In a small number of engagement files there was a lack of evidence that the 
auditor challenged evidence provided by the client to support their 
assumption that the entity was a going concern. It appears that the auditor 
often accepted the client’s estimates of future cash flows without critically 
assessing the assumptions underlying those estimates 
Analytical review procedures 
115 In some of the engagement files the auditor did not undertake appropriate 
analytical procedures as required by Auditing Standard ASA 520 Analytical 
Procedures (ASA 520). In more than half of these cases, the analytical 
review procedures undertaken at the preliminary stage of the audit were not 
adequate to be considered a risk assessment procedure sufficient to obtain an 
understanding of the entity and its environment. In addition, in most of these 
cases, analytical review procedures were also not performed adequately at 
the final stage of the audit to gain an understanding of the whether the 
financial report as a whole was consistent with the auditor’s understanding 
of the entity. 
116 In almost half of these instances, the auditor relied on analytical review 
procedures as substantive tests for certain balances. However, in these cases 
the auditor did not sufficiently evidence:  
(a) how the analytical review procedures provided appropriate audit 
evidence to support audit-specific assertions relating to those balances 
for example, the completeness, accuracy and existence of bank balances 
or debtors;  
(b) that there was an appropriate relationship between the data used and the 
population being audited or that the source data was sufficiently 
independent; 
(c) whether the expectation established was sufficiently precise to identify 
a material misstatement; and/or 
(d) that the difference of the recorded balance from the expectation 
established was sufficiently investigated.  
117 Often when analytical review procedures conducted by the auditor resulted 
in variances, the auditor accepted explanations provided by management of 
the client without corroborating or challenging those explanations or 
comparing them with the auditors’ own understanding of client’s operations. 
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Engagement quality control reviews 
118 In many engagement files there was a lack of sufficient appropriate evidence 
of the engagement quality control reviews. This deficiency can raise 
questions about the effectiveness of the EQCR role, particularly given the:  
(a) number of ASIC findings about engagement files that did not contain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support the testing of and 
conclusions reached about key judgement or risk areas; 
(b) lack of sufficient appropriate evidence that the EQCR actually reviewed 
the work done by the engagement team in key judgement or risk areas, 
with the file usually containing only a signature on an audit review 
checklist; 
(c) many instances where time records indicated that the EQCR recorded 
spent less than 1% of the total time charged by the engagement team on 
an engagement; and 
(d) small number of instances where the engagement quality control review 
was performed by a person who was not eligible to be an EQCR in 
accordance with the requirements of the Corporations Act. In addition, 
Auditing Standard ASQC 1 Quality Control for Firms that Perform 
Audits and Reviews of Financial Reports and Other Financial 
Information, and Other Assurance Engagements (ASQC 1) sets out that 
an EQCR for an audit of the financial report of a listed entity is likely to 
be an individual with sufficient appropriate experience and the authority 
to act as an engagement partner on audits of financial reports of listed 
entities.  
119 Auditing Standard ASA 220 Quality Control for Audits of Historical 
Financial Information (ASA 220) requires an engagement quality control 
review for audits of financial reports of listed entities that includes an 
objective evaluation of the significant judgements made by the engagement 
team and the conclusions reached in formulating the auditor’s report. 
120 To provide assurance that a high quality audit was undertaken, an 
engagement file needs to contain evidence that a qualified EQCR reviewed 
the file in accordance with the requirements of ASA 220. 
121 We acknowledge that the Larger National and Other National and Network 
firms have implemented policies and procedures for the EQCR role and 
review. We also recognise that the time spent by EQCRs will vary from 
engagement to engagement and can be affected by the composition of the 
audit team, the size and risk profile of the client and the EQCR’s familiarity 
with the client. However, given the extent of findings from our 2009–10 
inspection and previous inspections, we continue to have concerns about the 
number of deficiencies observed in this area. Leaders of the firms should 
remind firm personnel about the importance of the role of the EQCR. 
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Other observations and findings 
122 During our review of audit engagement files, other instances were noted 
where the auditor failed to perform certain audit procedures or did not 
undertake the procedures strictly in accordance with the relevant Australian 
auditing standard. A smaller number of audit engagement files did not 
contain sufficient appropriate evidence to demonstrate that the auditor 
undertook procedures to:  
(a) ensure significant litigation or claims were identified. In some 
instances, solicitor’s representation letters were not requested or 
obtained and there was no evidence on the engagement file of the 
alternative procedures the auditor performed to identify potential legal 
matters. In some instances where solicitor’s letters were obtained, there 
was no evidence that the auditor considered whether matters in these 
letters needed to be accounted for and disclosed; 
(b) select an appropriate sample of items for audit testing. In those 
circumstances, the auditor did not document sufficiently the rationale 
for the size or the method used for selecting the sample; 
(c) test journal entries and other adjustments throughout the financial year. 
In our view, given that journal entries and other adjustments can be 
used to manipulate financial results, testing of unusual and material 
journal entries is an important audit procedure that should be performed 
to cover the whole financial year; and 
(d) establish an appropriate quantitative materiality level to plan risk 
assessment procedures and other procedures. In those circumstances, 
the auditor did not meet the requirements of the firm’s policy or the 
Australian auditing standards by either setting the materiality at an 
inappropriate level or using an inappropriate basis for setting 
materiality. 
123 In most of these cases, the auditor provided oral explanations about the 
auditor’s consideration of these specific matters, but this was not 
documented on the engagement file. If the evidence of the work done is not 
documented it is difficult to ascertain the nature, timing and extent of audit 
procedures the auditor performed to reach a conclusion and comply with the 
requirements of the Australian auditing standards. 
Smaller firms 
124 During 2009–10 we conducted inspections of eight Smaller firms not 
previously inspected. Taking into consideration the size and nature of these 
Smaller firms and the profile of the clients they audit, we focused on the 
review of nine listed entity audit engagement files selected based on risk 
criteria to assess audit quality.  
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125 Our review of the engagement files concentrated on the substance of the 
auditors’ work, to assess if there was sufficient appropriate audit evidence on 
the file to support the key audit considerations and the conclusions of the 
auditor. Our reviews were not designed to detect all instances of non-
compliance or to confirm all aspects of the audit opinion. During 2009–10, 
we reported separately to each of the firms on the findings from our reviews. 
Common observations and findings 
126 Our review of audit engagement files of Smaller firms raised concerns about 
the quality of audit evidence on five of the nine engagement files and the 
extent and timing of engagement quality control reviews.  
Audit evidence and documentation 
127 In our last public report we noted that in a large number of engagement files 
there was insufficient evidence to support key audit assertions. We noted the 
area of evidence and documentation as a major area of focus for Smaller 
firms.  
128 In 2009–10 we continued to find instances where the engagement files failed 
to provide sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support the nature, timing 
and extent of audit procedures performed and the conclusions reached on 
key judgement and risk areas. In particular, we noted instances where some 
areas of the audit were performed utilising checklists with no supporting 
evidence or documentation of the procedures undertaken.  
129 In a small number of the engagement files it was difficult to see how the 
auditor objectively assessed the evidence presented by clients and exercised 
an appropriate attitude of professional scepticism. In areas that require client 
management to make estimates of or judgements about significant and 
material areas of a financial report, a questioning mind and objective 
approach to assessing evidence is critical. 
Consideration of the risk of fraud 
130 We found in a number of the engagement files reviewed that there was 
insufficient audit evidence to demonstrate that the auditor had complied with 
ASA 240 and made enquiries of management about their: 
(a) assessment of the risk of fraud;  
(b) processes for identifying and responding to fraud risks;  
(c) communication with those charged with governance about their processes; 
(d) communications to employees about management’s views on business 
practices and ethical behaviour; and 
(e) knowledge of any actual, suspected or alleged fraud. 
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131 In addition, there was no evidence that the auditor obtained an understanding 
of how those charged with the governance of the entity exercised oversight of 
management’s processes for identifying and responding to the risk of fraud.  
132 Smaller firms need to be diligent in their consideration of the risk of fraud so 
that they are able to design and perform adequate audit procedures to cover 
the risk of fraud. 
Financial statement disclosures 
133 In a number of cases we found deficiencies in the financial statements of the 
entities audited. It was not evident from the documentation on the file 
whether the auditor had complied with the requirements of ASA 330 to 
evaluate whether the overall presentation of the financial report, including 
the financial disclosures, was in accordance with the entity’s applicable 
reporting financial reporting framework. 
134 In addition, in one engagement file there was insufficient evidence that the 
auditor had reviewed other information in the entity’s annual report to ensure 
it was consistent with audited financial information. 
Related parties 
135 In a number of engagement files there was no evidence of audit procedures 
performed to address the risk of the financial reports containing material 
misstatements that result from the existence of related parties and related 
party transactions. Smaller firms need to ensure they fully address the 
requirements for the audit of related party transactions, particularly given the 
nature of related party transactions and possible complexities associated with 
the transactions and their audit. 
Laws and regulations 
136 In some engagement files there was a lack of sufficient appropriate evidence 
that the auditor assessed the client’s compliance with laws and regulations as 
required by Auditing Standard ASA 250 Consideration of Laws and 
Regulations in an Audit of a Financial Report (ASA 250).  
Engagement quality control reviews 
137 We found little or no evidence on the majority of the engagement files to 
support the engagement quality control review. This review should include 
an objective evaluation of the significant judgements made by the 
engagement team and the conclusions reached in formulating the auditor’s 
report. Engagement quality control reviews provide an essential overlay of 
quality control, particularly for Smaller firms that have yet to develop and 
implement an internal monitoring program: see paragraph 185. In these 
instances, it may be warranted for Smaller firms to take a more rigorous 
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approach to engagement quality control reviews and go beyond the 
requirements of the Australian auditing standards in order to ensure a high 
quality audit is achieved. 
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D Detailed observations and findings: Quality 
control 
Key points 
Some Larger National firms should improve their independence systems 
and testing of those systems to avoid contraventions of the independence 
requirements of the Corporations Act.  
Other National and Network firms can improve some aspects of their 
quality control systems, particularly by emphasising the importance of audit 
quality and independence in messages from leaders of the firm, and 
including audit quality and independence as clear criteria in partner 
performance evaluations.  
Smaller firms need to continue to develop and implement many aspects of 
their quality control systems; in particular, systems to enable compliance 
with the independence requirements of the Corporations Act and ethical 
and professional requirements, and procedures to systematically and 
rigorously examine and monitor audit quality. 
Larger National and Other National and Network firms  
138 ASQC 1 was effective from 1 January 2010. ASQC 1 is based on the 
equivalent international standard on quality control that was issued by the 
International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants and is equivalent to 
Accounting Professional and Ethical Standard APES 320 Quality Control for 
Firms (APES 320). 
139 The firm’s quality control systems enable them to meet the requirements of 
ASQC 1 and ASA 220. Our assessment, therefore, is based on the elements 
set out in ASQC 1 and APES 320:  
(a) leadership responsibilities for quality within the firm;  
(b) ethical requirements; 
(c) acceptance and continuance of client relationships and specific 
engagements; 
(d) human resources, engagement performance; and  
(e) monitoring. 
140 Where, in a previous inspection, we did not have any observations or 
findings for a particular element of a quality control system, we only 
reviewed and tested key changes to these elements. Our observations and 
findings arising from our review of the elements reviewed and tested during 
2009–10 are set out in the sections below.  
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141 Because the extent and composition of the quality control systems can vary 
between the Larger National firms and the Other National and Network 
firms due to their structure and the resources available within the networks, 
the results for the Larger National firms and the Other National and Network 
firms are shown separately. 
Larger National firms 
Leadership responsibilities for quality within the firm 
142 Larger National firms have policies and procedures that recognise that 
quality is essential to performing audits in accordance with legal and 
professional requirements.  
143 The leadership of these firms remain committed to an appropriate ‘tone at 
the top’ and we consider this commitment continues to have a positive and 
ongoing impact on maintaining a strong culture of audit quality and 
independence. 
144 However, based on the observations and findings from some Larger National 
firms’ own monitoring processes and ASIC’s observations and findings in 
this report, leaders of these firms should continue to reinforce the need to:  
(a) conduct high quality audits that can withstand internal and external 
scrutiny, and demonstrate this through obtaining appropriate audit 
evidence that is sufficiently documented on the engagement file and 
rigorous engagement quality control reviews; 
(b) exercise a heightened level of professional scepticism in significant 
judgemental areas of the audit; and  
(c) comply with independence requirements of the Corporations Act and 
the firms’ own independence policies. 
Ethical requirements and independence 
Auditor rotation requirement contraventions  
145 During 2009–10, two contraventions of the auditor rotation requirements of 
the Corporations Act were noted at a Larger National firm. Once these 
contraventions were identified by the Larger National firm’s internal 
monitoring systems they were rectified by the firm and the matters were 
disclosed to ASIC. 
146 The contraventions involved a partner playing a significant role either as an 
engagement partner or an EQCR in the audit of a listed client for more than 
five out of seven successive financial years. Consequently, a new partner and 
a new EQCR were assigned to the listed client. 
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Contravention of other independence requirements 
147 A Larger National firm identified and reported to us a contravention of the 
independence requirements of the Corporations Act. The contravention 
involved a partner holding a direct financial interest in a listed audit client. 
148 Although the partner did not provide any audit or non-audit services to the 
audit client, Accounting Professional and Ethical Standard APES 110 Code 
of Ethics for Professional Accountants (APES 110) notes that if any partner 
of a firm, in the office in which the engagement partner practices in 
connection with the audit, holds a direct financial interest in an audit client, 
the self-interest threat created would be so significant that no safeguard 
could reduce the threat to an acceptable level. The partner no longer holds 
the position of partner at this Larger National firm. 
Policies, systems and processes 
149 The Larger National firms have independence policies and systems that 
reflect the requirements of the Corporations Act, and also require partners 
and senior staff to disclose their investments on interactive databases that are 
automatically matched with the firms’ prohibited securities lists. During 
2009–10, the Larger National firms continued to test how partners complied 
with these policies and systems. 
150 Although the firms continue to identify instances of non-compliance with 
their own policies that include requirements that go further than the 
Corporations Act, the number of instances of non-compliance has not 
increased compared to prior years.  
151 Our review of the Larger National firms’ policies, systems and processes for 
ethical and independence requirements found a small number of instances 
where there was scope for enhancement. These findings were brought to the 
attention of the relevant firms in our private reports to them. 
Engagement performance 
152 All Larger National firms continue to enhance their systems and processes to 
better integrate audit technology with their audit methodologies, and adopt 
changes to policies and processes with the introduction of the Clarity 
auditing standards. Some firms implemented, or are in the process of 
implementing, new audit technology systems.  
153 The leadership of some firms need to reinforce messages to partners and 
staff about the importance of following the firm’s policies and the relevant 
Australian auditing standards when performing specific audit procedures. 
These relate to the nature, extent and timing of audit procedures to be 
performed for specific account balances in the financial report, ensuring that 
reasonable assurance is obtained over specific audit assertions. 
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154 Where there is divergence from firm policies, adequate explanations should 
be provided in the engagement files. These explanations should contain 
details of the alternative audit procedures performed to obtain the necessary 
assurance over specific account balances.  
155 A number of firms have strategies in place to ensure audit engagements are 
conducted in the most efficient and effective manner. However, the firms 
need to focus on these aspects in the performance of audit engagements, in 
their audit training, partner and staff briefings, and in scoping their internal 
quality control review activities to ensure that audit quality is not 
compromised. 
Monitoring 
156 All of the Larger National firms have comprehensive policies and 
procedures for monitoring their audit quality in accordance with legal and 
professional requirements. The Larger National firms regularly undertake 
rigorous inspections of a selection of completed audit engagements. They 
use the results of these inspections to enhance their audit quality systems, if 
necessary, and direct the focus of staff training. 
157 Two of the Larger National firms need to improve their processes for 
reporting to ASIC about contraventions and suspected contraventions of the 
Corporations Act, in accordance with s311. These include contraventions of 
the independence requirements of the Corporations Act. 
Human resources 
158 All of the Larger National firms have mature systems and processes in place 
to provide assurance that personnel are competent, capable and committed to 
ethical principles. We found a small number of instances where there is 
scope for the Larger National firms to improve aspects of these systems.  
159 To provide clear messages to personnel about the importance of complying 
with ethical principles: 
(a) one Larger National firm should consider the sufficiency of internal 
disciplinary action for contraventions of the rotation requirements of the 
Corporations Act, to ensure they are commensurate with the nature of 
the breaches identified; and  
(b) another Larger National firm should formally publish its disciplinary 
policy for staff below the level of partner, and communicate the key 
messages of the policy to the relevant personnel. 
160 To ensure that the sufficiency and appropriateness of training for personnel 
can be monitored, one Larger National firm needs to ensure it continues to 
properly record attendance by personnel at training courses.  
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Other National and Network firms 
Leadership responsibilities for quality within the firm 
161 All of the Other National and Network firms recognise the importance of 
audit quality. However, some of these firms need to strengthen the ‘tone at 
the top’ messages to partners and staff about audit quality and the 
consequences of non-compliance. This is essential at the Other National and 
Network firms that we inspected for the first time during 2009–10.  
162 The messages from the leadership at two of the Other National and Network 
firms should emphasise the overriding importance of audit quality and 
commitment to independence and ethical principles. ‘Tone at the top’ 
messages can be communicated in variety of ways, including through formal 
and informal dialogue, at training seminars and conferences and by 
incorporating them into mission statements or strategic plans. 
163 Some of the Other National and Network firms can improve the 
communication of their messages about audit quality and ethics and 
independence by making them transparent in strategic plans or an integral 
part of agendas for board and executive meetings. 
Ethical requirements and independence issues 
Auditor rotation 
164 During 2009–10, we noted one instance where an audit partner had played a 
significant role in the audit of a listed client for in excess of five years, in 
contravention of the Corporations Act. The audit of the listed client has been 
assigned to another partner. 
165 While most of the Other National and Network firms have systems in place 
to monitor compliance with the auditor rotation requirement of the 
Corporations Act, one Other National and Network firm needs to implement 
processes to ensure it can satisfy these legislative requirements. Another 
Other National and Network firm needs to improve partner rotation plans to 
ensure that its member firms are able to manage the rotation of partners for 
existing audit clients that become listed.  
Policies and procedures 
166 All of the Other National and Network firms inspected have policies and 
processes in place to facilitate compliance with the independence 
requirements of the Corporations Act and professional standards. However, 
the completeness and adequacy of the independence policies and processes 
varied, reflecting the nature or maturity of the national partnership or 
network structure of those firms. 
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167 The independence policies and processes of more than half of the Other 
National and Network firms need improvement to ensure that they are 
consistent with the requirements of the Corporations Act and Australian 
accounting professional and ethical standards, and are applied consistently 
across the member firms of the network. 
Testing of independence systems 
168 Approximately two thirds of the Other National and Network firms are not 
testing their independence systems and processes to ensure compliance with 
their legal and professional independence requirements. A quarter of the 
Other National and Network firms have commenced testing their 
independence systems and processes. However, in one instance the testing 
does not extend to assessing the completeness and accuracy of the partners’ 
annual independence declarations and, in another instance, not all of the 
member firms are testing their independence systems across the network. 
169 Without a rigorous testing program, firms can only place limited reliance on 
the effectiveness of their independence systems and processes. An effective 
testing program can identify potential non-compliance on an ongoing basis. 
Firms that have robust testing programs in place are identifying non-
compliance with their policies and the Corporations Act. 
170 Where firms are testing their independence systems and processes, the 
communication of the results of the testing process to all personnel sends a 
strong and clear message about the importance of independence. 
Acceptance and continuance of client relationships and specific 
engagements 
171 The majority of the Other National and Network firms have adequate 
policies and procedures in place for the acceptance and continuance of client 
relationships and specific engagements. We noted a small number of 
instances where the policies and procedures could be improved. 
172 One of the Other National and Network firms needs to implement a formal 
procedure to document the process for performing conflict checks prior to 
accepting a new audit client. Two of the Other National and Network firms 
can improve their client acceptance and continuance evaluation procedures 
by, in one instance, including criteria for accepting clients in specific 
industries and, in another, by requiring a concurring partner approve 
acceptance and continuance decisions. 
173 The primary focus of client acceptance and continuance procedures should 
continue to be on independence considerations, possible conflicts of interest 
and whether the firm continues to have the requisite skills to conduct an 
engagement (as required by ASQC 1).  
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Engagement performance 
174 Most of the Other National and Network firms need to enhance their audit 
manuals so that they include complete policies and procedures for all 
elements of undertaking an audit, and also provide practical guidance about 
the application of the Australian auditing standards and the firm’s audit tool.  
175 We noted that in some instances the audit manuals did not contain formal 
policies on sampling, archiving and safe custody (integrity) of engagement 
files. The audit manuals were also deficient in guiding audit engagement 
teams about the role of the EQCR, the extent and timing of an engagement 
quality control review, and the procedures necessary to enable an auditor to 
rely on the work of other auditors or experts. 
176 We also found in some of the Other National and Network firms that there 
was inconsistent application by member firms of the network of parts of the 
audit manuals, including the approach to sampling and the form and content 
of audit reports issued. 
177 To achieve a high quality audit, it is critical for the firms to have 
comprehensive audit manuals that accurately reflect the requirements of the 
Australian auditing standards and the Corporations Act and that are 
consistently followed by all the member firms in the network. 
Monitoring 
178 All of the Other National and Network firms have procedures in place to 
facilitate monitoring of audit quality in accordance with the requirements of 
ASQC 1. At the time of our inspection, one of the Other National and 
Network firms had not completed its first monitoring program. One of the 
Other National and Network firms can improve its monitoring processes by 
establishing a mandatory action plan for audit deficiencies identified from 
the monitoring process, including training and following up the proposed 
remedial action. 
179 Many of the Other National and Network firms need to adopt formal policies 
and procedures to deal appropriately with complaints and allegations of non-
compliance with professional standards and regulatory and legal 
requirements. 
Human resources 
180 The majority of the Other National and Network firms need to implement 
policies and procedures to ensure adequate consideration is given to audit 
quality and independence in partner performance evaluations. A clear 
understanding of audit quality and adherence to ethical principles should be 
key criteria for advancement and remuneration decisions. 
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181 Some of the Other National and Network firms do not document partner 
evaluations. One of the Other National and Network firms does not have a 
formal evaluation process for partners. A formal documented evaluation 
process is important to ensure that partners and staff are aware of the firm’s 
expectations for audit quality and ethical principles. The evaluation process 
should also enable partners and staff to receive meaningful feedback on their 
performance, including advice on areas of improvement and additional 
training needs. 
182 The results of internal and external quality monitoring processes and 
outcomes of the firms’ independence testing should be incorporated into 
individual performance evaluation and remuneration decisions at most Other 
National and Network firms. 
Smaller firms  
183 ASIC conducted limited-scope inspections on eight Smaller firms during the 
audit inspection program in 2009–10. The audit inspection program for 
Smaller firms is targeted in scope, taking into consideration the size, client 
profile and nature of these firms. In conducting the inspections of the quality 
control systems of Smaller firms we focused on core aspects of the systems 
as they related to audit quality on the nine engagement files we reviewed at 
the eight Smaller firms. 
Quality control systems 
184 While it is recognised that the size and characteristics of Smaller firms may 
limit the sophistication of their quality control systems, Smaller firms 
undertaking audits are still required to comply with their legal and 
professional obligations. On this basis, we found a number of areas where 
Smaller firms need to take action to ensure they can comply with the 
requirements of the Corporations Act and professional standards.  
185 The majority of Smaller firms do not have a monitoring program in place 
that includes a periodic inspection of a selection of completed engagement 
files. Without ongoing evaluation and monitoring of their quality control 
systems, Smaller firms may not be able ascertain whether their systems are 
operating effectively to facilitate compliance with professional standards and 
other relevant legal and regulatory requirements. While some Smaller firms 
rely on the outcomes of The Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia 
(ICAA) quality reviews and ASIC inspections, these are not a substitute for 
an internal monitoring program within the firm. 
186 Some Smaller firms are yet to formalise policies and procedures for the 
acceptance and continuance of client relationships and specific engagements. 
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Smaller firms need to ensure they develop, implement and are able to 
comply with such policies, so that they undertake or continue to undertake 
only those engagements for which they have the competence, capabilities 
and resources and, most importantly, from which they are free of conflicts.  
187 One of the Smaller firms had not yet developed formal policies and 
procedures for the completion of annual independence declarations by 
personnel of the firm as required by ASQC 1. The collection and monitoring 
of such information is crucial to identify any potential conflicts of interests 
that could result in a contravention of the Corporations Act if the firm 
accepted a new engagement or continued with existing engagements. 
188 We also suggested a number of improvements to some of the Smaller firms 
in relation to the resources being utilised, such as ensuring audit manuals or 
audit guidance are up-to-date, and provide adequate guidance to staff. The 
introduction of the Clarity auditing standards is the opportune time for 
Smaller firms to review their audit manuals and tools to ensure that they 
accurately reflect the requirements of the Australian auditing standards and 
the Corporations Act.  
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E Future focuses  
Key points 
Our future focuses will include:  
• conducting inspections of those firms that audit significant public interest 
entities, focusing on entities and industries with perceived heightened 
risks based on current market conditions; 
• refining our inspection approach to ensure that it continues to be 
effective and consistent with international best practices; 
• following up the extent to which matters noted in our previous 
inspections have been addressed, with an emphasis on performing 
engagement file reviews, particularly of significant audit judgement 
areas, to assess audit quality;  
• monitoring the impact of regulatory developments in auditing;  
• ongoing engagement with firms on the future inspection reporting 
process and audit quality initiatives; and  
• continued collaboration with foreign regulators to minimise the 
regulatory burden on Australian auditing professionals. 
Inspection scope and process 
189 The focus of our audit inspection program will continue to be those firms 
that audit entities likely to be of greater public interest, and those entities and 
industries that are more vulnerable to the risks emanating from existing and 
emerging market conditions.  
190 We will continue to conduct follow-up inspections of firms. Where 
significant issues were identified in previous inspections, we will escalate 
follow-up inspections to ensure the firms are taking prompt and appropriate 
action to address our observations and findings. Our inspections of Smaller 
firms will continue to extend to those firms that have not previously been 
subject to an audit inspection.  
191 Our future reviews of engagement files will include financial institutions, 
managed investments schemes and audits of Australian financial services 
(AFS) licensees. 
192 We will continue to monitor and examine the causes of recent corporate 
collapses. Where deficiencies in auditor conduct appear to have contributed 
to a lack of transparency in the financial position and financial performance 
of an entity on a timely basis leading up to the collapse, we will focus on 
these areas in our future audit inspections. 
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193 Our inspection process is continually reviewed to ensure that it remains 
effective. We are considering further refinements to the nature and extent of 
our engagement file selection processes, file reviews and other inspection 
processes, such as including a focus on reviewing the firm’s internal 
specialist technical groups (e.g. technical accounting, treasury, actuarial, 
taxation) that support audit engagement teams to assess processes applied by 
those groups on matters referred and the quality of their advice. 
Specific areas of focus 
Audit quality and evidence 
194 Given the issues noted in this inspection report, our future inspections will 
continue to focus on whether the auditors obtained sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence to be able to draw reasonable conclusions on which to base 
their opinion. 
195 Where appropriate, we will challenge engagement partners on whether the 
evidence obtained and documented on engagement files for specific audit 
assertions is sufficient and appropriate and supports the significant 
judgements made to reach their conclusions and form their opinions.  
196 If there is no documentation on an engagement file, we will presume that the 
auditor did not obtain the necessary audit evidence to support the procedures 
performed or conclusions reached. 
Professional scepticism 
197 The level of professional scepticism exercised by auditors has been in the 
spotlight during the global economic downturn and the resultant high profile 
corporate collapses worldwide.  
198 In areas and circumstances that involve significant judgements by clients 
when preparing their financial statements, auditors should have a heightened 
level of professional scepticism. A lack of documented evidence of the 
exercise of professional scepticism by engagement partners and teams could 
lead to potential concerns relating to the objectivity and quality of audit 
work undertaken. 
199 Based on the above and the findings in some of the 2009–10 inspections, 
professional scepticism exercised by auditors will be an area of continued 
focus in future inspections. We will review engagement files for evidence of 
the extent of professional scepticism exercised by engagement teams in 
significant judgement areas.  
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Relying on the work of others 
200 In this report we have noted instances where we had concerns about the 
auditor relying on the work of experts (internal and external) and other 
auditors (in the same network as the principal auditor or in an unrelated 
network). In light of these concerns and changes resulting from the Clarity 
auditing standards—for example, the changes to ASA 600, noted in 
paragraph 82—we will continue to focus on areas where the auditor relies on 
the work performed by others to draw conclusions on which to base the audit 
opinion. 
201 We will review engagement files for evidence that the auditor assessed the 
competence and objectivity of experts and other auditors, considered 
whether the scope of the work performed by others was adequate for the 
purposes of the audit, and evaluated the appropriateness of the work 
performed by others as audit evidence for the audit assertions being 
considered. In particular, we will consider whether the auditor has sufficient 
skills to review the work performed by an expert used by the audit client or 
should have engaged their own independent expert, and whether sufficient 
audit work has been performed on information used by experts. Our 
selection of audit engagement files will include entities where:  
(a) there were group audit arrangements;  
(b) the entity used service organisations;  
(c) joint venture operations were included in an entity’s financial report; or  
(d) experts were used by the entity.  
Audit fees and audit efficiencies 
202 While it is not ASIC’s role to interfere in the setting of audit fees between a 
firm and its client, large reductions in audit fees have the potential impact on 
audit quality.  
203 To understand the level of fee reductions, in 2010 we wrote to the 14 largest 
firms requesting a listing of all successful formal proposals for audits of 
financial reports of new or existing clients. We used this information to 
select and review a sample of entities with substantial fee reductions as part 
of some inspections. While our findings to date are not indicative of any 
negative impact on audit quality, we are aware that in most instances the 
impact on audit quality would only be evident in subsequent years.  
204 We will continue to target engagement files where there is evidence of large 
fee reduction on new or existing audits without any apparent underlying 
changes to business operations. Our review of engagement files will focus 
on the sufficiency of the audit quality, and we will continue to focus on 
firms’ acceptance and continuance processes in this regard. 
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205 In addition, we are aware that a number of firms have strategies in place to 
ensure audit engagements are conducted in the most efficient manner. We 
will focus on these initiatives to ensure that audit quality is not compromised 
as a result of their implementation. 
Other areas of focus 
206 Other specific areas that we intend to focus on in future inspections include:  
(a) any areas of deficiency in auditor conduct that may have contributed to 
a lack of transparency in the financial position and financial 
performance of an entity on a timely basis leading up to a corporate 
collapse; ; 
(b) the auditors’ understanding of the business model of the entity and risk 
assessment for individual engagements, and the auditors’ interaction 
with the audit committee to ensure that key areas of risk are included in 
the audit strategy; 
(c) application of the new ‘Clarity’ auditing standards, including standards 
that have undergone considerable change; 
(d) monitoring ‘opinion shopping’, particularly where there are 
communications with an audit firm about their views on specific 
accounting treatments prior to acceptance of a new engagement; 
(e) the involvement of the engagement partners and EQCRs at different 
stages of the audit, including planning, consultations with the 
engagement team and reviewing key judgements and conclusions 
reached; 
(f) the quality and extent of the auditor’s communications with those 
charged with governance of the entity, particularly communication of 
unadjusted differences and the significant audit judgement areas of 
going concern assessments, fair value measurement and impairment 
testing; 
(g) the extent of audit procedures performed and internal consultations; 
(h) the audit of financial statement disclosures, to ensure that the investing 
public is properly informed; 
(i) compliance with financial reporting disclosure requirements through 
our financial reporting surveillances and targeting those entities with 
deficient disclosures for audit inspections;  
(j) the adequacy and timeliness of auditors reporting suspected 
contraventions of the Corporations Act under s311, s601HG and s990K; 
and 
(k) scrutinising compliance with the auditor rotation requirements of the 
Corporations Act, including EQCRs as they are required to be 
registered company auditors.  
 REPORT 242: Audit inspection program public report for 2009–10 
© Australian Securities and Investments Commission June 2011 Page 48 
Regulatory developments 
207 In the wake of the global financial crisis, questions are being asked about 
whether the role of auditors can be enhanced to mitigate any new financial 
risk in the future. A number of matters are being considered globally and 
locally by governments and regulators as a result of the global economic 
downturn, such as Treasury’s consultation paper on audit quality in 
Australia.5 We will actively monitor future regulatory developments in 
auditing and consider their impact on the audit inspection program.  
208 Specific areas of regulatory developments that we will focus on in the next 
cycle of audit inspections are detailed below. 
Clarity auditing standards 
209 Auditing standards have been revised and redrafted in the ‘Clarity’ format 
internationally. The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) 
issued revised and redrafted Australian auditing standards in the Clarity 
format in October 2009 and they are operative for financial reporting periods 
commencing on or after 1 January 2010.  
210 During our more recent inspections, we have engaged in discussions with the 
firms’ executive leaders and assessed the firms’ readiness for the Clarity 
auditing standards. The firms were at various stages of effecting changes to 
policies, systems and processes and training staff, but the majority had plans 
in place and were progressing with their implementation strategies.  
211 Firms need to invest time and resources into understanding the changed 
requirements of these new standards, particularly standards (such as 
ASA 600) that have substantial additional requirements, and ensure their 
audit methodology meets the new or amended requirements.  
212 We will shortly commence reviews of audit engagement files under the 
Clarity auditing standards. To ensure that the profession is well informed on 
a timely basis, we intend to issue a media release on our initial overall 
findings from these reviews in early 2012.  
New code of ethics: Revised APES 110  
213 The APESB has released a revised APES 110, the Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants, which aligns Australia’s professional 
requirements with international standards and introduces Australian specific 
requirements relating to inadvertent violations and multiple threats to 
auditor’s independence.  
                                                     
5 Consultation Paper, Audit Quality in Australia: A Strategic Review, Treasury, 1 March 2010. 
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214 Effective from 1 July 2011, the revised APES 110 extends the current 
rotation provisions to all key audit partners and the independence 
requirements for audits of listed entities to all public interest entities. Among 
other changes made, the revised APES 110 further strengthens some of the 
requirements relating to the provision of non-assurance services to audit 
clients.  
215 Firms will need to be aware of all the relevant changes, particularly 
provisions relating to the new concepts of public interest entities and key 
audit partners, which for transitional purposes will not take effect until 
1 January 2012.  
216 Firms will also need to be cautious in the interpretation and application of 
the requirements in the revised APES 110 that differ and, in some instances, 
are less stringent than those imposed by the Corporations Act. 
International collaboration 
217 ASIC continues to work to minimise the regulatory burden on Australian 
auditing professionals by seeking arrangements with other international audit 
oversight bodies. These arrangements involve reliance on ASIC by other 
regulators or conducting work either jointly with them or on their behalf. 
218 The PCAOB has a responsibility to monitor compliance of Australian 
auditors with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US). In 2007, ASIC entered into an 
arrangement with the PCAOB to conduct joint audit inspections and has 
been doing so since this time. 
219 In January 2011, the European Commission recognised the equivalence of 
the audit oversight system in Australia. EU audit regulators can now enter 
into cooperative arrangements with ASIC, in order to rely on ASIC’s audit 
firm inspections carried out on Australian firms that audit Australian 
companies listed in the European Union, or Australian subsidiaries of EU 
companies. 
220 We will continue to work with other international audit regulation 
counterparts to reduce any regulatory overlap. Where possible, we will 
concentrate on maximising cross-border recognition opportunities and 
establishing regulatory cooperation arrangements. 
221 ASIC is an active member of the International Forum of Independent Audit 
Regulators (IFIAR), comprising audit oversight bodies from around the 
globe. IFIAR’s goals include sharing knowledge of the audit market between 
regulators, promoting collaboration and consistency in regulatory activity, 
and providing a platform for dialogue with other organisations that have an 
interest in audit quality. ASIC chairs the International Co-operation Working 
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Group and is a member of the Global Public Policy Committee Working 
Group. 
222 ASIC is also a member of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) and actively participates in IOSCO Standing 
Committee No.1 on Accounting, Auditing and Disclosure. We are members 
of the Auditing Subcommittee and the Accounting Subcommittee, as well as 
chairing the International Financial Reporting Standards Regulatory 
Interpretation and Enforcement Subcommittee.  
223 Our contribution and participation at the IFIAR and IOSCO will continue to 
ensure that our inspection techniques and processes remain current and 
relevant in the changing global financial economy.  
224 We will continue to actively monitor future developments in auditing and 
will respond to trends and issues through our inspection process and other 
targeted project work. 
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Appendix: How we conducted our work  
225 This report covers inspections of firms substantially completed between 
1 July 2009 and 31 December 2010. The nature of our monitoring approach 
means that inspections were spread throughout the period, with inspections 
starting and concluding at some firms earlier than at others. 
Our monitoring approach 
Larger National and Other National and Network firms 
226 We focused on assessing whether each firm had documented and 
implemented a quality control system that provides reasonable assurance 
that: 
(a) the firms comply with the auditor independence requirements in Div 3, 
4 and 5 of Pt 2M.4 of the Corporations Act (i.e. independence); and 
(b) the firms’ audit methodologies facilitate the conduct of their audits in 
accordance with the Australian auditing standards as required in Div 3 
of Pt 2M.3 of the Corporations Act (i.e. audit quality). 
227 It is not the purpose of our inspection program to benchmark the firms or to 
make specific recommendations on how to improve independence or audit 
quality policies and systems. However, during our inspection we highlighted 
to each firm suggested areas for improvement. 
228 In particular, we considered the following areas of each of the firm’s quality 
control systems: 
(a) leadership responsibilities for quality within the firm;  
(b) ethical requirements; 
(c) acceptance and continuance of client relationships and specific 
engagements;  
(d) human resources; 
(e) engagement performance; and 
(f) monitoring. 
229 Our inspections concentrated first on reviewing each firm’s independence 
systems and processes, including examining each firm’s testing results. We 
conducted only limited testing of each firm’s systems. 
230 Second, we examined each firm’s audit methodology for compliance with 
Australian auditing standards operative for financial reporting periods 
commencing prior to the date of our inspection. 
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231 Third, we reviewed the conduct of aspects of a limited number of archived 
individual audit engagements for compliance with each firm’s stated audit 
methodology and applicable Australian auditing standards as at the date of 
each audit or review. We also focused on specific areas most affected by the 
global economic downturn. Each review concentrated on the substance of 
work and on whether sufficient appropriate audit evidence was on file to 
support the conclusions reached for key decisions and significant judgements 
about the audit. 
232 Our work programs are tailored to focus on key risk areas for each audit. 
They are not designed to find minor instances of non-compliance. We 
challenged audit partners regarding the basis on which significant 
judgements were made. 
Smaller firms 
233 To reflect the size and client profile of Smaller firms, our inspection 
approach is limited compared with inspections of Larger National firms and 
Other National and Network firms. 
234 A limited inspection of a Smaller firm comprised: 
(a) conducting a review of aspects of generally one archived audit 
engagement file of a listed entity for compliance with each firm’s stated 
audit methodology and the applicable Australian auditing standards as 
at the date of each audit or review; and 
(b) holding discussions with leaders, engagement partners and other senior 
members of the engagement team (for the file selected) about the 
engagement file reviewed and certain policies and procedures relating 
to auditor independence and audit quality employed by the firm. 
235 The inspection process is not designed to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the firms’ quality control systems; instead, it focuses on the 
quality of audit conduct. Enquiries were in the context of observations 
specific to the engagement reviewed and therefore may vary across firms 
where different risks are identified. 
236 Smaller firm engagement file reviews were mainly conducted at our offices, 
with on-site activities limited to discussions with firm personnel at the 
commencement and the completion of the inspection. 
The inspection process 
237 The inspection process was designed to gain an understanding of: 
(a) the quality of audit work by the firm; 
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(b) the firms’ executive leadership direction and strategic priorities for 
independence and audit quality; 
(c) the firms’ policies and systems for ensuring audit quality and 
compliance with their independence obligations; 
(d) the firms’ independence and audit methodology training programs; 
(e) the links between the firms’ independence and audit quality policies and 
the performance management processes; and 
(f) internal monitoring programs conducted by the firms. 
238 In conducting our inspections, we: 
(a) reviewed material provided by the firms under notice pursuant to the 
ASIC Act; 
(b) reviewed aspects of a selection of archived audit engagements at each 
firm, weighted towards listed entities; 
(c) reviewed the firms’ systems and processes for managing compliance 
with the audit independence requirements of the Corporations Act and 
for ensuring audit quality; 
(d) conducted limited testing of the firms’ compliance with its 
independence and audit quality policies, systems and processes 
(e) interviewed selected partners holding leadership roles in the firms; 
(f) interviewed selected human resources representatives; 
(g) interviewed a number of the firms’ other partners and staff; and 
(h) in the case of Larger National, and Other National and Network firms, 
visited some of their capital city offices and interviewed selected 
partners and staff. 
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Key terms 
Term Meaning in this document 
AASB 101 (for 
example) 
An Australian accounting standard (in this example 
numbered 101)  
AFS licensee A person who holds an Australian financial services 
licence under s913B of the Corporations Act 
Note: This is a definition contained in s761A of the 
Corporations Act. 
APES 110 (for 
example) 
An Australian accounting professional and ethical 
standard (in this example numbered 110)  
APESB Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 
ASA 200 (for 
example) 
An Australian auditing standard (in this example 
numbered 200)  
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
ASIC Act Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 (Cth) 
ASQC 1 An Australian auditing standard on quality control  
ASX The exchange market known as ASX, operated by ASX 
Limited 
AUASB Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
Australian accounting 
professional and 
ethical standards 
Standards issued by the APESB 
Australian accounting 
standards 
Standards issued by the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board pursuant to s334 of the Corporations Act 
Australian auditing 
standards 
Standards issued by the AUASB pursuant to s336 of the 
Corporations Act 
Clarity auditing 
standards 
Australian auditing standards revised and redrafted to 
conform with the ‘Clarity’ International Standards on 
Auditing issued by the International Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board  
Clarity format The format of auditing standards resulting from the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
‘Clarity’ project to enhance the understanding and 
implementation of auditing standards, as well as to 
facilitate translation.  
CLERP 9 Act Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform 
and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) 
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Term Meaning in this document 
Corporations Act Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), including regulations made 
for the purposes of that Act 
engagement quality 
control review 
A process designed to provide an objective evaluation, 
before the auditor’s report is issued, of the significant 
judgements the engagement team made and the 
conclusions they reached in formulating the auditor’s 
report 
EQCR Engagement quality control reviewer 
firm An audit firm inspected by ASIC as part of the audit 
inspection program 
FRC Financial Reporting Council 
ICAA The Institute of Chartered Accountants Australia 
IFIAR International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commissions 
Larger National firms Firms that audit numerous listed entities (more that 5% by 
market capitalisation) and are national partnerships and 
members of a global network with multiple offices 
Other National and 
Network firms 
Firms with national partnerships or individual offices that 
audit many listed entities and are members of a national 
or international network 
PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (US) 
s311 (for example) A section of the Corporations Act (in this example 
numbered 311), unless otherwise specified 
Sarbanes-Oxley (US) Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (US) 
Smaller firms Firms with small number of audit partners that audit a 
limited number of listed entities 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 192: Audit inspection 
program public report for 2008-09 (March 2010) 
 
The text of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Report 192: 
Audit inspection program public report for 2008-09 (March 2010) is attached as 
Appendix 4. 
  
  
REPORT 192 
Audit inspection program 
public report for 2008–09 
 
March 2010 
 
About this report 
This report sets out key themes and issues identified by ASIC’s audit 
inspection program for 2008–09.  
We expect this report to be beneficial to the audit firms we inspected, other 
audit firms, the investing public, companies, audit committees and other 
interested stakeholders. 
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About ASIC regulatory documents 
In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory 
documents. 
Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC 
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance. 
Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by: 
 explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under 
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act) 
 explaining how ASIC interprets the law 
 describing the principles underlying ASIC’s approach 
 giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such 
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how 
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations). 
Information sheets: provide concise guidance on a specific process or 
compliance issue or an overview of detailed guidance. 
Reports: describe ASIC compliance or relief activity or the results of a 
research project. 
Scope/Disclaimer  
Sections of this report may describe deficiencies or potential deficiencies in 
the systems, policies, procedures, practices or conduct of some of the 19 
audit firms inspected (Firms). The absence of a reference in this report to 
any other aspect of a Firm’s systems, policies, procedures, practices or 
conduct should not be construed as approval by ASIC of those aspects, or 
any indication that in ASIC’s view those aspects comply with relevant laws 
and professional standards. 
In the course of reviewing aspects of a limited sample of selected audit and 
review engagements, an inspection may identify ways in which a particular 
audit or review is deficient. It is not the purpose of an inspection, however, to 
review all of the Firm’s audit or review engagements or to identify every 
aspect in which a reviewed audit or review may be deficient. Accordingly, 
this report does not provide assurance that the Firms’ audits or reviews, or 
their clients’ financial statements, are free of deficiencies not specifically 
described in this report. 
Unless stated otherwise, not all matters in this report apply to every Firm 
and, where they do apply to more than one Firm, there will often be 
differences in degree. Our observations and findings relate only to the 
individual firms inspected and cannot be extrapolated across the auditing 
profession in Australia. Our observations and findings can differ significantly 
even between firms of similar size and for that reason we caution against 
drawing conclusions about any firms not yet inspected by ASIC. 
Unlike some other jurisdictions, ASIC is also the securities regulator in 
Australia. This report covers inspections but does not include any matters 
arising from other regulatory activities such as investigations or surveillances 
in relation to the Firms or its clients, although these matters may inform 
focus areas in inspections. 
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Executive summary 
Overview of findings 
1 This report covers audit firm inspections substantially completed in 
the period 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2009 as part of ASIC’s audit 
inspection program. This report does not cover audits for the year 
ended 30 June 2009 or the results of ASIC’s other activities relating to 
auditors (such as our financial reporting surveillance program, 
surveillances relating to identified concerns with individual audits, 
referrals to the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary 
Board, and investigations in connection with corporate failures). 
2 Australia’s audit regime compares well internationally. Further, it was 
pleasing to see that Australian firms have taken steps since our last 
report to make further enhancements and refinements to their 
independence and audit quality systems and processes. 
3 ASIC reviewed audit engagement files across 19 firms, focusing on 
the substance of the auditor’s work and whether sufficient and 
appropriate audit evidence was documented to support the conclusions 
reached in relation to key audit judgements. Our audit inspection 
program has identified a number of cases requiring improvements in 
audit quality in audit areas related to the global financial crisis (GFC), 
such as appropriate use of experts in testing asset valuations. Our audit 
inspections also continue to identify a number of other matters to be 
addressed by firms, particularly in the areas of audit evidence and 
documentation for significant audit judgement areas.  
4 We will continue to assess the overall performance of the auditing 
profession as we complete our inspection activities for the end of 2009 
and 2010 and as the results of surveillances and investigations become 
known. 
5 Different entities are affected differently in the current economic 
conditions. Auditors should continue to focus on areas such as going 
concern, impairment of assets, and determination of fair values of 
assets, as appropriate. 
The inspection process 
6 Unlike many other regulators internationally, ASIC is both an audit 
oversight regulator and a securities regulator. In addition to our audit 
inspection program, the results from which are the subject of this 
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report, we conduct a range of other activities that cover the work of 
auditors. These other activities include our financial reporting 
surveillance program, surveillances of individual audits, and 
investigations into corporate failures. While the focus areas in our 
inspection program are informed by these other activities, the 
inspection program does not duplicate these other activities. For 
example, we do not review audit files in our inspections relating to 
entities for which we are also investigating a corporate failure. Where 
serious concerns are identified with individual audits in an inspection, 
these matters are transferred to separate surveillance activities. 
7 The results of our investigation and surveillance activities also reflect 
on firm audit quality. However, investigations and surveillances can 
take time to be resolved, including the results of court action and other 
appropriate actions. We will be in a better position to assess the 
performance of the audit profession during the GFC once the 
outcomes of those activities are known. 
8 During 2009, we conducted more timely reviews of individual audit 
engagement files by performing those reviews closer to the 
completion of audit work. Previously reviews where conducted 12 
months or more after audit completion. While our inspections have 
continued to focus on audit process matters, we have also placed 
emphasis on assessing the quality of audit risk assessments and 
judgements. Our file reviews focused on entities and areas most likely 
to be affected by the GFC. 
9 Much of this report is split between national partnerships that are 
members of global networks with multiple offices (National Firms), 
individual offices of firms that are members of international 
associations (Network Firms) and firms with small number of audit 
partners that audit a limited number of listed entities (Smaller Firms). 
Key findings—audit quality 
10 Our audit inspections continue to identify a number of significant 
matters that need to be addressed by the firms, particularly in the areas 
of audit evidence and documentation for significant judgement areas. 
While there may be cases where the necessary audit evidence was 
obtained and proper consideration was given to significant judgement 
areas but not documented, there will also be cases where the necessary 
audit evidence and analysis to support the audit opinion was not 
obtained or performed. There may be no material misstatement in the 
audited financial report, but if evidence and analysis are not obtained 
or performed the auditor does not have a basis for their opinion. This 
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extends to evidence and judgements in areas most impacted by the 
GFC. 
11 While the full implications and outcomes of the GFC, including the 
public outcomes of our investigations and surveillances, are still 
unknown, improvements are required by all firms in specific areas 
most affected by the current economic conditions such as going 
concern assessments, impairment of assets and fair value 
determinations. Further details of the implications of the GFC on the 
audit profession are provided in Section B. 
12 There are instances where audit risk assessments have failed to 
identify key risks and where fundamental audit procedures have not 
been conducted. Even where there are no identified audit risks for 
particular transactions or balances, a basic level of testing is still 
required. 
13 Even in focusing on risk areas identified by the Firms, our individual 
audit and review engagement reviews for Firms continue to reveal 
significant numbers of cases where there was a lack of sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence for judgements in key audit areas, 
documentation failed to provide enough evidence to support the 
conclusions reached or audit procedures were not adequately 
undertaken. 
14 There continues to be a need for improvement by all Firms, 
particularly in the areas of audit evidence and documentation, reliance 
on another auditors’ or experts’ work, risk assessments (including risk 
of fraud), impairment testing, fair value measurements, related party 
transactions, going concern assessments and engagement quality 
control reviews.  
Key findings—quality control 
15 While the Firms previously inspected have made enhancements and 
refinements to audit quality systems and processes since our last 
public report, a key area of focus for National Firms continues to be 
the ongoing review and testing of quality control systems and ensuring 
that these systems remain relevant and robust, particularly in the 
context of risks associated with the GFC.  
16 Some Network Firms have made good progress towards adopting 
common policies, systems and processes in respect of independence 
and audit quality within their practice. However, a number of Network 
Firms were in a transitionary phase in modifying their systems, 
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policies and processes to ensure uniformity in approach across 
member firms.  
17 For Network Firms, it is critical that once common quality control 
policies and processes are fully embedded, an effective testing and 
monitoring regime is established to assess the effectiveness of quality 
control systems. Network Firms also need to establish clear linkages 
between partner remuneration and the results of quality monitoring 
reviews of both independence and audit engagements.  
18 Our observations and findings for Smaller Firms related primarily to a 
failure to record on the audit engagement files all the work which the 
auditor performed and relied on in forming conclusions and, in some 
cases, failing to perform certain audit procedures.  
19 Quality control areas that the Smaller Firms also need to focus on 
include formalising independence and monitoring processes to ensure 
compliance with the requirements of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Corporations Act) and professional and ethical standards. 
Future focus  
20 As the full effect of the GFC is still uncertain, our inspection approach 
continues to focus on relevant audit risk areas and how firms are 
addressing those areas. 
21 Inspections will continue to focus on quality control systems and 
processes with a greater emphasis on engagement performance for 
those firms previously inspected. We will continue to focus on those 
firms that audit entities likely to be of greater public interest. We will 
also continue to focus on how firms are complying with the Auditing 
Standards and professional and ethical standards, paying particular 
attention to those Auditing Standards impacted more by the effects of 
the GFC and those that were poorly applied in previous years.  
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A The audit inspection program 
Key points 
There remains a need for improvement by the firms in relation to audit 
evidence and documentation, including in areas most affected by the GFC. 
The full implications of the GFC are still unknown. 
We have observed that significant improvements in quality control systems 
and processes are made after our first inspection of a firm. 
Objective 
22 ASIC’s audit inspection program aims to promote high-quality 
external audits of financial reports under Ch 2M of the Corporations 
Act of listed and other entities of greater public interest so that users 
can have greater confidence in financial reports. A strong audit 
profession helps maintain and promote confidence and integrity in 
Australia’s capital markets. 
23 The purpose of the inspection program is not to benchmark the Firms 
and firms are responsible for addressing any improvement areas 
identified.  
24 Our audit oversight activities help maintain and raise the standard of 
conduct in the auditing profession. We focus on audit quality and 
promoting compliance with the requirements of the Corporations Act, 
Auditing Standards and Professional Ethical Standards. We do not 
seek to confirm the overall audit opinions. 
25 Our inspection program has an education and compliance focus, 
although enforcement action will be taken where significant non-
compliance is identified. Such enforcement actions are outside the 
scope of the audit inspection program and are referred to ASIC’s 
Deterrence teams for further consideration and action. 
GFC focus 
26 The financial performance of many entities has been adversely 
affected by the global economic downturn. Our financial reporting 
surveillance media releases identify key financial reporting areas that 
have been significantly affected by the economic downturn. These 
media releases geared towards the accounting and audit profession, 
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are published on a regular basis and available on our website 
(www.asic.gov.au). 
27 Inevitably, the GFC has placed increased focus on accountants and 
auditors who are part of the financial reporting chain, together with 
management, directors, audit committees, internal audit, and external 
experts. 
28 The GFC has heightened the need for auditors to focus on assessing 
the appropriateness of the going concern assumption, particularly 
given reduced liquidity and ability of clients to refinance debt or raise 
new funds, and comply with lending covenants. Firms need to ensure 
that audit team members have sufficient skills to audit fair values and 
impairments, or the means to engage their own expert if necessary. In 
addition, the scope of an expert’s work, whether internal or external, 
must be adequate for audit purposes. Auditors need to adopt an even 
higher degree of professional scepticism in challenging clients, 
particularly for significant audit judgement areas.  
29 As part of our inspection program activities, during 2008–09, we also 
met with the senior leadership of the eight largest firms in Australia to 
discuss and assess each firm’s preparedness for auditing in the GFC. 
The purpose of these meetings was to understand the range of 
measures and specific actions undertaken by these firms to manage the 
implications of the GFC for their audit activities.  
30 Generally, the firms that we met had taken proactive steps to manage 
the risks associated with the GFC on their audit clients. Some of these 
steps included identifying and reassessing audit client risk ratings, 
appointing specialist panels for quality assurance purposes, adopting 
an increased focus on specialist consultations, providing additional 
specific technical training on areas of focus, and reassessing the 
allocation of partners and staff for higher-risk engagements.  
31 As the majority of the 101 individual audit and review engagement 
files we selected for review at National Firms, Network Firms and 
Smaller Firms were for financial reporting periods between 30 June 
2007 and 31 December 2008, we will continue to focus on the 
effectiveness of the above initiatives in our 2009–10 audit inspection 
program. 
Improvements since previous inspections 
32 The firms inspected continue to respond positively to the legislative 
and professional requirements by implementing robust systems and 
processes that are designed to ensure compliance with the audit 
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quality and auditor independence requirements of the Corporations 
Act, Australian Auditing Standards (ASAs) and Accounting 
Professional and Ethical Standards (APESs).  
33 Most firms improve their quality control systems after the first 
inspection. In most instances, the results of the first inspection indicate 
that some quality control elements either have not been addressed by 
these firms, or many systems and processes have not been fully 
developed.  
34 Subsequent inspections almost always show a marked improvement in 
most, if not all, areas identified in the first inspection receiving 
attention by the Firms’ leadership. Many Firms have committed, and 
continue to commit, dedicated technical resources and, where 
required, have developed or further enhanced existing policies and 
systems to assist them in complying with legislative requirements. 
This trend was also observed in this cycle of inspections.  
Changes to the inspection approach 
35 A number of Firms meet the revised definition of a network firm 
contained in Accounting Professional and Ethical Standard APES 110 
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (APES 110), applicable 
from 1 July 2008. We therefore changed our approach from individual 
Firm inspections to inspections of a number of member firms of a 
network. Five Firms were inspected under a network basis for the first 
time in this inspection cycle. 
36 In 2008–09, we inspected four National Firms and nine Network 
Firms where we undertook full-scope inspections comprising the 
review of firm-wide procedures and review of individual audit and 
review engagements. We also extended our coverage, using a limited 
inspection scope, to include six Smaller Firms. We maintained the 
number of audit and review engagements selected for review 
compared to the previous inspection cycle, with particular focus on 
those entities with a heightened risk as a result of the GFC and those 
Auditing Standards that our previous inspections showed required 
continued attention. 
37 Appendix 1 contains further details about how we conducted our 
work. 
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Scope of our audit inspections 
38 This is the fourth public report on our audit inspection program since 
the enactment of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9) on 1 
July 2004.  
39 This report summarises the results of audit inspections of 19 audit 
firms (Firms) conducted over an 18-month period from 1 January 
2008 to 30 June 2009. The Firms inspected range in size as follows:  
(a) national partnerships that are members of global networks with 
multiple offices (National Firms); 
(b) individual offices of Firms that are members of international 
associations (Network Firms); and  
(c) firms with small number of audit partners that audit a limited 
number of listed entities (Smaller Firms).  
40 A summary of our inspections of the Firms and whether they were 
inspected for the first time or more than once is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary of firms visited in 2008–09 
Firms Inspected for the 
first time 
Inspected more 
than once 
Total 
National Firms — 4 4 
Network Firms 8 1 9 
Smaller Firms 6 — 6 
Total 14 5 19 
Note 1: For the eight Network Firms visited once, under the revised APES definition of 
a network firm applicable from 1 July 2008, five firms were inspected on a network 
basis with a number of member firms of the network being inspected. One of these 
networks had previously been inspected in 2007. Three individual member firms of 
other network firms were also inspected. 
Note 2: The Network Firm visited more than once relates to a follow-up inspection of 
an individual member firm of a network. 
41 This report is structured as follows: 
(a) Section B sets out our observations and findings from the review 
of 95 audit and review engagements for National and Network 
Firms; 
(b) Section C sets out our observations and findings on quality 
control systems from the reviews of National Firms and Network 
Firms;  
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(c) Section D details our observations and findings from the review 
of quality control systems and six audit engagement files from 
the Smaller Firm inspections; 
(d) Section E outlines the future focus of the audit inspection 
program; and 
(e) Appendix 1 provides information on how we conduct our work.  
Previous inspection reports 
42 In September 2005, we published our first public audit inspection 
report covering the 2004–05 financial year. This report assessed 
whether firms had documented and implemented a quality control 
system that provided reasonable assurance of compliance with the 
auditor independence requirements of the Corporations Act. 
43 In 2005–06, we broadened our scope to assess whether firms’ audit 
methodologies facilitated the conduct of audits in compliance with the 
audit quality requirements of the Corporations Act. Our second public 
report covering this extended scope was published in August 2006. 
44 Our third public inspection report, published in June 2008, covered an 
18-month period from 1 July 2006 to 31 December 2007. During this 
period, we continued to focus on the firms’ independence policies, 
systems and processes, to assess compliance with the auditor 
independence requirements in Div 3, 4 and 5 of Pt 2M.4 of the 
Corporations Act and relevant professional and ethical standards.  
45 This inspection report and previous reports are available on our 
website (www.asic.gov.au). 
Diversity of Firms 
46 As at June 2009, the National Firms audited approximately 900 (S&P 
300–260) listed entities which accounted for 95% (S&P 300–97%) in 
terms of total market capitalisation.  
47 Firms differ in areas such as size, nature, type of audit clients and risk 
management strategies. How each firm complies with its legal and 
professional obligations is affected by these factors. 
48 Even among National and Network Firms there are differences in their 
size, structures, strategies, target markets, extent of centralised 
resources, international reach and risk management strategies. There 
are even greater differences when Smaller Firms are compared with 
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National and Network Firms. As a result, observations and findings 
varied between the National Firms, Network Firms and Smaller Firms. 
49 Our inspection program for National Firms, Network Firms and 
Smaller Firms is appropriately tailored to recognise this diversity.  
International collaboration 
50 As noted in our last public report, ASIC entered into an arrangement 
with the US-based Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) on 17 July 2007 to assist the PCAOB ascertain compliance 
by Australian auditors with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (US). 
Three inspections were conducted jointly with the PCAOB during the 
period covered by this report.  
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B Audit quality—National and Network Firms 
Key points 
There continues to be room for improvement by all firms with regard to: 
 sufficiency and appropriateness of audit evidence and documentation; 
 reliance on another auditor’s or expert’s work; 
 risk assessments; 
 impairment testing and fair value measurements;  
 going concern assessment; and  
 engagement quality control reviews. 
Introduction 
51 Our inspection program focused on the practical application of the 
Firms’ audit methodologies. During the 18-month period covered by 
this report, we inspected 19 Firms and reviewed 88 audit and 7 review 
engagements across the National Firms and Network Firms. In 
comparison, during the period covered by the previous public 
inspection report, we undertook 82 audit and 19 review engagements. 
Note: The 88 audit and 7 review engagements exclude 6 audit engagements that were 
reviewed as part of the Small Firm inspection program (see Section C). 
52 Similar matters were noted in relation to National Firms and Network 
Firms from the engagement file reviews. For this reason we have not 
made a distinction between observations and findings that relate to 
National Firms or Network Firms in this section. 
53 We only reviewed those engagements where the final assembly of the 
audit and the review engagement file has been completed by the firm. 
Auditing Standard ASA 230 Audit Documentation (ASA 230) 
ordinarily allows 60 days after the audit report date for the final 
assembly of the file to be completed. As such, the majority of the 
individual engagement files selected for review in Figure 1 were for 
financial reporting periods ending between 30 June 2007 and 31 
December 2008.  
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Figure 1: Number of engagement files reviewed by ASIC during public reporting years 
 
 
54 The engagement file reviews focused on specific areas affected by 
current economic conditions. Each review focused on the substance of 
the auditor’s work and on whether sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence was on file to support the conclusions reached in relation to 
key audit decisions and significant judgements.  
55 Our file selections were spread across a number of sectors and based 
on entities perceived to be at heightened risk as a result of the 
economic downturn. A summary of the basis for selecting engagement 
files reviewed is provided in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Engagement files reviewed by sector 2008–09 
 
Audit quality 
56 Our review of aspects of the 95 selected engagement files at National 
Firms and Network Firms was designed to focus on audit quality to 
assess whether the key matters that contribute to an audit opinion or 
review conclusion had been adequately considered by the engagement 
team. It was not designed to detect all instances of non-compliance or 
to confirm all aspects of the audit opinion or the review conclusion.  
57 Our reviews revealed a number of instances where documentation on 
the engagement file failed to provide sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence to support certain audit assertions. A lack of audit 
documentation meant there was a lack of sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence on the engagement file to support certain audit assertions, 
even allowing for oral explanations. 
58 In some cases, the auditor failed to perform or to document certain 
mandatory audit procedures necessary to support the audit opinion or 
the review conclusion. In these cases, we challenged audit partners 
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regarding the basis on which significant judgements were made prior 
to their signing of the audit or the review report.  
59 As a result of our discussions with the audit partners, in a few 
instances, further audit work was performed by engagement teams to 
confirm that the original judgements and conclusions were appropriate 
and that the financial report was not materially misstated.  
60 Network Firms and National Firms continue to communicate our and 
their own internal monitoring findings regarding engagement files to 
individual engagement teams as well as the broader audit practice 
through technical training sessions, regular staff alerts and bulletins. 
61 We have reported separately to each Firm in relation to these 
deficiencies and in some cases have accelerated our follow-up 
inspections of firms to ensure that corrective actions taken by the 
Firms are adequate. 
62 The proportion of reviewed engagement files that contained sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence to support all key conclusions appears in 
Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Percentage of engagement files which contained sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence to support key conclusions reached 
 
Common observations and findings 
63 A summary of our observations and findings from the 95 engagements 
inspected at National Firms and Network Firms is provided in Figure 4.  
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64 This chart represents observations and findings in the key audit areas 
requiring improvement as a percentage of the total observations and 
findings from the 95 engagement files reviewed. These observations 
and findings are presented in two parts to reflect:  
(a) matters that were frequently identified across the Firms and most 
significant in the context of the risks associated with the 
economic downturn; and  
(b) other matters requiring improvement.  
Figure 4: Observations and findings from engagement file reviews 
 
 
Note: Figure 4 represents observations and findings in each key audit area as a percentage of the total 
observations and findings from the 95 engagement files reviewed. 
Audit documentation and audit evidence 
65 The Corporations Act requires audits to be conducted in accordance 
with the Auditing Standards. The same Auditing Standards were 
applicable for all 95 engagements selected for review.  
66 Auditing Standards ASA 230 and ASA 500 Audit Evidence (ASA 
500) require the auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence 
to be able to draw reasonable conclusions on which to base their 
opinion. However, insufficient documentation of audit work 
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undertaken and the basis on which audit judgements have been made 
continues to be a major area of concern. Documentation deficiencies 
are pervasive across a number of areas noted in this section.  
Lack of documentation and audit evidence 
67 Matters relating to audit evidence and documentation accounted for 
25% of the total issues noted in the 95 engagement files we reviewed. 
A number of these related to:  
(a) inadequate documentation to support the audit procedures 
performed or the evidence obtained; and 
(b) incomplete or late assembly of engagement files. 
68 In most of these cases, there was a failure to record on the engagement 
file audit work which the auditor performed and relied on in forming 
their conclusions about key audit assertions. In these cases, there is a 
risk that the audit work was not adequately performed and that the 
conclusions reached were not appropriate. 
69 In some instances, the auditor may have failed to perform certain 
procedures.  
70 In the majority of cases, the auditor made verbal representations that 
the audit work had been performed but not documented.  
71 Paragraph 13 of ASA 230 states that ‘ordinarily, oral explanations by 
the auditor, on their own, do not represent adequate support for the 
work the auditor performed or conclusions the auditor reached, but 
may be used to explain or clarify information contained in the audit 
documentation’. 
72 In addition a fundamental requirement of paragraph 11 of ASA 230 is 
that ‘the auditor shall prepare the audit documentation so as to enable 
an experienced auditor, having no previous connection with the audit, 
to understand:  
(a) the nature, timing, and extent of the audit procedures performed to 
comply with Auditing Standards and applicable legal and regulatory 
requirements;  
(b) the results of the audit procedures and the audit evidence obtained; 
and  
(c) significant matters arising during the audit and the conclusions 
reached thereon.’ 
Documentation must be timely 
73 ASA 230 also requires timely preparation of audit documentation that 
provides a sufficient and appropriate record of the basis for the 
auditor’s report and evidence that the audit was performed in 
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accordance with the Auditing Standards and applicable legal and 
regulatory requirements.  
74 Timely documentation of audit procedures performed helps ensure the 
quality of the audit, and facilitates the effective review and evaluation 
of the audit evidence obtained and conclusions reached before the 
audit report is finalised.  
75 In many cases, the engagement files were not assembled and 
completed within 60 days of signing of the audit report. Auditing 
Standard ASA 230 ordinarily allows 60 days after the audit report date 
for the final assembly of the engagement file to be completed.  
Engagement quality control  
76 In a number of engagement files there was a lack of evidence of 
reviews by the engagement partner and the EQCR partner and/or a 
lack of timely reviews. In particular: 
(a) engagement partners or EQCR partners didn’t identify a lack of 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence and documentation to 
support key conclusions reached;  
(b) there were recurring or similar findings of deficiencies from the 
Firms’ own internal quality monitoring processes;  
(c) there was minimal documentation of high-risk areas and complex 
matters considered by the engagement partner and/or the EQCR partner 
at the planning and/or the completion phases of the audit; and 
(d) time records for a number of engagements indicated that the EQCR 
partner spent or recorded less than 1% of the total time charged by 
the engagement team to the individual engagement, including 
instances where no time was charged by the EQCR partner.  
77 ASA 220 requires that before the auditors’ report is issued, through 
review of the audit documentation and discussion with the 
engagement team, the engagement partner shall be satisfied that 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence has been obtained to support the 
conclusions reached and for the auditor’s report to be issued.  
78 ASA 220 also requires an engagement quality control review for 
audits of financial reports of listed entities that includes an objective 
evaluation of the significant judgements made by the engagement 
team, and conclusions reached in formulating the auditor’s report.  
79 The involvement of a suitably-qualified EQCR partner at critical 
stages of the audit (including the review of audit planning and review 
of the engagement teams’ key judgements and conclusions) is a vital 
element of quality control.  
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Fair value measurements and impairment 
80 Auditing Standard ASA 545 Auditing Fair Value Measurements and 
Disclosure (ASA 545) requires the auditor to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence that fair value measurements and 
disclosures are in accordance with the entity’s applicable financial 
reporting framework. ASA 545 applies to fair value measurement for 
the purpose of impairment testing under the accounting standards and 
similar impairment calculations, such as ‘value in use’ calculations.  
81 Values of many assets were affected by the economic downturn. 
Accounting standards have required enhanced disclosures of key 
valuation assumptions and sources of estimation uncertainty.  
82 In a number of engagements reviewed, auditors failed to adequately 
document their consideration of whether client staff had the relevant 
expertise and experience to perform ‘value in use’ calculations in 
accordance with Accounting Standard AASB 136 Impairment of 
Assets as required by ASA 545 and whether there was a need to use 
the work of an expert. Similar issues were noted when financial 
models were utilised to determine fair values. 
83 In some instances where there was a significant risk relating to the fair 
value of an asset, the auditors did not adequately document or 
challenge whether the key assumptions used by management provided 
a reasonable basis for measuring fair value and disclosures in the 
financial report.  
84 Other common flaws observed included: 
(a) lack of clarity in the audit working papers, which suggested the 
auditor did not understand the nature of the discount rate being 
used or the nature of the cash flows being discounted; 
(b) the discount rate utilised not reflecting the risks specific to the 
asset;  
(c) the use of high growth rate assumptions, both within and beyond 
explicit forecast periods, which were not adequately supported 
and in some cases very optimistic; 
(d) poor documentation of sensitivity analyses performed by the 
engagement team to test management assumptions;  
(e) failing to evaluate whether the disclosures about fair values made 
by the entity were in accordance with the relevant accounting 
standards; 
(f) the client omitting an estimate of some key future cash flows 
which the company expected to derive from the asset; and 
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(g) failing to ensure that the ‘value in use’ calculation was consistent 
with other audit evidence obtained during the audit, including 
valuation cross checks. 
Using the work of experts 
External experts 
85 Auditing Standard ASA 620 Using the Work of an Expert (ASA 620) 
requires an auditor to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence that 
the scope of the expert’s work is adequate for the purpose of the audit. 
The auditor is also required to evaluate the expert’s objectivity. The 
risk that an expert’s objectivity may be impaired increases where the 
expert is employed by the client.  
86 A number of engagement files we reviewed did not adequately 
document how the auditors met the requirements of ASA 620. 
Common deficiencies were: 
(a) the lack of sufficient evidence on the engagement files that the 
auditor considered the professional competence and objectivity of 
the expert, the appropriateness of the expert’s work as audit 
evidence, and the reasonableness of the source data used by the 
expert to confirm the integrity and consistency of the data used; 
(b) some experts’ work did not include independently assessing the 
reasonableness of key assumptions which underpinned the 
valuation and the audit documentation did not adequately address 
this key limitation of scope in the expert’s work; and  
(c) it was not always clear that an expert engaged to determine the 
discount rate had determined the rate having regard to the risks 
attached to cash flows, as required by the relevant accounting 
standard.  
Internal experts 
87 Due to the recent economic downturn, it is increasingly common for 
engagement teams to rely on internal specialists for key areas of work 
such as fair value measurement and asset impairment.  
88 Although appropriate use of specialists should enhance audit quality, 
in some instances engagement teams accepted the work undertaken by 
specialists without an adequate review of the sufficiency and 
appropriateness of audit evidence obtained, including in some 
instances where specific restrictions on the scope of the specialists’ 
work were not addressed. 
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89 Engagement teams need to ensure that work performed by specialists 
is fully-integrated into the audit process, and ensure there are no gaps 
in work by clearly agreeing on the scope of the work to be performed, 
clarifying respective responsibilities, and ensuring that the scope and 
conclusions are appropriately documented. 
Going concern 
90 Auditing Standard ASA 570 Going Concern (ASA 570) requires the 
auditor to consider the appropriateness of management’s assessment 
of the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern in the preparation 
of the financial report.  
91 ASA 570 requires the auditor to undertake specific procedures when 
events or conditions have been identified, which may cast significant 
doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. This 
includes gathering sufficient appropriate audit evidence to confirm or 
dispel whether or not material uncertainty exists by performing audit 
procedures and considering the effects of management plans and other 
mitigating factors. 
92 In a small number of engagement files, there appeared to be a lack of 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence supporting the auditor’s 
consideration and evaluation of management’s assessment of the 
entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. We noted instances 
where key indicators such as cash flows for the next 12 months from 
the date of the audit report, were not considered by the auditor. In two 
instances, events or conditions casting doubt on the entity’s ability to 
continue as a going concern had been identified but a modified 
opinion was not issued.  
Using the work of another auditor 
93 Auditing Standard ASA 600 Using the Work of Another Auditor (ASA 
600) requires the principal auditor to consider the professional 
competence of the other auditor when planning to use the work of that 
auditor.  
94 In a small number of the 95 engagement files reviewed, the work of 
another auditor was relied upon by the principal auditor. In many of 
these cases there was insufficient evidence on the engagement files 
that the auditor considered the professional competence of the other 
auditor.  
95 Although most of the other auditors were part of the network firm, it is 
still necessary for the auditor to give appropriate consideration to their 
competency. While some firms had enquired about the results of the 
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internal quality reviews of the other audit firm, this was not part of the 
formal quality control process.  
96 Other common deficiencies noted were a lack of sufficient appropriate 
audit evidence and/or documentation to evidence that: 
(a) the work of the other auditor was adequate in a context of the 
subsidiary audit and complied with the Auditing Standards; 
(b) the principal auditor had considered the impact of any substantial 
differences between the auditing and accounting standards where 
the entity audited by the other auditor is overseas; and 
(c) all the work requested by the principal auditor in the interoffice 
or group instructions were actually received and/or reviewed by 
the principal auditor. 
Subsequent events 
97 Auditing Standard ASA 560 Subsequent Events (ASA 560) requires 
the auditor to perform audit procedures designed to obtain sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence that all events up to the date of the 
auditor’s report that may require adjustment or disclosure in the 
financial report are identified.  
98 In a few engagement files reviewed, there was no evidence that 
adequate audit procedures had been performed to ensure that events 
up to the date of the auditor’s report had been considered. In a number 
of instances, subsequent events work was performed, however, this 
was performed well before the date of the audit report.  
99 In some instances, there was a lack of sufficient appropriate audit 
evidence on the engagement file to support that audit work had been 
performed prior to signing the audit opinion or review conclusion to 
fully determine the materiality of the subsequent event, and therefore 
to support conclusions relating to the non-disclosure of post-balance 
date events in the financial report. In other instances, although the 
directors’ report contained disclosure on subsequent events, the 
audited financial reports did not contain similar disclosures. 
Fraud 
100 Auditing Standard ASA 240 The Auditor’s Responsibility to Consider 
Fraud in an Audit of a Financial Report (ASA 240) requires 
consideration of the risks of material misstatement in the financial 
report due to fraud in planning and performing the audit, and perform 
procedures to reduce audit risk to an acceptably low level.  
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101 Common issues noted in this area included a lack of robust 
documentation of fraud risk discussions within the engagement team 
during audit planning with those charged with governance. 
102 In a number of instances, firms have implemented checklists or 
questionnaires to assist in ensuring compliance with the requirements 
of the standard. Although the checklists were generally completed by 
engagement teams, there was limited or no documentation on the 
engagement file supporting the risk factors identified and how audit 
procedures were designed to address those risks.  
103 Contrary to the requirements of the standard, we also noted some 
instances where limited or no audit procedures were performed to 
identify and assess the risks of material misstatement due to fraud 
relating to revenue recognition. 
Risk assessment and response 
104 Auditing Standards ASA 315 Understanding the Entity and its 
Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement (ASA 
315) and ASA 330 The Auditor’s Procedures in Response to Assessed 
Risks (ASA 330) require understanding the entity and its environment, 
including its internal controls, and assessing the risks of material 
misstatement of the financial report (whether due to fraud or error), 
and designing and performing further audit procedures at the financial 
report and assertion levels in a financial report audit.  
105 In a number of engagements reviewed, there was a lack of sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence on file to indicate that the requirements of 
the standards had been met. In some cases, there was no documented 
assessment and understanding of the entity and its environment, 
including its internal controls to identify and assess the risks of 
material misstatement of the financial report.  
106 The requirements to assess the significance of identified risks during 
the planning process and reassessing those risks throughout and at the 
end of the audit were not complied with in some instances. Also, the 
identified risks were not linked to audit procedures designed to 
mitigate those risks in some instances. 
107 Other non-compliances related to a lack of audit documentation to 
evidence that a review of accounting policies and an evaluation of the 
overall presentation of the financial report had been performed, and 
that material journal entries and other adjustments made during the 
course of preparing the financial report had been examined. 
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Form and content of audit reports 
108 A number of audit reports for the engagements selected for review 
were not in compliance with the requirements of Auditing Standard 
ASA 700 The Auditor’s Report on a General Purpose Financial 
Report (ASA 700) or the Corporations Act. For example, at one 
Network Firm we noted that several auditor’s reports did not include 
an opinion on whether the remuneration report contained in the 
directors’ report complied with the Corporations Act. At another 
Network Firm, we noted that some audit opinions were not signed 
under the correct name of the firm. 
Other observations and findings  
109 Our other observations and findings from the review of the audit and 
review engagement files are detailed below. 
Analytical procedures 
110 In a number of cases, analytical procedures used in the planning of the 
audit were not performed well, with limited or no predictive analysis 
undertaken and management data was utilised without adequate work 
to ascertain the reliability of the data.  
111 Similarly, for substantive analytical procedures, it was common for 
engagement teams to document explanations provided by 
management without further independent corroboration of the 
explanations or reference to the auditors’ own understanding of the 
entities’ operations. 
Sampling 
112 In a small number of engagement files reviewed, we found instances 
of inappropriate sampling methods, inadequate sample sizes and 
poorly-documented rationales for selecting particular items for audit 
testing.  
113 Further, the auditor’s consideration of the sample results, the nature 
and cause of any errors identified and their possible effect on the 
particular audit objective on some engagements were not documented 
in the engagement file.  
Related parties 
114 Several engagement files had insufficient audit work in relation to the 
identification and assessment of related parties, related party 
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transactions and completeness of related party disclosures in the 
financial statements in accordance with the requirements of 
Accounting Standard AASB 124 Related Party Disclosures.  
Laws and regulations 
115 Several engagement files failed to demonstrate either an assessment of 
the client’s compliance with laws and regulations or obtain specific 
representation from management regarding compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations. 
116 In addition, at one Network Firm, we noted that the director’s report 
(accompanying the audited financial report in the annual report) did 
not contain certain disclosures required by the Corporations Act. 
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C Quality control systems—National and Network 
Firms 
Key points 
Some National Firms need to improve the review and testing of their quality 
control systems, particularly in the context of auditor rotation.  
Many Network Firms need to fully implement common quality control 
policies and processes. 
Network Firms need to adopt an effective testing and monitoring regime to 
assess the effectiveness of their quality control systems. 
Introduction 
118 All firms need to have quality control systems in place that meets the 
requirements of Accounting Professional and Ethical Standard APES 
320 Quality Control for Firms (APES 320) and Auditing Standard 
ASA 220 Quality Control for Audits of Historical Financial 
Information (ASA 220).  
119 In assessing the firms’ quality control framework we follow the 
elements set out in APES 320, being: leadership responsibilities for 
quality within the Firm, ethical requirements, acceptance and 
continuance of client relationships and specific engagements, human 
resources, engagement performance and monitoring.  
120 The following sections summarise ASIC’s observations and findings 
for each of these elements with respect to National Firms and Network 
Firms inspected during 2008–09. 
National Firms 
Leadership responsibilities for quality within the firm 
121 National Firms have policies and procedures designed to ensure audit 
quality and that audits are performed in accordance with legal and 
professional requirements.  
122 Although the frequency of independence and audit quality messages 
appear to be adequate at all National Firms, the observations and 
findings from some National Firm’s own monitoring processes and 
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our engagement file reviews were, in some cases, at odds with these 
messages.  
123 National Firms should continue to ensure that appropriate leaders 
within their respective firms regularly reinforce the ‘tone at the top’ 
messages about audit quality and the consequences of non-compliance 
to partners and staff.  
Ethical requirements and independence issues  
Policies, systems and processes 
124 All National Firms have implemented systems and processes to 
facilitate compliance with their independence policies, and many 
Firms continue to improve their policies and systems. National Firms’ 
policies and procedures require partners and senior staff to disclose 
their investments on an interactive database which is automatically 
matched with a prohibited securities list.  
125 Although the extent of testing performed by the National Firms on 
independence quality control systems varies between each Firm, the 
sample sizes for testing partner independence declarations on a 
periodic basis increased for all Firms in 2008–09.  
126 Irrespective of the sophistication of the systems in place or the sample 
sizes tested by each National Firm, all National Firms’ internal testing 
of compliance continued to reveal non-compliances with their 
independence policies and systems. It is important to note, however, 
that in some areas the National Firms’ policies include requirements 
that go further than those of the Corporations Act.  
127 The most common non-compliance with policy at some of the 
National Firms continued to be the failure of partners and staff to 
record all reportable investments and financial interests in the Firms’ 
independence monitoring systems. This is despite the level of 
resources invested by the National Firms in their quality control 
infrastructure, and continuous reinforcement of independence 
requirements through training and communications to partners and 
staff from the Firms’ leadership.  
Auditor rotation  
128 Four contraventions of the auditor rotation requirements of the 
Corporations Act were noted at two of the National Firms—three at 
one firm and one at another firm. These contraventions of the 
Corporations Act were identified by the firm’s internal monitoring 
systems and disclosed to ASIC on a voluntary basis. In all cases, an 
 REPORT 192: Audit inspection program public report for 2008–09 
© Australian Securities and Investments Commission March 2010 Page 30 
ineligible partner played a significant role either as an engagement 
partner or engagement quality control review partner in the audit of a 
listed client for more than five out of seven successive financial years.  
129 The Firms’ investigations into the root cause of these contraventions 
indicated that improvements were required to either the auditor 
rotation databases that captured the partner rotation information or 
other related internal monitoring processes. The leadership of each 
Firm took strong and timely action, including financial sanctions, 
against the partners involved. These National Firms also enhanced 
their rotation monitoring processes to reduce the possibility of further 
breaches.  
Consultations  
130 Some National Firms need to ensure that independence consultations 
are better documented so that potential independence threats are 
identified, escalated, and action is taken to reduce the threats to an 
acceptable level. National Firms increased the importance of 
compliance with independence requirements when evaluating partner 
performance, by imposing financial penalties for significant identified 
non-compliances. 
Acceptance and continuance of client relationships and 
specific engagements 
131 All National Firms have robust policies and processes for client and 
engagement acceptance and continuance, including allocating risk 
ratings to all audit clients. In response to the GFC, National Firms 
have increased their attention to managing the risks associated with 
accepting and retaining clients and have reassessed the ratings of 
individual clients and engagements.  
Human resources 
132 We reviewed the partner and staff evaluation and remuneration 
processes at all National and Network Firms to assess auditor 
independence and audit quality aspects.  
133 National Firms have extensive human resource policies and 
procedures that give due recognition to audit quality, ethical 
principles, competence in staff and partner evaluation, remuneration 
and promotion procedures. However, the practical application of these 
policies and procedures can be further improved.  
134 Some common observations from a limited sample of partner and staff 
performance evaluation documents reviewed at each National Firm 
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included the need to improve the sufficiency and uniformity of 
documentation regarding partner and staff performance reviews. There 
was a lack of transparent indicators linking compliance with 
independence policies and the results of internal monitoring reviews 
to partner remuneration and bonus allocations. 
135 We also noted that some National Firms were not recording industry-
specific training for staff. These National Firms need to implement 
processes to record industry-specific training to help identify staff 
with relevant industry knowledge for specialised and complex audit 
engagements.  
Engagement performance 
136 All National Firms continue to enhance their systems and processes to 
better integrate audit technology with their audit methodology. A 
number of Firms implemented, or are in the process of implementing, 
new audit technology systems.  
Monitoring 
Policies and procedures  
137 All National Firms have comprehensive policies and procedures to 
govern the monitoring of independence and audit quality in 
accordance with legal and professional requirements. The Firms make 
regular and rigorous periodic inspections of a selection of completed 
audit engagements and the results are reported to their leadership 
team. Further, National Firms have clear accountable action plans for 
ongoing consideration and evaluation of their quality control systems 
and staff training.  
Monitoring review findings 
138 Overall, the processes developed and adopted by National Firms 
appear to be robust. However, in some instances, we noted that the 
types of issues identified through the internal quality review processes 
were very similar when compared with the previous year’s monitoring 
results. This raises the question as to whether the Firms’ program is an 
effective mechanism in changing partner and staff behaviour and 
whether the means of addressing recurring non-compliance were 
effective.  
Timing or monitoring reviews 
139 At some National Firms, there was a significant time delay between 
conducting audit work and the timing of internal quality reviews due 
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to the Firms’ global quality monitoring timeframes. This may impact 
on audit quality due to a lack of timely remedial action in relation to 
individual engagements.  
140 To prevent deficiencies similar to those detected in past reviews from 
being repeated in future engagements, prompt disciplinary action is 
required against partners and staff who fail to comply with the Firms’ 
policies and procedures as well as other appropriate actions such as 
timely and effective staff training. Given that the timing of these 
reviews is governed by global policies, the affected Firms have put in 
place other initiatives and communication strategies to ensure that key 
messages from the quality reviews are provided efficiently to staff.  
Reporting to ASIC 
141 Some National Firms need to ensure they comply with their 
obligations under s311 of the Corporations Act to report 
contraventions and suspected contraventions of the Corporations Act 
to ASIC. These include contraventions in relation to the auditor 
independence requirements of the Corporations Act and significant 
non-compliances with Accounting and Auditing Standards.  
Network Firms 
Leadership responsibilities for quality within the firm 
142 While all Network Firms have indicated their commitment to audit 
quality during our inspections, there is a clear need to further 
strengthen their policies and procedures that promote the recognition 
of audit quality in performing engagements and the consequences of 
non-compliance with these policies and procedures.  
143 The Network Firms’ leadership need to clearly communicate and 
demonstrate an internal culture and tone that emphasises the 
overriding importance of audit quality, including in strategic plans or 
other similar documents.  
144 Network Firms can further demonstrate ‘tone at the top’ by ensuring 
that transparent linkages exist between their monitoring processes for 
audit quality, auditor independence, partner and staff evaluation and 
remuneration processes. 
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Ethical requirements and independence issues  
Policies, systems and processes 
145 The completeness and adequacy of independence policies varied 
among Network Firms. In particular, a number of Firms were still in a 
transitionary phase in modifying their systems, policies and processes 
to ensure uniformity between member firms. Therefore we were 
unable to assess the operating effectiveness of policies and procedures 
over an extended period of time at these firms. In some instances, we 
noted inconsistencies in policies and the practical application of 
systems and processes at Network member firms.  
Testing of independence systems 
146 With the exception of two Network Firms, testing the independence 
systems and processes used to ensure compliance with their legal and 
professional independence requirements had not commenced at 
Network Firms. For one of the two Network Firms that is testing its 
independence systems, the program is not comprehensive and the 
Network Firm did not deal with identified breaches arising from its 
testing process in a timely manner.  
147 Without a robust testing program, only limited reliance can be placed 
by Network Firms on the effectiveness of their independence systems 
and processes.  
Auditor rotation 
148 Based on the size and nature of their listed audit client portfolios, 
Network Firms do not have sophisticated systems to monitor 
compliance with the auditor rotation requirements of the Corporations 
Act. However, some of the more common findings for some of the 
Network Firms included:  
(a) no documented auditor rotation plan;  
(b) rotation plan not updated to reflect recent partner movements; 
and 
(c) the engagement quality control reviewer (EQCR) not included in 
rotation plans. 
Consultation 
149 In addition, some Network Firms lacked formal processes to record 
and monitor independence consultations and ensure that any potential 
independence threats were identified, documented and action taken to 
reduce the threats to an acceptable level.  
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Acceptance and continuance of client relationships and 
specific engagements 
150 While no significant systemic issues were noted, many Network Firms 
need to make their client acceptance and engagement continuance 
systems and processes more comprehensive and rigorous. Appropriate 
consideration needs to be given to the risk assessment process, 
including implications of significant changes in the risk profile of 
existing clients. This should take into account the integrity of key 
management personnel, including their attitudes toward aggressive 
interpretation of accounting standards and the importance of an 
internal control environment, business reputation, its operations and 
practices and inappropriate limitation in the scope of audit work.  
151 The primary focus should continue to be on independence 
considerations, possible conflicts of interests and whether the firm 
continues to have the requisite skills to conduct an engagement.  
152 In some instances, we noted that detailed consideration of whether to 
continue with an existing audit engagement occurs after a firm has 
been appointed as the auditor at the client’s annual general meeting 
and in some instances after the audit planning has commenced or been 
completed. 
153 Network Firms need to ensure that continuance assessments are made 
immediately after completing an audit so that the decision to 
discontinue with the engagement can be communicated in a timely 
manner to the client prior to reappointment at the annual general 
meeting and consent to resign from ASIC is obtained in accordance 
with the Corporations Act and the timing outlined in ASIC policies.  
Human resources 
154 Most Network Firms do not have appropriate policies and procedures 
to adequately consider audit quality and independence attributes in 
partner performance evaluations, and many Network Firms do not 
document partner evaluations. Policies and procedures should be 
documented to ensure that partners and staff are aware of the Firm’s 
expectations regarding audit quality and ethical principles.  
155 Clear understanding of audit quality and adherence to ethical 
principles should be key criteria for advancement and remuneration 
decisions. Failure to comply with these criteria should result in 
disciplinary and other appropriate action, such as training.  
156 An adequate system of performance appraisals needs to be in place in 
order for partners and staff to receive meaningful feedback on their 
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performance, including advice on areas of improvement and 
additional training needs.  
157 Completion and approval of appraisal documentation for both partners 
and staff should be on a timely basis to promote audit quality. In 
addition, the results of internal and external quality monitoring 
processes and outcomes of the Firms’ independence testing should be 
incorporated into individual performance evaluation and 
remuneration.  
Engagement performance 
158 Some Network Firms are yet to develop or implement comprehensive 
audit manuals that provide practical guidance on Auditing Standards 
and application of the audit firm’s software to ensure clarity and 
consistency in the conduct of audit work. Gaps were noted between 
some Firms’ audit technology software and audit manuals, which 
resulted in inconsistent application of electronic work paper 
methodology across members of Network Firms. Examples of 
shortcomings in engagement performance policies and their 
application at some Network Firms include: 
(a) lack of an up-to-date audit manual to provide staff with practical 
guidance on the Firm’s interpretation of the Auditing Standards 
and the use of audit technology to ensure clarity and consistency 
in conducting audit work; 
(b) no clear guidance in the existing audit manual on the roles and 
responsibilities of the EQCR, including the extent, timing and 
documentation requirements of the EQCR in accordance with 
ASA 220; 
(c) no policy in audit manual regarding final assembly and archiving 
of audit engagement files, audit documentation requirements and 
inadvertent loss of engagement files; 
(d) inconsistency in the use of audit methodology and technology 
between member firms of the same network; and 
(e) non-utilisation of standard security features of the audit 
technology systems to enhance integrity of the engagement file 
(e.g. passwords and lockdown features not utilised, log of 
changes made to working papers and the function to back date 
and post date sign-offs not active). 
Monitoring 
159 Most Network Firms need to strengthen policies and procedures that 
facilitate monitoring of independence and audit quality requirements 
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to ensure they are relevant, adequate, operating effectively and are 
complied with in practice. Many Network Firms need to formalise 
internal monitoring policies and procedures by having clear guidance 
on the frequency of reviews, selection of audit files, and 
communication of the results of the reviews and consequences for 
partners and staff if the Firms’ policies on audit conduct are not 
complied with.  
160 While some Network Firms had commenced their periodic review of 
engagement files as required by their policy, others had not 
commenced these reviews. APES 320 requires periodic inspection of a 
selection of completed audit engagements. 
161 A number of Network Firms need to adopt formal policies and 
procedures to deal appropriately with internal complaints and 
allegations of non-compliance with professional standards, regulatory 
and legal requirements.  
162 All Network Firms need to improve their processes to ensure a clear 
and transparent link exists between the results of internal quality 
monitoring of engagement files and partner performance evaluations 
and remuneration. 
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D Smaller Firms 
Key points 
Smaller Firms need to focus on formalising their independence and quality 
monitoring processes. 
Sufficient appropriate audit evidence, documentation of audit work 
undertaken and the basis on which audit judgements were made should 
continue to be major areas of focus for the Smaller Firms. 
Introduction 
163 There are approximately 90 small audit firms that audit entities listed 
on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). In 2008–09, we 
expanded our inspection program to include a selection of six Smaller 
Firms auditing entities listed on ASX.  
164 Due to the size, client profile and nature of these firms, we used a 
limited inspection scope. Our inspections were limited to reviewing 
one listed entity audit engagement file for each firm selected and 
enquiring about aspects of the firm’s systems of quality control as 
they related to that engagement.  
Audit quality  
165 The observations and findings from our review of aspects of six 
selected engagement files indicated a general need to improve the 
level of documentation to evidence compliance with the Auditing 
Standards.  
166 Smaller Firms also need to ensure that an adequate engagement 
quality control review is conducted for audits of financial reports of 
listed entities, while also managing the auditor rotation requirements 
of the Corporations Act. Such reviews should be conducted on a 
timely basis at appropriate stages during the audit, not only at the 
concluding stages, so that significant matters can be appropriately 
addressed.  
167 In at least half of the six engagements reviewed, we noted the 
following concerns.  
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Evidence and documentation 
168 We noted instances where the selected engagement file failed to 
provide enough audit evidence to support key audit assertions.  
169 The deficiencies noted primarily related to a failure to record on the 
engagement file all of the audit work that the auditor asserted to have 
performed and relied on when forming conclusions about key audit 
assertions. These deficiencies increased the risk that the audit work 
was not adequately performed and that the conclusions reached were 
not appropriate.  
170 Sufficient documentation of audit work undertaken and the basis on 
which audit judgements have been made should continue to be a 
major area of focus for Smaller Firms. 
Use of experts 
171 Some of the Smaller Firms inspected did not fully adhere to the 
requirements of the Auditing Standards concerning the use of experts 
when placing significant reliance on the work performed by a client-
appointed expert. In some instances: 
(a) no evaluation of the professional competence and objectivity of 
the expert was performed; and  
(b) there was insufficient evidence on the engagement file that the 
auditor had considered whether the scope of the expert’s work 
provided adequate audit evidence and could be relied upon for 
the purpose of the audit.  
Risk and fraud assessment  
172 The risk assessments performed for the selected engagements were 
often not in compliance with the requirements of the Auditing 
Standards. The auditors did not link the identified risks to audit 
procedures designed to mitigate these risks, including fraud risk 
assessment procedures. Smaller Firms should ensure that:  
(a) proper identification and assessment of the significance of 
identified risks is undertaken during the planning process and a 
reassessment of those risks occurs during and at the end of the 
audit; and  
(b) audit procedures are designed to adequately address significant 
risk areas identified. 
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Analytical procedures 
173 Analytical procedures were either poorly or not completed by all of 
the firms. The Auditing Standards require analytical procedures to be 
applied as risk assessment procedures at the planning stage and in the 
overall review at the end of the audit. Smaller Firms should ensure 
that where management data is utilised, adequate work is performed 
on the reliability of the data, and management explanations for 
significant variances in financial statements are in accordance with the 
auditor’s own understanding of an entity’s operations. 
Quality control systems 
174 In conducting our inspections and in making our observations and 
findings, we are conscious of the size and nature of the Smaller Firms. 
175 Our Smaller Firm inspections did not include a full review of firm-
wide quality control systems. Rather, it was designed to ascertain the 
quality of audit conduct at Smaller Firms.  
176 Our consideration of compliance by Smaller Firms’ with the 
independence requirements of the Corporations Act and relevant 
professional and ethical standards was limited to high-level 
discussions with the Firms’ leadership and considering independence 
matters relating to the individual audit engagement file selected for 
review.  
177 Although our inspection of the Smaller Firms did not identify any 
independence breaches, Smaller Firms need to review their 
professional, ethical and statutory requirements in relation to 
independence and quality control to ensure they comply with their 
obligations, including the auditor rotation obligations under s324DA 
of the Corporations Act. For the Smaller Firms inspected we noted 
that: 
(a) Half of the firms did not have an annual independence 
confirmation process for assurance personnel to confirm their 
compliance with independence policies and procedures, as 
required by paragraph 23 of APES 320. 
(b) Two firms did not have established policies and processes for the 
approval of non-audit services to audit clients prior to the service 
being provided as required by paragraph 290.158 of APES 110.  
(c) Two firms were at a greater risk of breaching the auditor rotation 
requirements under the Corporations Act due to the limited 
number of audit partners within their respective audit practices. 
These firms should consider partner succession planning to 
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ensure they are able to continue to comply with the auditor 
rotation requirements of the Corporations Act. 
(d) Most of the firms did not have established policies and processes 
relating to the monitoring of system of quality control, including 
performing periodic inspection of their selected completed 
engagements as required by paragraph 74 of APES 320.  
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E Future focus 
Key points 
Our future focus will include: 
 conducting inspections of those firms that audit significant public interest 
entities, focusing on risks arising due to the GFC; 
 follow-up the extent to which matters noted in our previous inspections 
have been addressed, with an emphasis on performing engagement file 
reviews, particularly in relation to significant audit judgement areas;  
 monitoring the impact of regulatory developments in auditing;  
 ongoing engagement with firms on the future inspection reporting 
process and audit quality initiatives; and  
 continued collaboration with foreign regulators to minimise the 
regulatory burden on Australian firms. 
Overall scope 
178 The focus of our audit inspection program will continue to be those 
firms who audit entities likely to be of greater public interest.  
179 As in prior years, we will conduct follow-up inspections of firms 
visited for the first time during 2008–09 to ensure that prompt and 
appropriate action is being taken to address our observations and 
findings. We will also conduct follow up inspections of some other 
firms previously inspected and will continue to extend our inspections 
to Network Firms and Smaller Firms that have not previously been 
subject to an audit inspection. 
Audit quality and evidence 
180 Auditor independence and audit quality are important contributors to 
confidence in financial reports. Particularly given the concerns noted 
in this report, we will also continue to focus on specific areas most 
affected by the current economic conditions such as going concern 
assessments, impairment of assets, fair value determination, off-
balance sheet arrangements, and financial instrument disclosures.  
181 We will continue to focus our attention on engagement file reviews, 
paying particular attention to basic audit procedures and those 
Auditing Standards that have been poorly applied in previous years. 
Reinforcing the need for robust documentation to support the 
conclusions reached in relation to key decisions and significant 
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judgements regarding an audit will continue to be an area of focus for 
our inspections. If there is no documentation on file, the presumption 
must be that the auditor did not obtain the necessary audit evidence. 
182 Other specific areas that we intend to focus on include:  
(a) internal quality control processes and risk assessments 
undertaken to identify clients with heightened risk; 
(b) understanding the business model and risk assessment for 
individual engagements; 
(c) monitoring and examining the causes of recent corporate 
collapses, especially where they relate to auditor matters and 
focusing on these areas in our future audit inspections; 
(d) monitoring the involvement of the EQCR at different stages of 
the audit, including consultations held with the engagement team 
and review of the key judgements and conclusions reached; 
(e) sufficient appropriate audit evidence and documentation recorded 
on engagement files to support the significant judgements made 
by auditors in reaching their conclusions and framing their audit 
opinions;  
(f) monitoring of the adequacy and timeliness of s311 statutory 
reporting obligations of the Corporations Act when auditors have 
reasonable grounds to suspect a significant contravention; and  
(g) compliance with the auditor rotation requirements of the 
Corporations Act, given the contraventions noted for some of the 
firms inspected. 
183 Our audit file reviews will include a focus on entities most likely to be 
impacted by current market conditions. We will also focus on audit 
quality for new or existing audits where audit fees appear low or 
appear to have been reduced for reasons other than changes in the 
underlying business of the entity being audited. 
Compliance with new requirements 
Clarity standards 
184 In Australia, audits conducted under the Corporations Act must 
comply with Auditing Standards issued by the Auditing and 
Assurance Standards Board (AUASB), which are based on 
International Standards of Auditing (ISAs). 
185 A comprehensive program was initiated in 2004 by the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) to enhance the quality 
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and consistency of global audit practice through applying a new ‘clarity’ 
format to all ISAs. This project was completed in December 2008. The 
ISAs have also been substantively revised.  
186 The revised and redrafted Australian Auditing Standards based on the 
international clarity standards will be operative for audits of financial 
reports with reporting periods commencing on or after 1 January 
2010. Firms need to invest time and resources in understanding the 
new requirements of these new standards and ensure their audit 
methodology meets the new requirements. We will continue to 
monitor compliance with legally-enforceable Auditing Standards. 
Australian Standards on Quality Control (ASQC 1)  
187 The AUASB has issued Auditing Standard ASQC 1 Quality Control 
for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews, of Financial Reports, 
Other Financial Information, and Other Assurance Engagements 
(ASQC 1). Systems of quality control in compliance with this 
Auditing Standard are required to be established by 1 January 2010.  
188 ASQC 1 is a new pronouncement of the AUASB and is based on the 
international equivalent, International Standard on Quality Control (ISQC 1 
Quality Controls for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial 
Reports, and Other Assurance and Related Services Engagements) issued 
by the International Ethics Standards Board (IESBA) for Accountants, 
which is in itself the basis for APES 320 issued by the Accounting 
Professional and Ethical Standards Board (APESB).  
189 Firms should not need to implement new quality control processes, as 
they should already comply with the requirements of APES 320, but 
should be mindful of any changes resulting from changes to ISQC 1. 
Our inspections and inspection reports already cover compliance with 
the requirements of APES 320. 
Revised international ethical standards 
190 The IESBA has released a new Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants. The effective date for the revised code is 1 January 2011 
subject to some transitional provisions. The revised code is being 
considered by the APESB. 
191 The revised international code extends the current rotation provisions 
to all key audit partners in addition to engagement and review partners 
and extends partner rotation requirements from listed entities to 
include all other public interest entities. The revised international code 
also further strengthens some of the requirements relating to the 
provision of non-assurance services to audit clients.  
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192 We will monitor the effect of any changes to the existing Australian 
professional code (APES 110).  
Our audit inspection process 
193 We continually review our audit inspection process to ensure that it is 
effective and focuses on current risk areas. From 30 June 2009 file 
reviews we are placing emphasis on assessing the quality of the 
auditor’s understanding of the auditee’s business, risk assessments and 
audit judgements. We are also performing more timely file reviews. 
We are considering further changes in the nature and extent of our file 
reviews and other inspection processes, including a focus on the 
performance of basic audit procedures as well as risk areas. 
194 We also monitor developments in inspection processes in other 
international jurisdictions that have independent programs to ensure 
that our inspection reporting process remains effective. 
Other work 
Drivers of audit quality 
195 While we acknowledge that assessment of audit quality is subjective, 
we intend to continue to engage with firms to discuss factors that 
impact on audit quality. We understand that these factors will vary 
between firms. We will continue to obtain statistical data from firms 
on existing financial and non-financial performance measures to 
assess factors that could impact on audit quality.  
International collaboration  
196 We will continue to work with our international audit regulation 
counterparts in order to reduce any regulatory overlap. Where 
possible, we will concentrate on maximising cross-border recognition 
opportunities and establishing regulatory cooperation arrangements. 
197 Our contribution and participation at the International Forum of 
Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) will continue to 
ensure that our inspection techniques and process remains current and 
relevant with the changing global financial economy.  
198 We will continue to actively monitor future developments in auditing 
and will respond to trends and issues through our inspection process 
and other targeted project work.  
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Appendix 1: How we conducted our work 
199 This report covers inspections of Firms substantially completed 
between 1 January 2008 and 30 June 2009. The nature of our 
monitoring approach means that inspections were spread throughout 
the period, with inspections starting and concluding at some Firms 
earlier than at others. 
Our monitoring approach 
National Firms and Network Firms 
200 We focused on assessing whether each Firm had documented and 
implemented a quality control system that provides reasonable 
assurance that: 
(a) the Firms comply with the auditor independence requirements in 
Div 3, 4 and 5 of Pt 2M.4 of the Corporations Act (i.e. 
independence); and 
(b) the Firms’ audit methodologies facilitate the conduct of their 
audits in accordance with the Auditing Standards as required in 
Div 3 of Pt 2M.3 of the Corporations Act (i.e. audit quality).  
201 It is not the purpose of our inspection program to benchmark the 
Firms or to make specific recommendations on how to improve 
independence or audit quality policies and systems. However, during 
our inspection, we highlighted to each Firm some suggested areas for 
improvement.  
202 In particular, we considered the following areas in respect of each of 
the Firms’ quality control systems: 
(a) executive leadership;  
(b) independence; 
(c) acceptance and continuance;  
(d) human resources; 
(e) engagement performance; and 
(f) monitoring. 
203 Our inspections concentrated firstly on reviewing each Firm’s 
independence systems and processes, including examining each 
Firm’s testing results. We conducted only limited testing of each 
Firm’s systems. 
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204 Second, we examined each Firm’s audit methodology for compliance 
with Auditing Standards operative for financial reporting periods 
commencing prior to the date of our inspection. 
205 Third, we reviewed the conduct of aspects of a limited number of 
archived individual audit and review engagements for compliance 
with each Firm’s stated audit methodology and applicable Auditing 
Standards as at the date of each audit or review. We also focused on 
specific areas most affected by the current economic conditions. Each 
review concentrated on the substance of work and on whether 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence was on file to support the 
conclusions reached in relation to key decisions and significant 
judgements about the audit.  
206 Our work programs are tailored to focus on key risk areas for each 
audit. They are not designed to find minor instances of non-
compliance. We challenged audit partners regarding the basis on 
which significant judgements were made. 
Smaller Firms  
207 To reflect the size and client profile of smaller audit practices, our 
inspection approach is limited compared with inspections of National 
Firms and Network Firms.  
208 A limited inspection of a Smaller Firm comprised: 
(a) conducting a review of aspects of one archived audit engagement 
file of a listed entity for compliance with each Firm’s stated audit 
methodology and applicable Auditing Standards as at the date of 
each audit or review; and 
(b) holding discussions with leaders, engagement partners and other 
senior members of the engagement team (for the file selected) 
regarding the engagement file reviewed and certain policies and 
procedures relating to auditor independence and audit quality 
employed by the Firm. 
209 The inspection process is not designed to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of the Firms’ quality control systems, but rather, focus 
on the quality of audit conduct. Enquiries were in the context of 
observations specific to the engagement reviewed and therefore, may 
vary across firms where different risks are identified. 
210 Smaller Firm engagement file reviews were mainly conducted at our 
offices, with on-site activities limited to discussions with Firms’ 
personnel at the commencement and the completion of the inspection. 
 REPORT 192: Audit inspection program public report for 2008–09 
© Australian Securities and Investments Commission March 2010 Page 47 
The inspection process 
211 The inspection process was designed to gain an understanding of: 
(a) the Firms’ executive leadership direction and strategic priorities 
in relation to independence and audit quality; 
(b) the Firms’ policies and systems for ensuring audit quality and 
compliance with their independence obligations; 
(c) the Firms’ independence and audit methodology training 
programs; 
(d) the links between the Firms’ independence and audit quality 
policies and the performance management processes; and 
(e) internal monitoring programs conducted by the Firms. 
212 In conducting our inspections, we: 
(a) reviewed material provided by the Firms under notice pursuant to 
the Australian Securities and Investments Act 2001 (ASIC Act); 
(b) reviewed the Firms’ systems and processes for managing 
compliance with the audit independence requirements of the 
Corporations Act and for ensuring audit quality; 
(c) reviewed aspects of a selection of archived audit and review 
engagements at each Firm, weighted towards listed entities; 
(d) interviewed selected partners holding leadership roles in the 
Firms; 
(e) interviewed selected human resources representatives; 
(f) interviewed a number of the Firms’ other partners and staff; and 
(g) in the case of National Firms, visited some of their capital city 
offices and interviewed selected partners and staff. 
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Key terms 
Term Meaning in this document 
AAC Authorised Audit Company 
APES Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards 
ASA Australian Auditing Standards issued by AUASB pursuant 
to s336 of the Corporations Act 
ASIC Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
ASIC Act Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 
2001 
ASX Australian Securities Exchange 
AUASB Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
CLERP 9 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform 
and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 
Corporations Act Corporations Act 2001 including the Corporations 
Regulations 2001 made for the purposes of that Act 
EQCR Engagement Quality Control Reviewer 
IAASB International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
IFIAR International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators 
ISA International Standards of Auditing 
National Firms National partnerships that are members of global 
networks with multiple offices 
Network Firms Individual offices of Firms that are members of 
international associations 
PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board of the 
United States of America 
RCA Registered Company Auditor 
Smaller Firms Firms with small number of audit partners that audit a 
limited number of listed entities 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
Sample Checklist to determine whether [TO INSERT NAME OF AUDITOR 
INDEPENDENCE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL] is consistent with the public interest 
from the perspective of private interest theory 
 
No. INTEREST GROUP COST 
(Including $ estimates 
where possible) 
BENEFIT 
(Including $ estimates 
where possible) 
1 Primary users of 
accounting 
information785  
 
 
 
2 Accounting 
Associations786  
 
 
 
3 Big 4 Firms787  
 
 
4 Middle Tier Firms788  
 
 
5 Small Firms789  
 
 
6 Managers of 
Companies790  
 
 
 
7 Accounting Professional 
& Ethical Standards 
  
                                                 
785 The primary users of accounting information consist of individual investors and those in the financial 
community who rely on the objectivity and integrity of auditors in order to invest on behalf of these 
individual investors. 
786 The members of the Australian accounting professional bodies being the CPA Australia, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia and the Institute of Public Accountants (formerly known as the 
‘National Institute of Accountants’). 
787 The Big 4 Firms are Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG Australia and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
788 Middle Tier Firms are firms (other than the Big 4 Firms) that have a mix of listed and non-listed entities 
as audit clients. 
789 Small Firms have audit clients that generally comprise of non-listed entities which by virtue of their size 
and nature of business, do not require as many audit staff and specialised audit experience to complete the 
audit. 
790 These consist of companies that produce financial information for external users. 
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No. INTEREST GROUP COST 
(Including $ estimates 
where possible) 
BENEFIT 
(Including $ estimates 
where possible) 
Board Limited  
8 Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 
 
 
 
9 Australian Securities 
Exchange Ltd (formerly 
known as the Australian 
Stock Exchange Ltd) 
 
 
 
10 Auditing & Assurance 
Standards Board 
 
 
 
11 Companies Auditors and 
Liquidators Disciplinary 
Board 
 
 
 
12 Financial Reporting 
Council 
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION791 [TO 
INSERT THE NAME 
OF THE INTEREST 
GROUP(S) THAT 
STAND(S) TO DERIVE 
THE MOST BENEFIT 
FROM THE 
LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSAL] 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
791 In circumstances where it is concluded that the primary users of accounting information are not the main 
beneficiaries of the legislative proposal, further investigation may need to be made into the merits of the 
relevant proposal in order for it to be considered as consistent with the public interest. 
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TABLE OF SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
No. RELEVANT PROPOSALS FINDINGS FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF 
PRIVATE INTEREST 
THEORY 
OUTCOME PROPOSALS FOR LAW 
REFORM (WHERE 
APPLICABLE) 
1 Expanded FRC 
The Government will expand 
the responsibilities of the FRC, 
which currently oversees the 
accounting standard setting 
process, to oversee auditor 
independence requirements in 
Australia. 
The Accounting Associations 
and Big 4 Firms successfully 
lobbied to maintain the 
Accounting Associations’ 
influence in the enforcement of 
auditor independence 
requirements. ASIC was 
successful in its lobbying efforts 
to maintain its influence in the 
enforcement of auditor 
independence requirements. 
 
 
The FRC’s responsibility for the 
direct monitoring of the auditor 
independence requirements in 
Australia has been delegated to 
ASIC. The self-regulatory 
approach advocated and 
supported by the Accounting 
Associations is not in the public 
interest as the appearance of 
independence is still 
compromised. This is because a 
reasonable person will conclude 
that it is difficult for the 
Accounting Associations to be 
impartial in the enforcement 
process when there is a conflict 
of interest. 
 
In order to address this conflict 
of interest, it is prudent for 
another entity such as ASIC to 
be involved in the enforcement 
process rather than placing this 
responsibility solely on the 
Accounting Associations. ASIC 
however must be seen to be 
actively enforcing these 
requirements. 
  The Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms 
and the APPC influenced the 
development of the FRC to focus 
on oversight and not direct 
monitoring of the auditor 
independence requirements in 
Australia by limiting the FRC’s 
As above. As above. 
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No. RELEVANT PROPOSALS FINDINGS FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF 
PRIVATE INTEREST 
THEORY 
OUTCOME PROPOSALS FOR LAW 
REFORM (WHERE 
APPLICABLE) 
responsibilities to providing 
strategic policy advice to the 
Treasurer.  
The proposal by the Financial 
Reporting Council for an 
expanded FRC role to include 
the monitoring of the auditor 
independence requirements was 
disregarded. 
 
 
 
 
  The Accounting Associations, 
Managers of Companies 
(Producer Group) and ASX have 
had an influence in the 
development of the composition 
of the memberships of the FRC.   
The current membership of the 
FRC is comprised of 16 
members. The CPA, the 
Institute, the IPA and the ASFA 
are represented on the FRC.  
The ASIC Act provides the 
Treasurer with a wide discretion 
that can support the appointment 
of FRC members from key 
stakeholder groups in addition to 
those that are appointed 
independently and are not 
The ASIC Act should be 
amended to ensure that FRC 
members are appointed from key 
stakeholder groups in addition to 
those that are appointed 
independently and are not 
associated with such groups. 
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No. RELEVANT PROPOSALS FINDINGS FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF 
PRIVATE INTEREST 
THEORY 
OUTCOME PROPOSALS FOR LAW 
REFORM (WHERE 
APPLICABLE) 
associated with such groups. 
Ideal auditor independence 
means that the FRC should 
include members that do not 
have ties to interest and/or lobby 
groups.  
2 General Statement of Principle 
requiring Independence 
The Government will amend 
the Corporations Act to 
include a General Statement of 
Principle requiring the 
independence of auditors.  
The Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms  
and the ASX supported the 
general definition of auditor 
independence but were of the 
view that the definition of 
auditor independence in the 
accountants’ ethical code of 
conduct should be the definition 
adopted in CLERP 9. 
This view was also shared by the 
External Commentators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Corporations Act stipulates 
a general requirement for auditor 
independence and prohibits an 
auditor from auditing in specific 
circumstances. The Accounting 
Associations were not successful 
in their lobbying efforts in this 
regard as their ethical code of 
conduct was not adopted in 
CLERP 9 and neither were the 
International Federation of 
Accountants rules on auditor 
independence. 
Unsuccessful lobbying. No 
amendments required. 
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No. RELEVANT PROPOSALS FINDINGS FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF 
PRIVATE INTEREST 
THEORY 
OUTCOME PROPOSALS FOR LAW 
REFORM (WHERE 
APPLICABLE) 
3 Annual Declaration by Auditor 
The Government will amend 
the law to require the auditor 
to make an annual declaration 
that they have maintained their 
independence. 
The Accounting Associations 
and the Managers of Companies 
(Producer Group) were 
successful in their lobbying 
efforts in the development of the 
content for the auditor’s 
independence declaration.  
This view was also shared by the 
Legal Practitioners and the 
External Commentators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Corporations Act requires 
an auditor to provide a written 
declaration that to the best of the 
auditor’s knowledge, the auditor 
has not contravened any of the 
auditor independence 
requirements of the Corporations 
Act and any applicable code of 
professional conduct and that 
any contravention is to be set out 
in the declaration. 
It is in the public interest for 
auditors to adhere to applicable 
codes of professional conduct as 
this creates expectations of 
professional behaviour that are 
aimed at benefiting the public.  
It is also in the public interest for 
the Corporations Act to allow for 
the issuing of a qualified 
declaration to enable the auditor 
to provide a declaration that 
states the circumstance of any 
breach as this provides assurance 
to investors of the integrity of 
audited financial statements 
which in turn supports ideal 
auditor independence. 
No amendments required. 
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No. RELEVANT PROPOSALS FINDINGS FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF 
PRIVATE INTEREST 
THEORY 
OUTCOME PROPOSALS FOR LAW 
REFORM (WHERE 
APPLICABLE) 
4 Employment Relationships  
The Government will amend 
the law to strengthen 
restrictions on employment 
relationships between an 
auditor and the audit client. 
This will include a mandatory 
period of 2 years following 
resignation from an audit firm 
before a former partner who 
was directly involved in the 
audit of a client can become a 
director of the client or take a 
position with the client 
involving responsibility for 
fundamental management 
decisions.  
The Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms and ASX were 
successful in their lobbying 
efforts to limit the ‘cooling off’ 
period to 2 years instead of the 
proposed 4 years. These interest 
groups were also successful in 
their lobbying efforts in limiting 
the restrictions to partners and 
key senior members of the audit 
team.  
This view was also shared by the 
Legal Practitioners and the 
External Commentators. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Corporations Act prohibits a 
person from becoming an officer 
of an audited body for 2 years 
where the person ceases to be a 
member of an audit firm or 
director of an audit company and 
was a professional member of 
the audit team for the audit. The 
Corporations Act defines 
‘professional members of the 
audit team’ as any company 
auditor who conducts the audit 
and any other person who is in a 
position to directly influence the 
audit outcome. 
The specified ‘cooling off’ 
period and the restrictions 
applying to partners and key 
senior members of the audit 
team are consistent with ideal 
auditor independence as these 
are envisaged to strike an 
appropriate balance between 
promoting auditor independence 
and not unduly impeding audit 
professionals joining companies 
and bringing with them valuable 
financial expertise. 
No amendments required. 
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5 Financial Relationships 
The Government will amend 
the law to impose new 
restrictions on financial 
relationships. This will cover 
investments in audit clients and 
loans between an audit client, 
and the auditor or the 
auditor’s immediate family.  
The Big 4 Firms were satisfied 
with the guidelines contained in  
the accountants’ ethical code of 
conduct and did not believe it 
was appropriate for the 
Corporations Act to introduce 
further restrictions on financial 
relationships in addition to that 
imposed by professional 
standards. They recommended 
that the Corporations Act simply 
referred to the guidance 
developed and issued by the 
profession. 
 
The External Commentators also 
shared the same concerns as the 
Big 4 Firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Corporations Act currently 
introduces further restrictions on 
financial relationships and does 
not replace the definition of 
immediate family member with 
that adopted overseas that was 
spouse and dependents. 
 
Unsuccessful lobbying. No 
amendments required. 
6 Non-Audit Services 
The Government will 
The Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms,  Middle Tier Firms 
and Managers of Companies 
The Corporations Act requires  
listed companies to disclose in 
their respective company’s 
Unsuccessful lobbying. No 
amendments required. 
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implement a series of measures 
to deal with non-audit services. 
It will:- 
 
Amend the law to require 
mandatory disclosure in the 
annual report of fees paid for 
the categories of non-audit 
services provided. 
 
Amend the law to require a 
statement in the annual report 
of whether the audit committee 
is satisfied the provision of 
non-audit services is 
compatible with auditor 
independence. This disclosure 
would include an explanation 
as to why the non-audit 
services referred to in F1, if 
contracted, do not compromise 
auditor independence. 
(Producer Group) believed the 
threats (the inclusion of a list of 
non-audit services) were 
appropriately defined in the 
accountants’ ethical code of 
conduct and this proposal should 
require adherence to the code. 
 
The suggestions of the Public 
Investors and the External 
Commentators were also 
disregarded.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
annual report all non-audit 
services that have been provided. 
This includes details of the 
amounts paid or payable for the 
non-audit services. 
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7 Auditor Rotation 
The Government will make 
audit partner rotation 
compulsory after 5 years. The 
new requirement will apply to 
the lead engagement partner 
and the review partner. To 
maintain continuity of 
knowledge, the appointment of 
these partners could be 
staggered.  
The Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms, 
APPC, Accounting Professional 
& Ethical Standards Board 
Limited and the 
Financial Reporting Council 
were successful in their lobbying 
efforts for the audit engagement 
partner and audit review partner 
rotation period to increase from 
5 years to 7 years.  
 
This was not supported by the 
Small Firms, Legal Practitioners 
and the External Commentators. 
 
 
 
 
The Corporations Act permits an 
individual auditor who has acted 
as external auditor for the listed 
company for 5 successive years 
to continue to act in that capacity 
for up to a further 2 years 
provided requirements are 
satisfied in relation to the 
safeguarding of audit quality and 
auditor independence. 
The current requirements 
provide a practical solution 
which attempts to address 
auditor independence whilst at 
the same time seeks to avoid 
imposing additional financial 
burden on these companies. The 
stipulated auditor rotation period 
achieves significant cost savings 
as compared to compulsory 
yearly audit firm rotation which 
results in the enhancement of the 
economic needs of the 
shareholders of these companies, 
being the primary users of 
accounting information. The 
stipulated auditor rotation period 
is consistent with internationally 
No amendments required. 
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accepted best-practice as 
contained in the accountants’ 
ethical codes of conduct and 
other international examples 
which have showed a preference 
for 7 years in jurisdictions other 
than the US. 
8 Auditors’ Duties Expanded  
The Government will amend 
the law to expand matters 
which auditors must report to 
ASIC to include any attempt to 
influence, coerce, manipulate 
or mislead the auditor. 
The Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms, Managers of 
Companies (Producer Group), 
ASX and the Auditing & 
Assurance Standards Board 
were of the view that expanding 
the matters to be reported to 
include ‘attempts to influence, 
coerce or manipulate’ would be 
difficult to apply in practice for 
various reasons. 
This proposal was also rejected 
by the Legal Practitioners and 
the External Commentators.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
The Corporations Act requires 
individual auditors conducting 
an audit to notify ASIC within 
28 days after they become aware 
of any circumstances that 
amount to an attempt, in relation 
to the audit, by any person to 
unduly influence, coerce, 
manipulate or mislead a person 
involved in the conduct of the 
audit. 
Unsuccessful lobbying. No 
amendments required. 
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9 Streamline Auditor Discipline 
Arrangements 
The institutional arrangements 
for taking disciplinary action 
against registered company 
auditors will be strengthened 
to (amongst other things) 
provide a majority of members 
of the CALDB, with 
appropriate skills, who are 
non-accountants. 
The Accounting Associations, 
Big 4 Firms, Middle Tier Firms, 
Managers of Companies 
(Producer Group) and the 
Companies Auditors & 
Liquidators Disciplinary Board 
were generally successful in 
their lobbying efforts to ensure 
that the composition of the 
CALDB is not restricted to a 
majority of non-accountants.  
 
This view was also shared by the 
External Commentators  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ASIC Act does not prohibit 
the composition of the CALDB 
to consist of a majority of 
accountants. Ideal auditor 
independence means that the 
composition of the CALDB 
consists of at least a majority of 
non-accountants. 
The ASIC Act should be 
amended to accommodate the 
technical knowledge 
requirement and should ensure 
that the composition of the 
CALDB consists of a majority of 
non- accountants. 
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10 Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council 
The Government will establish 
a Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council, to be 
chaired by the Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Treasurer, 
which it will consult on all 
disclosure-related reforms to 
ensure they meet the needs of 
retail investors. 
The Accounting Associations 
and the Managers of Companies 
(Producer Group) were 
successful in lobbying against 
the existence of the Shareholders 
and Investors Advisory Council. 
 
The Legal Practitioners also 
objected to this proposal. 
On the other hand, this proposal 
was supported by the Public 
Investors. 
  
 
 
 
The Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council no longer 
exists. Retail investors now no 
longer have the opportunity to 
investigate disclosure-related 
concerns that relate to auditor 
independence in order to ensure 
that these concerns are 
consistent with ideal auditor 
independence. 
The government should create a 
new Shareholders and Investors 
Advisory Council. This can be 
specifically designed to protect 
and promote the interests of 
retail investors. 
The audit committee can be used 
as a forum for retail investors to 
voice their auditor independence 
concerns.  
Amendments to the ASX 
Corporate Governance 
Principles can support this. 
 
